Aperfectlygoodwillwouldthereforebeequallysubjecttoobjectivelaws（viz。，lawsofgood），butcouldnotbeconceivedasobligedtherebytoactlawfully，becauseofitselffromitssubjectiveconstitutionitcanonlybedeterminedbytheconceptionofgood。
ThereforenoimperativesholdfortheDivinewill，oringeneralforaholywill；oughtishereoutofplace，becausethevolitionisalreadyofitselfnecessarilyinunisonwiththelaw。Thereforeimperativesareonlyformulaetoexpresstherelationofobjectivelawsofallvolitiontothesubjectiveimperfectionofthewillofthisorthatrationalbeing，e。g。，thehumanwill。
Nowallimperativescommandeitherhypotheticallyorcategorically。Theformerrepresentthepracticalnecessityofapossibleactionasmeanstosomethingelsethatiswilled（oratleastwhichonemightpossiblywill）。Thecategoricalimperativewouldbethatwhichrepresentedanactionasnecessaryofitselfwithoutreferencetoanotherend，i。e。，asobjectivelynecessary。
Sinceeverypracticallawrepresentsapossibleactionasgoodand，onthisaccount，forasubjectwhoispracticallydeterminablebyreason，necessary，allimperativesareformulaedetermininganactionwhichisnecessaryaccordingtotheprincipleofawillgoodinsomerespects。Ifnowtheactionisgoodonlyasameanstosomethingelse，thentheimperativeishypothetical；ifitisconceivedasgoodinitselfandconsequentlyasbeingnecessarilytheprincipleofawillwhichofitselfconformstoreason，thenitiscategorical。
Thustheimperativedeclareswhatactionpossiblebymewouldbegoodandpresentsthepracticalruleinrelationtoawillwhichdoesnotforthwithperformanactionsimplybecauseitisgood，whetherbecausethesubjectdoesnotalwaysknowthatitisgood，orbecause，evenifitknowthis，yetitsmaximsmightbeopposedtotheobjectiveprinciplesofpracticalreason。
Accordinglythehypotheticalimperativeonlysaysthattheactionisgoodforsomepurpose，possibleoractual。Inthefirstcaseitisaproblematical，inthesecondanassertorialpracticalprinciple。Thecategoricalimperativewhichdeclaresanactiontobeobjectivelynecessaryinitselfwithoutreferencetoanypurpose，i。e。，withoutanyotherend，isvalidasanapodeictic（practical）principle。
Whateverispossibleonlybythepowerofsomerationalbeingmayalsobeconceivedasapossiblepurposeofsomewill；andthereforetheprinciplesofactionasregardsthemeansnecessarytoattainsomepossiblepurposeareinfactinfinitelynumerous。Allscienceshaveapracticalpart，consistingofproblemsexpressingthatsomeendispossibleforusandofimperativesdirectinghowitmaybeattained。
Thesemay，therefore，becalledingeneralimperativesofskill。
Herethereisnoquestionwhethertheendisrationalandgood，butonlywhatonemustdoinordertoattainit。Thepreceptsforthephysiciantomakehispatientthoroughlyhealthy，andforapoisonertoensurecertaindeath，areofequalvalueinthisrespect，thateachservestoeffectitspurposeperfectly。Sinceinearlyyouthitcannotbeknownwhatendsarelikelytooccurtousinthecourseoflife，parentsseektohavetheirchildrentaughtagreatmanythings，andprovidefortheirskillintheuseofmeansforallsortsofarbitraryends，ofnoneofwhichcantheydeterminewhetheritmaynotperhapshereafterbeanobjecttotheirpupil，butwhichitisatalleventspossiblethathemightaimat；andthisanxietyissogreatthattheycommonlyneglecttoformandcorrecttheirjudgementonthevalueofthethingswhichmaybechosenasends。
Thereisoneend，however，whichmaybeassumedtobeactuallysuchtoallrationalbeings（sofarasimperativesapplytothem，viz。，asdependentbeings），and，therefore，onepurposewhichtheynotmerelymayhave，butwhichwemaywithcertaintyassumethattheyallactuallyhavebyanaturalnecessity，andthisishappiness。Thehypotheticalimperativewhichexpressesthepracticalnecessityofanactionasmeanstotheadvancementofhappinessisassertorial。
Wearenottopresentitasnecessaryforanuncertainandmerelypossiblepurpose，butforapurposewhichwemaypresupposewithcertaintyandaprioriineveryman，becauseitbelongstohisbeing。Nowskillinthechoiceofmeanstohisowngreatestwell—beingmaybecalledprudence，*inthenarrowestsense。Andthustheimperativewhichreferstothechoiceofmeanstoone’sownhappiness，i。e。，thepreceptofprudence，isstillalwayshypothetical；theactionisnotcommandedabsolutely，butonlyasmeanstoanotherpurpose。
*Thewordprudenceistakenintwosenses：intheoneitmaybearthenameofknowledgeoftheworld，intheotherthatofprivateprudence。Theformerisaman’sabilitytoinfluenceotherssoastousethemforhisownpurposes。Thelatteristhesagacitytocombineallthesepurposesforhisownlastingbenefit。Thislatterisproperlythattowhichthevalueevenoftheformerisreduced，andwhenamanisprudentintheformersense，butnotinthelatter，wemightbettersayofhimthatheiscleverandcunning，but，onthewhole，imprudent。
Finally，thereisanimperativewhichcommandsacertainconductimmediately，withouthavingasitsconditionanyotherpurposetobeattainedbyit。Thisimperativeiscategorical。Itconcernsnotthematteroftheaction，oritsintendedresult，butitsformandtheprincipleofwhichitisitselfaresult；andwhatisessentiallygoodinitconsistsinthementaldisposition，lettheconsequencebewhatitmay。Thisimperativemaybecalledthatofmorality。
Thereisamarkeddistinctionalsobetweenthevolitionsonthesethreesortsofprinciplesinthedissimilarityoftheobligationofthewill。Inordertomarkthisdifferencemoreclearly，Ithinktheywouldbemostsuitablynamedintheirorderifwesaidtheyareeitherrulesofskill，orcounselsofprudence，orcommands（laws）
ofmorality。Foritislawonlythatinvolvestheconceptionofanunconditionalandobjectivenecessity，whichisconsequentlyuniversallyvalid；andcommandsarelawswhichmustbeobeyed，thatis，mustbefollowed，eveninoppositiontoinclination。Counsels，indeed，involvenecessity，butonewhichcanonlyholdunderacontingentsubjectivecondition，viz。，theydependonwhetherthisorthatmanreckonsthisorthataspartofhishappiness；thecategoricalimperative，onthecontrary，isnotlimitedbyanycondition，andasbeingabsolutely，althoughpractically，necessary，maybequiteproperlycalledacommand。Wemightalsocallthefirstkindofimperativestechnical（belongingtoart），thesecondpragmatic*（towelfare），thethirdmoral（belongingtofreeconductgenerally，thatis，tomorals）。
*Itseemstomethatthepropersignificationofthewordpragmaticmaybemostaccuratelydefinedinthisway。Forsanctionsarecalledpragmaticwhichflowproperlynotfromthelawofthestatesasnecessaryenactments，butfromprecautionforthegeneralwelfare。Ahistoryiscomposedpragmaticallywhenitteachesprudence，i。e。，instructstheworldhowitcanprovideforitsinterestsbetter，oratleastaswellas，themenofformertime。
Nowarisesthequestion，howarealltheseimperativespossible？
