Butstillitmustbewithhisownconsent-i。e。，theconsentofthemajority，givingiteitherbythemselvesortheirrepresentativeschosenbythem；forifanyoneshallclaimapowertolayandlevytaxesonthepeoplebyhisownauthority，andwithoutsuchconsentofthepeople，hetherebyinvadesthefundamentallawofproperty，andsubvertstheendofgovernment。ForwhatpropertyhaveIinthatwhichanothermaybyrighttakewhenhepleasestohimself？
141。Fourthly。Thelegislativecannottransferthepowerofmakinglawstoanyotherhands，foritbeingbutadelegatedpowerfromthepeople，theywhohaveitcannotpassitovertoothers。Thepeoplealonecanappointtheformofthecommonwealth，whichisbyconstitutingthelegislative，andappointinginwhosehandsthatshallbe。Andwhenthepeoplehavesaid，\"Wewillsubmit，andbegovernedbylawsmadebysuchmen，andinsuchforms，\"nobodyelsecansayothermenshallmakelawsforthem；norcantheybeboundbyanylawsbutsuchasareenactedbythosewhomtheyhavechosenandauthorisedtomakelawsforthem。
142。ThesearetheboundswhichthetrustthatisputinthembythesocietyandthelawofGodandNaturehavesettothelegislativepowerofeverycommonwealth，inallformsofgovernment。First：Theyaretogovernbypromulgatedestablishedlaws，nottobevariedinparticularcases，buttohaveoneruleforrichandpoor，forthefavouriteatCourt，andthecountrymanatplough。Secondly：Theselawsalsooughttobedesignedfornootherendultimatelybutthegoodofthepeople。Thirdly：Theymustnotraisetaxesonthepropertyofthepeoplewithouttheconsentofthepeoplegivenbythemselvesortheirdeputies。Andthisproperlyconcernsonlysuchgovernmentswherethelegislativeisalwaysinbeing，oratleastwherethepeoplehavenotreservedanypartofthelegislativetodeputies，tobefromtimetotimechosenbythemselves。Fourthly：Legislativeneithermustnorcantransferthepowerofmakinglawstoanybodyelse，orplaceitanywherebutwherethepeoplehave。
ChapterXII
TheLegislative，Executive，andFederativePoweroftheCommonwealth143。THElegislativepoweristhatwhichhasarighttodirecthowtheforceofthecommonwealthshallbeemployedforpreservingthecommunityandthemembersofit。Becausethoselawswhichareconstantlytobeexecuted，andwhoseforceisalwaystocontinue，maybemadeinalittletime，thereforethereisnoneedthatthelegislativeshouldbealwaysinbeing，nothavingalwaysbusinesstodo。Andbecauseitmaybetoogreattemptationtohumanfrailty，apttograspatpower，forthesamepersonswhohavethepowerofmakinglawstohavealsointheirhandsthepowertoexecutethem，wherebytheymayexemptthemselvesfromobediencetothelawstheymake，andsuitthelaw，bothinitsmakingandexecution，totheirownprivateadvantage，andtherebycometohaveadistinctinterestfromtherestofthecommunity，contrarytotheendofsocietyandgovernment。Thereforeinwell-orderedcommonwealths，wherethegoodofthewholeissoconsideredasitought，thelegislativepowerisputintothehandsofdiverspersonswho，dulyassembled，havebythemselves，orjointlywithothers，apowertomakelaws，whichwhentheyhavedone，beingseparatedagain，theyarethemselvessubjecttothelawstheyhavemade；whichisanewandneartieuponthemtotakecarethattheymakethemforthepublicgood。
144。Butbecausethelawsthatareatonce，andinashorttimemade，haveaconstantandlastingforce，andneedaperpetualexecution，oranattendancethereunto，thereforeitisnecessarythereshouldbeapoweralwaysinbeingwhichshouldseetotheexecutionofthelawsthataremade，andremaininforce。Andthusthelegislativeandexecutivepowercomeoftentobeseparated。
145。Thereisanotherpowerineverycommonwealthwhichonemaycallnatural，becauseitisthatwhichanswerstothepowereverymannaturallyhadbeforeheenteredintosociety。Forthoughinacommonwealththemembersofitaredistinctpersons，still，inreferencetooneanother，and，assuch，aregovernedbythelawsofthesociety，yet，inreferencetotherestofmankind，theymakeonebody，whichis，aseverymemberofitbeforewas，stillinthestateofNaturewiththerestofmankind，sothatthecontroversiesthathappenbetweenanymanofthesocietywiththosethatareoutofitaremanagedbythepublic，andaninjurydonetoamemberoftheirbodyengagesthewholeinthereparationofit。SothatunderthisconsiderationthewholecommunityisonebodyinthestateofNatureinrespectofallotherstatesorpersonsoutofitscommunity。
146。This，therefore，containsthepowerofwarandpeace，leaguesandalliances，andallthetransactionswithallpersonsandcommunitieswithoutthecommonwealth，andmaybecalledfederativeifanyonepleases。Sothethingbeunderstood，Iamindifferentastothename。
147。Thesetwopowers，executiveandfederative，thoughtheybereallydistinctinthemselves，yetonecomprehendingtheexecutionofthemunicipallawsofthesocietywithinitselfuponallthatarepartsofit，theotherthemanagementofthesecurityandinterestofthepublicwithoutwithallthosethatitmayreceivebenefitordamagefrom，yettheyarealwaysalmostunited。Andthoughthisfederativepowerinthewellorillmanagementofitbeofgreatmomenttothecommonwealth，yetitismuchlesscapabletobedirectedbyantecedent，standing，positivelawsthantheexecutive，andsomustnecessarilybelefttotheprudenceandwisdomofthosewhosehandsitisin，tobemanagedforthepublicgood。Forthelawsthatconcernsubjectsoneamongstanother，beingtodirecttheiractions，maywellenoughprecedethem。Butwhatistobedoneinreferencetoforeignersdependingmuchupontheiractions，andthevariationofdesignsandinterests，mustbeleftingreatparttotheprudenceofthosewhohavethispowercommittedtothem，tobemanagedbythebestoftheirskillfortheadvantageofthecommonwealth。
148。Though，asIsaid，theexecutiveandfederativepowerofeverycommunitybereallydistinctinthemselves，yettheyarehardlytobeseparatedandplacedatthesametimeinthehandsofdistinctpersons。Forbothofthemrequiringtheforceofthesocietyfortheirexercise，itisalmostimpracticabletoplacetheforceofthecommonwealthindistinctandnotsubordinatehands，orthattheexecutiveandfederativepowershouldbeplacedinpersonsthatmightactseparately，wherebytheforceofthepublicwouldbeunderdifferentcommands，whichwouldbeaptsometimeorothertocausedisorderandruin。
ChapterXIII
OftheSubordinationofthePowersoftheCommonwealth149。THOUGHinaconstitutedcommonwealthstandinguponitsownbasisandactingaccordingtoitsownnature-thatis，actingforthepreservationofthecommunity，therecanbebutonesupremepower，whichisthelegislative，towhichalltherestareandmustbesubordinate，yetthelegislativebeingonlyafiduciarypowertoactforcertainends，thereremainsstillinthepeopleasupremepowertoremoveoralterthelegislative，whentheyfindthelegislativeactcontrarytothetrustreposedinthem。Forallpowergivenwithtrustfortheattaininganendbeinglimitedbythatend，wheneverthatendismanifestlyneglectedoropposed，thetrustmustnecessarilybeforfeited，andthepowerdevolveintothehandsofthosethatgaveit，whomayplaceitanewwheretheyshallthinkbestfortheirsafetyandsecurity。Andthusthecommunityperpetuallyretainsasupremepowerofsavingthemselvesfromtheattemptsanddesignsofanybody，evenoftheirlegislators，whenevertheyshallbesofoolishorsowickedastolayandcarryondesignsagainstthelibertiesandpropertiesofthesubject。Fornomanorsocietyofmenhavingapowertodeliveruptheirpreservation，orconsequentlythemeansofit，totheabsolutewillandarbitrarydominionofanother，wheneveranyoneshallgoabouttobringthemintosuchaslavishcondition，theywillalwayshavearighttopreservewhattheyhavenotapowertopartwith，andtoridthemselvesofthosewhoinvadethisfundamental，sacred，andunalterablelawofself-preservationforwhichtheyenteredintosociety。Andthusthecommunitymaybesaidinthisrespecttobealwaysthesupremepower，butnotasconsideredunderanyformofgovernment，becausethispowerofthepeoplecannevertakeplacetillthegovernmentbedissolved。
