INTRODUCTIONTOTHESCIENCEOFRIGHT。
GENERALDEFINITIONS，ANDDIVISIONS。
A。WhattheScienceofRightis。
TheScienceofRighthasforitsobjecttheprinciplesofallthelawswhichitispossibletopromulgatebyexternallegislation。Wherethereissuchalegislation，itbecomes，inactualapplicationtoit，asystemofpositiverightandlaw;andhewhoisversedintheknowledgeofthissystemiscalledajuristorjurisconsult（jurisconsultus）。Apracticaljurisconsult（jurisperitus），oraprofessionallawyer，isonewhoisskilledintheknowledgeofpositiveexternallaws，andwhocanapplythemtocasesthatmayoccurinexperience。Suchpracticalknowledgeofpositiveright，andlaw，mayberegardedasbelongingtojurisprudence（jurisprudentia）intheoriginalsenseoftheterm。Butthetheoreticalknowledgeofrightandlawinprinciple，asdistinguishedfrompositivelawsandempiricalcases，belongstothepurescienceofright（jurisscientia）。
Thescienceofrightthusdesignatesthephilosophicalandsystematicknowledgeoftheprinciplesofnaturalright。Anditisfromthissciencethattheimmutableprinciplesofallpositivelegislationmustbederivedbypracticaljuristsandlawgivers。
B。WhatisRight？
Thisquestionmaybesaidtobeaboutasembarrassingtothejuristasthewell—knownquestion，\"Whatistruth？\"istothelogician。Itisallthemoreso，if，onreflection，hestrivestoavoidtautologyinhisreplyandrecognisethefactthatareferencetowhatholdstruemerelyofthelawsofsomeonecountryataparticulartimeisnotasolutionofthegeneralproblemthusproposed。Itisquiteeasytostatewhatmayberightinparticularcases（quidsitjuris），asbeingwhatthelawsofacertainplaceandofacertaintimesayormayhavesaid;butitismuchmoredifficulttodeterminewhetherwhattheyhaveenactedisrightinitself，andtolaydownauniversalcriterionbywhichrightandwrongingeneral，andwhatisjustandunjust，mayberecognised。Allthismayremainentirelyhiddenevenfromthepracticaljuristuntilheabandonhisempiricalprinciplesforatimeandsearchinthepurereasonforthesourcesofsuchjudgements，inordertolayarealfoundationforactualpositivelegislation。Inthissearch，hisempiricallawsmay，indeed，furnishhimwithexcellentguidance;butamerelyempiricalsystemthatisvoidofrationalprinciplesis，likethewoodenheadinthefableofPhaedrus，fineenoughinappearance，butunfortunatelyitwantsbrain。
1。Theconceptionofright—asreferringtoacorrespondingobligationwhichisthemoralaspectofit—inthefirstplace，hasregardonlytotheexternalandpracticalrelationofonepersontoanother，insofarastheycanhaveinfluenceuponeachother，immediatelyormediately，bytheiractionsasfacts。2。Inthesecondplace，theconceptionofrightdoesnotindicatetherelationoftheactionofanindividualtothewishorthemeredesireofanother，asinactsofbenevolenceorofunkindness，butonlytherelationofhisfreeactiontothefreedomofactionoftheother。
3。And，inthethirdplace，inthisreciprocalrelationofvoluntaryactions，theconceptionofrightdoesnottakeintoconsiderationthematterofthematteroftheactofwillinsofarastheendwhichanyonemayhaveinviewinwillingitisconcerned。Inotherwords，itisnotaskedinaquestionofrightwhetheranyoneonbuyinggoodsforhisownbusinessrealizesaprofitbythetransactionornot;
butonlytheformofthetransactionistakenintoaccount，inconsideringtherelationofthemutualactsofwill。Actsofwillorvoluntarychoicearethusregardedonlyinsofarastheyarefree，andastowhethertheactionofonecanharmonizewiththefreedomofanother，accordingtoauniversallaw。
Right，therefore，comprehendsthewholeoftheconditionsunderwhichthevoluntaryactionsofanyonepersoncanbeharmonizedinrealitywiththevoluntaryactionsofeveryotherperson，accordingtoauniversallawoffreedom。
C。UniversalPrincipleofRight。
\"Everyactionisrightwhichinitself，orinthemaximonwhichitproceeds，issuchthatitcancoexistalongwiththefreedomofthewillofeachandallinaction，accordingtoauniversallaw。\"
If，then，myactionormyconditiongenerallycancoexistwiththefreedomofeveryother，accordingtoauniversallaw，anyonedoesmeawrongwhohindersmeintheperformanceofthisaction，orinthemaintenanceofthiscondition。Forsuchahindranceorobstructioncannotcoexistwithfreedomaccordingtouniversallaws。
Itfollowsalsothatitcannotbedemandedasamatterofright，thatthisuniversalprincipleofallmaximsshallitselfbeadoptedasmymaxim，thatis，thatIshallmakeitthemaximofmyactions。Foranyonemaybefree，althoughhisfreedomisentirelyindifferenttome，orevenifIwishedinmyhearttoinfringeit，solongasIdonotactuallyviolatethatfreedombymyexternalaction。Ethics，however，asdistinguishedfromjurisprudence，imposesuponmetheobligationtomakethefulfillmentofrightamaximofmyconduct。
Theuniversallawofrightmaythenbeexpressedthus：\"Actexternallyinsuchamannerthatthefreeexerciseofthywillmaybeabletocoexistwiththefreedomofallothers，accordingtoauniversallaw。\"Thisisundoubtedlyalawwhichimposesobligationuponme;butitdoesnotatallimplyandstilllesscommandthatI
ought，merelyonaccountofthisobligation，tolimitmyfreedomtotheseveryconditions。Reasoninthisconnectionsaysonlythatitisrestrictedthusfarbyitsidea，andmaybelikewisethuslimitedinfactbyothers;anditlaysthisdownasapostulatewhichisnotcapableoffurtherproof。Astheobjectinviewisnottoteachvirtue，buttoexplainwhatrightis，thusfarthelawofright，asthuslaiddown，maynotandshouldnotberepresentedasamotive—principleofaction。
D。RightisConjoinedwiththeTitleorAuthoritytoCompel。
Theresistancewhichisopposedtoanyhindranceofaneffectisinrealityafurtheranceofthiseffectandisinaccordancewithitsaccomplishment。Now，everythingthatiswrongisahindranceoffreedom，accordingtouniversallaws;andcompulsionorconstraintofanykindisahindranceorresistancemadetofreedom。
Consequently，ifacertainexerciseoffreedomisitselfahindranceofthefreedomthatisaccordingtouniversallaws，itiswrong;andthecompulsionofconstraintwhichisopposedtoitisright，asbeingahinderingofahindranceoffreedom，andasbeinginaccordwiththefreedomwhichexistsinaccordancewithuniversallaws。Hence，accordingtothelogicalprincipleofcontradiction，allrightisaccompaniedwithanimpliedtitleorwarranttobringcompulsiontobearonanyonewhomayviolateitinfact。
E。StrictRightmaybealsoRepresentedasthePossibilityofaUniversalReciprocalCompulsioninharmonywiththeFreedomofAllaccordingtoUniversalLaws。