Thisquestiondoesnotseektoknowhowwecanconceivetheaccomplishmentoftheactionwhichtheimperativeordains，butmerelyhowwecanconceivetheobligationofthewillwhichtheimperativeexpresses。Nospecialexplanationisneededtoshowhowanimperativeofskillispossible。Whoeverwillstheend，willsalso（sofarasreasondecideshisconduct）themeansinhispowerwhichareindispensablynecessarythereto。Thispropositionis，asregardsthevolition，analytical；for，inwillinganobjectasmyeffect，thereisalreadythoughtthecausalityofmyselfasanactingcause，thatistosay，theuseofthemeans；andtheimperativeeducesfromtheconceptionofvolitionofanendtheconceptionofactionsnecessarytothisend。Syntheticalpropositionsmustnodoubtbeemployedindefiningthemeanstoaproposedend；buttheydonotconcerntheprinciple，theactofthewill，buttheobjectanditsrealization。E。g。，thatinordertobisectalineonanunerringprincipleImustdrawfromitsextremitiestwointersectingarcs；thisnodoubtistaughtbymathematicsonlyinsyntheticalpropositions；
butifIknowthatitisonlybythisprocessthattheintendedoperationcanbeperformed，thentosaythat，ifIfullywilltheoperation，Ialsowilltheactionrequiredforit，isananalyticalproposition；foritisoneandthesamethingtoconceivesomethingasaneffectwhichIcanproduceinacertainway，andtoconceivemyselfasactinginthisway。
Ifitwereonlyequallyeasytogiveadefiniteconceptionofhappiness，theimperativesofprudencewouldcorrespondexactlywiththoseofskill，andwouldlikewisebeanalytical。Forinthiscaseasinthat，itcouldbesaid：\"Whoeverwillstheend，willsalso（accordingtothedictateofreasonnecessarily）theindispensablemeanstheretowhichareinhispower。\"But，unfortunately，thenotionofhappinessissoindefinitethatalthougheverymanwishestoat。it，yethenevercansaydefinitelyandconsistentlywhatitisthathereallywishesandwills。Thereasonofthisisthatalltheelementswhichbelongtothenotionofhappinessarealtogetherempirical，i。e。，theymustbeborrowedfromexperience，andneverthelesstheideaofhappinessrequiresanabsolutewhole，amaximumofwelfareinmypresentandallfuturecircumstances。Nowitisimpossiblethatthemostclear—sightedandatthesametimemostpowerfulbeing（supposedfinite）shouldframetohimselfadefiniteconceptionofwhathereallywillsinthis。Doeshewillriches，howmuchanxiety，envy，andsnaresmighthenottherebydrawuponhisshoulders？Doeshewillknowledgeanddiscernment，perhapsitmightprovetobeonlyaneyesomuchthesharpertoshowhimsomuchthemorefearfullytheevilsthatarenowconcealedfromhim，andthatcannotbeavoided，ortoimposemorewantsonhisdesires，whichalreadygivehimconcernenough。Wouldhehavelonglife？whoguaranteestohimthatitwouldnotbealongmisery？wouldheatleasthavehealth？howoftenhasuneasinessofthebodyrestrainedfromexcessesintowhichperfecthealthwouldhaveallowedonetofall？andsoon。Inshort，heisunable，onanyprinciple，todeterminewithcertaintywhatwouldmakehimtrulyhappy；becausetodosohewouldneedtobeomniscient。Wecannotthereforeactonanydefiniteprinciplestosecurehappiness，butonlyonempiricalcounsels，e。g。ofregimen，frugality，courtesy，reserve，etc。，whichexperienceteachesdo，ontheaverage，mostpromotewell—being。
Henceitfollowsthattheimperativesofprudencedonot，strictlyspeaking，commandatall，thatis，theycannotpresentactionsobjectivelyaspracticallynecessary；thattheyarerathertoberegardedascounsels（consilia）thanpreceptspreceptsofreason，thattheproblemtodeterminecertainlyanduniversallywhatactionwouldpromotethehappinessofarationalbeingiscompletelyinsoluble，andconsequentlynoimperativerespectingitispossiblewhichshould，inthestrictsense，commandtodowhatmakeshappy；becausehappinessisnotanidealofreasonbutofimagination，restingsolelyonempiricalgrounds，anditisvaintoexpectthattheseshoulddefineanactionbywhichonecouldattainthetotalityofaseriesofconsequenceswhichisreallyendless。Thisimperativeofprudencewouldhoweverbeananalyticalpropositionifweassumethatthemeanstohappinesscouldbecertainlyassigned；foritisdistinguishedfromtheimperativeofskillonlybythis，thatinthelattertheendismerelypossible，intheformeritisgiven；ashoweverbothonlyordainthemeanstothatwhichwesupposetobewilledasanend，itfollowsthattheimperativewhichordainsthewillingofthemeanstohimwhowillstheendisinbothcasesanalytical。Thusthereisnodifficultyinregardtothepossibilityofanimperativeofthiskindeither。
Ontheotherhand，thequestionhowtheimperativeofmoralityispossible，isundoubtedlyone，theonlyone，demandingasolution，asthisisnotatallhypothetical，andtheobjectivenecessitywhichitpresentscannotrestonanyhypothesis，asisthecasewiththehypotheticalimperatives。Onlyherewemustneverleaveoutofconsiderationthatwecannotmakeoutbyanyexample，inotherwordsempirically，whetherthereissuchanimperativeatall，butitisrathertobefearedthatallthosewhichseemtobecategoricalmayyetbeatbottomhypothetical。Forinstance，whenthepreceptis：
\"Thoushaltnotpromisedeceitfully\"；anditisassumedthatthenecessityofthisisnotamerecounseltoavoidsomeotherevil，sothatitshouldmean：\"Thoushaltnotmakealyingpromise，lestifitbecomeknownthoushouldstdestroythycredit，\"butthatanactionofthiskindmustberegardedasevilinitself，sothattheimperativeoftheprohibitioniscategorical；thenwecannotshowwithcertaintyinanyexamplethatthewillwasdeterminedmerelybythelaw，withoutanyotherspringofaction，althoughitmayappeartobeso。Foritisalwayspossiblethatfearofdisgrace，perhapsalsoobscuredreadofotherdangers，mayhaveasecretinfluenceonthewill。Whocanprovebyexperiencethenon—existenceofacausewhenallthatexperiencetellsusisthatwedonotperceiveit？Butinsuchacasetheso—calledmoralimperative，whichassuchappearstobecategoricalandunconditional，wouldinrealitybeonlyapragmaticprecept，drawingourattentiontoourowninterestsandmerelyteachingustotaketheseintoconsideration。
Weshallthereforehavetoinvestigateapriorithepossibilityofacategoricalimperative，aswehavenotinthiscasetheadvantageofitsrealitybeinggiveninexperience，sothat[theelucidationof]
itspossibilityshouldberequisiteonlyforitsexplanation，notforitsestablishment。Inthemeantimeitmaybediscernedbeforehandthatthecategoricalimperativealonehasthepurportofapracticallaw；alltherestmayindeedbecalledprinciplesofthewillbutnotlaws，sincewhateverisonlynecessaryfortheattainmentofsomearbitrarypurposemaybeconsideredasinitselfcontingent，andwecanatanytimebefreefromthepreceptifwegiveupthepurpose；onthecontrary，theunconditionalcommandleavesthewillnolibertytochoosetheopposite；consequentlyitalonecarrieswithitthatnecessitywhichwerequireinalaw。
Secondly，inthecaseofthiscategoricalimperativeorlawofmorality，thedifficulty（ofdiscerningitspossibility）isaveryprofoundone。Itisanapriorisyntheticalpracticalproposition；*
andasthereissomuchdifficultyindiscerningthepossibilityofspeculativepropositionsofthiskind，itmayreadilybesupposedthatthedifficultywillbenolesswiththepractical。
*Iconnecttheactwiththewillwithoutpresupposinganyconditionresultingfromanyinclination，butapriori，andthereforenecessarily（thoughonlyobjectively，i。e。，assumingtheideaofareasonpossessingfullpoweroverallsubjectivemotives）。