150。Inallcaseswhilstthegovernmentsubsists，thelegislativeisthesupremepower。Forwhatcangivelawstoanothermustneedsbesuperiortohim，andsincethelegislativeisnootherwiselegislativeofthesocietybutbytherightithastomakelawsforalltheparts，andeverymemberofthesocietyprescribingrulestotheiractions，theyaretransgressed，thelegislativemustneedsbethesupreme，andallotherpowersinanymembersorpartsofthesocietyderivedfromandsubordinatetoit。
151。Insomecommonwealthswherethelegislativeisnotalwaysinbeing，andtheexecutiveisvestedinasinglepersonwhohasalsoashareinthelegislative，therethatsingleperson，inaverytolerablesense，mayalsobecalledsupreme；notthathehasinhimselfallthesupremepower，whichisthatoflaw-making，butbecausehehasinhimthesupremeexecutionfromwhomallinferiormagistratesderivealltheirseveralsubordinatepowers，or，atleast，thegreatestpartofthem；havingalsonolegislativesuperiortohim，therebeingnolawtobemadewithouthisconsent，whichcannotbeexpectedshouldeversubjecthimtotheotherpartofthelegislative，heisproperlyenoughinthissensesupreme。Butyetitistobeobservedthatthoughoathsofallegianceandfealtyaretakentohim，itisnottohimassupremelegislator，butassupremeexecutorofthelawmadebyajointpowerofhimwithothers，allegiancebeingnothingbutanobedienceaccordingtolaw，which，whenheviolates，hehasnorighttoobedience，norcanclaimitotherwisethanasthepublicpersonvestedwiththepowerofthelaw，andsoistobeconsideredastheimage，phantom，orrepresentativeofthecommonwealth，actedbythewillofthesocietydeclaredinitslaws，andthushehasnowill，nopower，butthatofthelaw。Butwhenhequitsthisrepresentation，thispublicwill，andactsbyhisownprivatewill，hedegradeshimself，andisbutasingleprivatepersonwithoutpowerandwithoutwill；themembersowingnoobediencebuttothepublicwillofthesociety。
152。Theexecutivepowerplacedanywherebutinapersonthathasalsoashareinthelegislativeisvisiblysubordinateandaccountabletoit，andmaybeatpleasurechangedanddisplaced；sothatitisnotthesupremeexecutivepowerthatisexemptfromsubordination，butthesupremeexecutivepowervestedinone，whohavingashareinthelegislative，hasnodistinctsuperiorlegislativetobesubordinateandaccountableto，fartherthanhehimselfshalljoinandconsent，sothatheisnomoresubordinatethanhehimselfshallthinkfit，whichonemaycertainlyconcludewillbebutverylittle。Ofotherministerialandsubordinatepowersinacommonwealthweneednotspeak，theybeingsomultipliedwithinfinitevarietyinthedifferentcustomsandconstitutionsofdistinctcommonwealths，thatitisimpossibletogiveaparticularaccountofthemall。Onlythusmuchwhichisnecessarytoourpresentpurposewemaytakenoticeofconcerningthem，thattheyhavenomannerofauthority，anyofthem，beyondwhatisbypositivegrantandcommissiondelegatedtothem，andareallofthemaccountabletosomeotherpowerinthecommonwealth。
153。Itisnotnecessary-no，norsomuchasconvenient-thatthelegislativeshouldbealwaysinbeing；butabsolutelynecessarythattheexecutivepowershould，becausethereisnotalwaysneedofnewlawstobemade，butalwaysneedofexecutionofthelawsthataremade。Whenthelegislativehathputtheexecutionofthelawstheymakeintootherhands，theyhaveapowerstilltoresumeitoutofthosehandswhentheyfindcause，andtopunishforanymal-administrationagainstthelaws。Thesameholdsalsoinregardofthefederativepower，thatandtheexecutivebeingbothministerialandsubordinatetothelegislative，which，ashasbeenshown，inaconstitutedcommonwealthisthesupreme，thelegislativealsointhiscasebeingsupposedtoconsistofseveralpersons；forifitbeasinglepersonitcannotbutbealwaysinbeing，andsowill，assupreme，naturallyhavethesupremeexecutivepower，togetherwiththelegislative，mayassembleandexercisetheirlegislativeatthetimesthateithertheiroriginalconstitutionortheirownadjournmentappoints，orwhentheyplease，ifneitherofthesehathappointedanytime，ortherebenootherwayprescribedtoconvokethem。Forthesupremepowerbeingplacedinthembythepeople，itisalwaysinthem，andtheymayexerciseitwhentheyplease，unlessbytheiroriginalconstitutiontheyarelimitedtocertainseasons，orbyanactoftheirsupremepowertheyhaveadjournedtoacertaintime，andwhenthattimecomestheyhavearighttoassembleandactagain。
154。Ifthelegislative，oranypartofit，beofrepresentatives，chosenforthattimebythepeople，whichafterwardsreturnintotheordinarystateofsubjects，andhavenoshareinthelegislativebutuponanewchoice，thispowerofchoosingmustalsobeexercisedbythepeople，eitheratcertainappointedseasons，orelsewhentheyaresummonedtoit；and，inthislattercase，thepowerofconvokingthelegislativeisordinarilyplacedintheexecutive，andhasoneofthesetwolimitationsinrespectoftime：-thateithertheoriginalconstitutionrequirestheirassemblingandactingatcertainintervals；andthentheexecutivepowerdoesnothingbutministeriallyissuedirectionsfortheirelectingandassemblingaccordingtodueforms；orelseitislefttohisprudencetocallthembynewelectionswhentheoccasionsorexigenciesofthepublicrequiretheamendmentofoldormakingofnewlaws，ortheredressorpreventionofanyinconvenienciesthatlieonorthreatenthepeople。
155。Itmaybedemandedhere，whatiftheexecutivepower，beingpossessedoftheforceofthecommonwealth，shallmakeuseofthatforcetohinderthemeetingandactingofthelegislative，whentheoriginalconstitutionorthepublicexigenciesrequireit？Isay，usingforceuponthepeople，withoutauthority，andcontrarytothetrustputinhimthatdoesso，isastateofwarwiththepeople，whohavearighttoreinstatetheirlegislativeintheexerciseoftheirpower。Forhavingerectedalegislativewithanintenttheyshouldexercisethepowerofmakinglaws，eitheratcertainsettimes，orwhenthereisneedofit，whentheyarehinderedbyanyforcefromwhatissonecessarytothesociety，andwhereinthesafetyandpreservationofthepeopleconsists，thepeoplehavearighttoremoveitbyforce。Inallstatesandconditionsthetrueremedyofforcewithoutauthorityistoopposeforcetoit。Theuseofforcewithoutauthorityalwaysputshimthatusesitintoastateofwarastheaggressor，andrendershimliabletobetreatedaccordingly。
