第4章

，Thisself-commandisverydifferentatdifferenttimes。Amaninhealthpossessesmoreofitthanonelanguishingwithsickness。Wearemoremasterofourthoughtsinthemorningthanintheevening:Fasting，thanafterafullmeal。Canwegiveanyreasonforthesevariations，exceptexperience？Wherethenisthepower，ofwhichwepretendtobeconscious？Istherenothere，eitherinaspiritualormaterialsubstance，orboth，somesecretmechanismorstructureofparts，uponwhichtheeffectdepends，andwhich，beingentirelyunknowntous，rendersthepowerorenergyofthewillequallyunknownandincomprehensible？

Volitionissurelyanactofthemind，withwhichwearesufficientlyacquainted。Reflectuponit。Consideritonallsides。Doyoufindanythinginitlikethiscreativepower，bywhichitraisesfromnothinganewidea，andwithakindofF/IAT\\，imitatestheomnipotenceofitsMaker，ifImaybeallowedsotospeak，whocalledforthintoexistenceallthevariousscenesofnature？Sofarfrombeingconsciousofthisenergyinthewill，itrequiresascertainexperienceasthatofwhichwearepossessed，toconvinceusthatsuchextraordinaryeffectsdoeverresultfromasimpleactofvolition。

Thegeneralityofmankindneverfindanydifficultyinaccountingforthemorecommonandfamiliaroperationsofnature——suchasthedescentofheavybodies，thegrowthofplants，thegenerationofanimals，or

thenourishmentofbodiesbyfood:Butsupposethat，inallthesecases，theyperceivetheveryforceorenergyofthecause，bywhichitisconnectedwithitseffect，andisforeverinfallibleinitsoperation。Theyacquire，bylonghabit，suchaturnofmind，that，upontheappearanceofthecause，theyimmediatelyexpectwithassuranceitsusualattendant，andhardlyconceiveitpossiblethatanyothereventcouldresultfromit。Itisonlyonthediscoveryofextraordinaryphaenomena，suchasearthquakes，pestilence，andprodigiesofanykind，thattheyfindthemselvesatalosstoassignapropercause，andtoexplainthemannerinwhichtheeffectisproducedbyit。Itisusualformen，insuchdifficultiestohaverecoursetosomeinvisibleintelligentprinciple[18]

astheimmediatecauseofthateventwhichsurprisesthem，andwhich，theythink，cannotbeaccountedforfromthecommonpowersofnature。Butphilosophers，whocarrytheirscrutinyalittlefarther，immediatelyperceivethat，eveninthemostfamiliarevents，theenergyofthecauseisasunintelligibleasinthemostunusual，andthatweonlylearnbyexperiencethefrequentC/ONJUNCTION\\ofobjects，withoutbeingeverabletocomprehendanythinglikeC/ONNEXION\\betweenthem。Here，then，manyphilosophersthinkthemselvesobligedbyreasontohaverecourse，onalloccasions，tothesameprinciple，whichthevulgarneverappealtobutincasesthatappearmiraculousandsupernatural。Theyacknowledgemind

andintelligencetobe，notonlytheultimateandoriginalcauseofallthings，buttheimmediateandsolecauseofeveryeventwhichappearsinnature。Theypretendthatthoseobjectswhicharecommonlydenominated，areinrealitynothingbut；andthatthetrueanddirectprincipleofeveryeffectisnotanypowerorforceinnature，butavolitionoftheSupremeBeing，whowillsthatsuchparticularobjectsshouldforeverbeconjoinedwitheachother。Insteadofsayingthatonebilliard-ballmovesanotherbyaforcewhichithasderivedfromtheauthorofnature，itistheDeityhimself，theysay，who，byaparticularvolition，movesthesecondball，beingdeterminedtothisoperationbytheimpulseofthefirstball，inconsequenceofthosegenerallawswhichhehaslaiddowntohimselfinthegovernmentoftheuniverse。Butphilosophersadvancingstillintheirinquiries，discoverthat，aswearetotallyignorantofthepoweronwhichdependsthemutualoperationofbodies，wearenolessignorantofthatpoweronwhichdependstheoperationofmindon

body，orofbodyonmind，norareweable，eitherfromoursensesorconsciousness，toassigntheultimateprincipleinonecasemorethanintheother。Thesameignorance，therefore，reducesthemtothesameconclusion。TheyassertthattheDeityistheimmediatecauseoftheunionbetweensoulandbody；andthattheyarenottheorgansofsense，which，beingagitatedbyexternalobjects，producesensationsinthemind；butthatitisaparticularvolitionofouromnipotentMaker，whichexcitessuchasensation，inconsequenceofsuchamotionintheorgan。Inlikemanner，itisnotanyenergyinthewillthatproduceslocalmotioninourmembers:ItisGodhimself，whoispleasedtosecondourwill，initselfimpotent，andtocommandthatmotionwhichweerroneouslyattributetoourownpowerandefficacy。Nordophilosophersstopatthis

conclusion。Theysometimesextendthesameinferencetotheminditself，initsinternaloperations。OurmentalvisionorconceptionofideasisnothingbutarevelationmadetousbyourMaker。Whenwevoluntarilyturnourthoughtstoanyobject，andraiseupitsimageinthefancy，itisnotthewillwhichcreatesthatidea:ItistheuniversalCreator，whodiscoversittothemind，andrendersitpresenttous。