Thispropositionmeanstherightisnottoberegardedascomposedoftwodifferentelements—obligationaccordingtoalaw，andatitleonthepartofonewhohasboundanotherbyhisownfreechoicetocompelhimtoperform。Butitimportsthattheconceptionofrightmaybeviewedasconsistingimmediatelyinthepossibilityofauniversalreciprocalcompulsion，inharmonywiththefreedomofall。
Asrightingeneralhasforitsobjectonlywhatisexternalinactions，strictright，asthatwithwhichnothingethicalisintermingled，requiresnoothermotivesofactionthanthosethataremerelyexternal;foritisthenpurerightandisunmixedwithanyprescriptionsofvirtue。Astrictright，then，intheexactsenseoftheterm，isthatwhichalonecanbecalledwhollyexternal。Nowsuchrightisfounded，nodoubt，upontheconsciousnessoftheobligationofeveryindividualaccordingtothelaw;butifitistobepureassuch，itneithermaynorshouldrefertothisconsciousnessasamotivebywhichtodeterminethefreeactofthewill。Forthispurpose，however，itfoundsupontheprincipleofthepossibilityofanexternalcompulsion，suchasmaycoexistwiththefreedomofeveryoneaccordingtouniversallaws。Accordingly，then，whereitissaidthatacreditorhasarighttodemandfromadebtorthepaymentofhisdebt，thisdoesnotmeanmerelythathecanbringhimtofeelinhismindthatreasonobligeshimtodothis;butitmeansthathecanapplyanexternalcompulsiontoforceanysuchonesotopay，andthatthiscompulsionisquiteconsistentwiththefreedomofall，includingthepartiesinquestion，accordingtoauniversallaw。Rightandthetitletocompel，thusindicatethesamething。
Thelawofright，asthusenunciated，isrepresentedasareciprocalcompulsionnecessarilyinaccordancewiththefreedomofeveryone，undertheprincipleofauniversalfreedom。Itisthus，asitwere，arepresentativeconstructionoftheconceptionofright，byexhibitingitinapureintuitiveperceptionapriori，aftertheanalogyofthepossibilityofthefreemotionsofbodiesunderthephysicallawoftheequalityofactionandreaction。Now，asinpuremathematics，wecannotdeducethepropertiesofitsobjectsimmediatelyfromamereabstractconception，butcanonlydiscoverthembyfigurativeconstructionorrepresentationofitsconceptions;soitisinlikemannerwiththeprincipleofright。Itisnotsomuchthemereformalconceptionofright，butratherthatofauniversalandequalreciprocalcompulsionasharmonizingwithit，andreducedundergenerallaws，thatmakesrepresentationofthatconceptionpossible。Butjustasthoseconceptionspresentedindynamicsarefoundeduponamerelyformalrepresentationofpuremathematicsaspresentedingeometry，reasonhastakencarealsotoprovidetheunderstandingasfaraspossiblewithintuitivepresentationsaprioriinbehoofofaconstructionoftheconceptionofright。Therightingeometricallines（rectum）isopposed，asthestraight，tothatwhichiscurvedandtothatwhichisoblique。Inthefirstopposition，thereisinvolvedaninnerqualityofthelinesofsuchanaturethatthereisonlyonestraightorrightlinepossiblebetweentwogivenpoints。Inthesecondcase，again，thepositionsoftwointersectingormeetinglinesareofsuchanaturethattherecanlikewisebeonlyonelinecalledtheperpendicular，whichisnotmoreinclinedtotheonesidethantheother，anditdividesspaceoneithersideintotwoequalparts。Afterthemannerofthisanalogy，thescienceofrightaimsatdeterminingwhateveryoneshallhaveashisownwithmathematicalexactness;butthisisnottobeexpectedintheethicalscienceofvirtue，asitcannotbutallowacertainlatitudeforexceptions。But，withoutpassingintothesphereofethics，therearetwocases—knownastheequivocalrightofequityandnecessity—whichclaimajuridicaldecision，yetforwhichnoonecanbefoundtogivesuchadecision，andwhich，asregardstheirrelationtorights，belong，asitwere，tothe\"Intermundia\"
ofEpicurus。Thesewemustattheoutsettakeapartfromthespecialexpositionofthescienceofright，towhichwearenowabouttoadvance;andwemayconsiderthemnowbywayofsupplementtotheseintroductoryexplanations，inorderthattheiruncertainconditionsmaynotexertadisturbinginfluenceonthefixedprinciplesoftheproperdoctrineofright。
F。SupplementaryRemarksonEquivocalRight。
（JusAequivocum）。
Witheveryright，inthestrictacceptation（jusstrictum），thereisconjoinedarighttocompel。Butitispossibletothinkofotherrightsofawiderkind（juslatum）inwhichthetitletocompelcannotbedeterminedbyanylaw。Nowtherearetworealorsupposedrightsofthiskind—equityandtherightofnecessity。Thefirstallegesarightthatiswithoutcompulsion;thesecondadoptsacompulsionthatiswithoutright。Thisequivocalness，however，canbeeasilyshowntorestonthepeculiarfactthattherearecasesofdoubtfulright，forthedecisionofwhichnojudgecanbeappointed。
I。Equity。
Equity（aequitas），regardedobjectively，doesnotproperlyconstituteaclaimuponthemoraldutyofbenevolenceorbeneficenceonthepartofothers;butwhoeverinsistsuponanythingonthegroundofequity，foundsuponhisrighttothesame。Inthiscase，however，theconditionsareawantingthatarerequisiteforthefunctionofajudgeinorderthatbemightdeterminewhatorwhatkindofsatisfactioncanbedonetothisclaim。Whenoneofthepartnersofamercantilecompany，formedundertheconditionofequalprofits，has，however，donemorethantheothermembers，andinconsequencehasalsolostmore，itisinaccordancewithequitythatheshoulddemandfromthecompanymorethanmerelyanequalshareofadvantagewiththerest。But，inrelationtostrictright—ifwethinkofajudgeconsideringhiscase—hecanfurnishnodefinitedatatoestablishhowmuchmorebelongstohimbythecontract;andincaseofanactionatlaw，suchademandwouldberejected。Adomesticservant，again，whomightbepaidhiswagesduetotheendofhisyearofserviceinacoinagethatbecamedepreciatedwithinthatperiod，sothatitwouldnotbeofthesamevaluetohimasitwaswhenheenteredonhisengagement，cannotclaimbyrighttobekeptfromlossonaccountoftheunequalvalueofthemoneyifhereceivesthedueamountofit。Hecanonlymakeanappealonthegroundofequity，—
adumbgoddesswhocannotclaimabearingofright，—becausetherewasnothingbearingonthispointinthecontractofservice，andajudgecannotgiveadecreeonthebasisofvagueorindefiniteconditions。
Henceitfollows，thatacourtofequity，forthedecisionofdisputedquestionsofright，wouldinvolveacontradiction。Itisonlywherehisownproperrightsareconcerned，andinmattersinwhichhecandecide，thatajudgemayoroughttogiveahearingtoequity。Thus，iftheCrownissupplicatedtogiveanindemnitytocertainpersonsforlossorinjurysustainedinitsservice，itmayundertaketheburdenofdoingso，although，accordingtostrictright，theclaimmightberejectedonthegroundofthepretextthatthepartiesinquestionundertooktheperformanceoftheserviceoccasioningtheloss，attheirownrisk。
