Thesedifficultieshavenotescapedourwriters，who，allthesame，arenottroubledbythem。Theremedy，theysay，istoobeywithoutamurmur：
GodsendsbadkingsinHiswrath，andtheymustbeborneasthescourgesofHeaven。Suchtalkisdoubtlessedifying;butitwouldbemoreinplaceinapulpitthaninapoliticalbook。Whatarewetothinkofadoctorwhopromisesmiracles，andwhosewholeartistoexhortthesufferertopatience？Weknowforourselvesthatwemustputupwithabadgovernmentwhenitisthere;thequestionishowtofindagoodone。7。MIXEDGOVERNMENTSSTRICTLYspeaking，thereisnosuchthingasasimplegovernment。Anisolatedrulermusthavesubordinatemagistrates;apopulargovernmentmusthaveahead。Thereistherefore，inthedistributionoftheexecutivepower，alwaysagradationfromthegreatertothelessernumber，withthedifferencethatsometimesthegreaternumberisdependentonthesmaller，andsometimesthesmalleronthegreater。
Sometimesthedistributionisequal，wheneithertheconstituentpartsareinmutualdependence，asinthegovernmentofEngland，ortheauthorityofeachsectionisindependent，butimperfect，asinPoland。Thislastformisbad;foritsecuresnounityinthegovernment，andtheStateisleftwithoutabondofunion。
Isasimpleoramixedgovernmentthebetter？Politicalwritersarealwaysdebatingthequestion，whichmustbeansweredaswehavealreadyansweredaquestionaboutallformsofgovernment。
Simplegovernmentisbetterinitself，justbecauseitissimple。Butwhentheexecutivepowerisnotsufficientlydependentuponthelegislativepower，i。e。，whentheprinceismorecloselyrelatedtotheSovereignthanthepeopletotheprince，thislackofproportionmustbecuredbythedivisionofthegovernment;forallthepartshavethennolessauthorityoverthesubjects，whiletheirdivisionmakesthemalltogetherlessstrongagainsttheSovereign。
Thesamedisadvantageisalsopreventedbytheappointmentofintermediatemagistrates，wholeavethegovernmententire，andhavetheeffectonlyofbalancingthetwopowersandmaintainingtheirrespectiverights。Governmentisthennotmixed，butmoderated。
Theoppositedisadvantagesmaybesimilarlycured，and，whenthegovernmentistoolax，tribunalsmaybesetuptoconcentrateit。Thisisdoneinalldemocracies。Inthefirstcase，thegovernmentisdividedtomakeitweak;inthesecond，tomakeitstrong：forthemaximaofbothstrengthandweaknessarefoundinsimplegovernments，whilethemixedformsresultinameanstrength。8。THATALLFORMSOFGOVERNMENTDONOTSUITALLCOUNTRIESLIBERTY，notbeingafruitofallclimates，isnotwithinthereachofallpeoples。Themorethisprinciple，laiddownbyMontesquieu，E2isconsidered，themoreitstruthisfelt;themoreitiscombated，themorechanceisgiventoconfirmitbynewproofs。
Inallthegovernmentsthatthereare，thepublicpersonconsumeswithoutproducing。Whencethendoesitgetwhatitconsumes？Fromthelabourofitsmembers。Thenecessitiesofthepublicaresuppliedoutofthesuperfluitiesofindividuals。ItfollowsthatthecivilStatecansubsistonlysolongasmen’slabourbringsthemareturngreaterthantheirneeds。
Theamountofthisexcessisnotthesameinallcountries。Insomeitisconsiderable，inothersmiddling，inyetothersnil，insomeevennegative。Therelationofproducttosubsistencedependsonthefertilityoftheclimate，onthesortoflabourthelanddemands，onthenatureofitsproducts，onthestrengthofitsinhabitants，onthegreaterorlessconsumptiontheyfindnecessary，andonseveralfurtherconsiderationsofwhichthewholerelationismadeup。
Ontheotherside，allgovernmentsarenotofthesamenature：somearelessvoraciousthanothers，andthedifferencesbetweenthemarebasedonthissecondprinciple，thatthefurtherfromtheirsourcethepubliccontributionsareremoved，themoreburdensometheybecome。Thechargeshouldbemeasurednotbytheamountoftheimpositions，butbythepaththeyhavetotravelinordertogetbacktothosefromwhomtheycame。
Whenthecirculationispromptandwell-established，itdoesnotmatterwhethermuchorlittleispaid;thepeopleisalwaysrichand，financiallyspeaking，alliswell。Onthecontrary，howeverlittlethepeoplegives，ifthatlittledoesnotreturntoit，itissoonexhaustedbygivingcontinually：
theStateisthenneverrich，andthepeopleisalwaysapeopleofbeggars。
Itfollowsthat，themorethedistancebetweenpeopleandgovernmentincreases，themoreburdensometributebecomes：thus，inademocracy，thepeoplebearstheleastcharge;inanaristocracy，agreatercharge;and，inmonarchy，theweightbecomesheaviest。Monarchythereforesuitsonlywealthynations;aristocracy，Statesofmiddlingsizeandwealth;anddemocracy，Statesthataresmallandpoor。
Infact，themorewereflect，themorewefindthedifferencebetweenfreeandmonarchicalStatestobethis：intheformer，everythingisusedforthepublicadvantage;inthelatter，thepublicforcesandthoseofindividualsareaffectedbyeachother，andeitherincreasesastheothergrowsweak;finally，insteadofgoverningsubjectstomakethemhappy，despotismmakesthemwretchedinordertogovernthem。
Wefindthen，ineveryclimate，naturalcausesaccordingtowhichtheformofgovernmentwhichitrequirescanbeassigned，andwecanevensaywhatsortofinhabitantsitshouldhave。
Unfriendlyandbarrenlands，wheretheproductdoesnotrepaythelabour，shouldremaindesertanduncultivated，orpeopledonlybysavages;landswheremen’slabourbringsinnomorethantheexactminimumnecessarytosubsistenceshouldbeinhabitedbybarbarouspeoples：insuchplacesallpolityisimpossible。Landswherethesurplusofproductoverlabourisonlymiddlingaresuitableforfreepeoples;thoseinwhichthesoilisabundantandfertileandgivesagreatproductforalittlelabourcallformonarchicalgovernment，inorderthatthesurplusofsuperfluitiesamongthesubjectsmaybeconsumedbytheluxuryoftheprince：foritisbetterforthisexcesstobeabsorbedbythegovernmentthandissipatedamongtheindividuals。Iamawarethatthereareexceptions;buttheseexceptionsthemselvesconfirmtherule，inthatsoonerorlatertheyproducerevolutionswhichrestorethingstothenaturalorder。
Generallawsshouldalwaysbedistinguishedfromindividualcausesthatmaymodifytheireffects。IfalltheSouthwerecoveredwithRepublicsandalltheNorthwithdespoticStates，itwouldbenonethelesstruethat，inpointofclimate，despotismissuitabletohotcountries，barbarismtocoldcountries，andgoodpolitytotemperateregions。Iseealsothat，theprinciplebeinggranted，theremaybedisputesonitsapplication;
itmaybesaidthattherearecoldcountriesthatareveryfertile，andtropicalcountriesthatareveryunproductive。Butthisdifficultyexistsonlyforthosewhodonotconsiderthequestioninallitsaspects。Wemust，asIhavealreadysaid，takelabour，strength，consumption，etc。，intoaccount。