156。Thepowerofassemblinganddismissingthelegislative，placedintheexecutive，givesnottheexecutiveasuperiorityoverit，butisafiduciarytrustplacedinhimforthesafetyofthepeopleinacasewheretheuncertaintyandvariablenessofhumanaffairscouldnotbearasteadyfixedrule。Foritnotbeingpossiblethatthefirstframersofthegovernmentshouldbyanyforesightbesomuchmastersoffutureeventsastobeabletoprefixsojustperiodsofreturnanddurationtotheassembliesofthelegislative，inalltimestocome，thatmightexactlyansweralltheexigenciesofthecommonwealth，thebestremedycouldbefoundforthisdefectwastotrustthistotheprudenceofonewhowasalwaystobepresent，andwhosebusinessitwastowatchoverthepublicgood。
Constant，frequentmeetingsofthelegislative，andlongcontinuationsoftheirassemblies，withoutnecessaryoccasion，couldnotbutbeburdensometothepeople，andmustnecessarilyintimeproducemoredangerousinconveniencies，andyetthequickturnofaffairsmightbesometimessuchastoneedtheirpresenthelp；anydelayoftheirconveningmightendangerthepublic；andsometimes，too，theirbusinessmightbesogreatthatthelimitedtimeoftheirsittingmightbetooshortfortheirwork，androbthepublicofthatbenefitwhichcouldbehadonlyfromtheirmaturedeliberation。
What，then，couldbedoneinthiscasetopreventthecommunityfrombeingexposedsometimeorothertoimminenthazardononesideortheother，byfixedintervalsandperiodssettothemeetingandactingofthelegislative，buttoentrustittotheprudenceofsomewho，beingpresentandacquaintedwiththestateofpublicaffairs，mightmakeuseofthisprerogativeforthepublicgood？Andwhereelsecouldthisbesowellplacedasinhishandswhowasentrustedwiththeexecutionofthelawsforthesameend？Thus，supposingtheregulationoftimesfortheassemblingandsittingofthelegislativenotsettledbytheoriginalconstitution，itnaturallyfellintothehandsoftheexecutive；notasanarbitrarypowerdependingonhisgoodpleasure，butwiththistrustalwaystohaveitexercisedonlyforthepublicweal，astheoccurrencesoftimesandchangeofaffairsmightrequire。Whethersettledperiodsoftheirconvening，oralibertylefttotheprinceforconvokingthelegislative，orperhapsamixtureofboth，haththeleastinconvenienceattendingit，itisnotmybusinessheretoinquire，butonlytoshowthat，thoughtheexecutivepowermayhavetheprerogativeofconvokinganddissolvingsuchconventionsofthelegislative，yetitisnottherebysuperiortoit。
157。Thingsofthisworldareinsoconstantafluxthatnothingremainslonginthesamestate。Thuspeople，riches，trade，power，changetheirstations；flourishingmightycitiescometoruin，andproveintimeneglecteddesolatecorners，whilstotherunfrequentedplacesgrowintopopulouscountriesfilledwithwealthandinhabitants。Butthingsnotalwayschangingequally，andprivateinterestoftenkeepingupcustomsandprivilegeswhenthereasonsofthemareceased，itoftencomestopassthatingovernmentswherepartofthelegislativeconsistsofrepresentativeschosenbythepeople，thatintractoftimethisrepresentationbecomesveryunequalanddisproportionatetothereasonsitwasatfirstestablishedupon。Towhatgrossabsurditiesthefollowingofcustomwhenreasonhasleftitmaylead，wemaybesatisfiedwhenweseethebarenameofatown，ofwhichthereremainsnotsomuchastheruins，wherescarcesomuchhousingasasheepcote，ormoreinhabitantsthanashepherdistobefound，sendasmanyrepresentativestothegrandassemblyoflaw-makersasawholecountynumerousinpeopleandpowerfulinriches。Thisstrangersstandamazedat，andeveryonemustconfessneedsaremedy；thoughmostthinkithardtofindone，becausetheconstitutionofthelegislativebeingtheoriginalandsupremeactofthesociety，antecedenttoallpositivelawsinit，anddependingwhollyonthepeople，noinferiorpowercanalterit。And，therefore，thepeoplewhenthelegislativeisonceconstituted，havinginsuchagovernmentaswehavebeenspeakingofnopowertoactaslongasthegovernmentstands，thisinconvenienceisthoughtincapableofaremedy。
158。Saluspopulisupremalexiscertainlysojustandfundamentalarule，thathewhosincerelyfollowsitcannotdangerouslyerr。If，therefore，theexecutivewhohasthepowerofconvokingthelegislative，observingratherthetrueproportionthanfashionofrepresentation，regulatesnotbyoldcustom，buttruereason，thenumberofmembersinallplaces，thathavearighttobedistinctlyrepresented，whichnopartofthepeople，howeverincorporated，canpretendto，butinproportiontotheassistancewhichitaffordstothepublic，itcannotbejudgedtohavesetupanewlegislative，buttohaverestoredtheoldandtrueone，andtohaverectifiedthedisorderswhichsuccessionoftimehadinsensiblyaswellasinevitablyintroduced；foritbeingtheinterestaswellasintentionofthepeopletohaveafairandequalrepresentative，whoeverbringsitnearesttothatisanundoubtedfriendtoandestablisherofthegovernment，andcannotmisstheconsentandapprobationofthecommunity；prerogativebeingnothingbutapowerinthehandsoftheprincetoprovideforthepublicgoodinsuchcaseswhich，dependinguponunforeseenanduncertainoccurrences，certainandunalterablelawscouldnotsafelydirect。Whatsoevershallbedonemanifestlyforthegoodofthepeople，andestablishingthegovernmentuponitstruefoundationsis，andalwayswillbe，justprerogative。
Thepoweroferectingnewcorporations，andtherewithnewrepresentatives，carrieswithitasuppositionthatintimethemeasuresofrepresentationmightvary，andthosehaveajustrighttoberepresentedwhichbeforehadnone；andbythesamereason，thoseceasetohavearight，andbetooinconsiderableforsuchaprivilege，whichbeforehadit。Itisnotachangefromthepresentstatewhich，perhaps，corruptionordecayhasintroduced，thatmakesaninroaduponthegovernment，butthetendencyofittoinjureoroppressthepeople，andtosetuponepartorpartywithadistinctionfromandanunequalsubjectionoftherest。Whatsoevercannotbutbeacknowledgedtobeofadvantagetothesocietyandpeopleingeneral，uponjustandlastingmeasures，willalways，whendone，justifyitself；andwheneverthepeopleshallchoosetheirrepresentativesuponjustandundeniablyequalmeasures，suitabletotheoriginalframeofthegovernment，itcannotbedoubtedtobethewillandactofthesociety，whoeverpermittedorproposedtothemsotodo。
ChapterXIV
OfPrerogative159。WHEREthelegislativeandexecutivepowerareindistincthands，astheyareinallmoderatedmonarchiesandwell-framedgovernments，therethegoodofthesocietyrequiresthatseveralthingsshouldbelefttothediscretionofhimthathastheexecutivepower。Forthelegislatorsnotbeingabletoforeseeandprovidebylawsforallthatmaybeusefultothecommunity，theexecutorofthelaws，havingthepowerinhishands，hasbythecommonlawofNaturearighttomakeuseofitforthegoodofthesociety，inmanycaseswherethemunicipallawhasgivennodirection，tillthelegislativecanconvenientlybeassembledtoprovideforit；nay，manythingstherearewhichthelawcanbynomeansprovidefor，andthosemustnecessarilybelefttothediscretionofhimthathastheexecutivepowerinhishands，tobeorderedbyhimasthepublicgoodandadvantageshallrequire；nay，itisfitthatthelawsthemselvesshouldinsomecasesgivewaytotheexecutivepower，orrathertothisfundamentallawofNatureandgovernment-viz。，thatasmuchasmaybeallthemembersofthesocietyaretobepreserved。Forsincemanyaccidentsmayhappenwhereinastrictandrigidobservationofthelawsmaydoharm，asnottopulldownaninnocentman’shousetostopthefirewhenthenexttoitisburning；andamanmaycomesometimeswithinthereachofthelaw，whichmakesnodistinctionofpersons，byanactionthatmaydeserverewardandpardon；itisfittherulershouldhaveapowerinmanycasestomitigatetheseverityofthelaw，andpardonsomeoffenders，sincetheendofgovernmentbeingthepreservationofallasmuchasmaybe，eventheguiltyaretobesparedwhereitcanprovenoprejudicetotheinnocent。
