Fromthedutythusindicated，therefurthernecessarilyarisestherightoftheparentstothemanagementandtrainingofthechild，solongasitisitselfincapableofmakingproperuseofitsbodyasanorganism，andofitsmindasanunderstanding。Thisinvolvesitsnourishmentandthecareofitseducation。Thisincludes，ingeneral，thefunctionofforminganddevelopingitpractically，thatitmaybeableinthefuturetomaintainandadvanceitself，andalsoitsmoralcultureanddevelopment，theguiltofneglectingitfallingupontheparents。Allthistrainingistobecontinuedtillthechildreachestheperiodofemancipation（emancipatio），astheageofpracticableself—support。Theparentsthenvirtuallyrenouncetheparentalrighttocommand，aswellasallclaimtorepaymentfortheirpreviouscareandtrouble;forwhichcareandtrouble，aftertheprocessofeducationiscomplete，theycanonlyappealtothechildren，bywayofanyclaim，onthegroundoftheobligationofgratitudeasadutyofvirtue。
Fromthefactofpersonalityinthechildren，itfurtherfollowsthattheycanneverberegardedasthepropertyoftheparents，butonlyasbelongingtothembywayofbeingintheirpossession，likeotherthingsthatareheldapartfromthepossessionofallothersandthatcanbebroughtbackevenagainstthewillofthesubjects。
Hencetherightoftheparentsisnotapurelyrealright，anditisnotalienable（juspersonalissimum）。Butneitherisitamerelypersonalright;itisapersonalrightofarealkind，thatis，apersonalrightthatisconstitutedandexercisedafterthemannerofarealright。
Itisthereforeevidentthatthetitleofapersonalrightofarealkindmustnecessarilybeadded，inthescienceofright，tothetitlesofrealrightandpersonalright，thedivisionofrightsintothesetwobeingnotcomplete。For，iftherightoftheparentstothechildrenweretreatedasifitweremerelyarealrighttoapartofwhatbelongstotheirhouse，theycouldnotfoundonlyuponthedutyofthechildrentoreturntotheminclaimingthemwhentheyrunaway，buttheywouldbethenentitledtoseizethemandimpoundthemlikethingsorrunawaycattle。
TITLEIII。HouseholdRight。（MasterandServant）
30。RelationandRightoftheMasterofaHousehold。
Thechildrenofthehouse，who，alongwiththeparents，constituteafamily，attainmajority，andbecomemastersofthemselves（majorennes，suijuris），evenwithoutacontractofreleasefromtheirpreviousstateofdependence，bytheiractuallyattainingtothecapabilityofself—maintenance。Thisattainmentarises，ontheonehand，asastateofnaturalmajority，withtheadvanceofyearsinthegeneralcourseofnature;and，ontheotherhand，ittakesform，asastateinaccordancewiththeirownnaturalcondition。Theythusacquiretherightofbeingtheirownmasters，withouttheinterpositionofanyspecialjuridicalact，andthereforemerelybylaw（lege）;andtheyowetheirparentsnothingbywayoflegaldebtfortheireducation，justastheparents，ontheirside，arenowreleasedfromtheirobligationstothechildreninthesameway。Parentsandchildrenthusgainorregaintheirnaturalfreedom;andthedomesticsociety，whichwasnecessaryaccordingtothelawofright，isthusnaturallydissolved。
Bothparties，however，mayresolvetocontinuethehousehold，butunderanothermodeofobligation。Itmayassumetheformofarelationbetweenthebeadofthehouse，asitsmaster，andtheothermembersasdomesticservants，maleorfemale;andtheconnectionbetweentheminthisnewregulateddomesticeconomy（societasherilis）maybedeterminedbycontract。Themasterofthehouse，actuallyorvirtually，entersintocontractwiththechildren，nowbecomemajorandmastersofthemselves;or，iftherebenochildreninthefamily，withotherfreepersonsconstitutingthemembershipofthehousehold;andthusthereisestablisheddomesticrelationshipnotfoundedonsocialequality，butsuchthatonecommandsasmaster，andanotherobeysasservant（imperantisetsubjectidomestici）。