Thedictumofequitymaybeputthus：\"Thestrictestrightisthegreatestwrong\"（summumjussummainjuria）。Butthisevilcannotbeobviatedbytheformsofright，althoughitrelatestoamatterofright;forthegrievancethatitgivesrisetocanonlybeputbeforea\"courtofconscience\"（forumpoli），whereaseveryquestionofrightmustbetakenbeforeacivilcourt（forumsoli）。
II。TheRightofNecessity。
Theso—calledrightofnecessity（jusnecessitatis）isthesupposedrightortitle，incaseofthedangeroflosingmyownlife，totakeawaythelifeofanotherwhohas，infact，donemenoharm。Itisevidentthat，viewedasadoctrineofright，thismustinvolveacontradiction，Forthisisnotthecaseofawrongfulaggressormakinganunjustassaultuponmylife，andwhomIanticipatebydeprivinghimofhisown（jusinculpataetutelae）;norconsequentlyisitaquestionmerelyoftherecommendationofmoderationwhichbelongstoethicsasthedoctrineofvirtue，andnottojurisprudenceasthedoctrineofright。Itisaquestionoftheallowablenessofusingviolenceagainstonewhohasusednoneagainstme。
Itisclearthattheassertionofsucharightisnottobeunderstoodobjectivelyasbeinginaccordancewithwhatalawwouldprescribe，butmerelysubjectively，asproceedingontheassumptionofhowasentencewouldbepronouncedbyacourtinthecase。Therecan，infact，benocriminallawassigningthepenaltyofdeathtoamanwho，whenshipwreckedandstrugglinginextremedangerforhislife，andinordertosaveit，maythrustanotherfromaplankonwhichhehadsavedhimself。Forthepunishmentthreatenedbythelawcouldnotpossiblyhavegreaterpowerthanthefearofthelossoflifeinthecaseinquestion。Suchapenallawwouldthusfailaltogethertoexerciseitsintendedeffect;forthethreatofanevilwhichisstilluncertain—suchasdeathbyajudicialsentence—
couldnotovercomethefearofanevilwhichiscertain，asdrowningisinsuchcircumstances。Anactofviolentself—preservation，then，oughtnottobeconsideredasaltogetherbeyondcondemnation（inculpabile）;itisonlytobeadjudgedasexemptfrompunishment（impunibile）。Yetthissubjectiveconditionofimpunity，byastrangeconfusionofideas，hasbeenregardedbyjuristsasequivalenttoobjectivelawfulness。
Thedictumoftherightofnecessityisputintheseterms：
\"Necessityhasnolaw\"（Necessitasnonhabetlegem）。Andyettherecannotbeanecessitythatcouldmakewhatiswronglawful。
Itisapparent，then，thatin。judgementsrelatingbothto\"equity\"and\"therightofnecessity，\"theequivocationsinvolvedarisefromaninterchangeoftheobjectiveandsubjectivegroundsthatenterintotheapplicationoftheprinciplesofright，whenviewedrespectivelybyreasonorbyajudicialtribunal。Whatonemayhavegoodgroundsforrecognisingasright，initself，maynotfindconfirmationinacourtofjustice;andwhathemustconsidertobewrong，initself，mayobtainrecognitioninsuchacourt。Andthereasonofthisisthattheconceptionofrightisnottakeninthetwocasesinoneandthesamesense。
DIVISION
DIVISIONOFTHESCIENCEOFRIGHT。
A。GeneralDivisionoftheDutiesofRight。
（JuridicalDuties）。
InthisdivisionwemayveryconvenientlyfollowUlpian，ifhisthreeformulaearetakeninageneralsense，whichmaynothavebeenquiteclearlyinhismind，butwhichtheyarecapableofbeingdevelopedintoorofreceiving。Theyarethefollowing：
1。Honestevive。\"Liverightly。\"juridicalrectitude，orhonour（honestasjuridica），consistsinmaintainingone’sownworthasamaninrelationtoothers。Thisdutymayberenderedbytheproposition：\"Donotmakethyselfameremeansfortheuseofothers，butbetothemlikewiseanend。\"Thisdutywillbeexplainedinthenextformulaasanobligationarisingoutoftherightofhumanityinourownperson（lexjusti）。
2。Neminemlaede。\"Dowrongtonoone。\"Thisformulamayberenderedsoastomean：\"Donowrongtoanyone，evenifthoushouldstbeunderthenecessity，inobservingthisduty，toceasefromallconnectionwithothersandtoavoidallsociety\"（lexjuridica）。
3。Suumcuiquetribue。\"Assigntoeveryonewhatishisown。\"Thismayberendered，\"Enter，ifwrongcannotbeavoided，intoasocietywithothersinwhicheveryonemayhavesecuredtohimwhatishisown。\"Ifthisformulaweretobesimplytranslated，\"Giveeveryonehisown，\"itwouldexpressanabsurdity，forwecannotgiveanyonewhathealreadyhas。Ifitistohaveadefinitemeaning，itmustthereforerunthus：\"Enterintoastateinwhicheveryonecanhavewhatishisownsecuredagainsttheactionofeveryother\"（lexjustitiae）。
Thesethreeclassicalformulae，atthesametime，representprincipleswhichsuggestadivisionofthesystemofjuridicaldutiesintointernalduties，externalduties，andthoseconnectingdutieswhichcontainthelatterasdeducedfromtheprincipleoftheformerbysubsumption。
B。UniversalDivisionofRights。
I。NaturalRightandPositiveRight。Thesystemofrights，viewedasascientificsystemofdoctrines，isdividedintonaturalrightandpositiveright。Naturalrightrestsuponpurerationalprinciplesapriori;positiveorstatutoryrightiswhatproceedsfromthewillofalegislator。
II。InnateRightandAcquiredRight。Thesystemofrightsmayagainberegardedinreferencetotheimpliedpowersofdealingmorallywithothersasboundbyobligations，thatis，asfurnishingalegaltitleofactioninrelationtothem。Thusviewed，thesystemisdividedintoinnaterightandacquiredright。Innaterightisthatrightwhichbelongstoeveryonebynature，independentofalljuridicalactsofexperience。Acquiredrightisthatrightwhichisfoundeduponsuchjuridicalacts。
Innaterightmayalsobecalledthe\"internalmineandthine\"
（meumveltuuminternum）forexternalrightmustalwaysbeacquired。
ThereisonlyoneInnateRight，theBirthrightofFreedom。
Freedomisindependenceofthecompulsorywillofanother;andinsofarasitcancoexistwiththefreedomofallaccordingtoauniversallaw，itistheonesoleoriginal，inbornrightbelongingtoeverymaninvirtueofhishumanity。Thereis，indeed，aninnateequalitybelongingtoeverymanwhichconsistsinhisrighttobeindependentofbeingboundbyotherstoanythingmorethanthattowhichhemayalsoreciprocallybindthem。Itis，consequently，theinbornqualityofeverymaninvirtueofwhichheoughttobehisownmasterbyright（suijuris）。Thereis，also，thenaturalqualityofjustnessattributabletoamanasnaturallyofunimpeachableright（justi），becausebehasdonenowrongtoanyonepriortohisownjuridicalactions。And，further，thereisalsotheinnaterightofcommonactiononthepartofeveryman，sothathemaydotowardsotherswhatdoesnotinfringetheirrightsortakeawayanythingthatistheirsunlesstheyarewillingtoappropriateit;suchmerelytocommunicatethought，tonarrateanything，ortopromisesomethingwhethertrulyandhonestly，oruntrulyanddishonestly（veriloquimautfalsiloquim），foritrestsentirelyupontheseotherswhethertheywillbelieveortrustinitornot。*Butalltheserightsortitlesarealreadyincludedintheprincipleofinnatefreedom，andarenotreallydistinguishedfromit，evenasdividingmembersunderahigherspeciesofright。