Thus，accordingtothesephilosophers，everythingisfullofGod。Notcontentwiththeprinciple，thatnothingexistsbutbyhiswill，thatnothingpossessesanypowerbutbyhisconcession:Theyrobnature，andallcreatedbeings，ofeverypower，inordertorendertheirdependenceontheDeitystillmoresensibleandimmediate。Theyconsidernotthat，bythistheory，theydiminish，insteadofmagnifying，thegrandeurofthoseattributes，whichtheyaffectsomuchtocelebrate。ItarguessurelymorepowerintheDeitytodelegateacertaindegreeofpowertoinferiorcreaturesthantoproduceeverythingbyhisownimmediatevolition。

Itarguesmorewisdomtocontriveatfirstthefabricoftheworldwithsuchperfectforesightthat，ofitself，andbyitsproperoperation，itmayserveallthepurposesofprovidence，thanifthegreatCreatorwereobligedeverymomenttoadjustitsparts，andanimatebyhisbreathallthewheelsofthatstupendousmachine。

Butifwewouldhaveamorephilosophicalconfutationofthistheory，perhapsthetwofollowingreflectionsmaysuffice:

，itseemstomethatthistheoryoftheuniversalenergyandoperationoftheSupremeBeingistooboldevertocarryconvictionwithittoaman，sufficientlyapprizedoftheweaknessofhumanreason，andthenarrowlimitstowhichitisconfinedinallitsoperations。Thoughthechainofargumentswhichconducttoitwereeversological，theremustariseastrongsuspicion，ifnotanabsoluteassurance，thatithascarriedusquitebeyondthereachofourfaculties，whenitleadstoconclusionssoextraordinary，andsoremotefromcommonlifeandexperience。Wearegotintofairyland，longerewehavereachedthelaststepsofourtheory；andtherewehavenoreasontotrustourcommonmethodsofargument，ortothinkthatourusualanalogiesandprobabilitieshaveanyauthority。Ourlineistooshorttofathomsuchimmenseabysses。Andhoweverwemayflatterourselvesthatweareguided，ineverystepwhichwetake，byakindofverisimilitudeandexperience，wemaybeassuredthatthisfanciedexperiencehasnoauthoritywhenwethusapplyittosubjectsthatlieentirelyoutofthesphereofexperience。

Butonthisweshallhaveoccasiontotouchafterwards。[19]

，Icannotperceiveanyforceintheargumentsonwhichthistheoryisfounded。Weareignorant，itistrue，ofthemannerinwhichbodiesoperateoneachother:Theirforceorenergyisentirelyincomprehensible:

Butarewenotequallyignorantofthemannerorforcebywhichamind，eventhesuprememind，operateseitheronitselforonbody？Whence，Ibeseechyou，doweacquireanyideaofit？Wehavenosentimentorconsciousnessofthispowerinourselves。WehavenoideaoftheSupremeBeingbutwhatwelearnfromreflectiononourownfaculties。Wereourignorance，therefore，agoodreasonforrejectinganything，weshouldbeledintothatprincipleofdenyingallenergyintheSupremeBeingasmuchasinthegrossestmatter。Wesurelycomprehendaslittletheoperationsofoneasoftheother。Isitmoredifficulttoconceivethatmotionmayarisefromimpulsethanthatitmayarisefromvolition？Allweknowisourprofoundignoranceinbothcases。[20]

PARTII。

B/UT\\tohastentoaconclusionofthisargument，whichisalreadydrawnouttotoogreatalength:Wehavesoughtinvainforanideaofpowerornecessaryconnexioninallthesourcesfromwhichwecouldsupposeittobederived。Itappearsthat，insingleinstancesoftheoperationofbodies，wenevercan，byourutmostscrutiny，discoveranythingbutoneeventfollowinganother，withoutbeingabletocomprehendanyforceorpowerbywhichthecauseoperates，oranyconnexionbetweenitanditssupposedeffect。Thesamedifficultyoccursincontemplatingtheoperationsofmindonbody——whereweobservethemotionofthelattertofollowuponthevolitionoftheformer，butarenotabletoobserve

orconceivethetiewhichbindstogetherthemotionandvolition，ortheenergybywhichthemindproducesthiseffect。Theauthorityofthewilloveritsownfacultiesandideasisnotawhitmorecomprehensible:Sothat，uponthewhole，thereappearsnot，throughoutallnature，anyoneinstanceofconnexionwhichisconceivablebyus。Alleventsseementirelylooseandseparate。Oneeventfollowsanother；

butwenevercanobserveanytiebetweenthem。Theyseem，butnever。Andaswecanhavenoideaofanythingwhichneverappearedtoouroutwardsenseorinwardsentiment，thenecessaryconclusionseemstobethatwehavenoideaofconnexionorpoweratall，andthatthesewordsareabsolutely，withoutanymeaning，whenemployedeitherinphilosophicalreasoningsorcommonlife。

Buttherestillremainsonemethodofavoidingthisconclusion，andonesourcewhichwehavenotyetexamined。