Taketwotractsofequalextent，oneofwhichbringsinfiveandtheotherten。Iftheinhabitantsofthefirstconsumefourandthoseofthesecondnine，thesurplusofthefirstproductwillbeafifthandthatofthesecondatenth。Theratioofthesetwosurpluseswillthenbeinversetothatoftheproducts，andthetractwhichproducesonlyfivewillgiveasurplusdoublethatofthetractwhichproducesten。
Butthereisnoquestionofadoubleproduct，andIthinknoonewouldputthefertilityofcoldcountries，asageneralrule，onanequalitywiththatofhotones。Letus，however，supposethisequalitytoexist：
letus，ifyouwill，regardEnglandasonthesamelevelasSicily，andPolandasEgypt？furthersouth，weshallhaveAfricaandtheIndies;furthernorth，nothingatall。Togetthisequalityofproduct，whatadifferencetheremustbeintillage：inSicily，thereisonlyneedtoscratchtheground;inEngland，howmenmusttoil！But，wheremorehandsareneededtogetthesameproduct，thesuperfluitymustnecessarilybeless。
Consider，besides，thatthesamenumberofmenconsumemuchlessinhotcountries。Theclimaterequiressobrietyforthesakeofhealth;andEuropeanswhotrytolivethereastheywouldathomeallperishofdysenteryandindigestion。\"Weare，\"saysChardin，\"carnivorousanimals，wolves，incomparisonwiththeAsiatics。SomeattributethesobrietyofthePersianstothefactthattheircountryislesscultivated;butitismybeliefthattheircountryaboundslessincommoditiesbecausetheinhabitantsneedless。Iftheirfrugality，\"hegoeson，\"weretheeffectofthenakednessoftheland，onlythepoorwouldeatlittle;buteverybodydoesso。Again，lessormorewouldbeeateninvariousprovinces，accordingtotheland’sfertility;butthesamesobrietyisfoundthroughoutthekingdom。Theyareveryproudoftheirmanneroflife，sayingthatyouhaveonlytolookattheirhuetorecognisehowfaritexcelsthatoftheChristians。Infact，thePersiansareofanevenhue;theirskinsarefair，fineandsmooth;
whilethehueoftheirsubjects，theArmenians，wholiveaftertheEuropeanfashion，isroughandblotchy，andtheirbodiesaregrossandunwieldy。\"
Theneareryougettotheequator，thelesspeopleliveon。Meattheyhardlytouch;rice，maize，curcur，milletandcassavaaretheirordinaryfood。ThereareintheIndiesmillionsofmenwhosesubsistencedoesnotcostahalfpennyaday。EveninEuropewefindconsiderabledifferencesofappetitebetweenNorthernandSouthernpeoples。ASpaniardwillliveforaweekonaGerman’sdinner。Inthecountriesinwhichmenaremorevoracious，luxurythereforeturnsinthedirectionofconsumption。InEngland，luxuryappearsinawell-filledtable;inItaly，youfeastonsugarandflowers。
Luxuryinclothesshowssimilardifferences。Inclimatesinwhichthechangesofseasonarepromptandviolent，menhavebetterandsimplerclothes;
wheretheyclothethemselvesonlyforadornment，whatisstrikingismorethoughtofthanwhatisuseful;clothesthemselvesarethenaluxury。AtNaples，youmayseedailywalkinginthePausilippeummeningold-embroidereduppergarmentsandnothingelse。Itisthesamewithbuildings;magnificenceisthesoleconsiderationwherethereisnothingtofearfromtheair。
InParisandLondon，youdesiretobelodgedwarmlyandcomfortably;inMadrid，youhavesuperbsalons，butnotawindowthatcloses，andyougotobedinamerehole。
Inhotcountriesfoodsaremuchmoresubstantialandsucculent;andthethirddifferencecannotbuthaveaninfluenceonthesecond。WhyaresomanyvegetableseateninItaly？Becausetheretheyaregood，nutritiousandexcellentintaste。InFrance，wheretheyarenourishedonlyonwater，theyarefarfromnutritiousandarethoughtnothingofattable。Theytakeupallthesamenolessground，andcostatleastasmuchpainstocultivate。ItisaprovedfactthatthewheatofBarbary，inotherrespectsinferiortothatofFrance，yieldsmuchmoreflour，andthatthewheatofFranceinturnyieldsmorethanthatofnortherncountries;fromwhichitmaybeinferredthatalikegradationinthesamedirection，fromequatortopole，isfoundgenerally。Butisitnotanobviousdisadvantageforanequalproducttocontainlessnourishment？
Toallthesepointsmaybeaddedanother，whichatoncedependsonandstrengthensthem。Hotcountriesneedinhabitantslessthancoldcountries，andcansupportmoreofthem。Thereisthusadoublesurplus，whichisalltotheadvantageofdespotism。Thegreatertheterritoryoccupiedbyafixednumberofinhabitants，themoredifficultrevoltbecomes，becauserapidorsecretconcertedactionisimpossible，andthegovernmentcaneasilyunmaskprojectsandcutcommunications;butthemoreanumerouspeopleisgatheredtogether，thelesscanthegovernmentusurptheSovereign’splace：thepeople’sleaderscandeliberateassafelyintheirhousesastheprinceincouncil，andthecrowdgathersasrapidlyinthesquaresastheprince’stroopsintheirquarters。Theadvantageoftyrannicalgovernmentthereforeliesinactingatgreatdistances。Withthehelpoftherallying-pointsitestablishes，itsstrength，likethatofthelever，26growswithdistance。Thestrengthofthepeople，ontheotherhand，actsonlywhenconcentrated：whenspreadabroad，itevaporatesandislost，likepowderscatteredontheground，whichcatchesfireonlygrainbygrain。
Theleastpopulouscountriesarethusthefittestfortyranny：fierceanimalsreignonlyindeserts。9。THEMARKSOFAGOODGOVERNMENTTHEquestion\"Whatabsolutelyisthebestgovernment？\"isunanswerableaswellasindeterminate;orrather，thereareasmanygoodanswersastherearepossiblecombinationsintheabsoluteandrelativesituationsofallnations。
Butifitisaskedbywhatsignwemayknowthatagivenpeopleiswellorillgoverned，thatisanothermatter，andthequestion，beingoneoffact，admitsofananswer。
Itisnot，however，answered，becauseeveryonewantstoansweritinhisownway。Subjectsextolpublictranquillity，citizensindividualliberty;
theoneclasspreferssecurityofpossessions，theotherthatofperson;
theoneregardsasthebestgovernmentthatwhichismostsevere，theothermaintainsthatthemildestisthebest;theonewantscrimespunished，theotherwantsthemprevented;theonewantstheStatetobefearedbyitsneighbours，theotherprefersthatitshouldbeignored;theoneiscontentifmoneycirculates，theotherdemandsthatthepeopleshallhavebread。Evenifanagreementwerecometoontheseandsimilarpoints，shouldwehavegotanyfurther？Asmoralqualitiesdonotadmitofexactmeasurement，agreementaboutthemarkdoesnotmeanagreementaboutthevaluation。
Formypart，Iamcontinuallyastonishedthatamarksosimpleisnotrecognised，orthatmenareofsobadfaithasnottoadmitit。Whatistheendofpoliticalassociation？Thepreservationandprosperityofitsmembers。Andwhatisthesurestmarkoftheirpreservationandprosperity？