160。Thispowertoactaccordingtodiscretionforthepublicgood，withouttheprescriptionofthelawandsometimesevenagainstit，isthatwhichiscalledprerogative；forsinceinsomegovernmentsthelaw-makingpowerisnotalwaysinbeingandisusuallytoonumerous，andsotooslowforthedispatchrequisitetoexecution，andbecause，also，itisimpossibletoforeseeandsobylawstoprovideforallaccidentsandnecessitiesthatmayconcernthepublic，ormakesuchlawsaswilldonoharm，iftheyareexecutedwithaninflexiblerigouronalloccasionsanduponallpersonsthatmaycomeintheirway，thereforethereisalatitudelefttotheexecutivepowertodomanythingsofchoicewhichthelawsdonotprescribe。
161。Thispower，whilstemployedforthebenefitofthecommunityandsuitablytothetrustandendsofthegovernment，isundoubtedprerogative，andneverisquestioned。Forthepeopleareveryseldomorneverscrupulousorniceinthepointorquestioningofprerogativewhilstitisinanytolerabledegreeemployedfortheuseitwasmeant-thatis，thegoodofthepeople，andnotmanifestlyagainstit。
Butiftherecomestobeaquestionbetweentheexecutivepowerandthepeopleaboutathingclaimedasaprerogative，thetendencyoftheexerciseofsuchprerogative，tothegoodorhurtofthepeople，willeasilydecidethatquestion。
162。Itiseasytoconceivethatintheinfancyofgovernments，whencommonwealthsdifferedlittlefromfamiliesinnumberofpeople，theydifferedfromthemtoobutlittleinnumberoflaws；andthegovernorsbeingasthefathersofthem，watchingoverthemfortheirgood，thegovernmentwasalmostallprerogative。Afewestablishedlawsservedtheturn，andthediscretionandcareoftherulersuppledtherest。Butwhenmistakeorflatteryprevailedwithweakprinces，tomakeuseofthispowerforprivateendsoftheirownandnotforthepublicgood，thepeoplewerefain，byexpresslaws，togetprerogativedeterminedinthosepointswhereintheyfounddisadvantagefromit，anddeclaredlimitationsofprerogativeinthosecaseswhichtheyandtheirancestorshadleftintheutmostlatitudetothewisdomofthoseprinceswhomadenootherbutarightuseofit-thatis，forthegoodoftheirpeople。
163。Andthereforetheyhaveaverywrongnotionofgovernmentwhosaythatthepeoplehaveencroachedupontheprerogativewhentheyhavegotanypartofittobedefinedbypositivelaws。Forinsodoingtheyhavenotpulledfromtheprinceanythingthatofrightbelongedtohim，butonlydeclaredthatthatpowerwhichtheyindefinitelyleftinhisorhisancestors’hands，tobeexercisedfortheirgood，wasnotathingtheyintendedhim，whenheuseditotherwise。Fortheendofgovernmentbeingthegoodofthecommunity，whatsoeveralterationsaremadeinittendingtothatendcannotbeanencroachmentuponanybody；sincenobodyingovernmentcanhavearighttendingtoanyotherend；andthoseonlyareencroachmentswhichprejudiceorhinderthepublicgood。Thosewhosayotherwisespeakasiftheprincehadadistinctandseparateinterestfromthegoodofthecommunity，andwasnotmadeforit；
therootandsourcefromwhichspringalmostallthoseevilsanddisorderswhichhappeninkinglygovernments。Andindeed，ifthatbeso，thepeopleunderhisgovernmentarenotasocietyofrationalcreatures，enteredintoacommunityfortheirmutualgood，suchashavesetrulersoverthemselves，toguardandpromotethatgood；butaretobelookedonasaherdofinferiorcreaturesunderthedominionofamaster，whokeepsthemandworksthemforhisownpleasureorprofit。Ifmenweresovoidofreasonandbrutishastoenterintosocietyuponsuchterms，prerogativemightindeedbe，whatsomemenwouldhaveit，anarbitrarypowertodothingshurtfultothepeople。
164。Butsincearationalcreaturecannotbesupposed，whenfree，toputhimselfintosubjectiontoanotherforhisownharm（thoughwherehefindsagoodandawiserulerhemaynot，perhaps，thinkiteithernecessaryorusefultosetpreciseboundstohispowerinallthings），prerogativecanbenothingbutthepeople’spermittingtheirrulerstodoseveralthingsoftheirownfreechoicewherethelawwassilent，andsometimestooagainstthedirectletterofthelaw，forthepublicgoodandtheiracquiescinginitwhensodone。Forasagoodprince，whoismindfulofthetrustputintohishandsandcarefulofthegoodofhispeople，cannothavetoomuchprerogative-
thatis，powertodogood，soaweakandillprince，whowouldclaimthatpowerhispredecessorsexercised，withoutthedirectionofthelaw，asaprerogativebelongingtohimbyrightofhisoffice，whichhemayexerciseathispleasuretomakeorpromoteaninterestdistinctfromthatofthepublic，givesthepeopleanoccasiontoclaimtheirrightandlimitthatpower，which，whilstitwasexercisedfortheirgood，theywerecontentshouldbetacitlyallowed。
165。AndthereforehethatwilllookintothehistoryofEnglandwillfindthatprerogativewasalwayslargestinthehandsofourwisestandbestprinces，becausethepeopleobservingthewholetendencyoftheiractionstobethepublicgood，orifanyhumanfrailtyormistake（forprincesarebutmen，madeasothers）
appearedinsomesmalldeclinationsfromthatend，yetitwasvisiblethemainoftheirconducttendedtonothingbutthecareofthepublic。Thepeople，therefore，findingreasontobesatisfiedwiththeseprinces，whenevertheyactedwithout，orcontrarytotheletterofthelaw，acquiescedinwhattheydid，andwithouttheleastcomplaint，letthemenlargetheirprerogativeastheypleased，judgingrightlythattheydidnothinghereintotheprejudiceoftheirlaws，sincetheyactedconformablytothefoundationandendofalllaws-thepublicgood。
166。SuchGod-likeprinces，indeed，hadsometitletoarbitrarypowerbythatargumentthatwouldproveabsolutemonarchythebestgovernment，asthatwhichGodHimselfgovernstheuniverseby，becausesuchkingspartakeofHiswisdomandgoodness。Uponthisisfoundedthatsaying，\"Thatthereignsofgoodprinceshavebeenalwaysmostdangeroustothelibertiesoftheirpeople。\"Forwhentheirsuccessors，managingthegovernmentwithdifferentthoughts，woulddrawtheactionsofthosegoodrulersintoprecedentandmakethemthestandardoftheirprerogative-asifwhathadbeendoneonlyforthegoodofthepeoplewasarightinthemtodofortheharmofthepeople，iftheysopleased-ithasoftenoccasionedcontest，andsometimespublicdisorders，beforethepeoplecouldrecovertheiroriginalrightandgetthattobedeclarednottobeprerogativewhichtrulywasneverso；sinceitisimpossibleanybodyinthesocietyshouldeverhavearighttodothepeopleharm，thoughitbeverypossibleandreasonablethatthepeopleshouldnotgoabouttosetanyboundstotheprerogativeofthosekingsorrulerswhothemselvestransgressednottheboundsofthepublicgood。For\"prerogativeisnothingbutthepowerofdoingpublicgoodwithoutarule。\"