*Itiscustomarytodesignateeveryuntruththatisspokenintentionallyassuch，althoughitmaybeinafrivolousmanneralie，orfalsehood（mendacium），becauseitmaydoharm，atleastinsofarasanyonewhorepeatsitingoodfaithmaybemadealaughing—stockoftoothersonaccountofhiseasycredulity。Butinthejuridicalsense，onlythatuntruthiscalledaliewhichimmediatelyinfringestherightofanother，suchasafalseallegationofacontracthavingbeenconcluded，whentheallegationisputforwardinordertodeprivesomeoneofwhatishis（falsiloquimdolosum）。Thisdistinctionofconceptionssocloselyalliedisnotwithoutfoundation;becauseontheoccasionofasimplestatementofone’sthoughts，itisalwaysfreeforanothertotakethemashemay;andyettheresultingrepute，thatsuchaoneisamanwhosewordcannotbetrusted，comessoclosetotheopprobriumofdirectlycallinghimaliar，thattheboundary—lineseparatingwhat，insuchacase，belongstojurisprudence，andwhatisspecialtoethics，canhardlybeotherwisedrawn。
Thereasonwhysuchadivisionintoseparaterightshasbeenintroducedintothesystemofnaturalright，viewedasincludingallthatisinnate，wasnotwithoutapurpose。Itsobjectwastoenableprooftobemorereadilyputforwardincaseofanycontroversyarisingaboutanacquiredright，andquestionsemergingeitherwithreferencetoafactthatmightbeindoubt，or，ifthatwereestablished，inreferencetoarightunderdispute。Forthepartyrepudiatinganobligation，andonwhomtheburdenofproof（onusprobandi）mightbeincumbent，couldthusmethodicallyrefertohisinnaterightoffreedomasspecifiedundervariousrelationsindetail，andcouldthereforefounduponthemequallyasdifferenttitlesofright。
Intherelationofinnateright，andconsequentlyoftheinternalmineandthine，thereisthereforenotrights，butonlyoneright。
And，accordingly，thishighestdivisionofrightsintoinnateandacquired，whichevidentlyconsistsoftwomembersextremelyunequalintheircontentsisproperlyplacedintheintroduction;andthesubdivisionsofthescienceofrightmaybereferredindetailtotheexternalmineandthine。
C。MethodicalDivisionoftheScienceofRight。
Thehighestdivisionofthesystemofnaturalrightshouldnotbe—
asitisfrequentlyput—into\"naturalright\"and\"socialright，\"
butintonaturalrightandcivilright。Thefirstconstitutesprivateright;thesecond，publicright。Foritisnotthe\"socialstate\"butthe\"civilstate\"thatisopposedtothe\"stateofnature\";
forinthe\"stateofnature\"theremaywellbesocietyofsomekind，butthereisno\"civil\"society，asaninstitutionsecuringthemineandthinebypubliclaws。Itisthusthatright，viewedunderreferencetothestateofnature，isspeciallycalledprivateright。
Thewholeoftheprinciplesofrightwillthereforefalltobeexpoundedunderthetwosubdivisionsofprivaterightandpublicright。
CH1
FIRSTPART。PRIVATERIGHT。
TheSystemofthoseLawsWhichRequireNoExternalPromulgation。
CHAPTERI。OftheModeofHavingAnythingExternalasOne’sOwn。
1。TheMeaningof\"Mine\"inRight（MeumJuris）。
Anythingis\"Mine\"byright，orisrightfullymine，whenIamsoconnectedwithit，thatifanyotherpersonshouldmakeuseofitwithoutmyconsent，hewoulddomealesionorinjury。Thesubjectiveconditionoftheuseofanythingispossessionofit。
Anexternalthing，howeverassuchcouldonlybemine，ifImayassumeittobepossiblethatIcanbewrongedbytheusewhichanothermightmakeofitwhenitisnotactuallyinmypossession。
Henceitwouldbeacontradictiontohaveanythingexternalasone’sown，werenottheconceptionofpossessioncapableoftwodifferentmeanings，assensiblepossessionthatisperceivablebythesenses，andrationalpossessionthatisperceivableonlybytheintellect。
Bytheformeristobeunderstoodaphysicalpossession，andbythelatter，apurelyjuridicalpossessionofthesameobject。
Thedescriptionofanobjectas\"externaltome\"maysignifyeitherthatitismerely\"differentanddistinctfrommeasasubject，\"orthatitisalso\"athingplacedoutsideofme，andtobefoundelsewhereinspaceortime。\"Takeninthefirstsense，thetermpossessionsignifiesrationalpossession;and，inthesecondsense，itmustmeanempiricalpossession。Arationalorintelligiblepossession，ifsuchbepossible，ispossessionviewedapartfromphysicalholdingordetention（detentio）。
2。JuridicalPostulateofthePracticalReason。
Itispossibletohaveanyexternalobjectofmywillasmine。Inotherwords，amaximtothiseffect—wereittobecomelaw—thatanyobjectonwhichthewillcanbeexertedmustremainobjectivelyinitselfwithoutanowner，asresnullius，iscontrarytotheprincipleofright。
Foranobjectofanyactofmywill，issomethingthatitwouldbephysicallywithinmypowertouse。Now，supposetherewerethingsthatbyrightshouldabsolutelynotbeinourpower，or，inotherwords，thatitwouldbewrongorinconsistentwiththefreedomofall，accordingtouniversallaw，tomakeuseofthem。Onthissupposition，freedomwouldsofarbedeprivingitselfoftheuseofitsvoluntaryactivity，inthusputtinguseableobjectsoutofallpossibilityofuse。Inpracticalrelations，thiswouldbetoannihilatethem，bymakingthemresnullius，notwithstandingthefactactactsofwillinrelationtosuchthingswouldformallyharmonize，intheactualuseofthem，withtheexternalfreedomofallaccordingtouniversallaws。Nowthepurepracticalreasonlaysdownonlyformallawsasprinciplestoregulatetheexerciseofthewill;
andthereforeabstractsfromthematteroftheactofwill，asregardstheotherqualitiesoftheobject，whichisconsideredonlyinsofarasitisanobjectoftheactivityofthewill。Hencethepracticalreasoncannotcontain，inreferencetosuchanobject，anabsoluteprohibitionofitsuse，becausethiswouldinvolveacontradictionofexternalfreedomwithitself。Anobjectofmyfreewill，however，isonewhichIhavethephysicalcapabilityofmakingsomeuseofatwill，sinceitsusestandsinmypower（inpotentia）。
Thisistobedistinguishedfromhavingtheobjectbroughtundermydisposal（inpostestatemmeamreductum），whichsupposesnotacapabilitymerely，butalsoaparticularactofthefree—will。Butinordertoconsidersomethingmerelyasanobjectofmywillassuch，itissufficienttobeconsciousthatIhaveitinmypower。Itisthereforeanassumptionaprioriofthepracticalreasontoregardandtreateveryobjectwithintherangeofmyfreeexerciseofwillasobjectivelyapossiblemineorthine。