Theirnumbersandpopulation。Seekthennowhereelsethismarkthatisindispute。Therestbeingequal，thegovernmentunderwhich，withoutexternalaids，withoutnaturalisationorcolonies，thecitizensincreaseandmultiplymost，isbeyondquestionthebest。Thegovernmentunderwhichapeoplewanesanddiminishesistheworst。Calculators，itisleftforyoutocount，tomeasure，tocompare。2710。THEABUSEOFGOVERNMENTANDITSTENDENCYTODEGENERATEAStheparticularwillactsconstantlyinoppositiontothegeneralwill，thegovernmentcontinuallyexertsitselfagainsttheSovereignty。Thegreaterthisexertionbecomes，themoretheconstitutionchanges;and，asthereisinthiscasenoothercorporatewilltocreateanequilibriumbyresistingthewilloftheprince，soonerorlatertheprincemustinevitablysuppresstheSovereignandbreakthesocialtreaty。Thisistheunavoidableandinherentdefectwhich，fromtheverybirthofthebodypolitic，tendsceaselesslytodestroyit，asageanddeathendbydestroyingthehumanbody。
Therearetwogeneralcoursesbywhichgovernmentdegenerates：i。e。，whenitundergoescontraction，orwhentheStateisdissolved。
Governmentundergoescontractionwhenitpassesfromthemanytothefew，thatis，fromdemocracytoaristocracy，andfromaristocracytoroyalty。
Todosoisitsnaturalpropensity。28Ifittookthebackwardcoursefromthefewtothemany，itcouldbesaidthatitwasrelaxed;butthisinversesequenceisimpossible。
Indeed，governmentsneverchangetheirformexceptwhentheirenergyisexhaustedandleavesthemtooweaktokeepwhattheyhave。Ifagovernmentatonceextendeditssphereandrelaxeditsstringency，itsforcewouldbecomeabsolutelynil，anditwouldpersiststillless。Itisthereforenecessarytowindupthespringandtightentheholdasitgivesway：orelsetheStateitsustainswillcometogrief。
ThedissolutionoftheStatemaycomeaboutineitheroftwoways。
First，whentheprinceceasestoadministertheStateinaccordancewiththelaws，andusurpstheSovereignpower。Aremarkablechangethenoccurs：notthegovernment，buttheState，undergoescontraction;ImeanthatthegreatStateisdissolved，andanotherisformedwithinit，composedsolelyofthemembersofthegovernment，whichbecomesfortherestofthepeoplemerelymasterandtyrant。SothatthemomentthegovernmentusurpstheSovereignty，thesocialcompactisbroken，andallprivatecitizensrecoverbyrighttheirnaturalliberty，andareforced，butnotbound，toobey。
Thesamethinghappenswhenthemembersofthegovernmentseverallyusurpthepowertheyshouldexerciseonlyasabody;thisisasgreataninfractionofthelaws，andresultsinevengreaterdisorders。Therearethen，sotospeak，asmanyprincesastherearemagistrates，andtheState，nolessdividedthanthegovernment，eitherperishesorchangesitsform。
WhentheStateisdissolved，theabuseofgovernment，whateveritis，bearsthecommonnameofanarchy。Todistinguish，democracydegeneratesintoochlocracy，andaristocracyintooligarchy;andIwouldaddthatroyaltydegeneratesintotyranny;butthislastwordisambiguousandneedsexplanation。
Invulgarusage，atyrantisakingwhogovernsviolentlyandwithoutregardforjusticeandlaw。Intheexactsense，atyrantisanindividualwhoarrogatestohimselftheroyalauthoritywithouthavingarighttoit。ThisishowtheGreeksunderstoodtheword\"tyrant\"：theyapplieditindifferentlytogoodandbadprinceswhoseauthoritywasnotlegitimate。29Tyrantandusurperarethusperfectlysynonymousterms。
InorderthatImaygivedifferentthingsdifferentnames，Icallhimwhousurpstheroyalauthorityatyrant，andhimwhousurpsthesovereignpoweradespot。Thetyrantishewhothrustshimselfincontrarytothelawstogoverninaccordancewiththelaws;thedespotishewhosetshimselfabovethelawsthemselves。Thusthetyrantcannotbeadespot，butthedespotisalwaysatyrant。11。THEDEATHOFTHEBODYPOLITICSUCHisthenaturalandinevitabletendencyofthebestconstitutedgovernments。IfSpartaandRomeperished，whatStatecanhopetoendureforever？Ifwewouldsetupalong-livedformofgovernment，letusnotevendreamofmakingiteternal。Ifwearetosucceed，wemustnotattempttheimpossible，orflatterourselvesthatweareendowingtheworkofmanwithastabilityofwhichhumanconditionsdonotpermit。
Thebodypolitic，aswellasthehumanbody，beginstodieassoonasitisborn，andcarriesinitselfthecausesofitsdestruction。Butbothmayhaveaconstitutionthatismoreorlessrobustandsuitedtopreservethemalongerorashortertime。Theconstitutionofmanistheworkofnature;thatoftheStatetheworkofart。Itisnotinmen’spowertoprolongtheirownlives;butitisforthemtoprolongasmuchaspossiblethelifeoftheState，bygivingitthebestpossibleconstitution。ThebestconstitutedStatewillhaveanend;butitwillendlaterthananyother，unlesssomeunforeseenaccidentbringsaboutitsuntimelydestruction。
Thelife-principleofthebodypoliticliesinthesovereignauthority。
ThelegislativepoweristheheartoftheState;theexecutivepowerisitsbrain，whichcausesthemovementofalltheparts。Thebrainmaybecomeparalysedandtheindividualstilllive。Amanmayremainanimbecileandlive;butassoonastheheartceasestoperformitsfunctions，theanimalisdead。
TheStatesubsistsbymeansnotofthelaws，butofthelegislativepower。Yesterday’slawisnotbindingto-day;butsilenceistakenfortacitconsent，andtheSovereignisheldtoconfirmincessantlythelawsitdoesnotabrogateasitmight。Allthatithasoncedeclareditselftowillitwillsalways，unlessitrevokesitsdeclaration。
Whythenissomuchrespectpaidtooldlaws？Forthisveryreason。
Wemustbelievethatnothingbuttheexcellenceofoldactsofwillcanhavepreservedthemsolong：iftheSovereignhadnotrecognisedthemasthroughoutsalutary，itwouldhaverevokedthemathousandtimes。Thisiswhy，sofarfromgrowingweak，thelawscontinuallygainnewstrengthinanywellconstitutedState;theprecedentofantiquitymakesthemdailymorevenerable：whilewhereverthelawsgrowweakastheybecomeold，thisprovesthatthereisnolongeralegislativepower，andthattheStateisdead。12。HOWTHESOVEREIGNAUTHORITYMAINTAINSITSELFTHESovereign，havingnoforceotherthanthelegislativepower，actsonlybymeansofthelaws;andthelawsbeingsolelytheauthenticactsofthegeneralwill，theSovereigncannotactsavewhenthepeopleisassembled。Thepeopleinassembly，I
shallbetold，isamerechimera。Itissoto-day，buttwothousandyearsagoitwasnotso。Hasman’snaturechanged？
Theboundsofpossibility，inmoralmatters，arelessnarrowthanweimagine：itisourweaknesses，ourvicesandourprejudicesthatconfinethem。Basesoulshavenobeliefingreatmen;vileslavessmileinmockeryatthenameofliberty。