Whenanynaturalobjectoreventispresented，itisimpossibleforus，byanysagacityorpenetration，todiscover，orevenconjecture，withoutexperience，whateventwillresultfromit，ortocarryourforesightbeyondthatobjectwhichisimmediatelypresenttothememoryandsenses。Evenafteroneinstanceorexperimentwherewehaveobservedaparticulareventtofollowuponanother，wearenotentitledtoformageneralrule，orforetellwhatwill

happeninlikecases；itbeingjustlyesteemedanunpardonabletemeritytojudgeofthewholecourseofnaturefromonesingleexperiment，howeveraccurateorcertain。Butwhenoneparticularspeciesofeventhasalways，inallinstances，beenconjoinedwithanother，wemakenolongeranyscrupleofforetellingoneupontheappearanceoftheother，andofemployingthatreasoning，whichcanaloneassureusofanymatteroffactorexistence。Wethencalltheoneobject，；theother，。Wesupposethatthereissomeconnexionbetweenthem；somepowerintheone，bywhichitinfalliblyproducestheother，andoperateswiththegreatestcertaintyandstrongestnecessity。

Itappears，then，thatthisideaofanecessaryconnexionamongeventsarisesfromanumberofsimilarinstanceswhichoccuroftheconstantconjunctionoftheseevents；norcanthatideaeverbesuggestedbyanyoneoftheseinstances，surveyedinallpossiblelightsandpositions。Butthereisnothinginanumberofinstances，differentfromeverysingleinstance，whichissupposedtobeexactlysimilar；exceptonly，thatafterarepetitionofsimilarinstances，themindiscarriedbyhabit，upontheappearanceofoneevent，toexpectitsusualattendant，andtobelievethatitwillexist。Thisconnexion，therefore，whichweinthemind，thiscustomarytransitionoftheimaginationfromoneobjecttoits

usualattendant，isthesentimentorimpressionfromwhichweformtheideaofpowerornecessaryconnexion。Nothingfartherisinthecase。Contemplatethesubjectonallsides；youwillneverfindanyotheroriginofthatidea。Thisisthesoledifferencebetweenoneinstance，fromwhichwecanneverreceivetheideaofconnexion，andanumberofsimilarinstances，bywhichitissuggested。Thefirsttimeamansawthecommunicationofmotionbyimpulse，asbytheshockoftwobilliard-balls，hecouldnotpronouncethattheoneeventwas:Butonlythatitwaswiththeother。Afterhehasobservedseveralinstancesofthisnature，hethenpronouncesthemtobe。Whatalterationhashappenedtogiverisetothisnewideaof？Nothingbutthathenowtheseeventstobeinhisimagination，andcanreadilyforetelltheexistenceofonefromtheappearanceoftheother。Whenwesay，therefore，

thatoneobjectisconnectedwithanother，wemeanonlythattheyhaveacquiredaconnexioninourthought，andgiverisetothisinference，bywhichtheybecomeproofsofeachother\'sexistence:Aconclusionwhichissomewhatextraordinary，butwhichseemsfoundedonsufficientevidence。Norwillitsevidencebeweakenedbyanygeneraldiffidenceoftheunderstanding，orscepticalsuspicionconcerningeveryconclusionwhichisnewandextraordinary。Noconclusionscanbemoreagreeabletoscepticismthansuchasmakediscoveriesconcerningtheweaknessandnarrowlimitsofhumanreasonandcapacity。

Andwhatstrongerinstancecanbeproducedofthesurprisingignoranceandweaknessoftheunderstandingthanthepresent。Forsurely，iftherebeanyrelationamongobjectswhichitimportstoustoknowperfectly，itisthatofcauseandeffect。Onthisarefoundedallourreasoningsconcerningmatteroffactorexistence。Bymeansofitaloneweattainanyassuranceconcerningobjectswhichareremovedfromthepresenttestimonyofourmemoryandsenses。Theonlyimmediateutilityofallsciences，istoteachus，howtocontrolandregulatefutureeventsbytheircauses。Ourthoughtsandenquiriesare，therefore，everymoment，employedaboutthisrelation:Yetsoimperfectaretheideaswhichweformconcerningit，thatitisimpossibletogiveanyjustdefinitionofcause，exceptwhatisdrawnfromsomethingextraneousandforeigntoit。Similarobjectsarealwaysconjoinedwithsimilar。Ofthiswehaveexperience。

Suitablytothisexperience，therefore，wemaydefineacausetobe。Orinotherwords。

Theappearanceofacausealwaysconveysthemind，byacustomarytransition，totheideaoftheeffect。Ofthisalsowehaveexperience。Wemay，therefore，suitablytothisexperience，formanotherdefinitionofcause，andcallit，。Butthoughboththesedefinitionsbedrawnfromcircumstancesforeigntothecause，wecannotremedythisinconvenience，orattainanymoreperfectdefinition，whichmaypointoutthatcircumstancesinthecause，whichgivesitaconnexionwithitseffect。Wehavenoideaofthisconnexion，norevenanydistantnotionwhatitiswedesiretoknow，whenweendeavourataconceptionofit。Wesay，

forinstance，thatthevibrationofthisstringisthecauseofthisparticularsound。Butwhatdowemeanbythataffirmation？Weeithermean。Wemayconsidertherelationofcauseandeffectineitherofthesetwolights；butbeyondthese，wehavenoideaofit。

Torecapitulate，therefore，thereasoningsofthissection:Everyideaiscopiedfromsomeprecedingimpressionorsentiment；andwherewecannotfindanyimpression，wemaybecertainthatthereisnoidea。Inallsingleinstancesoftheoperationofbodiesorminds，thereisnothingthatproducesanyimpression，norconsequentlycansuggestanyideaofpowerornecessaryconnexion。Butwhenmanyuniforminstancesappear，andthesameobjectisalwaysfollowedbythesameevent；wethenbegintoentertainthenotionofcauseandconnexion。

