Ethicallegislationisthatwhichcannotbeexternal，althoughthedutiesitprescribesmaybeexternalaswellasinternal。Juridicallegislationisthatwhichmayalsobeexternal。Thusitisanexternaldutytokeepapromiseenteredintobycontract;buttheinjunctiontodothismerelybecauseitisaduty，withoutregardtoanyothermotive，belongsexclusivelytotheinternallegislation。Itdoesnotbelongthustotheethicalsphereasbeingaparticularkindofdutyoraparticularmodeofactiontowhichwearebound—foritisanexternaldutyinethicsaswellasinjurisprudence—butitisbecausethelegislationinthecasereferredtoisinternal，andcannothaveanexternallawgiver，thattheobligationisreckonedasbelongingtoethics。Forthesamereason，thedutiesofbenevolence，althoughtheyareexternaldutiesasobligationstoexternalactions，are，inlikemanner，reckonedasbelongingtoethics，becausetheycanonlybeenjoinedbylegislationthatisinternal。Ethicshasnodoubtitsownpeculiarduties—suchasthosetowardsoneself—butitbasalsodutiesincommonwithjurisprudence，onlynotunderthesamemodeofobligation。Inshort，thepeculiarityofethicallegislationistoenjointheperformanceofcertainactionsmerelybecausetheyareduties，andtomaketheprincipleofdutyitself—whateverbeitssourceoroccasion—thesolesufficingmotiveoftheactivityofthewill。Thus，then，therearemanyethicaldutiesthataredirectlysuch;andtheinnerlegislationalsomakestheothers—allandeachofthem—indirectlyethical。
Thedeductionofthedivisionofasystemistheproofofitscompletenessaswellasofitscontinuity，sothattheremaybealogicaltransitionfromthegeneralconceptiondividedtothemembersofthedivision，andthroughthewholeseriesofthesubdivisionswithoutanybreakorleapinthearrangement（divisiopersaltum）。Suchadivisionisoneofthemostdifficultconditionsforthearchitectofasystemtofulfil。Thereisevensomedoubtastowhatisthehighestconceptionthatisprimarilydividedintorightandwrong（autfasautnefas）。Itisassuredlytheconceptionoftheactivityofthefree—willingeneral。Inlikemanner，theexpoundersofontologystartfromsomethingandnothing，withoutperceivingthatthesearealreadymembersofadivisionforwhichthehighestdividedconceptionisawanting，andwhichcanbenootherthanthatofthingingeneral。
IV。GENERALPRELIMINARYCONCEPTIONSDEFINEDANDEXPLAINED。
（Philosophiapracticauniversalis）。
Theconceptionoffreedomisaconceptionofpurereason。Itisthereforetranscendentinsofarasregardstheoreticalphilosophy;
foritisaconceptionforwhichnocorrespondinginstanceorexamplecanbefoundorsuppliedinanypossibleexperience。
Accordinglyfreedomisnotpresentedasanobjectofanytheoreticalknowledgethatispossibleforus。Itisinnorespectaconstitutive，butonlyaregulativeconception;anditcanbeacceptedbythespeculativereasonasatmostamerelynegativeprinciple。Inthepracticalsphereofreason，however，therealityoffreedommaybedemonstratedbycertainpracticalprincipleswhich，aslaws，proveacausalityofthepurereasonintheprocessofdeterminingtheactivityofthewillthatisindependentofallempiricalandsensibleconditions。Andthusthereisestablishedthefactofapurewillexistinginusasthesourceofallmoralconceptionsandlaws。
Onthispositiveconceptionoffreedominthepracticalrelationcertainunconditionalpracticallawsarefounded，andtheyspeciallyconstitutemorallaws。Inrelationtousashumanbeings，withanactivityofwillmodifiedbysensibleinfluencessoasnottobeconformabletothepurewill，butasoftencontrarytoit，theselawsappearasimperativescommandingorprohibitingcertainactions;andassuchtheyarecategoricalorunconditionalimperatives。Theircategoricalandunconditionalcharacterdistinguishesthemfromthetechnicalimperativeswhichexpresstheprescriptionsofart，andwhichalwayscommandonlyconditionally。