Letusjudgeofwhatcanbedonebywhathasbeendone。IshallsaynothingoftheRepublicsofancientGreece;buttheRomanRepublicwas，tomymind，agreatState，andthetownofRomeagreattown。ThelastcensusshowedthattherewereinRomefourhundredthousandcitizenscapableofbearingarms，andthelastcomputationofthepopulationoftheEmpireshowedoverfourmillioncitizens，excludingsubjects，foreigners，women，childrenandslaves。
Whatdifficultiesmightnotbesupposedtostandinthewayofthefrequentassemblageofthevastpopulationofthiscapitalanditsneighbourhood。
YetfewweekspassedwithouttheRomanpeoplebeinginassembly，andevenbeingsoseveraltimes。ItexercisednotonlytherightsofSovereignty，butalsoapartofthoseofgovernment。Itdealtwithcertainmatters，andjudgedcertaincases，andthiswholepeoplewasfoundinthepublicmeeting-placehardlylessoftenasmagistratesthanascitizens。
Ifwewentbacktotheearliesthistoryofnations，weshouldfindthatmostancientgovernments，eventhoseofmonarchicalform，suchastheMacedonianandtheFrankish，hadsimilarcouncils。Inanycase，theoneincontestablefactIhavegivenisananswertoalldifficulties;itisgoodlogictoreasonfromtheactualtothepossible。13。THESAME（continued）ITisnotenoughfortheassembledpeopletohaveoncefixedtheconstitutionoftheStatebygivingitssanctiontoabodyoflaw;itisnotenoughforittohavesetupaperpetualgovernment，orprovidedonceforallfortheelectionofmagistrates。Besidestheextraordinaryassembliesunforeseencircumstancesmaydemand，theremustbefixedperiodicalassemblieswhichcannotbeabrogatedorprorogued，sothatontheproperdaythepeopleislegitimatelycalledtogetherbylaw，withoutneedofanyformalsummoning。
But，apartfromtheseassembliesauthorisedbytheirdatealone，everyassemblyofthepeoplenotsummonedbythemagistratesappointedforthatpurpose，andinaccordancewiththeprescribedforms，shouldberegardedasunlawful，andallitsactsasnullandvoid，becausethecommandtoassembleshoulditselfproceedfromthelaw。
Thegreaterorlessfrequencywithwhichlawfulassembliesshouldoccurdependsonsomanyconsiderationsthatnoexactrulesaboutthemcanbegiven。ItcanonlybesaidgenerallythatthestrongerthegovernmentthemoreoftenshouldtheSovereignshowitself。
This，Ishallbetold，maydoforasingletown;butwhatistobedonewhentheStateincludesseveral？Isthesovereignauthoritytobedivided？
Orisittobeconcentratedinasingletowntowhichalltherestaremadesubject？
Neithertheonenortheother，Ireply。First，thesovereignauthorityisoneandsimple，andcannotbedividedwithoutbeingdestroyed。Inthesecondplace，onetowncannot，anymorethanonenation，legitimatelybemadesubjecttoanother，becausetheessenceofthebodypoliticliesinthereconciliationofobedienceandliberty，andthewordssubjectandSovereignareidenticalcorrelativestheideaofwhichmeetsinthesingleword\"citizen。\"
Ianswerfurtherthattheunionofseveraltownsinasinglecityisalwaysbad，andthat，ifwewishtomakesuchaunion，weshouldnotexpecttoavoiditsnaturaldisadvantages。ItisuselesstobringupabusesthatbelongtogreatStatesagainstonewhodesirestoseeonlysmallones;
buthowcansmallStatesbegiventhestrengthtoresistgreatones，asformerlytheGreektownsresistedtheGreatKing，andmorerecentlyHollandandSwitzerlandhaveresistedtheHouseofAustria？
Nevertheless，iftheStatecannotbereducedtotherightlimits，thereremainsstilloneresource;thisis，toallownocapital，tomaketheseatofgovernmentmovefromtowntotown，andtoassemblebyturnineachtheProvincialEstatesofthecountry。
Peopletheterritoryevenly，extendeverywherethesamerights，beartoeveryplaceinitabundanceandlife：bythesemeanswilltheStatebecomeatonceasstrongandaswellgovernedaspossible。Rememberthatthewallsoftownsarebuiltoftheruinsofthehousesofthecountryside。
ForeverypalaceIseeraisedinthecapital，mymind’seyeseesawholecountrymadedesolate。14。THESAME（continued）THEmomentthepeopleislegitimatelyassembledasasovereignbody，thejurisdictionofthegovernmentwhollylapses，theexecutivepowerissuspended，andthepersonofthemeanestcitizenisassacredandinviolableasthatofthefirstmagistrate;forinthepresenceofthepersonrepresented，representativesnolongerexist。
MostofthetumultsthataroseinthecomitiaatRomewereduetoignoranceorneglectofthisrule。Theconsulswereinthemmerelythepresidentsofthepeople;thetribunesweremerespeakers;30thesenatewasnothingatall。
Theseintervalsofsuspension，duringwhichtheprincerecognisesoroughttorecogniseanactualsuperior，havealwaysbeenviewedbyhimwithalarm;andtheseassembliesofthepeople，whicharetheaegisofthebodypoliticandthecurbonthegovernment，haveatalltimesbeenthehorrorofrulers：whothereforeneversparepains，objections，difficulties，andpromises，tostopthecitizensfromhavingthem。Whenthecitizensaregreedy，cowardly，andpusillanimous，andloveeasemorethanliberty，theydonotlongholdoutagainsttheredoubledeffortsofthegovernment;andthus，astheresistingforceincessantlygrows，thesovereignauthorityendsbydisappearing，andmostcitiesfallandperishbeforetheirtime。
Butbetweenthesovereignauthorityandarbitrarygovernmenttheresometimesintervenesameanpowerofwhichsomethingmustbesaid。15。DEPUTIESORREPRESENTATIVESASsoonaspublicserviceceasestobethechiefbusinessofthecitizens，andtheywouldratherservewiththeirmoneythanwiththeirpersons，theStateisnotfarfromitsfall。
Whenitisnecessarytomarchouttowar，theypaytroopsandstayathome：
whenitisnecessarytomeetincouncil，theynamedeputiesandstayathome。Byreasonofidlenessandmoney，theyendbyhavingsoldierstoenslavetheircountryandrepresentativestosellit。
Itisthroughthehustleofcommerceandthearts，throughthegreedyself-interestofprofit，andthroughsoftnessandloveofamenitiesthatpersonalservicesarereplacedbymoneypayments。Mensurrenderapartoftheirprofitsinordertohavetimetoincreasethematleisure。Makegiftsofmoney，andyouwillnotbelongwithoutchains。Thewordfinanceisaslavishword，unknowninthecity-state。Inacountrythatistrulyfree，thecitizensdoeverythingwiththeirownarmsandnothingbymeansofmoney;sofarfrompayingtobeexemptedfromtheirduties，theywouldevenpayfortheprivilegeoffulfillingthemthemselves。Iamfarfromtakingthecommonview：Iholdenforcedlabourtobelessopposedtolibertythantaxes。
ThebettertheconstitutionofaStateis，themoredopublicaffairsencroachonprivateinthemindsofthecitizens。Privateaffairsareevenofmuchlessimportance，becausetheaggregateofthecommonhappinessfurnishesagreaterproportionofthatofeachindividual，sothatthereislessforhimtoseekinparticularcares。Inawell-orderedcityeverymanfliestotheassemblies：underabadgovernmentnoonecarestostirasteptogettothem，becausenooneisinterestedinwhathappensthere，becauseitisforeseenthatthegeneralwillwillnotprevail，andlastlybecausedomesticcaresareall-absorbing。Goodlawsleadtothemakingofbetterones;badonesbringaboutworse。AssoonasanymansaysoftheaffairsoftheStateWhatdoesitmattertome？theStatemaybegivenupforlost。