Thispostulatemaybecalled\"apermissivelaw\"ofthepracticalreason，asgivingusaspecialtitlewhichwecouldnotevolveoutofthemereconceptionsofrightgenerally。Andthistitleconstitutestherighttoimposeuponallothersanobligation，nototherwiselaiduponthem，toabstainfromtheuseofcertainobjectsofourfreechoice，becausewehavealreadytakenthemintoourpossession。Reasonwillsthatthisshallberecognisedasavalidprinciple，anditdoessoaspracticalreason;anditisenabledbymeansofthispostulateaprioritoenlargeitsrangeofactivityinpractice。
3。PossessionandOwnership。
Anyonewhowouldasserttherighttoathingashismustbeinpossessionofitasanobject。Werehenotitsactualpossessororowner，hecouldnotbewrongedorinjuredbytheusewhichanothermightmakeofitwithouthisconsent。For，shouldanythingexternaltohim，andinnowayconnectedwithhimbyright，affectthisobject，itcouldnotaffecthimselfasasubject，nordohimanywrong，unlesshestoodinarelationofownershiptoit。
4。ExpositionoftheConceptionofthe。
ExternalMineandThine。
Therecanonlybethreeexternalobjectsofmywillintheactivityofchoice：
（1）Acorporealthingexternaltome;
（2）Thefree—willofanotherintheperformanceofaparticularact（praestatio）;
（3）Thestateofanotherinrelationtomyself。
Thesecorrespondtothecategoriesofsubstance，causality，andreciprocity;andtheyformthepracticalrelationsbetweenmeandexternalobjects，accordingtothelawsoffreedom。
A。Icanonlycallacorporealthingoranobjectinspace\"mine，\"
when，evenalthoughnotinphysicalpossessionofit，IamabletoassertthatIaminpossessionofitinanotherrealnonphysicalsense。Thus，IamnotentitledtocallanappleminemerelybecauseIholditinmyhandorpossessitphysically;butonlywhenIamentitledtosay，\"Ipossessit，althoughIhavelaiditoutofmyhand，andwhereveritmaylie。\"Inlikemanner，Iamnotentitledtosayoftheground，onwhichImayhavelaidmyselfdown，thatthereforeitismine;butonlywhenIcanrightlyassertthatitstillremainsinmypossession，althoughImayhaveleftthespot。Foranyonewho，intheformerappearancesofempiricalpossession，mightwrenchtheappleoutofmyhand，ordragmeawayfrommyresting—place，would，indeed，injuremeinrespectoftheinner\"mine\"
offreedom，butnotinrespectoftheexternal\"mine，\"unlessI
couldassertthatIwasinthepossessionoftheobject，evenwhennotactuallyholdingitphysically。AndifIcouldnotdothis，neithercouldIcalltheappleorthespotmine。
B。Icannotcalltheperformanceofsomethingbytheactionofthewillofanother\"mine，\"ifIcanonlysay\"ithascomeintomypossessionatthesametimewithapromise\"（pactumreinitum）;butonlyifIamabletoassert\"Iaminpossessionofthewilloftheother，soastodeterminehimtotheperformanceofaparticularact，althoughthetimefortheperformanceofithasnotyetcome。\"Inthelattercase，thepromisebelongstothenatureofthingsactuallyheldaspossessed，andasanactiveobligationIcanreckonitmine;andthisholdsgoodnotonlyifIhavethethingpromised—asinthefirstcase—alreadyinmypossession，butevenalthoughIdonotyetpossessitinfact。Hence，Imustbeabletoregardmyselfinthoughtasindependentofthatempiricalformofpossessionthatislimitedbytheconditionoftimeandasbeing，nevertheless，inpossessionoftheobject。
C。Icannotcallawife，achild，adomestic，or，generally，anyotherperson\"mine\"merelybecauseIcommandthematpresentasbelongingtomyhousehold，orbecauseIhavethemundercontrol，andinmypowerandpossession。ButIcancallthemmine，if，althoughtheymayhavewithdrawnthemselvesfrommycontrolandIdonotthereforepossessthemempirically，Icanstillsay\"Ipossessthembymymerewill，providedtheyexistanywhereinspaceortime;and，consequently，mypossessionofthemispurelyjuridical。\"Theybelong，infact，tomypossessions，onlywhenandsofarasIcanassertthisasamatterofright。
5。DefinitionoftheConceptionoftheExternalMineandThine。
Definitionsarenominalorreal。Anominaldefinitionissufficientmerelytodistinguishtheobjectdefinedfromallotherobjects，anditspringsoutofacompleteanddefiniteexpositionofitsconception。Arealdefinitionfurthersufficesforadeductionoftheconceptiondefined，soastofurnishaknowledgeoftherealityoftheobject。Thenominaldefinitionoftheexternal\"mine\"wouldthusbe：\"Theexternalmineisanythingoutsideofmyself，suchthatanyhindranceofmyuseofitatwillwouldbedoingmeaninjuryorwrongasaninfringementofthatfreedomofminewhichmaycoexistwiththefreedomofallothersaccordingtoauniversallaw。\"Therealdefinitionofthisconceptionmaybeputthus：\"Theexternalmineisanythingoutsideofmyself，suchthatanypreventionofmyuseofitwouldbeawrong，althoughImaynotbeinpossessionofitsoastobeactuallyholdingitasanobject。\"Imustbeinsomekindofpossessionofanexternalobject，iftheobjectistoberegardedasmine;for，otherwise，anyoneinterferingwiththisobjectwouldnot，indoingso，affectme;nor，consequently，wouldhetherebydomeanywrong。Hence，accordingtoSS4，arationalpossession（possessionoumenon）mustbeassumedaspossible，ifthereistoberightlyanexternalmineandthine。Empiricalpossessionisthusonlyphenomenalpossessionorholding（detention）oftheobjectinthesphereofsensibleappearance（possessiophenomenon），althoughtheobjectwhichIpossessisnotregardedinthispracticalrelationasitselfaphenomenon—accordingtotheexpositionoftheTranscendentalAnalyticintheCritiqueofPureReason—butasathinginitself。ForintheCritiqueofPureReasontheinterestofreasonturnsuponthetheoreticalknowledgeofthenatureofthingsandhowfarreasoncangoinsuchknowledge。Butherereasonhastodealwiththepracticaldeterminationoftheactionofthewillaccordingtolawsoffreedom，whethertheobjectisperceivablethroughthesensesormerelythinkablebythepureunderstanding。Andright，asunderconsideration，isapurepracticalconceptionofthereasoninrelationtotheexerciseofthewillunderlawsoffreedom。
And，hence，itisnotquitecorrecttospeakof\"possessing\"arighttothisorthatobject，butitshouldratherbesaidthatanobjectispossessedinapurelyjuridicalway;forarightisitselftherationalpossessionofanobject，andto\"possessapossession，\"wouldbeanexpressionwithoutmeaning。
6。DeductionoftheConceptionofaPurelyJuridicalPossessionofanExternalObject（PossessioNoumenon）。
Thequestion，\"Howisanexternalmineandthinepossible？\"resolvesitselfintothisotherquestion：\"Howisamerelyjuridicalorrationalpossessionpossible？\"Andthissecondquestionresolvesitselfagainintoathird：\"Howisasyntheticpropositioninrightpossibleapriori？\"