167。ThepowerofcallingparliamentsinEngland，astoprecisetime，place，andduration，iscertainlyaprerogativeoftheking，butstillwiththistrust，thatitshallbemadeuseofforthegoodofthenationastheexigenciesofthetimesandvarietyofoccasionshallrequire。Foritbeingimpossibletoforeseewhichshouldalwaysbethefittestplaceforthemtoassemblein，andwhatthebestseason，thechoiceofthesewasleftwiththeexecutivepower，asmightbebestsubservienttothepublicgoodandbestsuittheendsofparliament。
168。Theoldquestionwillbeaskedinthismatterofprerogative，\"Butwhoshallbejudgewhenthispowerismadearightuseof？\"I
answer：Betweenanexecutivepowerinbeing，withsuchaprerogative，andalegislativethatdependsuponhiswillfortheirconvening，therecanbenojudgeonearth。Astherecanbenonebetweenthelegislativeandthepeople，shouldeithertheexecutiveorthelegislative，whentheyhavegotthepowerintheirhands，design，orgoabouttoenslaveordestroythem，thepeoplehavenootherremedyinthis，asinallothercaseswheretheyhavenojudgeonearth，buttoappealtoHeaven；fortherulersinsuchattempts，exercisingapowerthepeopleneverputintotheirhands，whocanneverbesupposedtoconsentthatanybodyshouldruleoverthemfortheirharm，dothatwhichtheyhavenotarighttodo。Andwherethebodyofthepeople，oranysingleman，aredeprivedoftheirright，orareundertheexerciseofapowerwithoutright，havingnoappealonearththeyhavealibertytoappealtoHeavenwhenevertheyjudgethecauseofsufficientmoment。Andtherefore，thoughthepeoplecannotbejudge，soastohave，bytheconstitutionofthatsociety，anysuperiorpowertodetermineandgiveeffectivesentenceinthecase，yettheyhavereservedthatultimatedeterminationtothemselveswhichbelongstoallmankind，wherethereliesnoappealonearth，byalawantecedentandparamounttoallpositivelawsofmen，whethertheyhavejustcausetomaketheirappealtoHeaven。Andthisjudgementtheycannotpartwith，itbeingoutofaman’spowersotosubmithimselftoanotherastogivehimalibertytodestroyhim；GodandNatureneverallowingamansotoabandonhimselfastoneglecthisownpreservation。Andsincehecannottakeawayhisownlife，neithercanhegiveanotherpowertotakeit。Norletanyonethinkthislaysaperpetualfoundationfordisorder；forthisoperatesnottilltheinconvenienceissogreatthatthemajorityfeelit，andarewearyofit，andfindanecessitytohaveitamended。Andthistheexecutivepower，orwiseprinces，neverneedcomeinthedangerof；
anditisthethingofallotherstheyhavemostneedtoavoid，as，ofallothers，themostperilous。
ChapterXV
OfPaternal，PoliticalandDespoticalPower，ConsideredTogether169。THOUGHIhavehadoccasiontospeakoftheseseparatelybefore，yetthegreatmistakesoflateaboutgovernmenthaving，asI
suppose，arisenfromconfoundingthesedistinctpowersonewithanother，itmaynotperhapsbeamisstoconsiderthemheretogether。
170。First，then，paternalorparentalpowerisnothingbutthatwhichparentshaveovertheirchildrentogovernthem，forthechildren’sgood，tilltheycometotheuseofreason，orastateofknowledge，whereintheymaybesupposedcapabletounderstandthatrule，whetheritbethelawofNatureorthemunicipallawoftheircountry，theyaretogovernthemselvesby-capable，Isay，toknowit，aswellasseveralothers，wholiveasfreemenunderthatlaw。TheaffectionandtendernessGodhathplantedinthebreastsofparentstowardstheirchildrenmakesitevidentthatthisisnotintendedtobeaseverearbitrarygovernment，butonlyforthehelp，instruction，andpreservationoftheiroffspring。Buthappenasitwill，thereis，asIhaveproved，noreasonwhyitshouldbethoughttoextendtolifeanddeath，atanytime，overtheirchildren，morethanoveranybodyelse，orkeepthechildinsubjectiontothewillofhisparentswhengrowntoamanandtheperfectuseofreason，anyfartherthanashavingreceivedlifeandeducationfromhisparentsobligeshimtorespect，honour，gratitude，assistance，andsupport，allhislife，tobothfatherandmother。Andthus，itistrue，thepaternalisanaturalgovernment，butnotatallextendingitselftotheendsandjurisdictionsofthatwhichispolitical。Thepowerofthefatherdothnotreachatalltothepropertyofthechild，whichisonlyinhisowndisposing。
171。Secondly，politicalpoweristhatpowerwhicheverymanhavinginthestateofNaturehasgivenupintothehandsofthesociety，andthereintothegovernorswhomthesocietyhathsetoveritself，withthisexpressortacittrust，thatitshallbeemployedfortheirgoodandthepreservationoftheirproperty。Nowthispower，whicheverymanhasinthestateofNature，andwhichhepartswithtothesocietyinallsuchcaseswherethesocietycansecurehim，istousesuchmeansforthepreservingofhisownpropertyashethinksgoodandNatureallowshim；andtopunishthebreachofthelawofNatureinotherssoas（accordingtothebestofhisreason）maymostconducetothepreservationofhimselfandtherestofmankind；
sothattheendandmeasureofthispower，whenineveryman’shands，inthestateofNature，beingthepreservationofallofhissociety-thatis，allmankindingeneral-itcanhavenootherendormeasure，wheninthehandsofthemagistrate，buttopreservethemembersofthatsocietyintheirlives，liberties，andpossessions，andsocannotbeanabsolute，arbitrarypowerovertheirlivesandfortunes，whichareasmuchaspossibletobepreserved；butapowertomakelaws，andannexsuchpenaltiestothemasmaytendtothepreservationofthewhole，bycuttingoffthoseparts，andthoseonly，whicharesocorruptthattheythreatenthesoundandhealthy，withoutwhichnoseverityislawful。Andthispowerhasitsoriginalonlyfromcompactandagreementandthemutualconsentofthosewhomakeupthecommunity。
172。Thirdly，despoticalpowerisanabsolute，arbitrarypoweronemanhasoveranother，totakeawayhislifewheneverhepleases；andthisisapowerwhichneitherNaturegives，forithasmadenosuchdistinctionbetweenonemanandanother，norcompactcanconvey。Forman，nothavingsuchanarbitrarypoweroverhisownlife，cannotgiveanothermansuchapoweroverit，butitistheeffectonlyofforfeiturewhichtheaggressormakesofhisownlifewhenheputshimselfintothestateofwarwithanother。Forhavingquittedreason，whichGodhathgiventobetherulebetwixtmanandman，andthepeaceablewayswhichthatteaches，andmadeuseofforcetocompasshisunjustendsuponanotherwherehehasnoright，herendershimselfliabletobedestroyedbyhisadversarywheneverhecan，asanyothernoxiousandbrutishcreaturethatisdestructivetohisbeing。
Andthuscaptives，takeninajustandlawfulwar，andsuchonly，aresubjecttoadespoticalpower，which，asitarisesnotfromcompact，soneitherisitcapableofany，butisthestateofwarcontinued。Forwhatcompactcanbemadewithamanthatisnotmasterofhisownlife？Whatconditioncanheperform？Andifhebeonceallowedtobemasterofhisownlife，thedespotical，arbitrarypowerofhismasterceases。Hethatismasterofhimselfandhisownlifehasaright，too，tothemeansofpreservingit；sothatassoonascompactenters，slaveryceases，andhesofarquitshisabsolutepowerandputsanendtothestateofwarwhoentersintoconditionswithhiscaptive。