Wethenanewsentimentorimpression，towit，acustomaryconnexioninthethoughtorimaginationbetweenoneobjectanditsusualattendant；andthissentimentistheoriginalofthatideawhichweseekfor。Forasthisideaarisesfromanumberofsimilarinstances，andnotfromanysingleinstance，itmustarisefromthatcircumstance，inwhichthenumberofinstancesdifferfromeveryindividualinstance。Butthiscustomaryconnexionortransitionoftheimaginationistheonlycircumstanceinwhichtheydiffer。Ineveryotherparticulartheyarealike。Thefirstinstancewhichwesawofmotioncommunicatedbytheshockoftwobilliardballs(toreturntothisobviousillustration)isexactlysimilartoanyinstancethatmay，atpresent，occurtous；exceptonly，thatwecouldnot，atfirst，one

eventfromtheother；whichweareenabledtodoatpresent，aftersolongacourseofuniformexperience。Iknownotwhetherthereaderwillreadilyapprehendthisreasoning。Iamafraidthat，shouldImultiplywordsaboutit，orthrowitintoagreatervarietyoflights，itwouldonlybecomemoreobscureandintricate。Inallabstractreasoningsthereisonepointofviewwhich，ifwecanhappilyhit，weshallgofarthertowardsillustratingthesubjectthanbyalltheeloquenceandcopiousexpressionintheworld。Thispointofviewweshouldendeavourtoreach，andreservetheflowersofrhetoricforsubjectswhicharemoreadaptedtothem。

I/T\\mightreasonablybeexpectedinquestionswhichhavebeencanvassedanddisputedwithgreateagerness，sincethefirstoriginofscience，andphilosophy，thatthemeaningofalltheterms，atleast，shouldhavebeenagreeduponamongthedisputants；andourenquiries，inthecourseoftwothousandyears，beenabletopassfromwordstothetrueandrealsubjectofthecontroversy。Forhoweasymayitseemtogiveexactdefinitionsofthetermsemployedinreasoning，andmakethesedefinitions，notthemeresoundofwords，theobjectoffuturescrutinyandexamination？Butifweconsiderthemattermorenarrowly，weshallbeapttodrawaquiteoppositeconclusion。Fromthiscircumstancealone，thatacontroversyhasbeenlongkeptonfoot，andremainsstillundecided，wemaypresumethatthereissomeambiguityintheexpression，andthatthedisputantsaffixdifferentideastothetermsemployedinthecontroversy。

Forasthefacultiesofthemindaresupposedtobenaturallyalikeineveryindividual；otherwisenothingcouldbemorefruitlessthantoreasonordisputetogether；itwereimpossible，ifmenaffixthesameideastotheirterms，thattheycouldsolongformdifferentopinionsofthesamesubject；especiallywhentheycommunicatetheirviews，andeachpartyturnthemselvesonallsides，insearchofargumentswhichmaygivethemthevictoryovertheirantagonists。Itistrue，ifmenattemptthediscussionofquestionswhichlieentirelybeyondthereachofhumancapacity，suchasthoseconcerningtheoriginofworlds，ortheeconomyoftheintellectualsystemorregionofspirits，theymaylongbeattheairintheirfruitlesscontests，andneverarriveatanydeterminateconclusion。Butifthequestionregardanysubjectofcommonlifeandexperience，nothing，onewouldthink，couldpreservethedisputesolongundecidedbutsomeambiguousexpressions，whichkeeptheantagonistsstillatadistance，andhinderthemfromgrapplingwitheachother。

Thishasbeenthecaseinthelongdisputedquestionconcerninglibertyandnecessity；andtosoremarkableadegreethat，ifIbenotmuchmistaken，weshallfind，thatallmankind，bothlearnedandignorant，havealwaysbeenofthesameopinionwithregardtothissubject，andthatafewintelligibledefinitionswouldimmediatelyhaveputanendtothewholecontroversy。Iownthatthisdisputehasbeensomuchcanvassedonallhands，andhasledphilosophersintosuchalabyrinthofobscuresophistry，thatitisnowonder，ifasensiblereaderindulgehiseasesofarastoturnadeafeartotheproposalofsuchaquestion，fromwhichhecanexpectneitherinstructionorentertainment。

Butthestateoftheargumenthereproposedmay，perhaps，servetorenewhisattention；asithasmorenovelty，promisesatleastsomedecisionofthecontroversy，andwillnotmuchdisturbhiseasebyanyintricateorobscurereasoning。

Ihope，therefore，tomakeitappearthatallmenhaveeveragreedinthedoctrinebothofnecessityandofliberty，accordingtoanyreasonablesense，whichcanbeputontheseterms；andthatthewholecontroversy，hashithertoturnedmerelyuponwords。Weshallbeginwithexaminingthedoctrineofnecessity。

Itisuniversallyallowedthatmatter，inallitsoperations，isactuatedbyanecessaryforce，andthateverynaturaleffectissopreciselydeterminedbytheenergyofitscausethatnoothereffect，insuchparticularcircumstances，couldpossiblyhaveresultedfromit。Thedegreeanddirectionofeverymotionis，bythelawsofnature，prescribedwithsuchexactnessthatalivingcreaturemayassoonarisefromtheshockoftwobodiesasmotioninanyotherdegreeordirectionthanwhatisactuallyproducedbyit。Wouldwe，therefore，formajustandpreciseideaof，wemustconsiderwhencethatideaariseswhenweapplyittotheoperationofbodies。