Allpropositionsofright—asjuridicalpropositions—arepropositionsapriori，fortheyarepracticallawsofreason（dictaminarationis）。Butthejuridicalpropositionapriorirespectingempiricalpossessionisanalytical;foritsaysnothingmorethanwhatfollowsbytheprincipleofcontradiction，fromtheconceptionofsuchpossession;namely，thatifIamtheholderofathinginthewayofbeingphysicallyconnectedwithit，anyoneinterferingwithitwithoutmyconsent—as，forinstance，inwrenchinganappleoutofmyhand—affectsanddetractsfrommyfreedomasthatwhichisinternallymine;andconsequentlythemaximofhisactionisindirectcontradictiontotheaxiomofright。Thepropositionexpressingtheprincipleofanempiricalrightfulpossessiondoesnotthereforegobeyondtherightofapersoninreferencetohimself。
Ontheotherhand，thepropositionexpressingthepossibilityofthepossessionofathingexternaltome，afterabstractionofalltheconditionsofempiricalpossessioninspaceandtime—consequentlypresentingtheassumptionofthepossibilityofapossessionoumenon—goesbeyondtheselimitingconditions;andbecausethispropositionassertsapossessionevenwithoutphysicalholding，asnecessarytotheconceptionoftheexternalmineandthine，itissynthetical。Andthusitbecomesaproblemforreasontoshowhowsuchaproposition，extendingitsrangebeyondtheconceptionofempiricalpossession，ispossibleapriori。
Inthismanner，forinstance，theactoftakingpossessionofaparticularportionofthesoilisamodeexercisingtheprivatefree—willwithoutbeinganactofusurpation。Thepossessorfoundsupontheinnaterightofcommonpossessionofthesurfaceoftheearth，andupontheuniversalwillcorrespondingaprioritoit，whichallowsaprivatepossessionofthesoil;becausewhataremerethingswouldbeotherwisemadeinthemselvesandbyalawintounappropriableobjects。Thusafirstappropriatoracquiresoriginallybyprimarypossessionaparticularportionoftheground;
andbyright（jure）heresistseveryotherpersonwhowouldhinderhimintheprivateuseofit，although，whilethe\"stateofnature\"
continues，thiscannotbedonebyjuridicalmeans（dejure），becauseapubliclawdoesnotyetexist。
Andalthoughapieceofgroundshouldberegardedasfree，ordeclaredtobesuch，soastobeforthepublicuseofallwithoutdistinction，yetitcannotbesaidthatitisthusfreebynatureandoriginallyso，priortoanyjuridicalact。Fortherewouldbearealrelationalreadyincorporatedinsuchapieceofgroundbytheveryfactthatthepossessionofitwasdeniedtoanyparticularindividual;andasthispublicfreedomofthegroundwouldbeaprohibitionofittoeveryparticularindividual，thispresupposesacommonpossessionofitwhichcannottakeeffectwithoutacontract。A
pieceofground，however，whichcanonlybecomepubliclyfreebycontract，mustactuallybeinthepossessionofallthoseassociatedtogether，whomutuallyinterdictorsuspendeachother，fromanyparticularorprivateuseofit。
Thisoriginalcommunityofthesoilandofthethingsuponit（communiofundioriginaria），isanideawhichhasobjectiveandpracticaljuridicalrealityandisentirelydifferentfromtheideaofaprimitivecommunityofthings，whichisafiction。Forthelatterwouldhavehadtobefoundedasaformofsociety，andmusthavetakenitsrisefromacontractbywhichallrenouncedtherightofprivatepossession，sothatbyunitingthepropertyownedbyeachintoawhole，itwasthustransformedintoacommonpossession。Buthadsuchaneventtakenplace，historymusthavepresentedsomeevidenceofit。Toregardsuchaprocedureastheoriginalmodeoftakingpossession，andtoholdthattheparticularpossessionsofeveryindividualmayandoughttobegroundeduponit，isevidentlyacontradiction。
Possession（possessio）istobedistinguishedfromhabitationasmereresidence（sedes）;andtheactoftakingpossessionofthesoilintheintentionofacquiringitonceforall，isalsotobedistinguishedfromsettlementordomicile（incolatus），whichisacontinuousprivatepossessionofaplacethatisdependentonthepresenceoftheindividualuponit。Wehavenotheretodealwiththequestionofdomiciliarysettlement，asthatisasecondaryjuridicalactwhichmayfollowuponpossession，ormaynotoccuratall;forassuchitcouldnotinvolveanoriginalpossession，butonlyasecondarypossessionderivedfromtheconsentofothers。
Simplephysicalpossession，orholdingofthesoil，involvesalreadycertainrelationsofrighttothething，althoughitiscertainlynotsufficienttoenablemetoregarditasmine。Relativetoothers，sofarastheyknow，itappearsasafirstpossessioninharmonywiththelawofexternalfreedom;and，atthesametime，itisembracedintheuniversaloriginalpossessionwhichcontainsapriorithefundamentalprincipleofthepossibilityofaprivatepossession。Hencetodisturbthefirstoccupierorholderofaportionofthesoilinhisuseofitisalesionorwrongdonetohim。Thefirsttakingofpossessionhasthereforeatitleofright（tituluspossessionis）initsfavour，whichissimplytheprincipleoftheoriginalcommonpossession;andthesayingthat\"Itiswellforthosewhoareinpossession\"（beatipossidentes），whenoneisnotboundtoauthenticatehispossession，isaprincipleofnaturalrightthatestablishesthejuridicalactoftakingpossession，asagroundofacquisitionuponwhicheveryfirstpossessormayfound。
IthasbeenshownintheCritiqueofPureReasonthatintheoreticalprinciplesapriori，anintuitionalperceptionapriorimustbesuppliedinconnectionwithanygivenconception;and，consequently，wereitaquestionofapurelytheoreticalprinciple，somethingwouldhavetobeaddedtotheconceptionofthepossessionofanobjecttomakeitreal。Butinrespectofthepracticalprincipleunderconsideration，theprocedureisjusttheconverseofthetheoreticalprocess;sothatalltheconditionsofperceptionwhichformthefoundationofempiricalpossessionmustbeabstractedortakenawayinordertoextendtherangeofthejuridicalconceptionbeyondtheempiricalsphere，andinordertobeabletoapplythepostulate，thateveryexternalobjectofthefreeactivityofmywill，sofarasIhaveitinmypower，althoughnotinthepossessionofit，maybereckonedasjuridicallymine。