Thisisaccordinglyapracticalpropositionwhichdoesnotdeducethewillingofanactionbymereanalysisfromanotheralreadypresupposed（forwehavenotsuchaperfectwill），butconnectsitimmediatelywiththeconceptionofthewillofarationalbeing，assomethingnotcontainedinit。
Inthisproblemwewillfirstinquirewhetherthemereconceptionofacategoricalimperativemaynotperhapssupplyusalsowiththeformulaofit，containingthepropositionwhichalonecanbeacategoricalimperative；forevenifweknowthetenorofsuchanabsolutecommand，yethowitispossiblewillrequirefurtherspecialandlaboriousstudy，whichwepostponetothelastsection。
WhenIconceiveahypotheticalimperative，ingeneralIdonotknowbeforehandwhatitwillcontainuntilIamgiventhecondition。
ButwhenIconceiveacategoricalimperative，Iknowatoncewhatitcontains。Forastheimperativecontainsbesidesthelawonlythenecessitythatthemaxims*shallconformtothislaw，whilethelawcontainsnoconditionsrestrictingit，thereremainsnothingbutthegeneralstatementthatthemaximoftheactionshouldconformtoauniversallaw，anditisthisconformityalonethattheimperativeproperlyrepresentsasnecessary。
*Amaximisasubjectiveprincipleofaction，andmustbedistinguishedfromtheobjectiveprinciple，namely，practicallaw。Theformercontainsthepracticalrulesetbyreasonaccordingtotheconditionsofthesubject（oftenitsignoranceoritsinclinations），sothatitistheprincipleonwhichthesubjectacts；butthelawistheobjectiveprinciplevalidforeveryrationalbeing，andistheprincipleonwhichitoughttoactthatisanimperative。
Thereisthereforebutonecategoricalimperative，namely，this：Actonlyonthatmaximwherebythoucanstatthesametimewillthatitshouldbecomeauniversallaw。
Nowifallimperativesofdutycanbededucedfromthisoneimperativeasfromtheirprinciple，then，althoughitshouldremainundecidedwhatiscalleddutyisnotmerelyavainnotion，yetatleastweshallbeabletoshowwhatweunderstandbyitandwhatthisnotionmeans。
Sincetheuniversalityofthelawaccordingtowhicheffectsareproducedconstituteswhatisproperlycallednatureinthemostgeneralsense（astoform），thatistheexistenceofthingssofarasitisdeterminedbygenerallaws，theimperativeofdutymaybeexpressedthus：Actasifthemaximofthyactionweretobecomebythywillauniversallawofnature。
Wewillnowenumerateafewduties，adoptingtheusualdivisionofthemintodutiestoourselvesandourselvesandtoothers，andintoperfectandimperfectduties。*
*ItmustbenotedherethatIreservethedivisionofdutiesforafuturemetaphysicofmorals；sothatIgiveithereonlyasanarbitraryone（inordertoarrangemyexamples）。Fortherest，I
understandbyaperfectdutyonethatadmitsnoexceptioninfavourofinclinationandthenIhavenotmerelyexternalbutalsointernalperfectduties。Thisiscontrarytotheuseofthewordadoptedintheschools；butIdonotintendtojustifythere，asitisalloneformypurposewhetheritisadmittedornot。
1。Amanreducedtodespairbyaseriesofmisfortunesfeelsweariedoflife，butisstillsofarinpossessionofhisreasonthathecanaskhimselfwhetheritwouldnotbecontrarytohisdutytohimselftotakehisownlife。Nowheinquireswhetherthemaximofhisactioncouldbecomeauniversallawofnature。Hismaximis：\"Fromself—loveIadoptitasaprincipletoshortenmylifewhenitslongerdurationislikelytobringmoreevilthansatisfaction。\"Itisaskedthensimplywhetherthisprinciplefoundedonself—lovecanbecomeauniversallawofnature。Nowweseeatoncethatasystemofnatureofwhichitshouldbealawtodestroylifebymeansoftheveryfeelingwhosespecialnatureitistoimpeltotheimprovementoflifewouldcontradictitselfand，therefore，couldnotexistasasystemofnature；hencethatmaximcannotpossiblyexistasauniversallawofnatureand，consequently，wouldbewhollyinconsistentwiththesupremeprincipleofallduty。
2。Anotherfindshimselfforcedbynecessitytoborrowmoney。Heknowsthathewillnotbeabletorepayit，butseesalsothatnothingwillbelenttohimunlesshepromisesstoutlytorepayitinadefinitetime。Hedesirestomakethispromise，buthehasstillsomuchconscienceastoaskhimself：\"Isitnotunlawfulandinconsistentwithdutytogetoutofadifficultyinthisway？\"
Supposehoweverthatheresolvestodoso：thenthemaximofhisactionwouldbeexpressedthus：\"WhenIthinkmyselfinwantofmoney，Iwillborrowmoneyandpromisetorepayit，althoughIknowthatI
nevercandoso。\"Nowthisprincipleofself—loveorofone’sownadvantagemayperhapsbeconsistentwithmywholefuturewelfare；
butthequestionnowis，\"Isitright？\"Ichangethenthesuggestionofself—loveintoauniversallaw，andstatethequestionthus：\"Howwoulditbeifmymaximwereauniversallaw？\"ThenIseeatoncethatitcouldneverholdasauniversallawofnature，butwouldnecessarilycontradictitself。Forsupposingittobeauniversallawthateveryonewhenhethinkshimselfinadifficultyshouldbeabletopromisewhateverhepleases，withthepurposeofnotkeepinghispromise，thepromiseitselfwouldbecomeimpossible，aswellastheendthatonemighthaveinviewinit，sincenoonewouldconsiderthatanythingwaspromisedtohim，butwouldridiculeallsuchstatementsasvainpretences。
3。Athirdfindsinhimselfatalentwhichwiththehelpofsomeculturemightmakehimausefulmaninmanyrespects。Buthefindshimselfincomfortablecircumstancesandpreferstoindulgeinpleasureratherthantotakepainsinenlargingandimprovinghishappynaturalcapacities。Heasks，however，whetherhismaximofneglectofhisnaturalgifts，besidesagreeingwithhisinclinationtoindulgence，agreesalsowithwhatiscalledduty。Heseesthenthatasystemofnaturecouldindeedsubsistwithsuchauniversallawalthoughmen（liketheSouthSeaislanders）shouldlettheirtalentsrestandresolvetodevotetheirlivesmerelytoidleness，amusement，andpropagationoftheirspecies—inaword，toenjoyment；buthecannotpossiblywillthatthisshouldbeauniversallawofnature，orbeimplantedinusassuchbyanaturalinstinct。
For，asarationalbeing，henecessarilywillsthathisfacultiesbedeveloped，sincetheyservehimandhavebeengivenhim，forallsortsofpossiblepurposes。
4。Afourth，whoisinprosperity，whileheseesthatothershavetocontendwithgreatwretchednessandthathecouldhelpthem，thinks：
\"Whatconcernisitofmine？LeteveryonebeashappyasHeavenpleases，orasbecanmakehimself；Iwilltakenothingfromhimnorevenenvyhim，onlyIdonotwishtocontributeanythingtohiswelfareortohisassistanceindistress!\"Nownodoubtifsuchamodeofthinkingwereauniversallaw，thehumanracemightverywellsubsistanddoubtlessevenbetterthaninastateinwhicheveryonetalksofsympathyandgood—will，oreventakescareoccasionallytoputitintopractice，but，ontheotherside，alsocheatswhenhecan，betraystherightsofmen，orotherwiseviolatesthem。Butalthoughitispossiblethatauniversallawofnaturemightexistinaccordancewiththatmaxim，itisimpossibletowillthatsuchaprincipleshouldhavetheuniversalvalidityofalawofnature。Forawillwhichresolvedthiswouldcontradictitself，inasmuchasmanycasesmightoccurinwhichonewouldhaveneedoftheloveandsympathyofothers，andinwhich，bysuchalawofnature，sprungfromhisownwill，hewoulddeprivehimselfofallhopeoftheaidhedesires。