Thelukewarmnessofpatriotism，theactivityofprivateinterest，thevastnessofStates，conquestandtheabuseofgovernmentsuggestedthemethodofhavingdeputiesorrepresentativesofthepeopleinthenationalassemblies。Thesearewhat，insomecountries，menhavepresumedtocalltheThirdEstate。Thustheindividualinterestoftwoordersisputfirstandsecond;thepublicinterestoccupiesonlythethirdplace。
Sovereignty，forthesamereasonasmakesitinalienable，cannotberepresented;itliesessentiallyinthegeneralwill，andwilldoesnotadmitofrepresentation：itiseitherthesame，orother;thereisnointermediatepossibility。Thedeputiesofthepeople，therefore，arenotandcannotbeitsrepresentatives：theyaremerelyitsstewards，andcancarrythroughnodefinitiveacts。Everylawthepeoplehasnotratifiedinpersonisnullandvoid？is，infact，notalaw。ThepeopleofEnglandregardsitselfasfree;butitisgrosslymistaken;itisfreeonlyduringtheelectionofmembersofparliament。Assoonastheyareelected，slaveryovertakesit，anditisnothing。Theuseitmakesoftheshortmomentsoflibertyitenjoysshowsindeedthatitdeservestolosethem。
Theideaofrepresentationismodern;itcomestousfromfeudalgovernment，fromthatiniquitousandabsurdsystemwhichdegradeshumanityanddishonoursthenameofman。Inancientrepublicsandeveninmonarchies，thepeopleneverhadrepresentatives;theworditselfwasunknown。ItisverysingularthatinRome，wherethetribunesweresosacrosanct，itwasneverevenimaginedthattheycouldusurpthefunctionsofthepeople，andthatinthemidstofsogreatamultitudetheyneverattemptedtopassontheirownauthorityasingleplebiscitum。Wecan，however，formanideaofthedifficultiescausedsometimesbythepeoplebeingsonumerous，fromwhathappenedinthetimeoftheGracchi，whensomeofthecitizenshadtocasttheirvotesfromtheroofsofbuildings。
Whererightandlibertyareeverything，disadvantagescountfornothing。
Amongthiswisepeopleeverythingwasgivenitsjustvalue，itslictorswereallowedtodowhatitstribuneswouldneverhavedaredtoattempt;
forithadnofearthatitslictorswouldtrytorepresentit。
Toexplain，however，inwhatwaythetribunesdidsometimesrepresentit，itisenoughtoconceivehowthegovernmentrepresentstheSovereign。
Lawbeingpurelythedeclarationofthegeneralwill，itisclearthat，intheexerciseofthelegislativepower，thepeoplecannotberepresented;
butinthatoftheexecutivepower，whichisonlytheforcethatisappliedtogivethelaweffect，itbothcanandshouldberepresented。Wethusseethatifwelookedcloselyintothematterweshouldfindthatveryfewnationshaveanylaws。Howeverthatmaybe，itiscertainthatthetribunes，possessingnoexecutivepower，couldneverrepresenttheRomanpeoplebyrightofthepowersentrustedtothem，butonlybyusurpingthoseofthesenate。
InGreece，allthatthepeoplehadtodo，itdidforitself;itwasconstantlyassembledinthepublicsquare。TheGreekslivedinamildclimate;
theyhadnonaturalgreed;slavesdidtheirworkforthem;theirgreatconcernwaswithliberty。Lackingthesameadvantages，howcanyoupreservethesamerights？Yoursevererclimatesaddtoyourneeds;31forhalftheyearyourpublicsquaresareuninhabitable;theflatnessofyourlanguagesunfitsthemforbeingheardintheopenair;yousacrificemoreforprofitthanforliberty，andfearslaverylessthanpoverty。
Whatthen？Islibertymaintainedonlybythehelpofslavery？Itmaybeso。Extremesmeet。Everythingthatisnotinthecourseofnaturehasitsdisadvantages，civilsocietymostofall。Therearesomeunhappycircumstancesinwhichwecanonlykeepourlibertyatothers’expense，andwherethecitizencanbeperfectlyfreeonlywhentheslaveismostaslave。SuchwasthecasewithSparta。Asforyou，modernpeoples，youhavenoslaves，butyouareslavesyourselves;youpayfortheirlibertywithyourown。
Itisinvainthatyouboastofthispreference;Ifindinitmorecowardicethanhumanity。
Idonotmeanbyallthisthatitisnecessarytohaveslaves，orthattherightofslaveryislegitimate：Iammerelygivingthereasonswhymodernpeoples，believingthemselvestobefree，haverepresentatives，whileancientpeopleshadnone。Inanycase，themomentapeopleallowsitselftoberepresented，itisnolongfree：itnolongerexists。
Allthingsconsidered，IdonotseethatitispossiblehenceforthfortheSovereigntopreserveamongustheexerciseofitsrights，unlessthecityisverysmall。Butifitisverysmall，itwillbeconquered？No。
Iwillshowlateronhowtheexternalstrengthofagreatpeople32maybecombinedwiththeconvenientpolityandgoodorderofasmallState。16。THATTHEINSTITUTIONOFGOVERNMENTISNOTACONTRACTTHElegislativepoweroncewellestablished，thenextthingistoestablishsimilarlytheexecutivepower;
forthislatter，whichoperatesonlybyparticularacts，notbeingoftheessenceoftheformer，isnaturallyseparatefromit。WereitpossiblefortheSovereign，assuch，topossesstheexecutivepower，rightandfactwouldbesoconfoundedthatnoonecouldtellwhatwaslawandwhatwasnot;andthebodypolitic，thusdisfigured，wouldsoonfallapreytotheviolenceitwasinstitutedtoprevent。
Asthecitizens，bythesocialcontract，areallequal，allcanprescribewhatallshoulddo，butnoonehasarighttodemandthatanothershalldowhathedoesnotdohimself。Itisstrictlythisright，whichisindispensableforgivingthebodypoliticlifeandmovement，thattheSovereign，ininstitutingthegovernment，confersupontheprince。
Ithasbeenheldthatthisactofestablishmentwasacontractbetweenthepeopleandtherulersitsetsoveritself，？acontractinwhichconditionswerelaiddownbetweenthetwopartiesbindingtheonetocommandandtheothertoobey。Itwillbeadmitted，Iamsure，thatthisisanoddkindofcontracttoenterinto。Butletusseeifthisviewcanbeupheld。
First，thesupremeauthoritycannomorebemodifiedthanitcanbealienated;tolimititistodestroyit。ItisabsurdandcontradictoryfortheSovereigntosetasuperioroveritself;tobinditselftoobeyamasterwouldbetoreturntoabsoluteliberty。
Moreover，itisclearthatthiscontractbetweenthepeopleandsuchandsuchpersonswouldbeaparticularact;andfromthisisfollowsthatitcanbeneitheralawnoranactofSovereignty，andthatconsequentlyitwouldbeillegitimate。
Itisplaintoothatthecontractingpartiesinrelationtoeachotherwouldbeunderthelawofnaturealoneandwhollywithoutguaranteesoftheirmutualundertakings，apositionwhollyatvariancewiththecivilstate。Hewhohasforceathiscommandbeingalwaysinapositiontocontrolexecution，itwouldcometothesamethingifthename\"contract\"weregiventotheactofonemanwhosaidtoanother：\"Igiveyouallmygoods，onconditionthatyougivemebackasmuchofthemasyouplease。\"