Thedomesticsorservantsmaythenberegardedbythemasterofthehouseholdasthusfarhis。Asregardstheformormodeofhispossessionofthem，theybelongtohimasifbyarealright;forifanyofthemrunaway，heisentitledtobringthemagainunderhispowerbyaunilateralactofhiswill。Butasregardsthematterofhisright，ortheuseheisentitledtomakeofsuchpersonsashisdomestics，heisnotentitledtoconducthimselftowardsthemasifhewastheirproprietororowner（dominusservi）;becausetheyareonlysubjectedtohispowerbycontract，andbyacontractundercertaindefiniterestrictions。Foracontractbywhichtheonepartyrenouncedhiswholefreedomfortheadvantageoftheother，ceasingtherebytobeapersonandconsequentlyhavingnodutyeventoobserveacontract，isselfcontradictory，andisthereforeofitselfnullandvoid。Thequestionastotherightofpropertyinrelationtoonewhohaslosthislegalpersonalitybyacrimedoesnotconcernushere。
Thiscontract，then，ofthemasterofahouseholdwithhisdomestics，cannotbeofsuchanaturethattheuseofthemcouldeverrightlybecomeanabuseofthem;andthejudgementastowhatconstitutesuseorabuseinsuchcircumstancestheisnotleftmerelytothemaster，butisalsocompetenttotheservants，whooughtnevertobeheldinbondageorbodilyservitudeasslavesorserfs。
Suchacontractcannot，therefore，beconcludedforlife，butinallcasesonlyforadefiniteperiod，withinwhichonepartymayintimatetotheotheraterminationoftheirconnection。Children，however，includingeventhechildrenofonewhohasbecomeenslavedowingtoacrime，arealwaysfree。Foreverymanisbornfree，becausehehasatbirthasyetbrokennolaw;andeventhecostofhiseducationtillhismaturitycannotbereckonedasadebtwhichheisboundtopay。Evenaslave，ifitwereinhispower，wouldbeboundtoeducatehischildrenwithoutbeingentitledtocountandreckonwiththemforthecost;andinviewofhisownincapacityfordischargingthisfunction，thepossessorofaslave，therefore，entersupontheobligationwhichhehasrenderedtheslavehimselfunabletofulfil。
Here，again，asunderthefirsttwotitles，itisclearthatthereisapersonalrightofarealkind，intherelationofthemasterofahousetohisdomestics。Forhecanlegallydemandthemasbelongingtowhatisexternallyhis，fromanyotherpossessorofthem;andheisentitledtofetchthembacktohishouse，evenbeforethereasonsthatmayhaveledthemtorunaway，andtheirparticularrightinthecircumstances，havebeenjuridicallyinvestigated。
SYSTEMATICDIVISIONOFALLTHERIGHTSCAPABLEOF
BEINGACQUIREDBYCONTRACT。
31。DivisionofContractsJuridicalConceptionsofMoneyandaBook。
Itisreasonabletodemandthatametaphysicalscienceofrightshallcompletelyanddefinitelydeterminethemembersofalogicaldivisionofitsconceptionsapriori，andthusestablishtheminagenuinesystem。Allempiricaldivision，ontheotherhand，ismerelyfragmentarypartition，anditleavesusinuncertaintyastowhethertheremaynotbemoremembersstillrequiredtocompletethewholesphereofthedividedconception。Adivisionthatismadeaccordingtoaprincipleapriorimaybecalled，incontrasttoallempiricalpartitions，adogmaticdivision。