Theseareafewofthemanyactualduties，oratleastwhatweregardassuch，whichobviouslyfallintotwoclassesontheoneprinciplethatwehavelaiddown。Wemustbeabletowillthatamaximofouractionshouldbeauniversallaw。Thisisthecanonofthemoralappreciationoftheactiongenerally。Someactionsareofsuchacharacterthattheirmaximcannotwithoutcontradictionbeevenconceivedasauniversallawofnature，farfromitbeingpossiblethatweshouldwillthatitshouldbeso。Inothersthisintrinsicimpossibilityisnotfound，butstillitisimpossibletowillthattheirmaximshouldberaisedtotheuniversalityofalawofnature，sincesuchawillwouldcontradictitselfItiseasilyseenthattheformerviolatestrictorrigorous（inflexible）duty；thelatteronlylaxer（meritorious）duty。Thusithasbeencompletelyshownhowalldutiesdependasregardsthenatureoftheobligation（nottheobjectoftheaction）onthesameprinciple。
Ifnowweattendtoourselvesonoccasionofanytransgressionofduty，weshallfindthatweinfactdonotwillthatourmaximshouldbeauniversallaw，forthatisimpossibleforus；onthecontrary，wewillthattheoppositeshouldremainauniversallaw，onlyweassumethelibertyofmakinganexceptioninourownfavouror（justforthistimeonly）infavourofourinclination。Consequentlyifweconsideredallcasesfromoneandthesamepointofview，namely，thatofreason，weshouldfindacontradictioninourownwill，namely，thatacertainprincipleshouldbeobjectivelynecessaryasauniversallaw，andyetsubjectivelyshouldnotbeuniversal，butadmitofexceptions。Ashoweverweatonemomentregardouractionfromthepointofviewofawillwhollyconformedtoreason，andthenagainlookatthesameactionfromthepointofviewofawillaffectedbyinclination，thereisnotreallyanycontradiction，butanantagonismofinclinationtothepreceptofreason，wherebytheuniversalityoftheprincipleischangedintoameregenerality，sothatthepracticalprincipleofreasonshallmeetthemaximhalfway。Now，althoughthiscannotbejustifiedinourownimpartialjudgement，yetitprovesthatwedoreallyrecognisethevalidityofthecategoricalimperativeand（withallrespectforit）onlyallowourselvesafewexceptions，whichwethinkunimportantandforcedfromus。
Wehavethusestablishedatleastthismuch，thatifdutyisaconceptionwhichistohaveanyimportandreallegislativeauthorityforouractions，itcanonlybeexpressedincategoricalandnotatallinhypotheticalimperatives。Wehavealso，whichisofgreatimportance，exhibitedclearlyanddefinitelyforeverypracticalapplicationthecontentofthecategoricalimperative，whichmustcontaintheprincipleofalldutyifthereissuchathingatall。
Wehavenotyet，however，advancedsofarastoproveapriorithatthereactuallyissuchanimperative，thatthereisapracticallawwhichcommandsabsolutelyofitselfandwithoutanyotherimpulse，andthatthefollowingofthislawisduty。
Withtheviewofattainingtothis，itisofextremeimportancetorememberthatwemustnotallowourselvestothinkofdeducingtherealityofthisprinciplefromtheparticularattributesofhumannature。Fordutyistobeapractical，unconditionalnecessityofaction；itmustthereforeholdforallrationalbeings（towhomanimperativecanapplyatall），andforthisreasononlybealsoalawforallhumanwills。Onthecontrary，whateverisdeducedfromtheparticularnaturalcharacteristicsofhumanity，fromcertainfeelingsandpropensions，nay，even，ifpossible，fromanyparticulartendencypropertohumanreason，andwhichneednotnecessarilyholdforthewillofeveryrationalbeing；thismayindeedsupplyuswithamaxim，butnotwithalaw；withasubjectiveprincipleonwhichwemayhaveapropensionandinclinationtoact，butnotwithanobjectiveprincipleonwhichweshouldbeenjoinedtoact，eventhoughallourpropensions，inclinations，andnaturaldispositionswereopposedtoit。Infact，thesublimityandintrinsicdignityofthecommandindutyaresomuchthemoreevident，thelessthesubjectiveimpulsesfavouritandthemoretheyopposeit，withoutbeingableintheslightestdegreetoweakentheobligationofthelawortodiminishitsvalidity。
Herethenweseephilosophybroughttoacriticalposition，sinceithastobefirmlyfixed，notwithstandingthatithasnothingtosupportitinheavenorearth。Hereitmustshowitspurityasabsolutedirectorofitsownlaws，nottheheraldofthosewhicharewhisperedtoitbyanimplantedsenseorwhoknowswhattutelarynature。Althoughthesemaybebetterthannothing，yettheycanneveraffordprinciplesdictatedbyreason，whichmusthavetheirsourcewhollyaprioriandthencetheircommandingauthority，expectingeverythingfromthesupremacyofthelawandtheduerespectforit，nothingfrominclination，orelsecondemningthemantoself—contemptandinwardabhorrence。
Thuseveryempiricalelementisnotonlyquiteincapableofbeinganaidtotheprincipleofmorality，butisevenhighlyprejudicialtothepurityofmorals，fortheproperandinestimableworthofanabsolutelygoodwillconsistsjustinthis，thattheprincipleofactionisfreefromallinfluenceofcontingentgrounds，whichaloneexperiencecanfurnish。Wecannottoomuchortoooftenrepeatourwarningagainstthislaxandevenmeanhabitofthoughtwhichseeksforitsprincipleamongstempiricalmotivesandlaws；forhumanreasoninitswearinessisgladtorestonthispillow，andinadreamofsweetillusions（inwhich，insteadofJuno，itembracesacloud）itsubstitutesformoralityabastardpatchedupfromlimbsofvariousderivation，whichlookslikeanythingonechoosestoseeinit，onlynotlikevirtuetoonewhohasoncebeheldherinhertrueform。*
*Tobeholdvirtueinherproperformisnothingelsebuttocontemplatemoralitystrippedofalladmixtureofsensiblethingsandofeveryspuriousornamentofrewardorself—love。Howmuchshetheneclipseseverythingelsethatappearscharmingtotheaffections，everyonemayreadilyperceivewiththeleastexertionofhisreason，ifitbenotwhollyspoiledforabstraction。
Thequestionthenisthis：\"Isitanecessarylawforallrationalbeingsthattheyshouldalwaysjudgeoftheiractionsbymaximsofwhichtheycanthemselveswillthattheyshouldserveasuniversallaws？\"Ifitisso，thenitmustbeconnected（altogetherapriori）
withtheveryconceptionofthewillofarationalbeinggenerally。
Butinordertodiscoverthisconnexionwemust，howeverreluctantly，takeastepintometaphysic，althoughintoadomainofitwhichisdistinctfromspeculativephilosophy，namely，themetaphysicofmorals。Inapracticalphilosophy，whereitisnotthereasonsofwhathappensthatwehavetoascertain，butthelawsofwhatoughttohappen，evenalthoughitneverdoes，i。e。，objectivepracticallaws，thereitisnotnecessarytoinquireintothereasonswhyanythingpleasesordispleases，howthepleasureofmeresensationdiffersfromtaste，andwhetherthelatterisdistinctfromageneralsatisfactionofreason；onwhatthefeelingofpleasureorpainrests，andhowfromitdesiresandinclinationsarise，andfromtheseagainmaximsbytheco—operationofreason：forallthisbelongstoanempiricalpsychology，whichwouldconstitutethesecondpartofphysics，ifweregardphysicsasthephilosophyofnature，sofarasitisbasedonempiricallaws。Buthereweareconcernedwithobjectivepracticallawsand，consequently，withtherelationofthewilltoitselfsofarasitisdeterminedbyreasonalone，inwhichcasewhateverhasreferencetoanythingempiricalisnecessarilyexcluded；sinceifreasonofitselfalonedeterminestheconduct（anditisthepossibilityofthisthatwearenowinvestigating），itmustnecessarilydosoapriori。