Accordingtothesecategoricalimperatives，certainactionsareallowedordisallowedasbeingmorallypossibleorimpossible;andcertainofthemortheiroppositesaremorallynecessaryandobligatory。Hence，inreferencetosuchactions，therearisestheconceptionofadutywhoseobservanceortransgressionisaccompaniedwithapleasureorpainofapeculiarkind，knownasmoralfeeling。Wedonot，however，takethemoralfeelingsorsentimentsintoaccountinconsideringthepracticallawsofreason。Fortheydonotformthefoundationorprincipleofpracticallawsofreason，butonlythesubjectiveeffectsthatariseinthemindontheoccasionofourvoluntaryactivitybeingdeterminedbytheselaws。Andwhiletheyneitheraddtonortakefromtheobjectivevalidityorinfluenceofthemorallawsinthejudgementofreason，suchsentimentsmayvaryaccordingtothedifferencesoftheindividualswhoexperiencethem。
Thefollowingconceptionsarecommontojurisprudenceandethicsasthetwomaindivisionsofthemetaphysicofmorals。
Obligationisthenecessityofafreeactionwhenviewedinrelationtoacategoricalimperativeofreason。Animperativeisapracticalrulebywhichanaction，otherwisecontingentinitself，ismadenecessary。Itisdistinguishedfromapracticallawinthatsuchalaw，whilelikewiserepresentingtheactionasnecessary，doesnotconsiderwhetheritisinternallynecessaryasinvolvedinthenatureoftheagent—sayasaholybeing—oriscontingenttohim，asinthecaseofmanaswefindhim;forwherethefirstconditionholdsgood，thereisinfactnoimperative。Henceanimperativeisarulewhichnotonlyrepresentsbutmakesasubjectivelycontingentactionnecessary;andit，accordingly，representsthesubjectasbeing（morally）necessitatedtoactinaccordancewiththisrule。A
categoricalorunconditionalimperativeisonewhichdoesnotrepresenttheactioninanywayimmediatelythroughtheconceptionofanendthatistobeattainedbyit;butitpresentstheactiontothemindasobjectivelynecessarybythemererepresentationofitsformasanaction，andthusmakesitnecessary。Suchimperativescannotbeputforwardbyanyotherpracticalsciencethanthatwhichprescribesobligations，anditisonlythescienceofmoralsthatdoesthis。Allotherimperativesaretechnical，andtheyarealtogetherconditional。Thegroundofthepossibilityofcategoricalimperativesliesinthefactthattheyrefertonodeterminationoftheactivityofthewillbywhichapurposemightbeassignedtoit，butsolelytoitsfreedom。
Everyactionisallowed（licitum）whichisnotcontrarytoobligation;andthisfreedomnotbeinglimitedbyanopposingimperative，constitutesamoralrightasawarrantortitleofaction（facultasmoralis）。Fromthisitisatonceevidentwhatactionsaredisallowedorillicit（illicita）。
Dutyisthedesignationofanyactiontowhichanyoneisboundbyanobligation。Itisthereforethesubject—matterofallobligation。Dutyasregardstheactionconcernedmaybeoneandthesame，andyetwemaybeboundtoitinvariousways。
Thecategoricalimperative，asexpressinganobligationinrespecttocertainactions，isamorallypracticallaw。Butbecauseobligationinvolvesnotmerelypracticalnecessityexpressedinalawassuch，butalsoactualnecessitation，thecategoricalimperativeisalaweitherofcommandorprohibition，accordingasthedoingornotdoingofanactionisrepresentedasaduty。Anactionwhichisneithercommandednorforbiddenismerelyallowed，becausethereisnolawrestrictingfreedom，noranydutyinrespectofit。Suchanactionissaidtobemorallyindifferent（indifferens，adiaphoron，resmeraefacultatis）。Itmaybeaskedwhethertherearesuchmorallyindifferentactions;andifthereare，whetherinadditiontothepreceptiveandprohibitivelaw（lexpraeceptivaetprohibitiva，lexmandatietvetiti），thereisalsorequiredapermissivelaw（lexpermissiva），inorderthatonemaybefreeinsuchrelationstoact，ortoforbearfromacting，athispleasure？Ifitwereso，themoralrightinquestionwouldnot，inallcases，refertoactionsthatareindifferentinthemselves（adiaphora）;fornospeciallawwouldberequiredtoestablishsucharight，consideredaccordingtomorallaws。