Everycontract，regardedinitselfobjectively，consistsoftwojuridicalacts：thepromiseanditsacceptance。Acquisitionbythelatter，unlessitbeapactumreinitumwhichrequiresdelivery，isnotapart，butthejuridicallynecessaryconsequenceofthecontract。
Consideredagainsubjectively，orastowhethertheacquisition，whichoughttohappenasanecessaryconsequenceaccordingtoreason，willalsofollow，infact，asaphysicalconsequence，itisevidentthatIhavenosecurityorguaranteethatthiswillhappenbythemereacceptanceofapromise。Thereis，therefore，somethingexternallyrequiredconnectedwiththemodeofthecontract，inreferencetothecertaintyofacquisitionbyit;andthiscanonlybesomeelementcompletinganddeterminingthemeansnecessarytotheattainmentofacquisitionasrealizingthepurposeofthecontract。
Andinhisconnectionandbehoof，threepersonsarerequiredtointervene—thepromiser，theacceptor，andthecautionerorsurety。
Theimportanceofthecautionerisevident;butbyhisinterventionandhisspecialcontractwiththepromiser，theacceptorgainsnothinginrespectoftheobjectbutthemeansofcompulsionthatenablehimtoobtainwhatishisown。
Accordingtotheserationalprinciplesoflogicaldivision，thereareproperlyonlythreepureandsimplemodesofcontract。Thereare，however，innumerablemixedandempiricalmodes，addingstatutoryandconventionalformstotheprinciplesofmineandthinethatareinaccordancewithrationallaws。Buttheylieoutsideofthecircleofthemetaphysicalscienceofright，whoserationalmodesofcontractcanalonebeindicatedhere。
Allcontractsarefoundeduponapurposeofacquisition，andareeither：
A。Gratuitouscontracts，withunilateralacquisition;orB。Onerouscontracts，withreciprocalacquisition;orC。Cautionarycontracts，withnoacquisition，butonlyguaranteeofwhathasbeenalreadyacquired。Thesecontractsmaybegratuitousontheoneside，andyet，atthesametime，onerousontheother。
A。Thegratuitouscontracts（pactagratuita）are：
1。Depositation（depositum），involvingthepreservationofsomevaluabledepositedintrust;
2。Commodate（commodatum）aloanoftheuseofathing;
3。Donation（donatio），afreegift。
B。Theonerouscontractsarecontractseitherofpermutationorofhiring。
I。Contractsofpermutationorreciprocalexchange（permutatiolatesicdicta）：
1。Barter，orstrictlyrealexchange（permutatiostrictesicdicta）。Goodsexchangedforgoods。
2。Purchaseandsale（emptiovenditio）。Goodsexchangedformoney。
3。Loan（mutuum）。Loanofafungibleunderconditionofitsbeingreturnedinkind：cornforcorn，ormoneyformoney。
II。Contractsoflettingandhiring（locatioconductio）：
1。Lettingofathingonhiretoanotherpersonwhoistomakeuseofit（locatiorei）。Ifthethingcanonlyberestoredinspecie，itmaybethesubjectofanonerouscontractcombiningtheconsiderationofinterestwithit（pactumusurarium）。
2。Lettingofworkonhire（locatiooperae）。Consenttotheuseofmypowersbyanotherforacertainprice（merces）。Theworkerunderthiscontractisahiredservant（mercenarius）。
3。Mandate（mandatum）。Thecontractofmandateisanengagementtoperformorexecuteacertainbusinessinplaceandinnameofanotherperson。Iftheactionismerelydoneintheplaceofanother，butnot，atthesametime，inhisname，itisperformancewithoutcommission（gestionegotii）;butifitisrightfullyperformedinnameoftheother，itconstitutesmandate，whichasacontractofprocurationisanonerouscontract（mandatumonerosum）。
C。Thecautionarycontracts（cautiones）are：
1。Pledge（pignus）。Cautionbyamoveabledepositedassecurity。
2。Suretyship（fidejussio）。Cautionforthefulfillmentofthepromiseofanother。