Itseemsevidentthat，ifallthescenesofnaturewerecontinuallyshiftedinsuchamannerthatnotwoeventsboreanyresemblancetoeachother，buteveryobjectwasentirelynew，withoutanysimilitudetowhateverhadbeenseenbefore，weshouldnever，inthatcase，haveattainedtheleastideaofnecessity，orofaconnexionamongtheseobjects。Wemightsay，uponsuchasupposition，thatoneobjectoreventhasfollowedanother；notthatonewasproducedbytheother。Therelationofcauseandeffectmustbeutterlyunknowntomankind。Inferenceandreasoningconcerningtheoperationsofnaturewould，fromthatmoment，beatanend；andthememoryandsensesremaintheonlycanals，bywhichtheknowledgeofanyrealexistencecouldpossiblyhaveaccesstothemind。Ouridea，therefore，ofnecessityandcausationarisesentirelyfromtheuniformityobservableintheoperationsofnature，wheresimilarobjectsareconstantlyconjoinedtogether，andthemindisdeterminedbycustomtoinfertheonefromtheappearanceoftheother。Thesetwocircumstancesformthewholeofthatnecessity，whichweascribetomatter。Beyondtheconstantofsimilarobjects，andtheconsequentfromonetotheother，wehavenonotionofanynecessityorconnexion。

Ifitappear，therefore，thatallmankindhaveeverallowed，withoutanydoubtorhesitation，thatthesetwocircumstancestakeplaceinthevoluntaryactionsofmen，andintheoperationsofmind；itmustfollow，thatallmankindhaveeveragreedinthedoctrineofnecessity，andthattheyhavehithertodisputed，merelyfornotunderstandingeachother。

Astothefirstcircumstance，theconstantandregularconjunctionofsimilarevents，wemaypossiblysatisfyourselvesbythefollowingconsiderations:Itisuniversallyacknowledgedthatthereisagreatuniformityamongtheactionsofmen，inallnationsandages，andthathumannatureremainsstillthesame，initsprinciplesandoperations。Thesamemotivesalwaysproducethesameactions:Thesameeventsfollowfromthesamecauses。

Ambition，avarice，self-love，vanity，friendship，generosity，publicspirit:Thesepassions，mixedinvariousdegrees，anddistributedthroughsociety，havebeen，fromthebeginningoftheworld，andstillare，thesourceofalltheactionsandenterprises，whichhaveeverbeenobservedamongmankind。Wouldyouknowthesentiments，inclinations，andcourseoflifeoftheG/REEKS\\andR/OMANS\\？StudywellthetemperandactionsoftheF/RENCH\\andE/NGLISH\\:Youcannotbemuchmistakenintransferringtotheformer

oftheobservationswhichyouhavemadewithregardtothelatter。Mankindaresomuchthesame，inalltimesandplaces，thathistoryinformsusofnothingneworstrangeinthisparticular。Itschiefuseisonlytodiscovertheconstantanduniversalprinciplesofhumannature，byshowingmeninallvarietiesofcircumstancesandsituations，andfurnishinguswithmaterialsfromwhichwemayformourobservationsandbecomeacquaintedwiththeregularspringsofhumanactionandbehaviour。Theserecordsofwars，intrigues，factions，andrevolutions，aresomanycollectionsofexperiments，bywhichthepoliticianormoralphilosopherfixestheprinciplesofhisscience，inthesamemannerasthephysicianornaturalphilosopherbecomesacquaintedwiththenatureofplants，minerals，andotherexternalobjects，bytheexperimentswhichheformsconcerningthem。Noraretheearth，water，andotherelements，examinedby

A/RISTOTLE\\，andH/IPPOCRATES\\，moreliketothosewhichatpresentlieunderourobservationthanthemendescribedbyP/OLYBIUS\\andT/ACITUS\\aretothosewhonowgoverntheworld。

Shouldatraveller，returningfromafarcountry，bringusanaccountofmen，whollydifferentfromanywithwhomwewereeveracquainted；men，whowereentirelydivestedofavarice，ambition，orrevenge；whoknewnopleasurebutfriendship，generosity，andpublicspirit；weshouldimmediately，fromthesecircumstances，detectthefalsehood，andprovehimaliar，withthesamecertaintyasifhehadstuffedhisnarrationwithstoriesofcentaursanddragons，miraclesandprodigies。Andifwewouldexplodeanyforgeryinhistory，wecannotmakeuseofamoreconvincingargument，thantoprove，thattheactionsascribedtoanypersonaredirectlycontrarytothecourseofnature，andthatnohumanmotives，insuchcircumstances，couldeverinducehimtosuchaconduct。TheveracityofQ/UINTUS\\

C/URTIUS\\isasmuchtobesuspected，whenhedescribesthesupernaturalcourageofA/LEXANDER\\，bywhichhewashurriedonsinglytoattackmultitudes，aswhenhedescribeshissupernaturalforceandactivity，bywhichhewasabletoresistthem。Soreadilyanduniversallydoweacknowledgeauniformityinhumanmotivesandactionsaswellasintheoperationsofbody。