ThereisonlyonecontractintheState，andthatistheactofassociation，whichinitselfexcludestheexistenceofasecond。Itisimpossibletoconceiveofanypubliccontractthatwouldnotbeaviolationofthefirst。17。THEINSTITUTIONOFGOVERNMENTUNDERwhatgeneralideathenshouldtheactbywhichgovernmentisinstitutedbeconceivedasfalling？
Iwillbeginbystatingthattheactiscomplex，asbeingcomposedoftwoothers？theestablishmentofthelawanditsexecution。
Bytheformer，theSovereigndecreesthatthereshallbeagoverningbodyestablishedinthisorthatform;thisactisclearlyalaw。
Bythelatter，thepeoplenominatestherulerswhoaretobeentrustedwiththegovernmentthathasbeenestablished。Thisnomination，beingaparticularact，isclearlynotasecondlaw，butmerelyaconsequenceofthefirstandafunctionofgovernment。
Thedifficultyistounderstandhowtherecanbeagovernmentalactbeforegovernmentexists，andhowthepeople，whichisonlySovereignorsubject，can，undercertaincircumstances，becomeaprinceormagistrate。
Itisatthispointthatthereisrevealedoneoftheastonishingpropertiesofthebodypolitic，bymeansofwhichitreconcilesapparentlycontradictoryoperations;forthisisaccomplishedbyasuddenconversionofSovereigntyintodemocracy，sothat，withoutsensiblechange，andmerelybyvirtueofanewrelationofalltoall，thecitizensbecomemagistratesandpassfromgeneraltoparticularacts，fromlegislationtotheexecutionofthelaw。
Thischangedrelationisnospeculativesubtletywithoutinstancesinpractice：ithappenseverydayintheEnglishParliament，where，oncertainoccasions，theLowerHouseresolvesitselfintoGrandCommittee，forthebetterdiscussionofaffairs，andthus，frombeingatonemomentasovereigncourt，becomesatthenextamerecommission;sothatsubsequentlyitreportstoitself，asHouseofCommons，theresultofitsproceedingsinGrandCommittee，anddebatesoveragainunderonenamewhatithasalreadysettledunderanother。
Itis，indeed，thepeculiaradvantageofdemocraticgovernmentthatitcanbeestablishedinactualitybyasimpleactofthegeneralwill。
Subsequently，thisprovisionalgovernmentremainsinpower，ifthisformisadopted，orelseestablishesinthenameoftheSovereignthegovernmentthatisprescribedbylaw;andthusthewholeproceedingisregular。Itisimpossibletosetupgovernmentinanyothermannerlegitimatelyandinaccordancewiththeprinciplessofarlaiddown。18。HOWTOCHECKTHEUSURPATIONSOFGOVERNMENTWHATwehavejustsaidconfirmsChapter16，andmakesitclearthattheinstitutionofgovernmentisnotacontract，butalaw;thatthedepositariesoftheexecutivepowerarenotthepeople’smasters，butitsofficers;thatitcansetthemupandpullthemdownwhenitlikes;thatforthemthereisnoquestionofcontract，butofobedienceandthatintakingchargeofthefunctionstheStateimposesonthemtheyaredoingnomorethanfulfillingtheirdutyascitizens，withouthavingtheremotestrighttoargueabouttheconditions。
Whenthereforethepeoplesetsupanhereditarygovernment，whetheritbemonarchicalandconfinedtoonefamily，oraristocraticandconfinedtoaclass，whatitentersintoisnotanundertaking;theadministrationisgivenaprovisionalform，untilthepeoplechoosestoorderitotherwise。
Itistruethatsuchchangesarealwaysdangerous，andthattheestablishedgovernmentshouldneverbetouchedexceptwhenitcomestobeincompatiblewiththepublicgood;butthecircumspectionthisinvolvesisamaximofpolicyandnotaruleofright，andtheStateisnomoreboundtoleavecivilauthorityinthehandsofitsrulersthanmilitaryauthorityinthehandsofitsgenerals。
Itisalsotruethatitisimpossibletobetoocarefultoobserve，insuchcases，alltheformalitiesnecessarytodistinguisharegularandlegitimateactfromaseditioustumult，andthewillofawholepeoplefromtheclamourofafaction。Hereaboveallnofurtherconcessionshouldbemadetotheuntowardpossibilitythancannot，inthestrictestlogic，berefusedit。Fromthisobligationtheprincederivesagreatadvantageinpreservinghispowerdespitethepeople，withoutitbeingpossibletosayhehasusurpedit;for，seemingtoavailhimselfonlyofhisrights，hefindsitveryeasytoextendthem，andtoprevent，underthepretextofkeepingthepeace，assembliesthataredestinedtothere-establishmentoforder;withtheresultthathetakesadvantageofasilencehedoesnotallowtobebroken，orofirregularitieshecausestobecommitted，toassumethathehasthesupportofthosewhomfearpreventsfromspeaking，andtopunishthosewhodaretospeak。Thusitwasthatthedecemvirs，firstelectedforoneyearandthenkeptoninofficeforasecond，triedtoperpetuatetheirpowerbyforbiddingthecomitiatoassemble;andbythiseasymethodeverygovernmentintheworld，onceclothedwiththepublicpower，soonerorlaterusurpsthesovereignauthority。
TheperiodicalassembliesofwhichIhavealreadyspokenaredesignedtopreventorpostponethiscalamity，aboveallwhentheyneednoformalsummoning;forinthatcase，theprincecannotstopthemwithoutopenlydeclaringhimselfalaw-breakerandanenemyoftheState。
Theopeningoftheseassemblies，whosesoleobjectisthemaintenanceofthesocialtreaty，shouldalwaystaketheformofputtingtwopropositionsthatmaynotbesuppressed，whichshouldbevotedonseparately。
Thefirstis：\"DoesitpleasetheSovereigntopreservethepresentformofgovernment？\"
Thesecondis：\"Doesitpleasethepeopletoleaveitsadministrationinthehandsofthosewhoareactuallyinchargeofit？\"
IamhereassumingwhatIthinkIhaveshown;thatthereisintheStatenofundamentallawthatcannotberevoked，notexcludingthesocialcompactitself;forifallthecitizensassembledofoneaccordtobreakthecompact，itisimpossibletodoubtthatitwouldbeverylegitimatelybroken。GrotiuseventhinksthateachmancanrenouncehismembershipofhisownState，andrecoverhisnaturallibertyandhisgoodsonleavingthecountry。33Itwouldbeindeedabsurdifallthecitizensinassemblycouldnotdowhateachcandobyhimself。
18。ThusatVenicetheCollege，evenintheabsenceoftheDoge，iscalled\"MostSerenePrince。\"
19。ThePalatineofPosen，fatheroftheKingofPoland，DukeofLorraine。
20。Ipreferlibertywithdangertopeacewithslavery。
21。Itisclearthatthewordoptimalesmeant，amongtheancients，notthebest，butthemostpowerful。
22。Itisofgreatimportancethattheformoftheelectionofmagistratesshouldberegulatedbylaw;forifitisleftatthediscretionoftheprince，itisimpossibletoavoidfallingintohereditaryaristocracy，astheRepublicsofVeniceandBerneactuallydid。ThefirstofthesehasthereforelongbeenaStatedissolved;thesecond，however，ismaintainedbytheextremewisdomofthesenate，andformsanhonourableandhighlydangerousexception。
