WhileSocrateswasspeaking，PythodorusthoughtthatParmenidesandZenowerenotaltogetherpleasedatthesuccessivestepsoftheargument;butstilltheygavetheclosestattentionandoftenlookedatoneanother，andsmiledasifinadmirationofhim。Whenhehadfinished，Parmenidesexpressedtheirfeelingsinthefollowingwords:—
Socrates，hesaid，Iadmirethebentofyourmindtowardsphilosophy;tellmenow，wasthisyourowndistinctionbetweenideasinthemselvesandthethingswhichpartakeofthem？anddoyouthinkthatthereisanideaoflikenessapartfromthelikenesswhichwepossess，andoftheoneandmany，andoftheotherthingswhichZenomentioned？
Ithinkthattherearesuchideas，saidSocrates。
Parmenidesproceeded:Andwouldyoualsomakeabsoluteideasofthejustandthebeautifulandthegood，andofallthatclass？
Yes，hesaid，Ishould。
Andwouldyoumakeanideaofmanapartfromusandfromallotherhumancreatures，oroffireandwater？
Iamoftenundecided，Parmenides，astowhetherIoughttoincludethemornot。
Andwouldyoufeelequallyundecided，Socrates，aboutthingsofwhichthementionmayprovokeasmile？—Imeansuchthingsashair，mud，dirt，oranythingelsewhichisvileandpaltry;wouldyousupposethateachofthesehasanideadistinctfromtheactualobjectswithwhichwecomeintocontact，ornot？
Certainlynot，saidSocrates;visiblethingslikethesearesuchastheyappeartous，andIamafraidthattherewouldbeanabsurdityinassuminganyideaofthem，althoughIsometimesgetdisturbed，andbegintothinkthatthereisnothingwithoutanidea;butthenagain，whenIhavetakenupthisposition，Irunaway，becauseIamafraidthatImayfallintoabottomlesspitofnonsense，andperish;andsoIreturntotheideasofwhichIwasjustnowspeaking，andoccupymyselfwiththem。
Yes，Socrates，saidParmenides;thatisbecauseyouarestillyoung;
thetimewillcome，ifIamnotmistaken，whenphilosophywillhaveafirmergraspofyou，andthenyouwillnotdespiseeventhemeanestthings;atyourage，youaretoomuchdisposedtoregardopinionsofmen。ButIshouldliketoknowwhetheryoumeanthattherearecertainideasofwhichallotherthingspartake，andfromwhichtheyderivetheirnames;thatsimilars，forexample，becomesimilar，becausetheypartakeofsimilarity;andgreatthingsbecomegreat，becausetheypartakeofgreatness;andthatjustandbeautifulthingsbecomejustandbeautiful，becausetheypartakeofjusticeandbeauty？
Yes，certainly，saidSocratesthatismymeaning。
Theneachindividualpartakeseitherofthewholeoftheideaorelseofapartoftheidea？Cantherebeanyothermodeofparticipation？
Therecannotbe，hesaid。
Thendoyouthinkthatthewholeideaisone，andyet，beingone，isineachoneofthemany？
Whynot，Parmenides？saidSocrates。
Becauseoneandthesamethingwillexistasawholeatthesametimeinmanyseparateindividuals，andwillthereforebeinastateofseparationfromitself。
Nay，buttheideamaybelikethedaywhichisoneandthesameinmanyplacesatonce，andyetcontinuouswithitself;inthiswayeachideamaybeone;andthesameinallatthesametime。
Ilikeyourway，Socrates，ofmakingoneinmanyplacesatonce。Youmeantosay，thatifIweretospreadoutasailandcoveranumberofmen，therewouldbeonewholeincludingmany—isnotthatyourmeaning？
Ithinkso。
Andwouldyousaythatthewholesailincludeseachman，orapartofitonly，anddifferentpartsdifferentmen？
Thelatter。
Then，Socrates，theideasthemselveswillbedivisible，andthingswhichparticipateinthemwillhaveapartofthemonlyandnotthewholeideaexistingineachofthem？
Thatseemstofollow。
Thenwouldyouliketosay，Socrates，thattheoneideaisreallydivisibleandyetremainsone？
Certainlynot，hesaid。
Supposethatyoudivideabsolutegreatness，andthatofthemanygreatthings，eachoneisgreatinvirtueofaportionofgreatnesslessthanabsolutegreatness—isthatconceivable？
No。
Orwilleachequalthing，ifpossessingsomesmallportionofequalitylessthanabsoluteequality，beequaltosomeotherthingbyvirtueofthatportiononly？
Impossible。
Orsupposeoneofustohaveaportionofsmallness;thisisbutapartofthesmall，andthereforetheabsolutelysmallisgreater;iftheabsolutelysmallbegreater，thattowhichthepartofthesmallisaddedwillbesmallerandnotgreaterthanbefore。
Howabsurd！
Theninwhatway，Socrates，willallthingsparticipateintheideas，iftheyareunabletoparticipateinthemeitheraspartsorwholes？
Indeed，hesaid，youhaveaskedaquestionwhichisnoteasilyanswered。
Well，saidParmenides，andwhatdoyousayofanotherquestion？
Whatquestion？
Iimaginethatthewayinwhichyouareledtoassumeoneideaofeachkindisasfollows:—Youseeanumberofgreatobjects，andwhenyoulookatthemthereseemstoyoutobeoneandthesameidea（ornature）inthemall;henceyouconceiveofgreatnessasone。
Verytrue，saidSocrates。
Andifyougoonandallowyourmindinlikemannertoembraceinoneviewtheideaofgreatnessandofgreatthingswhicharenottheidea，and—tocomparethem，willnotanothergreatnessarise，whichwillappeartobethesourceofallthese？
Itwouldseemso。
Thenanotherideaofgreatnessnowcomesintoviewoverandaboveabsolutegreatness，andtheindividualswhichpartakeofit;andthenanother，overandaboveallthese，byvirtueofwhichtheywillallbegreat，andsoeachideainsteadofbeingonewillbeinfinitelymultiplied。
Butmaynottheideas，askedSocrates，bethoughtsonly，andhavenoproperexistenceexceptinourminds，Parmenides？Forinthatcaseeachideamaystillbeone，andnotexperiencethisinfinitemultiplication。
Andcantherebeindividualthoughtswhicharethoughtsofnothing？
Impossible，hesaid。
Thethoughtmustbeofsomething？
Yes。
Ofsomethingwhichisorwhichisnot？
Ofsomethingwhichis。
Mustitnotbeofasinglesomething，whichthethoughtrecognizesasattachingtoall，beingasingleformornature？
Yes。
Andwillnotthesomethingwhichisapprehendedasoneandthesameinall，beanidea？
Fromthat，again，thereisnoescape。
Then，saidParmenides，ifyousaythateverythingelseparticipatesintheideas，mustyounotsayeitherthateverythingismadeupofthoughts，andthatallthingsthink;orthattheyarethoughtsbuthavenothought？
Thelatterview，Parmenides，isnomorerationalthanthepreviousone。Inmyopinion，theideasare，asitwere，patternsfixedinnature，andotherthingsarelikethem，andresemblancesofthem—whatismeantbytheparticipationofotherthingsintheideas，isreallyassimilationtothem。