Hencelikewisethebenefitofthatexperience，acquiredbylonglifeandavarietyofbusinessandcompany，inordertoinstructusintheprinciplesofhumannature，andregulateourfutureconduct，aswellasspeculation。Bymeansofthisguide，wemountuptotheknowledgeofmen\'sinclinationsandmotives，fromtheiractions，expressions，andevengestures；andagaindescendtotheinterpretationoftheiractionsfromourknowledgeoftheirmotivesandinclinations。Thegeneralobservationstreasuredupbyacourseofexperience，giveustheclueofhumannature，andteachustounravelallitsintricacies。

Pretextsandappearancesnolongerdeceiveus。Publicdeclarationspassforthespeciouscolouringofacause。Andthoughvirtueandhonourbeallowedtheirproperweightandauthority，thatperfectdisinterestedness，sooftenpretendedto，isneverexpectedinmultitudesandparties；seldomintheirleaders；

andscarcelyeveninindividualsofanyrankorstation。Butweretherenouniformityinhumanactions，andwereeveryexperimentwhichwecouldformofthiskindirregularandanomalous，itwereimpossibletocollectanygeneralobservationsconcerningmankind；andnoexperience，howeveraccuratelydigestedbyreflection，wouldeverservetoanypurpose。Whyistheagedhusbandmanmoreskilfulinhiscallingthantheyoungbeginnerbutbecausethereisacertainuniformityintheoperationofthesun，rain，andearthtowardstheproductionofvegetables；andexperienceteachestheoldpractitionertherulesbywhichthisoperationisgovernedanddirected。

Wemustnot，however，expectthatthisuniformityofhumanactionsshouldbecarriedtosuchalengthasthatallmen，inthesamecircumstances，willalwaysactpreciselyinthesamemanner，withoutmakinganyallowanceforthediversityofcharacters，prejudices，andopinions。Suchauniformityineveryparticular，isfoundinnopartofnature。Onthecontrary，fromobservingthevarietyofconductindifferentmen，weareenabledtoformagreatervarietyofmaxims，whichstillsupposeadegreeofuniformityandregularity。

Arethemannersofmendifferentindifferentagesandcountries？Welearnthencethegreatforceofcustomandeducation，whichmouldthehumanmindfromitsinfancyandformitintoafixedandestablishedcharacter。Isthebehaviourandconductoftheonesexveryunlikethatoftheother？Isitthencewebecomeacquaintedwiththedifferentcharacterswhichnaturehasimpresseduponthesexes，andwhichshepreserveswithconstancyandregularity？Aretheactionsofthesamepersonmuchdiversifiedinthedifferentperiodsofhislife，frominfancytooldage？Thisaffordsroomformanygeneralobservationsconcerningthegradualchangeofoursentimentsandinclinations，andthedifferentmaximswhichprevailinthedifferentagesofhumancreatures。Eventhecharacters，whicharepeculiartoeachindividual，haveauniformityintheirinfluence；otherwiseouracquaintancewiththepersonsandourobservationoftheirconductcouldneverteachustheirdispositions，orservetodirectourbehaviourwithregardtothem。

Igrantitpossibletofindsomeactions，whichseemtohavenoregularconnexionwithanyknownmotives，andareexceptionstoallthemeasuresofconductwhichhaveeverbeenestablishedforthegovernmentofmen。Butifwewouldwillinglyknowwhatjudgmentshouldbeformedofsuchirregularandextraordinaryactions，wemayconsiderthesentimentscommonlyentertainedwithregardtothoseirregulareventswhichappearinthecourseofnature，andtheoperationsofexternalobjects。Allcausesarenotconjoinedtotheirusualeffectswithlikeuniformity。Anartificer，whohandlesonlydeadmatter，maybedisappointedofhisaim，aswellasthepolitician，whodirectstheconductofsensibleandintelligentagents。

Thevulgar，whotakethingsaccordingtotheirfirstappearance，attributetheuncertaintyofeventstosuchanuncertaintyinthecausesasmakesthelatteroftenfailoftheirusualinfluence；thoughtheymeetwithnoimpedimentintheiroperation。Butphilosophers，observingthat，almostineverypartofnature，thereiscontainedavastvarietyofspringsandprinciples，whicharehid，byreasonoftheirminutenessorremoteness，find，thatitisatleastpossiblethecontrarietyofeventsmaynotproceedfromanycontingencyinthecause，butfromthesecretoperationofcontrarycauses。Thispossibilityisconvertedintocertaintybyfartherobservation，whentheyremarkthat，uponanexactscrutiny，acontrarietyofeffectsalwaysbetraysacontrarietyofcauses，andproceedsfromtheirmutualopposition。Apeasantcangivenobetterreasonforthestoppingofanyclockorwatchthantosay

thatitdoesnotcommonlygoright:Butanartisteasilyperceivesthatthesameforceinthespringorpendulumhasalwaysthesameinfluenceonthewheels；butfailsofitsusualeffects，perhapsbyreasonofagrainofdust，whichputsastoptothewholemovement。Fromtheobservationofseveralparallelinstances，philosophersformamaximthattheconnexionbetweenallcausesandeffectsisequallynecessary，andthatitsseeminguncertaintyinsomeinstancesproceedsfromthesecretoppositionofcontrarycauses。