23。Machiavelliwasapropermanandagoodcitizen;but，beingattachedtothecourtoftheMedici，hecouldnothelpveilinghisloveoflibertyinthemidstofhiscountry’soppression。
Thechoiceofhisdetestablehero，CaesarBorgia，clearlyenoughshowshishiddenaim;andthecontradictionbetweentheteachingofthePrinceandthatoftheDiscoursesonLivyandtheHistoryofFlorenceshowsthatthisprofoundpoliticalthinkerhassofarbeenstudiedonlybysuperficialorcorruptreaders。TheCourtofRomesternlyprohibitedhisbook。Icanwellbelieveit;foritisthatCourtitmostclearlyportrays。
24。Tacitus，Histories，i。16。
\"Forthebest，andalsotheshortestwayoffindingoutwhatisgoodandwhatisbadistoconsiderwhatyouwouldhavewishedtohappenornottohappen，hadanotherthanyoubeenEmperor。\"
25。IntheStatesman。
26。ThisdoesnotcontradictwhatIsaidbefore（BookII，ch。9）aboutthedisadvantagesofgreatStates;forwewerethendealingwiththeauthorityofthegovernmentoverthemembers，whileherewearedealingwithitsforceagainstthesubjects。Itsscatteredmembersserveitasrallying-pointsforactionagainstthepeopleatadistance，butithasnorallying-pointfordirectactiononitsmembersthemselves。Thusthelengthoftheleverisitsweaknessintheonecase，anditsstrengthintheother。
27。Onthesameprincipleitshouldbejudgedwhatcenturiesdeservethepreferenceforhumanprosperity。Thoseinwhichlettersandartshaveflourishedhavebeentoomuchadmired，becausethehiddenobjectoftheirculturehasnotbeenfathomed，andtheirfataleffectsnottakenintoaccount。\"ldqueapudimperitoshumanitasvocabatur，cumparsservitutisesset。\"（Foolscalled\"humanity\"whatwasapartofslavery，Tacitus，Agricola，31。）Shallweneverseeinthemaximsbookslaydownthevulgarinterestthatmakestheirwritersspeak？No，whatevertheymaysay，when，despiteitsrenown，acountryisdepopulated，itisnottruethatalliswell，anditisnotenoughthatapoetshouldhaveanincomeof100，000francstomakehisagethebestofall。Lessattentionshouldbepaidtotheapparentreposeandtranquillityoftherulersthantothewell-beingoftheirnationsaswholes，andaboveallofthemostnumerousStates。Ahail-stormlaysseveralcantonswaste，butitrarelymakesafamine。Outbreaksandcivilwarsgiverulersrudeshocks，buttheyarenottherealillsofpeoples，whomayevengetarespite，whilethereisadisputeastowhoshalltyranniseoverthem。Theirtrueprosperityandcalamitiescomefromtheirpermanentcondition：itiswhenthewholeremainscrushedbeneaththeyoke，thatdecaysetsin，andthattherulersdestroythematwill，and\"ubisolitudinemfaciunt，pacemappellant。\"（Wheretheycreatesolitude，theycallitpeace，Tacitus，Agricola，31。）WhenthebickeringsofthegreatdisturbedthekingdomofFrance，andtheCoadjutorofParistookadaggerinhispockettotheParliament，thesethingsdidnotpreventthepeopleofFrancefromprosperingandmultiplyingindignity，easeandfreedom。LongagoGreeceflourishedinthemidstofthemostsavagewars;bloodranintorrents，andyetthewholecountrywascoveredwithinhabitants。Itappeared，saysMachiavelli，thatinthemidstofmurder，proscriptionandcivilwar，ourrepubliconlythrove：thevirtue，moralityandindependenceofthecitizensdidmoretostrengthenitthanalltheirdissensionshaddonetoenfeebleit。A
littledisturbancegivesthesoulelasticity;whatmakestheracetrulyprosperousisnotsomuchpeaceasliberty。
28。TheslowformationandtheprogressoftheRepublicofVeniceinitslagoonsareanotableinstanceofthissequence;anditismostastonishingthat，aftermorethantwelvehundredyears’existence，theVenetiansseemtobestillatthesecondstage，whichtheyreachedwiththeSerrardiConsiglioin1198。AsfortheancientDukeswhoarebroughtupagainstthem，itisproved，whatevertheSquittiniodellalibertàvenetamaysayofthem，thattheywereinnosensesovereigns。
AcasecertaintobecitedagainstmyviewisthatoftheRomanRepublic，which，itwillbesaid，followedexactlytheoppositecourse，andpassedfrommonarchytoaristocracyandfromaristocracytodemocracy。Ibynomeanstakethisviewofit。
WhatRomulusfirstsetupwasamixedgovernment，whichsoondeterioratedintodespotism。Fromspecialcauses，theStatediedanuntimelydeath，asnew-bornchildrensometimesperishwithoutreachingmanhood。TheexpulsionoftheTarquinswastherealperiodofthebirthoftheRepublic。Butatfirstittookonnoconstantform，because，bynotabolishingthepatriciate，itlefthalfitsworkundone。For，bythismeans，hereditaryaristocracy，theworstofalllegitimateformsofadministration，remainedinconflictwithdemocracy，andtheformofthegovernment，asMachiavellihasproved，wasonlyfixedontheestablishmentofthetribunate：
onlythenwasthereatruegovernmentandaveritabledemocracy。Infact，thepeoplewasthennotonlySovereign，butalsomagistrateandjudge;
thesenatewasonlyasubordinatetribunal，totemperandconcentratethegovernment，andtheconsulsthemselves，thoughtheywerepatricians，firstmagistrates，andabsolutegeneralsinwar，wereinRomeitselfnomorethanpresidentsofthepeople。
Fromthatpoint，thegovernmentfolloweditsnaturaltendency，andinclinedstronglytoaristocracy。Thepatriciate，wemaysay，abolisheditself，andthearistocracywasfoundnolongerinthebodyofpatriciansasatVeniceandGenoa，butinthebodyofthesenate，whichwascomposedofpatriciansandplebeians，andeveninthebodyoftribuneswhentheybegantousurpanactivefunction：fornamesdonotaffectfacts，and，whenthepeoplehasrulerswhogovernforit，whatevernametheybear，thegovernmentisanaristocracy。
Theabuseofaristocracyledtothecivilwarsandthetriumvirate。Sulla，JuliusCaesarandAugustusbecameinfactrealmonarchs;
andfinally，underthedespotismofTiberius，theStatewasdissolved。
Romanhistorythenconfirms，insteadofinvalidating，theprincipleIhavelaiddown。
29。\"Omnesenimethabenturetdicunturtyranni，quipotestateutunturperpetuaineacivitatequælibertateusaest\"（CorneliusNepos，LifeofMiltiades）。（Forallthosearecalledandconsideredtyrants，whoholdperpetualpowerinaStatethathasknownliberty。）ItistruethatAristotle（Ethics，Bookviii，chapterx）distinguishesthetyrantfromthekingbythefactthattheformergovernsinhisowninterest，andthelatteronlyforthegoodofhissubjects;butnotonlydidallGreekauthorsingeneralusethewordtyrantinadifferentsense，asappearsmostclearlyinXenophon’sHiero，butalsoitwouldfollowfromAristotle’sdistinctionthat，fromtheverybeginningoftheworld，therehasnotyetbeenasingleking。