Thewillisconceivedasafacultyofdeterminingoneselftoactioninaccordancewiththeconceptionofcertainlaws。Andsuchafacultycanbefoundonlyinrationalbeings。Nowthatwhichservesthewillastheobjectivegroundofitsself—determinationistheend，and，ifthisisassignedbyreasonalone，itmustholdforallrationalbeings。Ontheotherhand，thatwhichmerelycontainsthegroundofpossibilityoftheactionofwhichtheeffectistheend，thisiscalledthemeans。Thesubjectivegroundofthedesireisthespring，theobjectivegroundofthevolitionisthemotive；hencethedistinctionbetweensubjectiveendswhichrestonsprings，andobjectiveendswhichdependonmotivesvalidforeveryrationalbeing。
Practicalprinciplesareformalwhentheyabstractfromallsubjectiveends；theyarematerialwhentheyassumethese，andthereforeparticularspringsofaction。Theendswhicharationalbeingproposestohimselfatpleasureaseffectsofhisactions（materialends）areallonlyrelative，foritisonlytheirrelationtotheparticulardesiresofthesubjectthatgivesthemtheirworth，whichthereforecannotfurnishprinciplesuniversalandnecessaryforallrationalbeingsandforeveryvolition，thatistosaypracticallaws。Hencealltheserelativeendscangiveriseonlytohypotheticalimperatives。
Supposing，however，thatthereweresomethingwhoseexistencehasinitselfanabsoluteworth，somethingwhich，beinganendinitself，couldbeasourceofdefinitelaws；theninthisandthisalonewouldliethesourceofapossiblecategoricalimperative，i。e。，apracticallaw。
NowIsay：manandgenerallyanyrationalbeingexistsasanendinhimself，notmerelyasameanstobearbitrarilyusedbythisorthatwill，butinallhisactions，whethertheyconcernhimselforotherrationalbeings，mustbealwaysregardedatthesametimeasanend。Allobjectsoftheinclinationshaveonlyaconditionalworth，foriftheinclinationsandthewantsfoundedonthemdidnotexist，thentheirobjectwouldbewithoutvalue。Buttheinclinations，themselvesbeingsourcesofwant，aresofarfromhavinganabsoluteworthforwhichtheyshouldbedesiredthatonthecontraryitmustbetheuniversalwishofeveryrationalbeingtobewhollyfreefromthem。Thustheworthofanyobjectwhichistobeacquiredbyouractionisalwaysconditional。Beingswhoseexistencedependsnotonourwillbutonnature’s，havenevertheless，iftheyareirrationalbeings，onlyarelativevalueasmeans，andarethereforecalledthings；rationalbeings，onthecontrary，arecalledpersons，becausetheirverynaturepointsthemoutasendsinthemselves，thatisassomethingwhichmustnotbeusedmerelyasmeans，andsofarthereforerestrictsfreedomofaction（andisanobjectofrespect）。These，therefore，arenotmerelysubjectiveendswhoseexistencehasaworthforusasaneffectofouraction，butobjectiveends，thatis，thingswhoseexistenceisanendinitself；anendmoreoverforwhichnoothercanbesubstituted，whichtheyshouldsubservemerelyasmeans，forotherwisenothingwhateverwouldpossessabsoluteworth；butifallworthwereconditionedandthereforecontingent，thentherewouldbenosupremepracticalprincipleofreasonwhatever。
Ifthenthereisasupremepracticalprincipleor，inrespectofthehumanwill，acategoricalimperative，itmustbeonewhich，beingdrawnfromtheconceptionofthatwhichisnecessarilyanendforeveryonebecauseitisanendinitself，constitutesanobjectiveprincipleofwill，andcanthereforeserveasauniversalpracticallaw。Thefoundationofthisprincipleis：rationalnatureexistsasanendinitself。Mannecessarilyconceiveshisownexistenceasbeingso；sofarthenthisisasubjectiveprincipleofhumanactions。Buteveryotherrationalbeingregardsitsexistencesimilarly，justonthesamerationalprinciplethatholdsforme：*sothatitisatthesametimeanobjectiveprinciple，fromwhichasasupremepracticallawalllawsofthewillmustbecapableofbeingdeduced。Accordinglythepracticalimperativewillbeasfollows：Soactastotreathumanity，whetherinthineownpersonorinthatofanyother，ineverycaseasanendwithal，neverasmeansonly。Wewillnowinquirewhetherthiscanbepracticallycarriedout。
*Thispropositionisherestatedasapostulate。Thegroundofitwillbefoundintheconcludingsection。
Toabidebythepreviousexamples：
Firstly，undertheheadofnecessarydutytooneself：Hewhocontemplatessuicideshouldaskhimselfwhetherhisactioncanbeconsistentwiththeideaofhumanityasanendinitself。Ifhedestroyshimselfinordertoescapefrompainfulcircumstances，heusesapersonmerelyasameantomaintainatolerableconditionuptotheendoflife。Butamanisnotathing，thatistosay，somethingwhichcanbeusedmerelyasmeans，butmustinallhisactionsbealwaysconsideredasanendinhimself。Icannot，therefore，disposeinanywayofamaninmyownpersonsoastomutilatehim，todamageorkillhim。（Itbelongstoethicspropertodefinethisprinciplemoreprecisely，soastoavoidallmisunderstanding，e。
g。，astotheamputationofthelimbsinordertopreservemyself，astoexposingmylifetodangerwithaviewtopreserveit，etc。Thisquestionisthereforeomittedhere。）
Secondly，asregardsnecessaryduties，orthoseofstrictobligation，towardsothers：Hewhoisthinkingofmakingalyingpromisetootherswillseeatoncethathewouldbeusinganothermanmerelyasamean，withoutthelattercontainingatthesametimetheendinhimself。ForhewhomIproposebysuchapromisetouseformyownpurposescannotpossiblyassenttomymodeofactingtowardshimand，therefore，cannothimselfcontaintheendofthisaction。
Thisviolationoftheprincipleofhumanityinothermenismoreobviousifwetakeinexamplesofattacksonthefreedomandpropertyofothers。Forthenitisclearthathewhotransgressestherightsofmenintendstousethepersonofothersmerelyasameans，withoutconsideringthatasrationalbeingstheyoughtalwaystobeesteemedalsoasends，thatis，asbeingswhomustbecapableofcontaininginthemselvestheendoftheverysameaction。*
*Letitnotbethoughtthatthecommon\"quodtibinonvisfieri，etc。\"couldservehereastheruleorprinciple。Foritisonlyadeductionfromtheformer，thoughwithseverallimitations；itcannotbeauniversallaw，foritdoesnotcontaintheprincipleofdutiestooneself，norofthedutiesofbenevolencetoothers（formanyaonewouldgladlyconsentthatothersshouldnotbenefithim，providedonlythathemightbeexcusedfromshowingbenevolencetothem），norfinallythatofdutiesofstrictobligationtooneanother，foronthisprinciplethecriminalmightargueagainstthejudgewhopunisheshim，andsoon。
Thirdly，asregardscontingent（meritorious）dutiestooneself：Itisnotenoughthattheactiondoesnotviolatehumanityinourownpersonasanendinitself，itmustalsoharmonizewithit。Nowthereareinhumanitycapacitiesofgreaterperfection，whichbelongtotheendthatnaturehasinviewinregardtohumanityinourselvesasthesubject：toneglectthesemightperhapsbeconsistentwiththemaintenanceofhumanityasanendinitself，butnotwiththeadvancementofthisend。