Thepossibilityofsuchapossession，withconsequentdeductionoftheconceptionofanonempiricalpossession，isfoundeduponthejuridicalpostulateofthepracticalreason，that\"Itisajuridicaldutysotoacttowardsothersthatwhatisexternalanduseablemaycomeintothepossessionorbecomethepropertyofsomeone。\"Andthispostulateisconjoinedwiththeexpositionoftheconceptionthatwhatisexternallyone’sownisfoundeduponapossession，thatisnotphysical。Thepossibilityofsuchapossession，thusconceived，cannot，however，beprovedorcomprehendedinitself，becauseitisarationalconceptionforwhichnoempiricalperceptioncanbefurnished;butitfollowsasanimmediateconsequencefromthepostulatethathasbeenenunciated。For，ifitisnecessarytoactaccordingtothatjuridicalprinciple，therationalorintelligibleconditionofapurelyjuridicalpossessionmustalsobepossible。Itneedastonishnoone，then，thatthetheoreticalaspectoftheprinciplesoftheexternalmineandthineislostfromviewintherationalsphereofpureintelligenceandpresentsnoextensionofknowledge;fortheconceptionoffreedomuponwhichtheyrestdoesnotadmitofanytheoreticaldeductionofitspossibility，anditcanonlybeinferredfromthepracticallawofreason，calledthecategoricalimperative，viewedasafact。
7。ApplicationofthePrincipleofthePossibilityofanExternalMineandThinetoObjectsofExperience。
Theconceptionofapurelyjuridicalpossessionisnotanempiricalconceptiondependentonconditionsofspaceandtime，andyetithaspracticalreality。Assuchitmustbeapplicabletoobjectsofexperience，theknowledgeofwhichisindependentoftheconditionsofspaceandtime。Therationalprocessbywhichtheconceptionofrightisbroughtintorelationtosuchobjectssoastoconstituteapossibleexternalmineandthine，isasfollows。Theconceptionofright，beingcontainedmerelyinreason，cannotbeimmediatelyappliedtoobjectsofexperience，soastogivetheconceptionofanempiricalpossession，butmustbeapplieddirectlytothemediatingconception，intheunderstanding，ofpossessioningeneral;sothat，insteadofphysicalholding（detentio）asanempiricalrepresentationofpossession，theformalconceptionorthoughtofhaving，abstractedfromallconditionsofspaceandtime，isconceivedbythemind，andonlyasimplyingthatanobjectisinmypowerandatmydisposal（inpotestatemeapositumesse）。Inthisrelation，thetermexternaldoesnotsignifyexistenceinanotherplacethanwhereI
am，normyresolutionandacceptanceatanothertimethanthemomentinwhichIhavetheofferofathing：itsignifiesonlyanobjectdifferentfromorotherthanmyself。Nowthepracticalreasonbyitslawofrightwills，thatIshallthinkthemineandthineinapplicationtoobjects，notaccordingtosensibleconditions，butapartfromtheseandfromthepossessiontheyindicate;becausetheyrefertodeterminationsoftheactivityofthewillthatareinaccordancewiththelawsoffreedom。Foritisonlyaconceptionoftheunderstandingthatcanbebroughtundertherationalconceptionofright。ImaythereforesaythatIpossessafield，althoughitisinquiteadifferentplacefromthatonwhichIactuallyfindmyself。Forthequestionhereisnotconcerninganintellectualrelationtotheobject，butIhavethethingpracticallyinmypowerandatmydisposal，whichisaconceptionofpossessionrealizedbytheunderstandingandindependentofrelationsofspace;anditismine，becausemywill，indeterminingitselftoanyparticularuseofit，isnotinconflictwiththelawofexternalfreedom。Nowitisjustinabstractionfromphysicalpossessionoftheobjectofmyfree—willinthesphereofsense，thatthepracticalreasonwillsthatarationalpossessionofitshallbethought，accordingtointellectualconceptionswhicharenotempirical，butcontainaprioritheconditionsofrationalpossession。Henceitisinthisfact，thatwefoundthegroundofthevalidityofsucharationalconceptionofpossessionpossessionoumenon）asaprincipleofauniversallyvalidlegislation。Forsuchalegislationisimpliedandcontainedintheexpression，\"Thisexternalobjectismine，\"becauseanobligationistherebyimposeduponallothersinrespectofit，whowouldotherwisenothavebeenobligedtoabstainfromtheuseofthisobject。
Themode，then，ofhavingsomethingexternaltomyselfasmine，consistsinaspeciallyjuridicalconnectionofthewillofthesubjectwiththatobject，independentlyoftheempiricalrelationstoitinspaceandintime，andinaccordancewiththeconceptionofarationalpossession。AparticularspotontheearthisnotexternallyminebecauseIoccupyitwithmybody;forthequestionherediscussedrefersonlytomyexternalfreedom，andconsequentlyitaffectsonlythepossessionofmyself，whichisnotathingexternaltome，andthereforeonlyinvolvesaninternalright。ButifI
continuetobeinpossessionofthespot，althoughIhavetakenmyselfawayfromitandgonetoanotherplace，onlyunderthatconditionismyexternalrightconcernedinconnectionwithit。Andtomakethecontinuouspossessionofthisspotbymypersonaconditionofhavingitasmine，musteitherbetoassertthatitisnotpossibleatalltohaveanythingexternalasone’sown，whichiscontrarytothepostulateinSS2，ortorequire，inorderthatthisexternalpossessionmaybepossible，thatIshallbeintwoplacesatthesametime。ButthisamountstosayingthatImustbeinaplaceandalsonotinit，whichiscontradictoryandabsurd。
ThispositionmaybeappliedtothecaseinwhichIhaveacceptedapromise;formyhavingandpossessioninrespectofwhathasbeenpromisedbecomeestablishedonthegroundofexternalright。Thisrightisnottobeannulledbythefactthatthepromiserhavingsaidatonetime，\"Thisthingshallbeyours，\"againatasubsequenttimesays，\"Mywillnowisthatthethingshallnotbeyours。\"Insuchrelationsofrationalright，theconditionsholdjustthesameasifthepromiserhad，withoutanyintervaloftimebetweenthem，madethetwodeclarationsofhiswill，\"Thisshallbeyours，\"andalso\"Thisshallnotbeyours\";whichmanifestlycontradictsitself。
Thesamethingholds，inlikemanner，oftheconceptionofthejuridicalpossessionofapersonasbelongingtotheHavingofasubject，whetheritbeawife，achild，oraservant。Therelationsofrightinvolvedinahousehold，andthereciprocalpossessionofallitsmembers，arenotannulledbythecapabilityofseparatingfromeachotherinspace;becauseitisbyjuridicalrelationsthattheyareconnected，andtheexternalmineandthine，asintheformercases，restsentirelyupontheassumptionofthepossibilityofapurelyrationalpossession，withouttheaccompanimentofphysicaldetentionorholdingoftheobject。
Reasonisforcedtoacritiqueofitsjuridicallypracticalfunctioninspecialreferencetotheconceptionoftheexternalmineandthine，bytheantinomyofthepropositionsenunciatedregardingthepossibilityofsuchaformofpossession。Forthesegiverisetoaninevitabledialectic，inwhichathesisandanantithesissetupequalclaimstothevalidityoftwoconflictingconditions。Reasonisthuscompelled，initspracticalfunctioninrelationtoright—asitwasinitstheoreticalfunction—tomakeadistinctionbetweenpossessionasaphenomenalappearancepresentedtothesenses，andthatpossessionwhichisrationalandthinkableonlybytheunderstanding。
Thesis。—Thethesis，inthiscase，is：\"Itispossibletohavesomethingexternalasmine，althoughIamnotinpossessionofit。\"