173。Naturegivesthefirstofthese-viz。，paternalpowertoparentsforthebenefitoftheirchildrenduringtheirminority，tosupplytheirwantofabilityandunderstandinghowtomanagetheirproperty。（BypropertyImustbeunderstoodhere，asinotherplaces，tomeanthatpropertywhichmenhaveintheirpersonsaswellasgoods。）Voluntaryagreementgivesthesecond-viz。，politicalpowertogovernors，forthebenefitoftheirsubjects，tosecuretheminthepossessionanduseoftheirproperties。Andforfeituregivesthethird-despoticalpowertolordsfortheirownbenefitoverthosewhoarestrippedofallproperty。
174。Hethatshallconsiderthedistinctriseandextent，andthedifferentendsoftheseseveralpowers，willplainlyseethatpaternalpowercomesasfarshortofthatofthemagistrateasdespoticalexceedsit；andthatabsolutedominion，howeverplaced，issofarfrombeingonekindofcivilsocietythatitisasinconsistentwithitasslaveryiswithproperty。Paternalpowerisonlywhereminoritymakesthechildincapabletomanagehisproperty；politicalwheremenhavepropertyintheirowndisposal；anddespoticaloversuchashavenopropertyatall。
ChapterXVI
OfConquest175。THOUGHgovernmentscanoriginallyhavenootherrisethanthatbeforementioned，norpolitiesbefoundedonanythingbuttheconsentofthepeople，yetsuchhavebeenthedisordersambitionhasfilledtheworldwith，thatinthenoiseofwar，whichmakessogreatapartofthehistoryofmankind，thisconsentislittletakennoticeof；and，therefore，manyhavemistakentheforceofarmsfortheconsentofthepeople，andreckonconquestasoneoftheoriginalsofgovernment。Butconquestisasfarfromsettingupanygovernmentasdemolishingahouseisfrombuildinganewoneintheplace。
Indeed，itoftenmakeswayforanewframeofacommonwealthbydestroyingtheformer；but，withouttheconsentofthepeople，cannevererectanewone。
176。Thattheaggressor，whoputshimselfintothestateofwarwithanother，andunjustlyinvadesanotherman’sright，can，bysuchanunjustwar，nevercometohavearightovertheconquered，willbeeasilyagreedbyallmen，whowillnotthinkthatrobbersandpirateshavearightofempireoverwhomsoevertheyhaveforceenoughtomaster，orthatmenareboundbypromiseswhichunlawfulforceextortsfromthem。Shouldarobberbreakintomyhouse，and，withadaggeratmythroat，makemesealdeedstoconveymyestatetohim，wouldthisgivehimanytitle？Justsuchatitlebyhisswordhasanunjustconquerorwhoforcesmeintosubmission。Theinjuryandthecrimeisequal，whethercommittedbythewearerofacrownorsomepettyvillain。Thetitleoftheoffenderandthenumberofhisfollowersmakenodifferenceintheoffence，unlessitbetoaggravateit。Theonlydifferenceis，greatrobberspunishlittleonestokeepthemintheirobedience；butthegreatonesarerewardedwithlaurelsandtriumphs，becausetheyaretoobigfortheweakhandsofjusticeinthisworld，andhavethepowerintheirownpossessionwhichshouldpunishoffenders。Whatismyremedyagainstarobberthatsobrokeintomyhouse？Appealtothelawforjustice。
Butperhapsjusticeisdenied，orIamcrippledandcannotstir；
robbed，andhavenotthemeanstodoit。IfGodhastakenawayallmeansofseekingremedy，thereisnothingleftbutpatience。Butmyson，whenable，mayseekthereliefofthelaw，whichIamdenied；
heorhissonmayrenewhisappealtillherecoverhisright。Buttheconquered，ortheirchildren，havenocourt-noarbitratoronearthtoappealto。Thentheymayappeal，asJephthadid，toHeaven，andrepeattheirappealtilltheyhaverecoveredthenativerightoftheirancestors，whichwastohavesuchalegislativeoverthemasthemajorityshouldapproveandfreelyacquiescein。Ifitbeobjectedthiswouldcauseendlesstrouble，Ianswer，nomorethanjusticedoes，wheresheliesopentoallthatappealtoher。Hethattroubleshisneighbourwithoutacauseispunishedforitbythejusticeofthecourtheappealsto。AndhethatappealstoHeavenmustbesurehehasrightonhisside，andaright，too，thatisworththetroubleandcostoftheappeal，ashewillansweratatribunalthatcannotbedeceived，andwillbesuretoretributetoeveryoneaccordingtothemischiefshehathcreatedtohisfellow-subjects-thatis，anypartofmankind。Fromwhenceitisplainthathethatconquersinanunjustwarcantherebyhavenotitletothesubjectionandobedienceoftheconquered。
177。Butsupposingvictoryfavourstherightside，letusconsideraconquerorinalawfulwar，andseewhatpowerhegets，andoverwhom。
First，itisplainhegetsnopowerbyhisconquestoverthosethatconqueredwithhim。Theythatfoughtonhissidecannotsufferbytheconquest，butmust，atleast，beasmuchfreemenastheywerebefore。Andmostcommonlytheyserveuponterms，andonconditiontosharewiththeirleader，andenjoyapartofthespoilandotheradvantagesthatattendtheconqueringsword，or，atleast，haveapartofthesubduedcountrybestoweduponthem。Andtheconqueringpeoplearenot，Ihope，tobeslavesbyconquest，andweartheirlaurelsonlytoshowtheyaresacrificestotheirleader’striumph。Theythatfoundabsolutemonarchyuponthetitleoftheswordmaketheirheroes，whoarethefoundersofsuchmonarchies，arrant\"draw-can-sirs，\"andforgettheyhadanyofficersandsoldiersthatfoughtontheirsideinthebattlestheywon，orassistedtheminthesubduing，orsharedinpossessingthecountriestheymastered。WearetoldbysomethattheEnglishmonarchyisfoundedintheNormanConquest，andthatourprinceshavetherebyatitletoabsolutedominion，which，ifitweretrue（asbythehistoryitappearsotherwise），andthatWilliamhadarighttomakewaronthisisland，yethisdominionbyconquestcouldreachnofartherthantotheSaxonsandBritonsthatweretheninhabitantsofthiscountry。TheNormansthatcamewithhimandhelpedtoconquer，andalldescendedfromthem，arefreemenandnosubjectsbyconquest，letthatgivewhatdominionitwill。AndifIoranybodyelseshallclaimfreedomasderivedfromthem，itwillbeveryhardtoprovethecontrary；anditisplain，thelawthathasmadenodistinctionbetweentheoneandtheotherintendsnotthereshouldbeanydifferenceintheirfreedomorprivileges。
178。Butsupposing，whichseldomhappens，thattheconquerorsandconqueredneverincorporateintoonepeopleunderthesamelawsandfreedom；letusseenextwhatpoweralawfulconquerorhasoverthesubdued，andthatIsayispurelydespotical。Hehasanabsolutepoweroverthelivesofthosewho，byanunjustwar，haveforfeitedthem，butnotoverthelivesorfortunesofthosewhoengagednotinthewar，noroverthepossessionsevenofthosewhowereactuallyengagedinit。
179。Secondly，Isay，then，theconquerorgetsnopowerbutonlyoverthosewhohaveactuallyassisted，concurred，orconsentedtothatunjustforcethatisusedagainsthim。Forthepeoplehavinggiventotheirgovernorsnopowertodoanunjustthing，suchasistomakeanunjustwar（fortheyneverhadsuchapowerinthemselves），theyoughtnottobechargedasguiltyoftheviolenceandinjusticethatiscommittedinanunjustwaranyfartherthantheyactuallyabetit，nomorethantheyaretobethoughtguiltyofanyviolenceoroppressiontheirgovernorsshoulduseuponthepeoplethemselvesoranypartoftheirfellow-subjects，theyhavingempoweredthemnomoretotheonethantotheother。Conquerors，itistrue，seldomtroublethemselvestomakethedistinction，buttheywillinglypermittheconfusionofwartosweepalltogether；butyetthisaltersnottheright；fortheconqueror’spoweroverthelivesoftheconqueredbeingonlybecausetheyhaveusedforcetodoormaintainaninjustice，hecanhavethatpoweronlyoverthosewhohaveconcurredinthatforce；alltherestareinnocent，andhehasnomoretitleoverthepeopleofthatcountrywhohavedonehimnoinjury，andsohavemadenoforfeitureoftheirlives，thanhehasoveranyotherwho，withoutanyinjuriesorprovocations，haveliveduponfairtermswithhim。