Thus，forinstance，inthehumanbody，whentheusualsymptomsofhealthorsicknessdisappointourexpectation；

whenmedicinesoperatenotwiththeirwontedpowers；whenirregulareventsfollowfromanyparticularcause；thephilosopherandphysicianarenotsurprisedatthematter，norareevertemptedtodeny，ingeneral，thenecessityanduniformityofthoseprinciplesbywhichtheanimaleconomyisconducted。Theyknowthatahumanbodyisamightycomplicatedmachine:Thatmanysecretpowerslurkinit，whicharealtogetherbeyondourcomprehension:Thattousitmustoftenappearveryuncertaininitsoperations:Andthatthereforetheirregularevents，whichoutwardlydiscoverthemselves，canbenoproofthatthelawsofnaturearenotobservedwiththegreatestregularityinitsinternaloperationsandgovernment。

Thephilosopher，ifhebeconsistent，mustapplythesamereasoningtotheactionsandvolitionsofintelligentagents。Themostirregularandunexpectedresolutionsofmenmayfrequentlybeaccountedforbythosewhoknoweveryparticularcircumstanceoftheircharacterandsituation。A

personofanobligingdispositiongivesapeevishanswer:

Buthehasthetoothache，orhasnotdined。Astupidfellowdiscoversanuncommonalacrityinhiscarriage:Buthehasmetwithasuddenpieceofgoodfortune。Orevenwhenanaction，assometimeshappens，cannotbeparticularlyaccountedfor，eitherbythepersonhimselforbyothers；weknow，ingeneral，thatthecharactersofmenare，toacertaindegree，inconstantandirregular。Thisis，inamanner，theconstantcharacterofhumannature；thoughitbeapplicable，inamoreparticularmanner，tosomepersonswhohavenofixedrulefortheirconduct，butproceedinacontinuedcourseofcapriceandinconstancy。Theinternalprinciplesandmotivesmayoperateinauniformmanner，notwithstandingtheseseemingirregularities；inthesamemannerasthewinds，rain，cloud，andothervariationsoftheweatheraresupposedtobegovernedbysteadyprinciples；thoughnoteasilydiscoverablebyhumansagacityandenquiry。

Thusitappears，notonlythattheconjunctionbetweenmotivesandvoluntaryactionsisasregularanduniformasthatbetweenthecauseandeffectinanypartofnature；butalsothatthisregularconjunctionhasbeenuniversallyacknowledgedamongmankind，andhasneverbeenthesubjectofdispute，eitherinphilosophyorcommonlife。Now，asitisfrompastexperiencethatwedrawall

concerningthefuture，andasweconcludethatobjectswillalwaysbeconjoinedtogetherwhichwefindtohavealwaysbeenconjoined；itmayseemsuperfluoustoprovethatthisexperienceduniformityinhumanactionsisasourcewhencewedrawinferencesconcerningthem。Butinordertothrowtheargumentintoagreatervarietyoflightsweshallalsoinsist，thoughbriefly，onthislattertopic。

Themutualdependenceofmenissogreatinallsocietiesthatscarceanyhumanactionisentirelycompleteinitself，orisperformedwithoutsomereferencetotheactionsofothers，whicharerequisitetomakeitanswerfullytheintentionoftheagent。Thepoorestartificer，wholaboursalone，expectsatleasttheprotectionofthemagistrate，toensurehimtheenjoymentofthefruitsofhislabour。Healsoexpectsthat，whenhecarrieshisgoodstomarket，andoffersthematareasonableprice，heshallfindpurchasers，andshallbeable，bythemoneyheacquires，toengageotherstosupplyhimwiththosecommoditieswhicharerequisiteforhissubsistence。Inproportionasmenextendtheirdealings，andrendertheirintercoursewithothersmorecomplicated，

theyalwayscomprehend，intheirschemesoflife，agreatervarietyofvoluntaryactions，whichtheyexpect，fromthepropermotives，toco-operatewiththeirown。Inalltheseconclusionstheytaketheirmeasuresfrompastexperience，inthesamemannerasintheirreasoningsconcerningexternalobjects；andfirmlybelievethatmen，aswellasalltheelements，aretocontinue，intheiroperations，thesamethattheyhaveeverfoundthem。A

manufacturerreckonsuponthelabourofhisservantsfortheexecutionofanyworkasmuchasuponthetoolswhichheemploys，andwouldbeequallysurprisedwerehisexpectationsdisappointed。Inshort，thisexperimentalinferenceandreasoningconcerningtheactionsofothersenterssomuchintohumanlifethatnoman，whileawake，iseveramomentwithoutemployingit。Havewenotreason，therefore，toaffirmthatallmankindhavealwaysagreedinthedoctrineofnecessityaccordingtotheforegoingdefinitionandexplicationofit？

Norhavephilosophersevenentertainedadifferentopinionfromthepeopleinthisparticular。For，nottomentionthatalmosteveryactionoftheirlifesupposesthatopinion，thereareevenfewofthespeculativepartsoflearningtowhichitisnotessential。Whatwouldbecomeof，hadwenotadependenceontheveracityofthehistorianaccordingtotheexperiencewhichwehavehadofmankind？Howcouldbeascience，iflawsandformsofgovernmenthadnotauniforminfluenceuponsociety？Wherewouldbethefoundationof，ifparticularcharactershadnocertainordeterminatepowertoproduceparticularsentiments，andifthesesentimentshadnoconstantoperationonactions？Andwithwhatpretencecouldweemployouruponanypoetorpoliteauthor，ifwecouldnotpronouncetheconductandsentimentsofhisactorseithernaturalorunnaturaltosuchcharacters，andinsuchcircumstances？Itseemsalmostimpossible，therefore，toengageeitherinscienceoractionofanykindwithoutacknowledgingthedoctrineofnecessity，andthisfrommotivetovoluntaryactions，fromcharacterstoconduct。