Fourthly，asregardsmeritoriousdutiestowardsothers：Thenaturalendwhichallmenhaveistheirownhappiness。Nowhumanitymightindeedsubsist，althoughnooneshouldcontributeanythingtothehappinessofothers，providedhedidnotintentionallywithdrawanythingfromit；butafterallthiswouldonlyharmonizenegativelynotpositivelywithhumanityasanendinitself，ifeveryonedoesnotalsoendeavour，asfarasinhimlies，toforwardtheendsofothers。Fortheendsofanysubjectwhichisanendinhimselfoughtasfaraspossibletobemyendsalso，ifthatconceptionistohaveitsfulleffectwithme。
Thisprinciple，thathumanityandgenerallyeveryrationalnatureisanendinitself（whichisthesupremelimitingconditionofeveryman’sfreedomofaction），isnotborrowedfromexperience，firstly，becauseitisuniversal，applyingasitdoestoallrationalbeingswhatever，andexperienceisnotcapableofdetermininganythingaboutthem；secondly，becauseitdoesnotpresenthumanityasanendtomen（subjectively），thatisasanobjectwhichmendoofthemselvesactuallyadoptasanend；butasanobjectiveend，whichmustasalawconstitutethesupremelimitingconditionofalloursubjectiveends，letthembewhatwewill；itmustthereforespringfrompurereason。Infacttheobjectiveprincipleofallpracticallegislationlies（accordingtothefirstprinciple）intheruleanditsformofuniversalitywhichmakesitcapableofbeingalaw（say，e。g。，alawofnature）；butthesubjectiveprincipleisintheend；nowbythesecondprinciplethesubjectofallendsiseachrationalbeing，inasmuchasitisanendinitself。Hencefollowsthethirdpracticalprincipleofthewill，whichistheultimateconditionofitsharmonywithuniversalpracticalreason，viz。：theideaofthewillofeveryrationalbeingasauniversallylegislativewill。
Onthisprincipleallmaximsarerejectedwhichareinconsistentwiththewillbeingitselfuniversallegislator。Thusthewillisnotsubjectsimplytothelaw，butsosubjectthatitmustberegardedasitselfgivingthelawand，onthisgroundonly，subjecttothelaw（ofwhichitcanregarditselfastheauthor）。
Inthepreviousimperatives，namely，thatbasedontheconceptionoftheconformityofactionstogenerallaws，asinaphysicalsystemofnature，andthatbasedontheuniversalprerogativeofrationalbeingsasendsinthemselves—theseimperatives，justbecausetheywereconceivedascategorical，excludedfromanyshareintheirauthorityalladmixtureofanyinterestasaspringofaction；theywere，however，onlyassumedtobecategorical，becausesuchanassumptionwasnecessarytoexplaintheconceptionofduty。Butwecouldnotproveindependentlythattherearepracticalpropositionswhichcommandcategorically，norcanitbeprovedinthissection；onething，however，couldbedone，namely，toindicateintheimperativeitself，bysomedeterminateexpression，thatinthecaseofvolitionfromdutyallinterestisrenounced，whichisthespecificcriterionofcategoricalasdistinguishedfromhypotheticalimperatives。Thisisdoneinthepresent（third）formulaoftheprinciple，namely，intheideaofthewillofeveryrationalbeingasauniversallylegislatingwill。
Foralthoughawillwhichissubjecttolawsmaybeattachedtothislawbymeansofaninterest，yetawillwhichisitselfasupremelawgiversofarasitissuchcannotpossiblydependonanyinterest，sinceawillsodependentwoulditselfstillneedanotherlawrestrictingtheinterestofitsself—lovebytheconditionthatitshouldbevalidasuniversallaw。
Thustheprinciplethateveryhumanwillisawillwhichinallitsmaximsgivesuniversallaws，*provideditbeotherwisejustified，wouldbeverywelladaptedtobethecategoricalimperative，inthisrespect，namely，thatjustbecauseoftheideaofuniversallegislationitisnotbasedoninterest，andthereforeitaloneamongallpossibleimperativescanbeunconditional。Orstillbetter，convertingtheproposition，ifthereisacategoricalimperative（i。e。，alawforthewillofeveryrationalbeing），itcanonlycommandthateverythingbedonefrommaximsofone’swillregardedasawillwhichcouldatthesametimewillthatitshoulditselfgiveuniversallaws，forinthatcaseonlythepracticalprincipleandtheimperativewhichitobeysareunconditional，sincetheycannotbebasedonanyinterest。
*Imaybeexcusedfromadducingexamplestoelucidatethisprinciple，asthosewhichhavealreadybeenusedtoelucidatethecategoricalimperativeanditsformulawouldallserveforthelikepurposehere。
Lookingbacknowonallpreviousattemptstodiscovertheprincipleofmorality，weneednotwonderwhytheyallfailed。Itwasseenthatmanwasboundtolawsbyduty，butitwasnotobservedthatthelawstowhichheissubjectareonlythoseofhisowngiving，thoughatthesametimetheyareuniversal，andthatheisonlyboundtoactinconformitywithhisownwill；awill，however，whichisdesignedbynaturetogiveuniversallaws。Forwhenonehasconceivedmanonlyassubjecttoalaw（nomatterwhat），thenthislawrequiredsomeinterest，eitherbywayofattractionorconstraint，sinceitdidnotoriginateasalawfromhisownwill，butthiswillwasaccordingtoalawobligedbysomethingelsetoactinacertainmanner。Nowbythisnecessaryconsequenceallthelabourspentinfindingasupremeprincipleofdutywasirrevocablylost。Formenneverelicitedduty，butonlyanecessityofactingfromacertaininterest。Whetherthisinterestwasprivateorotherwise，inanycasetheimperativemustbeconditionalandcouldnotbyanymeansbecapableofbeingamoralcommand。Iwillthereforecallthistheprincipleofautonomyofthewill，incontrastwitheveryotherwhichIaccordinglyreckonasheteronomy。
Theconceptionofthewillofeveryrationalbeingasonewhichmustconsideritselfasgivinginallthemaximsofitswilluniversallaws，soastojudgeitselfanditsactionsfromthispointofview—
thisconceptionleadstoanotherwhichdependsonitandisveryfruitful，namelythatofakingdomofends。
ByakingdomIunderstandtheunionofdifferentrationalbeingsinasystembycommonlaws。Nowsinceitisbylawsthatendsaredeterminedasregardstheiruniversalvalidity，hence，ifweabstractfromthepersonaldifferencesofrationalbeingsandlikewisefromallthecontentoftheirprivateends，weshallbeabletoconceiveallendscombinedinasystematicwhole（includingbothrationalbeingsasendsinthemselves，andalsothespecialendswhicheachmayproposetohimself），thatistosay，wecanconceiveakingdomofends，whichontheprecedingprinciplesispossible。
Forallrationalbeingscomeunderthelawthateachofthemmusttreatitselfandallothersnevermerelyasmeans，butineverycaseatthesametimeasendsinthemselves。Henceresultsasystematicunionofrationalbeingbycommonobjectivelaws，i。e。，akingdomwhichmaybecalledakingdomofends，sincewhattheselawshaveinviewisjusttherelationofthesebeingstooneanotherasendsandmeans。Itiscertainlyonlyanideal。
Arationalbeingbelongsasamembertothekingdomofendswhen，althoughgivinguniversallawsinit，heisalsohimselfsubjecttotheselaws。Hebelongstoitassovereignwhen，whilegivinglaws，heisnotsubjecttothewillofanyother。
Arationalbeingmustalwaysregardhimselfasgivinglawseitherasmemberorassovereigninakingdomofendswhichisrenderedpossiblebythefreedomofwill。Hecannot，however，maintainthelatterpositionmerelybythemaximsofhiswill，butonlyincaseheisacompletelyindependentbeingwithoutwantsandwithunrestrictedpoweradequatetohiswill。