180。Thirdly，thepoweraconquerorgetsoverthoseheovercomesinajustwarisperfectlydespotical；hehasanabsolutepoweroverthelivesofthosewho，byputtingthemselvesinastateofwar，haveforfeitedthem，buthehasnottherebyarightandtitletotheirpossessions。ThisIdoubtnotbutatfirstsightwillseemastrangedoctrine，itbeingsoquitecontrarytothepracticeoftheworld；
therebeingnothingmorefamiliarinspeakingofthedominionofcountriesthantosaysuchanoneconqueredit，asifconquest，withoutanymoreado，conveyedarightofpossession。Butwhenweconsiderthatthepracticeofthestrongandpowerful，howuniversalsoeveritmaybe，isseldomtheruleofright，howeveritbeonepartofthesubjectionoftheconquerednottoargueagainsttheconditionscutouttothembytheconqueringswords。
181。Thoughinallwartherebeusuallyacomplicationofforceanddamage，andtheaggressorseldomfailstoharmtheestatewhenheusesforceagainstthepersonsofthosehemakeswarupon，yetitistheuseofforceonlythatputsamanintothestateofwar。Forwhetherbyforcehebeginstheinjury，orelsehavingquietlyandbyfrauddonetheinjury，herefusestomakereparation，andbyforcemaintainsit，whichisthesamethingasatfirsttohavedoneitbyforce；itistheunjustuseofforcethatmakesthewar。Forhethatbreaksopenmyhouseandviolentlyturnsmeoutofdoors，orhavingpeaceablygotin，byforcekeepsmeout，does，ineffect，thesamething；supposingweareinsuchastatethatwehavenocommonjudgeonearthwhomImayappealto，andtowhomwearebothobligedtosubmit，forofsuchIamnowspeaking。Itistheunjustuseofforce，then，thatputsamanintothestateofwarwithanother，andtherebyhethatisguiltyofitmakesaforfeitureofhislife。Forquittingreason，whichistherulegivenbetweenmanandman，andusingforce，thewayofbeasts，hebecomesliabletobedestroyedbyhimheusesforceagainst，asanysavageravenousbeastthatisdangeroustohisbeing。
182。Butbecausethemiscarriagesofthefatherarenofaultsofthechildren，whomayberationalandpeaceable，notwithstandingthebrutishnessandinjusticeofthefather，thefather，byhismiscarriagesandviolence，canforfeitbuthisownlife，andinvolvesnothischildreninhisguiltordestruction。HisgoodswhichNature，thatwilleththepreservationofallmankindasmuchasispossible，hathmadetobelongtothechildrentokeepthemfromperishing，dostillcontinuetobelongtohischildren。Forsupposingthemnottohavejoinedinthewareitherthroughinfancyorchoice，theyhavedonenothingtoforfeitthem，norhastheconqueroranyrighttotakethemawaybythebarerightofhavingsubduedhimthatbyforceattemptedhisdestruction，though，perhaps，hemayhavesomerighttothemtorepairthedamageshehassustainedbythewar，andthedefenceofhisownright，whichhowfaritreachestothepossessionsoftheconqueredweshallseeby-and-by；sothathethatbyconquesthasarightoveraman’sperson，todestroyhimifhepleases，hasnottherebyarightoverhisestatetopossessandenjoyit。Foritisthebrutalforcetheaggressorhasusedthatgiveshisadversaryarighttotakeawayhislifeanddestroyhim，ifhepleases，asanoxiouscreature；butitisdamagesustainedthatalonegiveshimtitletoanotherman’sgoods；
forthoughImaykillathiefthatsetsonmeinthehighway，yetI
maynot（whichseemsless）takeawayhismoneyandlethimgo；thiswouldberobberyonmyside。Hisforce，andthestateofwarheputhimselfin，madehimforfeithislife，butgavemenotitletohisgoods。Theright，then，ofconquestextendsonlytothelivesofthosewhojoinedinthewar，butnottotheirestates，butonlyinordertomakereparationforthedamagesreceivedandthechargesofthewar，andthat，too，withreservationoftherightoftheinnocentwifeandchildren。
183。Lettheconquerorhaveasmuchjusticeonhissideascouldbesupposed，hehasnorighttoseizemorethanthevanquishedcouldforfeit；hislifeisatthevictor’smercy，andhisserviceandgoodshemayappropriatetomakehimselfreparation；buthecannottakethegoodsofhiswifeandchildren，theytoohadatitletothegoodsheenjoyed，andtheirsharesintheestatehepossessed。Forexample，IinthestateofNature（andallcommonwealthsareinthestateofNatureonewithanother）haveinjuredanotherman，andrefusingtogivesatisfaction，itiscometoastateofwarwhereinmydefendingbyforcewhatIhadgottenunjustlymakesmetheaggressor。Iamconquered；mylife，itistrue，asforfeit，isatmercy，butnotmywife’sandchildren’s。Theymadenotthewar，norassistedinit。Icouldnotforfeittheirlives，theywerenotminetoforfeit。Mywifehadashareinmyestate，thatneithercouldI
forfeit。Andmychildrenalso，beingbornofme，hadarighttobemaintainedoutofmylabourorsubstance。Herethenisthecase：Theconquerorhasatitletoreparationfordamagesreceived，andthechildrenhaveatitletotheirfather’sestatefortheirsubsistence。Forastothewife’sshare，whetherherownlabourorcompactgaveheratitletoit，itisplainherhusbandcouldnotforfeitwhatwashers。Whatmustbedoneinthecase？Ianswer：ThefundamentallawofNaturebeingthatall，asmuchasmaybe，shouldbepreserved，itfollowsthatiftherebenotenoughfullytosatisfyboth-viz。，fortheconqueror’slossesandchildren’smaintenance，hethathathandtosparemustremitsomethingofhisfullsatisfaction，andgivewaytothepressingandpreferabletitleofthosewhoareindangertoperishwithoutit。
184。Butsupposingthechargeanddamagesofthewararetobemadeuptotheconquerortotheutmostfarthing，andthatthechildrenofthevanquished，spoiledofalltheirfather’sgoods，aretobelefttostarveandperish，yetthesatisfyingofwhatshall，onthisscore，beduetotheconquerorwillscarcegivehimatitletoanycountryheshallconquer。Forthedamagesofwarcanscarceamounttothevalueofanyconsiderabletractoflandinanypartoftheworld，whereallthelandispossessed，andnonelieswaste。AndifIhavenottakenawaytheconqueror’slandwhich，beingvanquished，itisimpossibleIshould，scarceanyotherspoilIhavedonehimcanamounttothevalueofmine，supposingitofanextentanywaycomingnearwhatIhadoverrunofhis，andequallycultivatedtoo。Thedestructionofayear’sproductortwo（foritseldomreachesfourorfive）istheutmostspoilthatusuallycanbedone。Forastomoney，andsuchrichesandtreasuretakenaway，thesearenoneofNature’sgoods，theyhavebutaphantasticalimaginaryvalue；Naturehasputnosuchuponthem。TheyareofnomoreaccountbyherstandardthantheWampompekeoftheAmericanstoanEuropeanprince，orthesilvermoneyofEuropewouldhavebeenformerlytoanAmerican。Andfiveyears’