Antithesis。—Theantithesisis：\"Itisnotpossibletohaveanythingexternalasmine，ifIamnotinpossessionofit。\"
Solution。—Thesolutionis：\"BothPropositionsaretrue\";theformerwhenImeanempiricalpossession（possessiophaenomenon），thelatterwhenIunderstandbythesameterm，apurelyrationalpossession（possessionoumenon）。
Butthepossibilityofarationalpossession，andconsequentlyofanexternalmineandthine，cannotbecomprehendedbydirectinsight，butmustbededucedfromthepracticalreason。Andinthisrelationitisspeciallynoteworthythatthepracticalreasonwithoutintuitionalperceptions，andevenwithoutrequiringsuchanelementapriori，canextenditsrangebythemereeliminationofempiricalconditions，asjustifiedbythelawoffreedom，andcanthusestablishsyntheticalpropositionsapriori。Theproofofthisinthepracticalconnection，aswillbeshownafterwards，canbeadducedinananalyticalmanner。
8。ToHaveAnythingExternalasOne’sOwnisonlyPossibleinaJuridicalorCivilStateofSocietyundertheRegulationofaPublicLegislativePower。
If，bywordordeed，Ideclaremywillthatsomeexternalthingshallbemine，Imakeadeclarationthateveryotherpersonisobligedtoabstainfromtheuseofthisobjectofmyexerciseofwill;andthisimposesanobligationwhichnoonewouldbeunder，withoutsuchajuridicalactonmypart。ButtheassumptionofthisactatthesametimeinvolvestheadmissionthatIamobligedreciprocallytoobserveasimilarabstentiontowardseveryotherinrespectofwhatisexternallytheirs;fortheobligationinquestionarisesfromauniversalruleregulatingtheexternaljuridicalrelations。HenceIamnotobligedtoletalonewhatanotherpersondeclarestobeexternallyhis，unlesseveryotherpersonlikewisesecuresmebyaguaranteethathewillactinrelationtowhatismine，uponthesameprinciple。Thisguaranteeofreciprocalandmutualabstentionfromwhatbelongstoothersdoesnotrequireaspecialjuridicalactforitsestablishment，butisalreadyinvolvedintheconceptionofanexternalobligationofright，onaccountoftheuniversalityandconsequentlythereciprocityoftheobligatorinessarisingfromauniversalRule。Nowasinglewill，inrelationtoanexternalandconsequentlycontingentpossession，cannotserveasacompulsorylawforall，becausethatwouldbetodoviolencetothefreedomwhichisinaccordancewithuniversallaws。Thereforeitisonlyawillthatbindseveryone，andassuchacommon，collective，andauthoritativewill，thatcanfurnishaguaranteeofsecuritytoall。Butthestateofmenunderauniversal，external，andpubliclegislation，conjoinedwithauthorityandpower，iscalledthecivilstate。Therecanthereforebeanexternalmineandthineonlyinthecivilstateofsociety。
Consequence。—Itfollows，asacorollary，that，ifitisjuridicallypossibletohaveanexternalobjectasone’sown，theindividualsubjectofpossessionmustbeallowedtocompelorconstraineverypersonwithwhomadisputeastothemineorthineofsuchapossessionmayarise，toenteralongwithhimselfintotherelationsofacivilconstitution。
9。ThereMay，However，BeanExternalMineandThineFoundasaFactintheStateofNature，butitisonlyProvisory。
Naturalrightinthestateofacivilconstitutionmeanstheformsofrightwhichmaybededucedfromprinciplesaprioriastheconditionsofsuchaconstitution。Itisthereforenottobeinfringedbythestatutorylawsofsuchaconstitution;andaccordinglythejuridicalprincipleremainsinforce，that，\"Whoeverproceedsuponamaximbywhichitbecomesimpossibleformetohaveanobjectoftheexerciseofmywillasmine，doesmealesionorinjury。\"Foracivilconstitutionisonlythejuridicalconditionunderwhicheveryonehaswhatishisownmerelysecuredtohim，asdistinguishedfromitsbeingspeciallyassignedanddeterminedtohim。Allguarantee，therefore，assumesthateveryonetowhomathingissecuredisalreadyinpossessionofitashisown。Hence，priortothecivilconstitution—orapartfromit—anexternalmineandthinemustbeassumedaspossible，andalongwithitarighttocompeleveryonewithwhomwecouldcomeintoanykindofintercoursetoenterwithusintoaconstitutioninwhichwhatismineorthinecanbesecured。
Theremaythusbeapossessioninexpectationorinpreparationforsuchastateofsecurity，ascanonlybeestablishedonthelawofthecommonwill;andasitisthereforeinaccordancewiththepossibilityofsuchastate，itconstitutesaprovisoryortemporaryjuridicalpossession;whereasthatpossessionwhichisfoundinrealityinthecivilstateofsocietywillbeaperemptoryorguaranteedpossession。Priortoenteringintothisstate，forwhichheisnaturallyprepared，theindividualrightfullyresiststhosewhowillnotadaptthemselvestoit，andwhowoulddisturbhiminhisprovisorypossession;because，ifthewillofallexcepthimselfwereimposinguponhimanobligationtowithdrawfromacertainpossession，itwouldstillbeonlyaone—sidedorunilateralwill，andconsequentlyitwouldhavejustaslittlelegaltitle—whichcanbeproperlybasedonlyontheuniversalizedwill—tocontestaclaimofrightashewouldhavetoassertit。Yetbehastheadvantageonhisside，ofbeinginaccordwiththeconditionsrequisitetotheintroductionandinstitutionofacivilformofsociety。Inaword，themodeinwhichanythingexternalmaybeheldasone’sowninthestateofnature，isjustphysicalpossessionwithapresumptionofrightthusfarinitsfavour，thatbyunionofthewillsofallinapubliclegislationitwillbemadejuridical;andinthisexpectationitholdscomparatively，asakindofpotentialjuridicalpossession。
Thisprerogativeofright，asarisingfromthefactofempiricalpossession，isinaccordancewiththeformula：\"Itiswellforthosewhoareinpossession\"（Beatipossidentes）。Itdoesnotconsistinthefactthat，becausethepossessorhasthepresumptionofbeingarightfulman，itisunnecessaryforhimtobringforwardproofthathepossessesacertainthingrightfully，forthispositionappliesonlytoacaseofdisputedright。Butitisbecauseitaccordswiththepostulateofthepracticalreason，thateveryoneisinvestedwiththefacultyofhavingashisownanyexternalobjectuponwhichhehasexertedhiswill;and，consequently，allactualpossessionisastatewhoserightfulnessisestablisheduponthatpostulatebyananterioractofwill。Andsuchanact，iftherebenopriorpossessionofthesameobjectbyanotheropposedtoit，does，therefore，provisionallyjustifyandentitleme，accordingtothelawofexternalfreedom，torestrainanyonewhorefusestoenterwithmeintoastateofpubliclegalfreedomfromallpretensiontotheuseofsuchanobject。Forsuchaprocedureisrequisite，inconformitywiththepostulateofreason，inordertosubjecttomyproperuseathingwhichwouldotherwisebepracticallyannihilated，asregardsallproperuseofit。