Moralityconsiststheninthereferenceofallactiontothelegislationwhichalonecanrenderakingdomofendspossible。Thislegislationmustbecapableofexistingineveryrationalbeingandofemanatingfromhiswill，sothattheprincipleofthiswillisnevertoactonanymaximwhichcouldnotwithoutcontradictionbealsoauniversallawand，accordingly，alwayssotoactthatthewillcouldatthesametimeregarditselfasgivinginitsmaximsuniversallaws。
Ifnowthemaximsofrationalbeingsarenotbytheirownnaturecoincidentwiththisobjectiveprinciple，thenthenecessityofactingonitiscalledpracticalnecessitation，i。e。，duty。Dutydoesnotapplytothesovereigninthekingdomofends，butitdoestoeverymemberofitandtoallinthesamedegree。
Thepracticalnecessityofactingonthisprinciple，i。e。，duty，doesnotrestatallonfeelings，impulses，orinclinations，butsolelyontherelationofrationalbeingstooneanother，arelationinwhichthewillofarationalbeingmustalwaysberegardedaslegislative，sinceotherwiseitcouldnotbeconceivedasanendinitself。Reasonthenreferseverymaximofthewill，regardingitaslegislatinguniversally，toeveryotherwillandalsotoeveryactiontowardsoneself；andthisnotonaccountofanyotherpracticalmotiveoranyfutureadvantage，butfromtheideaofthedignityofarationalbeing，obeyingnolawbutthatwhichhehimselfalsogives。
Inthekingdomofendseverythinghaseithervalueordignity。
Whateverhasavaluecanbereplacedbysomethingelsewhichisequivalent；whatever，ontheotherhand，isaboveallvalue，andthereforeadmitsofnoequivalent，hasadignity。
Whateverhasreferencetothegeneralinclinationsandwantsofmankindhasamarketvalue；whatever，withoutpresupposingawant，correspondstoacertaintaste，thatistoasatisfactioninthemerepurposelessplayofourfaculties，hasafancyvalue；butthatwhichconstitutestheconditionunderwhichaloneanythingcanbeanendinitself，thishasnotmerelyarelativeworth，i。e。，value，butanintrinsicworth，thatis，dignity。
Nowmoralityistheconditionunderwhichalonearationalbeingcanbeanendinhimself，sincebythisaloneisitpossiblethatheshouldbealegislatingmemberinthekingdomofends。Thusmorality，andhumanityascapableofit，isthatwhichalonehasdignity。Skillanddiligenceinlabourhaveamarketvalue；wit，livelyimagination，andhumour，havefancyvalue；ontheotherhand，fidelitytopromises，benevolencefromprinciple（notfrominstinct），haveanintrinsicworth。Neithernaturenorartcontainsanythingwhichindefaultoftheseitcouldputintheirplace，fortheirworthconsistsnotintheeffectswhichspringfromthem，notintheuseandadvantagewhichtheysecure，butinthedispositionofmind，thatis，themaximsofthewillwhicharereadytomanifestthemselvesinsuchactions，eventhoughtheyshouldnothavethedesiredeffect。Theseactionsalsoneednorecommendationfromanysubjectivetasteorsentiment，thattheymaybelookedonwithimmediatefavourandsatisfaction：theyneednoimmediatepropensionorfeelingforthem；theyexhibitthewillthatperformsthemasanobjectofanimmediaterespect，andnothingbutreasonisrequiredtoimposethemonthewill；nottoflatteritintothem，which，inthecaseofduties，wouldbeacontradiction。Thisestimationthereforeshowsthattheworthofsuchadispositionisdignity，andplacesitinfinitelyaboveallvalue，withwhichitcannotforamomentbebroughtintocomparisonorcompetitionwithoutasitwereviolatingitssanctity。
Whatthenisitwhichjustifiesvirtueorthemorallygooddisposition，inmakingsuchloftyclaims？Itisnothinglessthantheprivilegeitsecurestotherationalbeingofparticipatinginthegivingofuniversallaws，bywhichitqualifieshimtobeamemberofapossiblekingdomofends，aprivilegetowhichhewasalreadydestinedbyhisownnatureasbeinganendinhimselfand，onthataccount，legislatinginthekingdomofends；freeasregardsalllawsofphysicalnature，andobeyingthoseonlywhichhehimselfgives，andbywhichhismaximscanbelongtoasystemofuniversallaw，towhichatthesametimehesubmitshimself。Fornothinghasanyworthexceptwhatthelawassignsit。Nowthelegislationitselfwhichassignstheworthofeverythingmustforthatveryreasonpossessdignity，thatisanunconditionalincomparableworth；andthewordrespectalonesuppliesabecomingexpressionfortheesteemwhicharationalbeingmusthaveforit。Autonomythenisthebasisofthedignityofhumanandofeveryrationalnature。
Thethreemodesofpresentingtheprincipleofmoralitythathavebeenadducedareatbottomonlysomanyformulaeoftheverysamelaw，andeachofitselfinvolvestheothertwo。Thereis，however，adifferenceinthem，butitisrathersubjectivelythanobjectivelypractical，intendednamelytobringanideaofthereasonnearertointuition（bymeansofacertainanalogy）andtherebynearertofeeling。Allmaxims，infact，have：
1。Aform，consistinginuniversality；andinthisviewtheformulaofthemoralimperativeisexpressedthus，thatthemaximsmustbesochosenasiftheyweretoserveasuniversallawsofnature。
2。Amatter，namely，anend，andheretheformulasaysthattherationalbeing，asitisanendbyitsownnatureandthereforeanendinitself，mustineverymaximserveastheconditionlimitingallmerelyrelativeandarbitraryends。
3。Acompletecharacterizationofallmaximsbymeansofthatformula，namely，thatallmaximsoughtbytheirownlegislationtoharmonizewithapossiblekingdomofendsaswithakingdomofnature。*Thereisaprogresshereintheorderofthecategoriesofunityoftheformofthewill（itsuniversality），pluralityofthematter（theobjects，i。e。，theends），andtotalityofthesystemofthese。Informingourmoraljudgementofactions，itisbettertoproceedalwaysonthestrictmethodandstartfromthegeneralformulaofthecategoricalimperative：Actaccordingtoamaximwhichcanatthesametimemakeitselfauniversallaw。If，however，wewishtogainanentranceforthemorallaw，itisveryusefultobringoneandthesameactionunderthethreespecifiedconceptions，andtherebyasfaraspossibletobringitnearertointuition。
*Teleologyconsidersnatureasakingdomofends；ethicsregardsapossiblekingdomofendsasakingdomnature。Inthefirstcase，thekingdomofendsisatheoreticalidea，adoptedtoexplainwhatactuallyis。Inthelatteritisapracticalidea，adoptedtobringaboutthatwhichisnotyet，butwhichcanberealizedbyourconduct，namely，ifitconformstothisidea。
Wecannowendwherewestartedatthebeginning，namely，withtheconceptionofawillunconditionallygood。Thatwillisabsolutelygoodwhichcannotbeevil—inotherwords，whosemaxim，ifmadeauniversallaw，couldnevercontradictitself。Thisprinciple，then，isitssupremelaw：\"Actalwaysonsuchamaximasthoucanstatthesametimewilltobeauniversallaw\"；thisisthesoleconditionunderwhichawillcannevercontradictitself；andsuchanimperativeiscategorical。Sincethevalidityofthewillasauniversallawforpossibleactionsisanalogoustotheuniversalconnexionoftheexistenceofthingsbygenerallaws，whichistheformalnotionofnatureingeneral，thecategoricalimperativecanalsobeexpressedthus：Actonmaximswhichcanatthesametimehavefortheirobjectthemselvesasuniversallawsofnature。Suchthenistheformulaofanabsolutelygoodwill。