30。InnearlythesamesenseasthiswordhasintheEnglishParliament。Thesimilarityofthesefunctionswouldhavebroughttheconsulsandthetribunesintoconflict，evenhadalljurisdictionbeensuspended。
31。ToadoptincoldcountriestheluxuryandeffeminacyoftheEastistodesiretosubmittoitschains;itisindeedtobowtothemfarmoreinevitablyinourcasethanintheirs。
32。Ihadintendedtodothisinthesequeltothiswork，whenindealingwithexternalrelationsIcametothesubjectofconfederations。Thesubjectisquitenew，anditsprincipleshavestilltobelaiddown。
33。Provided，ofcourse，hedoesnotleavetoescapehisobligationsandavoidhavingtoservehiscountryinthehourofneed。Flightinsuchacasewouldbecriminalandpunishable，andwouldbe，notwithdrawal，butdesertion。
Editor’sNotes：E1。Montesquieu，TheSpiritofLaws，III：3
E2。Montesquieu，TheSpiritofLaws，XIV
Rousseau：SocialContract：BookIVBOOKIV1。THATTHEGENERALWILLISINDESTRUCTIBLEASlongasseveralmeninassemblyregardthemselvesasasinglebody，theyhaveonlyasinglewillwhichisconcernedwiththeircommonpreservationandgeneralwell-being。Inthiscase，allthespringsoftheStatearevigorousandsimpleanditsrulesclearandluminous;therearenoembroilmentsorconflictsofinterests;
thecommongoodiseverywhereclearlyapparent，andonlygoodsenseisneededtoperceiveit。Peace，unityandequalityaretheenemiesofpoliticalsubtleties。Menwhoareuprightandsimplearedifficulttodeceivebecauseoftheirsimplicity;luresandingeniouspretextsfailtoimposeuponthem，andtheyarenotevensubtleenoughtobedupes。When，amongthehappiestpeopleintheworld，bandsofpeasantsareseenregulatingaffairsofStateunderanoak，andalwaysactingwisely，canwehelpscorningtheingeniousmethodsofothernations，whichmakethemselvesillustriousandwretchedwithsomuchartandmystery？
AStatesogovernedneedsveryfewlaws;and，asitbecomesnecessarytoissuenewones，thenecessityisuniversallyseen。Thefirstmantoproposethemmerelysayswhatallhavealreadyfelt，andthereisnoquestionoffactionsorintriguesoreloquenceinordertosecurethepassageintolawofwhateveryonehasalreadydecidedtodo，assoonasheissurethattherestwillactwithhim。
Theoristsareledintoerrorbecause，seeingonlyStatesthathavebeenfromthebeginningwronglyconstituted，theyarestruckbytheimpossibilityofapplyingsuchapolicytothem。TheymakegreatgameofalltheabsurditiesacleverrascaloraninsinuatingspeakermightgetthepeopleofParisorLondontobelieve。TheydonotknowthatCromwellwouldhavebeenputto\"thebells\"bythepeopleofBerne，andtheDucdeBeaufortonthetreadmillbytheGenevese。
ButwhenthesocialbondbeginstoberelaxedandtheStatetogrowweak，whenparticularinterestsbegintomakethemselvesfeltandthesmallersocietiestoexerciseaninfluenceoverthelarger，thecommoninterestchangesandfindsopponents：opinionisnolongerunanimous;thegeneralwillceasestobethewillofall;contradictoryviewsanddebatesarise;
andthebestadviceisnottakenwithoutquestion。
Finally，whentheState，ontheeveofruin，maintainsonlyavain，illusoryandformalexistence，whenineveryheartthesocialbondisbroken，andthemeanestinterestbrazenlylaysholdofthesacrednameof\"publicgood，\"thegeneralwillbecomesmute：allmen，guidedbysecretmotives，nomoregivetheirviewsascitizensthaniftheStatehadneverbeen;
andiniquitousdecreesdirectedsolelytoprivateinterestgetpassedunderthenameoflaws。
Doesitfollowfromthisthatthegeneralwillisexterminatedorcorrupted？
Notatall：itisalwaysconstant，unalterableandpure;butitissubordinatedtootherwillswhichencroachuponitssphere。Eachman，indetachinghisinterestfromthecommoninterest，seesclearlythathecannotentirelyseparatethem;buthisshareinthepublicmishapsseemstohimnegligiblebesidetheexclusivegoodheaimsatmakinghisown。Apartfromthisparticulargood，hewillsthegeneralgoodinhisowninterest，asstronglyasanyoneelse。Eveninsellinghisvoteformoney，hedoesnotextinguishinhimselfthegeneralwill，butonlyeludesit。Thefaulthecommitsisthatofchangingthestateofthequestion，andansweringsomethingdifferentfromwhatheisasked。Insteadofsaying，byhisvote，\"ItistotheadvantageoftheState，\"hesays，\"Itisofadvantagetothisorthatmanorpartythatthisorthatviewshouldprevail。\"Thusthelawofpublicorderinassembliesisnotsomuchtomaintaininthemthegeneralwillastosecurethatthequestionbealwaysputtoit，andtheansweralwaysgivenbyit。
IcouldheresetdownmanyreflectionsonthesimplerightofvotingineveryactofSovereignty？arightwhichnoonecantakefromthecitizens？andalsoontherightofstatingviews，makingproposals，dividinganddiscussing，whichthegovernmentisalwaysmostcarefultoleavesolelytoitsmembers，butthisimportantsubjectwouldneedatreatisetoitself，anditisimpossibletosayeverythinginasinglework。2。VOTINGITmaybeseen，fromthelastchapter，thatthewayinwhichgeneralbusinessismanagedmaygiveaclearenoughindicationoftheactualstateofmoralsandthehealthofthebodypolitic。Themoreconcertreignsintheassemblies，thatis，theneareropinionapproachesunanimity，thegreateristhedominanceofthegeneralwill。Ontheotherhand，longdebates，dissensionsandtumultproclaimtheascendancyofparticularinterestsandthedeclineoftheState。
Thisseemslessclearwhentwoormoreordersenterintotheconstitution，aspatriciansandplebeiansdidatRome;forquarrelsbetweenthesetwoordersoftendisturbedthecomitia，eveninthebestdaysoftheRepublic。
Buttheexceptionisratherapparentthanreal;forthen，throughthedefectthatisinherentinthebodypolitic，therewere，sotospeak，twoStatesinone，andwhatisnottrueofthetwotogetheristrueofeitherseparately。
Indeed，eveninthemoststormytimes，theplebiscitaofthepeople，whentheSenatedidnotinterferewiththem，alwayswentthroughquietlyandbylargemajorities。Thecitizenshavingbutoneinterest，thepeoplehadbutasinglewill。
Attheotherextremityofthecircle，unanimityrecurs;thisisthecasewhenthecitizens，havingfallenintoservitude，havelostbothlibertyandwill。Fearandflatterythenchangevotesintoacclamation;deliberationceases，andonlyworshipormaledictionisleft。SuchwasthevilemannerinwhichthesenateexpresseditsviewsundertheEmperors。Itdidsosometimeswithabsurdprecautions。Tacitusobservesthat，underOtho，thesenators，whiletheyheapedcursesonVitellius，contrivedatthesametimetomakeadeafeningnoise，inorderthat，shouldheeverbecometheirmaster，hemightnotknowwhateachofthemhadsaid。
Onthesevariousconsiderationsdependtherulesbywhichthemethodsofcountingvotesandcomparingopinionsshouldberegulated，accordingasthegeneralwillismoreorlesseasytodiscover，andtheStatemoreorlessinitsdecline。