productisnotworththeperpetualinheritanceofland，whereallispossessedandnoneremainswaste，tobetakenupbyhimthatisdisseised，whichwillbeeasilygranted，ifonedobuttakeawaytheimaginaryvalueofmoney，thedisproportionbeingmorethanbetweenfiveandfivethousand；though，atthesametime，halfayear’sproductismoreworththantheinheritancewhere，therebeingmorelandthantheinhabitantspossessandmakeuseof，anyonehaslibertytomakeuseofthewaste。Buttheirconquerorstakelittlecaretopossessthemselvesofthelandsofthevanquished。NodamagethereforethatmeninthestateofNature（asallprincesandgovernmentsareinreferencetooneanother）sufferfromoneanothercangiveaconquerorpowertodispossesstheposterityofthevanquished，andturnthemoutofthatinheritancewhichoughttobethepossessionofthemandtheirdescendantstoallgenerations。Theconquerorindeedwillbeapttothinkhimselfmaster；anditistheveryconditionofthesubduednottobeabletodisputetheirright。But，ifthatbeall，itgivesnoothertitlethanwhatbareforcegivestothestrongerovertheweaker；and，bythisreason，hethatisstrongestwillhavearighttowhateverhepleasestoseizeon。
185。Overthose，then，thatjoinedwithhiminthewar，andoverthoseofthesubduedcountrythatopposedhimnot，andtheposterityevenofthosethatdid，theconqueror，eveninajustwar，hath，byhisconquest，norightofdominion。Theyarefreefromanysubjectiontohim，andiftheirformergovernmentbedissolved，theyareatlibertytobeginanderectanothertothemselves。
186。Theconqueror，itistrue，usuallybytheforcehehasoverthem，compelsthem，withaswordattheirbreasts，tostooptohisconditions，andsubmittosuchagovernmentashepleasestoaffordthem；buttheinquiryis，whatrighthehastodoso？Ifitbesaidtheysubmitbytheirownconsent，thenthisallowstheirownconsenttobenecessarytogivetheconqueroratitletoruleoverthem。Itremainsonlytobeconsideredwhetherpromises，extortedbyforce，withoutright，canbethoughtconsent，andhowfartheybind。TowhichIshallsay，theybindnotatall；becausewhatsoeveranothergetsfrommebyforce，Istillretaintherightof，andheisobligedpresentlytorestore。Hethatforcesmyhorsefrommeoughtpresentlytorestorehim，andIhavestillarighttoretakehim。Bythesamereason，hethatforcedapromisefrommeoughtpresentlytorestoreit-i。e。，quitmeoftheobligationofit；orImayresumeitmyself-i。e。，choosewhetherIwillperformit。ForthelawofNaturelayinganobligationonme，onlybytherulessheprescribes，cannotobligemebytheviolationofherrules；suchistheextortinganythingfrommebyforce。Nordoesitatallalterthecase，tosayIgavemypromise，nomorethanitexcusestheforce，andpassestheright，whenIputmyhandinmypocketanddelivermypursemyselftoathiefwhodemandsitwithapistolatmybreast。
187。Fromallwhichitfollowsthatthegovernmentofaconqueror，imposedbyforceonthesubdued，againstwhomhehadnorightofwar，orwhojoinednotinthewaragainsthim，wherehehadright，hasnoobligationuponthem。
188。Butletussupposethatallthemenofthatcommunitybeingallmembersofthesamebodypolitic，maybetakentohavejoinedinthatunjustwar，whereintheyaresubdued，andsotheirlivesareatthemercyoftheconqueror。
189。Isaythisconcernsnottheirchildrenwhoareintheirminority。Forsinceafatherhathnot，inhimself，apoweroverthelifeorlibertyofhischild，noactofhiscanpossiblyforfeitit；
sothatthechildren，whatevermayhavehappenedtothefathers，arefreemen，andtheabsolutepoweroftheconquerorreachesnofartherthanthepersonsofthementhatweresubduedbyhim，anddieswiththem；andshouldhegovernthemasslaves，subjectedtohisabsolute，arbitrarypower，hehasnosuchrightofdominionovertheirchildren。Hecanhavenopoweroverthembutbytheirownconsent，whateverhemaydrivethemtosayordo，andhehasnolawfulauthority，whilstforce，andnotchoice，compelsthemtosubmission。
190。Everymanisbornwithadoubleright。First，arightoffreedomtohisperson，whichnoothermanhasapowerover，butthefreedisposalofitliesinhimself。Secondly，arightbeforeanyotherman，toinherit，withhisbrethren，hisfather’sgoods。
191。Bythefirstofthese，amanisnaturallyfreefromsubjectiontoanygovernment，thoughhebeborninaplaceunderitsjurisdiction。Butifhedisclaimthelawfulgovernmentofthecountryhewasbornin，hemustalsoquittherightthatbelongedtohim，bythelawsofit，andthepossessionstheredescendingtohimfromhisancestors，ifitwereagovernmentmadebytheirconsent。
192。Bythesecond，theinhabitantsofanycountry，whoaredescendedandderiveatitletotheirestatesfromthosewhoaresubdued，andhadagovernmentforceduponthem，againsttheirfreeconsents，retainarighttothepossessionoftheirancestors，thoughtheyconsentnotfreelytothegovernment，whosehardconditionswere，byforce，imposedonthepossessorsofthatcountry。Forthefirstconquerorneverhavinghadatitletothelandofthatcountry，thepeople，whoarethedescendantsof，orclaimunderthosewhowereforcedtosubmittotheyokeofagovernmentbyconstraint，havealwaysarighttoshakeitoff，andfreethemselvesfromtheusurpationortyrannytheswordhathbroughtinuponthem，tilltheirrulersputthemundersuchaframeofgovernmentastheywillinglyandofchoiceconsentto（whichtheycanneverbesupposedtodo，tilleithertheyareputinafullstateoflibertytochoosetheirgovernmentandgovernors，oratleasttilltheyhavesuchstandinglawstowhichtheyhave，bythemselvesortheirrepresentatives，giventheirfreeconsent，andalsotilltheyareallowedtheirdueproperty，whichissotobeproprietorsofwhattheyhavethatnobodycantakeawayanypartofitwithouttheirownconsent，withoutwhich，menunderanygovernmentarenotinthestateoffreemen，butaredirectslavesundertheforceofwar）。
AndwhodoubtsbuttheGrecianChristians，descendantsoftheancientpossessorsofthatcountry，mayjustlycastofftheTurkishyoketheyhavesolonggroanedunder，whenevertheyhaveapowertodoit？
193。Butgrantingthattheconqueror，inajustwar，hasarighttotheestates，aswellaspoweroverthepersonsoftheconquered，which，itisplain，hehathnot，nothingofabsolutepowerwillfollowfromhenceinthecontinuanceofthegovernment。Becausethedescendantsofthesebeingallfreemen，ifhegrantsthemestatesandpossessionstoinhabithiscountry，withoutwhichitwouldbeworthnothing，whatsoeverhegrantsthemtheyhavesofarasitisgrantedpropertyin；thenaturewhereofis，that，withoutaman’sownconsent，itcannotbetakenfromhim。
194。Theirpersonsarefreebyanativeright，andtheirproperties，betheymoreorless，aretheirown，andattheirowndispose，andnotathis；orelseitisnoproperty。Supposingtheconquerorgivestoonemanathousandacres，tohimandhisheirsforever；toanotherheletsathousandacres，forhislife，undertherentofL50orL500perannum。Hasnottheoneofthesearighttohisthousandacresforever，andtheotherduringhislife，payingthesaidrent？Andhathnotthetenantforlifeapropertyinallthathegetsoverandabovehisrent，byhislabourandindustry，duringthesaidterm，supposingitbedoubletherent？Cananyonesay，theking，orconqueror，afterhisgrant，may，byhispowerofconqueror，takeawayall，orpartoftheland，fromtheheirsofone，orfromtheotherduringhislife，hepayingtherent？Or，canhetakeawayfromeitherthegoodsormoneytheyhavegotuponthesaidlandathispleasure？Ifhecan，thenallfreeandvoluntarycontractscease，andarevoidintheworld；thereneedsnothingbutpowerenoughtodissolvethematanytime，andallthegrantsandpromisesofmeninpowerarebutmockeryandcollusion。Forcantherebeanythingmoreridiculousthantosay，Igiveyouandyoursthisforever，andthatinthesurestandmostsolemnwayofconveyancecanbedevised，andyetitistobeunderstoodthatIhaveright，ifIplease，totakeitawayfromyouagainto-morrow？