Rationalnatureisdistinguishedfromtherestofnaturebythis，thatitsetsbeforeitselfanend。Thisendwouldbethematterofeverygoodwill。Butsinceintheideaofawillthatisabsolutelygoodwithoutbeinglimitedbyanycondition（ofattainingthisorthatend）wemustabstractwhollyfromeveryendtobeeffected（sincethiswouldmakeeverywillonlyrelativelygood），itfollowsthatinthiscasetheendmustbeconceived，notasanendtobeeffected，butasanindependentlyexistingend。Consequentlyitisconceivedonlynegatively，i。e。，asthatwhichwemustneveractagainstandwhich，therefore，mustneverberegardedmerelyasmeans，butmustineveryvolitionbeesteemedasanendlikewise。Nowthisendcanbenothingbutthesubjectofallpossibleends，sincethisisalsothesubjectofapossibleabsolutelygoodwill；forsuchawillcannotwithoutcontradictionbepostponedtoanyotherobject。Theprinciple：\"Soactinregardtoeveryrationalbeing（thyselfandothers），thathemayalwayshaveplaceinthymaximasanendinhimself，\"isaccordinglyessentiallyidenticalwiththisother：\"Actuponamaximwhich，atthesametime，involvesitsownuniversalvalidityforeveryrationalbeing。\"ForthatinusingmeansforeveryendIshouldlimitmymaximbytheconditionofitsholdinggoodasalawforeverysubject，thiscomestothesamethingasthatthefundamentalprincipleofallmaximsofactionmustbethatthesubjectofallends，i。e。，therationalbeinghimself，beneveremployedmerelyasmeans，butasthesupremeconditionrestrictingtheuseofallmeans，thatisineverycaseasanendlikewise。
Itfollowsincontestablythat，towhateverlawsanyrationalbeingmaybesubject，hebeinganendinhimselfmustbeabletoregardhimselfasalsolegislatinguniversallyinrespectofthesesamelaws，sinceitisjustthisfitnessofhismaximsforuniversallegislationthatdistinguisheshimasanendinhimself；alsoitfollowsthatthisimplieshisdignity（prerogative）aboveallmerephysicalbeings，thathemustalwaystakehismaximsfromthepointofviewwhichregardshimselfand，likewise，everyotherrationalbeingaslaw—givingbeings（onwhichaccounttheyarecalledpersons）。Inthiswayaworldofrationalbeings（mundusintelligibilis）ispossibleasakingdomofends，andthisbyvirtueofthelegislationpropertoallpersonsasmembers。Thereforeeveryrationalbeingmustsoactasifhewerebyhismaximsineverycasealegislatingmemberintheuniversalkingdomofends。Theformalprincipleofthesemaximsis：\"Soactasifthymaximweretoservelikewiseastheuniversallaw（ofallrationalbeings）。\"Akingdomofendsisthusonlypossibleontheanalogyofakingdomofnature，theformerhoweveronlybymaxims，thatisself—imposedrules，thelatteronlybythelawsofefficientcausesactingundernecessitationfromwithout。Nevertheless，althoughthesystemofnatureislookeduponasamachine，yetsofarasithasreferencetorationalbeingsasitsends，itisgivenonthisaccountthenameofakingdomofnature。Nowsuchakingdomofendswouldbeactuallyrealizedbymeansofmaximsconformingtothecanonwhichthecategoricalimperativeprescribestoallrationalbeings，iftheywereuniversallyfollowed。Butalthougharationalbeing，evenifhepunctuallyfollowsthismaximhimself，cannotreckonuponallothersbeingthereforetruetothesame，norexpectthatthekingdomofnatureanditsorderlyarrangementsshallbeinharmonywithhimasafittingmember，soastoformakingdomofendstowhichhehimselfcontributes，thatistosay，thatitshallfavourhisexpectationofhappiness，stillthatlaw：\"Actaccordingtothemaximsofamemberofamerelypossiblekingdomofendslegislatinginituniversally，\"remainsinitsfullforce，inasmuchasitcommandscategorically。Anditisjustinthisthattheparadoxlies；thatthemeredignityofmanasarationalcreature，withoutanyotherendoradvantagetobeattainedthereby，inotherwords，respectforamereidea，shouldyetserveasaninflexiblepreceptofthewill，andthatitispreciselyinthisindependenceofthemaximonallsuchspringsofactionthatitssublimityconsists；anditisthisthatmakeseveryrationalsubjectworthytobealegislativememberinthekingdomofends：forotherwisehewouldhavetobeconceivedonlyassubjecttothephysicallawofhiswants。Andalthoughweshouldsupposethekingdomofnatureandthekingdomofendstobeunitedunderonesovereign，sothatthelatterkingdomtherebyceasedtobeamereideaandacquiredtruereality，thenitwouldnodoubtgaintheaccessionofastrongspring，butbynomeansanyincreaseofitsintrinsicworth。Forthissoleabsolutelawgivermust，notwithstandingthis，bealwaysconceivedasestimatingtheworthofrationalbeingsonlybytheirdisinterestedbehaviour，asprescribedtothemselvesfromthatidea[thedignityofman]alone。Theessenceofthingsisnotalteredbytheirexternalrelations，andthatwhich，abstractingfromthese，aloneconstitutestheabsoluteworthofman，isalsothatbywhichhemustbejudged，whoeverthejudgemaybe，andevenbytheSupremeBeing。Morality，then，istherelationofactionstotherelationofactionswill，thatis，totheautonomyofpotentialuniversallegislationbyitsmaxims。Anactionthatisconsistentwiththeautonomyofthewillispermitted；onethatdoesnotagreetherewithisforbidden。Awillwhosemaximsnecessarilycoincidewiththelawsofautonomyisaholywill，goodabsolutely。
Thedependenceofawillnotabsolutelygoodontheprincipleofautonomy（moralnecessitation）isobligation。This，then，cannotbeappliedtoaholybeing。Theobjectivenecessityofactionsfromobligationiscalledduty。
Fromwhathasjustbeensaid，itiseasytoseehowithappensthat，althoughtheconceptionofdutyimpliessubjectiontothelaw，weyetascribeacertaindignityandsublimitytothepersonwhofulfilsallhisduties。Thereisnot，indeed，anysublimityinhim，sofarasheissubjecttothemorallaw；butinasmuchasinregardtothatverylawheislikewisealegislator，andonthataccountalonesubjecttoit，hehassublimity。Wehavealsoshownabovethatneitherfearnorinclination，butsimplyrespectforthelaw，isthespringwhichcangiveactionsamoralworth。Ourownwill，sofaraswesupposeittoactonlyundertheconditionthatitsmaximsarepotentiallyuniversallaws，thisidealwillwhichispossibletousistheproperobjectofrespect；andthedignityofhumanityconsistsjustinthiscapacityofbeinguniversallylegislative，thoughwiththeconditionthatitisitselfsubjecttothissamelegislation。
TheAutonomyoftheWillastheSupremePrincipleofMoralityAutonomyofthewillisthatpropertyofitbywhichitisalawtoitself（independentlyofanypropertyoftheobjectsofvolition）。Theprincipleofautonomythenis：\"Alwayssotochoosethatthesamevolitionshallcomprehendthemaximsofourchoiceasauniversallaw。\"Wecannotprovethatthispracticalruleisanimperative，i。e。，thatthewillofeveryrationalbeingisnecessarilyboundtoitasacondition，byamereanalysisoftheconceptionswhichoccurinit，sinceitisasyntheticalproposition；wemustadvancebeyondthecognitionoftheobjectstoacriticalexaminationofthesubject，thatis，ofthepurepracticalreason，forthissyntheticpropositionwhichcommandsapodeicticallymustbecapableofbeingcognizedwhollyapriori。Thismatter，however，doesnotbelongtothepresentsection。Butthattheprincipleofautonomyinquestionisthesoleprincipleofmoralscanbereadilyshownbymereanalysisoftheconceptionsofmorality。Forbythisanalysiswefindthatitsprinciplemustbeacategoricalimperativeandthatwhatthiscommandsisneithermorenorlessthanthisveryautonomy。