Andindeed，whenweconsiderhowaptlyandevidencelinktogether，andformonlyonechainofargument，weshallmakenoscrupletoallowthattheyareofthesamenature，andderivedfromthesameprinciples。A

prisonerwhohasneithermoneynorinterest，discoverstheimpossibilityofhisescape，aswellwhenheconsiderstheobstinacyofthegaoler，asthewallsandbarswithwhichheissurrounded；and，inallattemptsforhisfreedom，choosesrathertoworkuponthestoneandironoftheone，thanupontheinflexiblenatureoftheother。Thesameprisoner，whenconductedtothescaffold，foreseeshisdeathascertainlyfromtheconstancyandfidelityofhisguards，asfromtheoperationoftheaxeorwheel。Hismindrunsalongacertaintrainofideas:Therefusalofthesoldierstoconsenttohisescape；theactionoftheexecutioner；theseparationoftheheadandbody；bleeding，convulsivemotions，anddeath。

Hereisaconnectedchainofnaturalcausesandvoluntaryactions；butthemindfeelsnodifferencebetweentheminpassingfromonelinktoanother:Norisitlesscertainofthefutureeventthanifitwereconnectedwiththeobjectspresenttothememoryorsenses，byatrainofcauses，cementedtogetherbywhatwearepleasedtocallanecessity。Thesameexperiencedunionhasthesameeffectonthemind，whethertheunited

objectsbemotives，volition，andactions；orfigureandmotion。Wemaychangethenameofthings；buttheirnatureandtheiroperationontheunderstandingneverchange。

Wereaman，whomIknowtobehonestandopulent，andwithwhomIliveinintimatefriendship，tocomeintomyhouse，whereIamsurroundedwithmyservants，Irestassuredthatheisnottostabmebeforeheleavesitinordertorobmeofmysilverstandish；andInomoresuspectthiseventthanthefallingofthehouseitself，whichisnew，andsolidlybuiltandfounded————Somayasuddenearthquakearise，andshakeandtumblemyhouseaboutmyears。Ishallthereforechangethesuppositions。IshallsaythatIknowwithcertaintythatheisnottoputhishandintothefireandholdittheretillitbeconsumed:Andthisevent，IthinkIcanforetellwiththesameassurance，asthat，ifhethrowhimselfoutatthewindow，andmeetwithnoobstruction，hewillnotremainamomentsuspendedintheair。Nosuspicionofanunknownfrenzycangivetheleastpossibilitytotheformerevent，whichissocontrarytoalltheknownprinciplesofhumannature。AmanwhoatnoonleaveshispursefullofgoldonthepavementatCharing-Cross，mayaswellexpectthatitwillflyawaylikeafeather，asthathewillfindituntouchedanhourafter。

Aboveonehalfofhumanreasoningscontaininferencesofasimilarnature，attendedwithmoreorlessdegreesofcertaintyproportionedtoourexperienceoftheusualconductofmankindinsuchparticularsituations。

Ihavefrequentlyconsidered，whatcouldpossiblybethereasonwhyallmankind，thoughtheyhaveever，withouthesitation，acknowledgedthedoctrineofnecessityintheirwholepracticeandreasoning，haveyetdiscoveredsuchareluctancetoacknowledgeitinwords，andhaverathershownapropensity，inallages，toprofessthecontraryopinion。

Thematter，Ithink，maybeaccountedforafterthefollowingmanner。Ifweexaminetheoperationsofbody，andtheproductionofeffectsfromtheircauses，weshallfindthatallourfacultiescannevercarryusfartherinourknowledgeofthisrelationthanbarelytoobservethatparticularobjectsaretogether，andthatthemindiscarried，bya，fromtheappearanceofonetothebeliefoftheother。Butthoughthisconclusionconcerninghumanignorancebetheresultofthestrictestscrutinyofthissubject，menstill

entertainastrongpropensitytobelievethattheypenetratefartherintothepowersofnature，andperceivesomethinglikeanecessaryconnexionbetweenthecauseandtheeffect。Whenagaintheyturntheirreflectionstowardstheoperationsoftheirownminds，andnosuchconnexionofthemotiveandtheaction；theyarethenceapttosuppose，thatthereisadifferencebetweentheeffectswhichresultfrommaterialforce，andthosewhicharisefromthoughtandintelligence。Butbeingonceconvincedthatweknownothingfartherofcausationofanykindthanmerelytheofobjects，andtheconsequentofthemindfromonetoanother，andfindingthatthese

twocircumstancesareuniversallyallowedtohaveplaceinvoluntaryactions；wemaybemoreeasilyledtoownthesamenecessitycommontoallcauses。Andthoughthisreasoningmaycontradictthesystemsofmanyphilosophers，inascribingnecessitytothedeterminationsofthewill，weshallfind，uponreflection，thattheydissentfromitinwordsonly，notintheirrealsentiment。Necessity，accordingtothesenseinwhichitisheretaken，hasneveryetbeenrejected，norcanever，Ithink，berejectedbyanyphilosopher。Itmayonly，perhaps，bepretendedthatthemindcanperceive，intheoperationsofmatter，somefartherconnexionbetweenthecauseandeffect；andconnexionthathasnotplaceinvoluntaryactionsofintelligentbeings。