3。Personalsecurity（praestatioobsidis）。
Guaranteeofpersonalperformance。
Thislistofallmodesinwhichthepropertyofonepersonmaybetransferredorconveyedtoanotherincludesconceptionsofcertainobjectsorinstrumentsrequiredforsuchtransference（translatio）。
Theseappeartobeentirelyempirical，anditmaythereforeseemquestionablewhethertheyareentitledtoaplaceinametaphysicalscienceofright。For，insuchascience，thedivisionsmustbemadeaccordingtoprinciplesapriori;andhencethematterofthejuridicalrelation，whichmaybeconventional，oughttobeleftoutofaccount，andonlyitsformshouldbetakenintoconsideration。
Suchconceptionsmaybeillustratedbytakingtheinstanceofmoney，incontradistinctionfromallotherexchangeablethingsaswaresandmerchandise;orbythecaseofabook。Andconsideringtheseasillustrativeexamplesinthisconnection，itwillbeshownthattheconceptionofmoneyasthegreatestandmostuseableofallthemeansofhumanintercommunicationthroughthings，inthewayofpurchaseandsaleincommerce，aswellasthatofbooksasthegreatestmeansofcarryingontheinterchangeofthought，resolvethemselvesintorelationsthatarepurelyintellectualandrational。
Andhenceitwillbemadeevidentthatsuchconceptionsdonotreallydetractfromthepurityofthegivenschemeofpurerationalcontracts，byempiricaladmixture。
IllustrationofRelationsofContractbytheConceptionsofMoneyandaBookI。WhatisMoney？
Moneyisathingwhichcanonlybemadeuseof，bybeingalienatedorexchanged。Thisisagoodnominaldefinition，asgivenbyAchenwall;anditissufficienttodistinguishobjectsofthewillofthiskindfromallotherobjects。Butitgivesusnoinformationregardingtherationalpossibilityofsuchathingasmoneyis。Yetweseethusmuchbythedefinition：（1）thatthealienationinthismodeofhumanintercommunicationandexchangeisnotviewedasagift，butisintendedasamodeofreciprocalacquisitionbyanonerouscontract;and（2）thatitisregardedasameremeansofcarryingoncommerce，universallyadoptedbythepeople，buthavingnovalueassuchofitself，incontrasttootherthingsasmercantilegoodsorwareswhichhaveaparticularvalueinrelationtospecialwantsexistingamongthepeople。Itthereforerepresentsallexchangeablethings。
Abushelofcornhasthegreatestdirectvalueasameansofsatisfyinghumanwants。Cattlemaybefedbyit;andtheseagainaresubservienttoournourishmentandlocomotion，andtheyevenlabourinourstead。Thus，bymeansofcorn，menaremultipliedandsupported，whonotonlyactagaininreproducingsuchnaturalproducts，butalsobyotherartificialproductstheycancometothereliefofallourproperwants。Thusaremenenabledtobuilddwellings，toprepareclothing，andtosupplyalltheingeniouscomfortsandenjoymentswhichmakeuptheproductsofindustry。Ontheotherhand，thevalueofmoneyisonlyindirect。Itcannotbeitselfenjoyed，norbeuseddirectlyforenjoyment;itis，however，ameanstowardsthis，andofalloutwardthingsitisofthehighestutility。
Wemayfoundarealdefinitionofmoneyprovisionallyupontheseconsiderations。Itmaythusbedefinedastheuniversalmeansofcarryingontheindustryofmeninexchangingintercommunicationswitheachother。Hencenationalwealth，insofarasitcanbeacquiredbymeansofmoney，isproperlyonlythesumoftheindustryorappliedlabourwithwhichmenpayeachother，andwhichisrepresentedbythemoneyincirculationamongthepeople。
Thethingwhichistobecalledmoneymust，therefore，havecostasmuchindustrytoproduceit，oreventoputitintothehandsofothers，asmaybeequivalenttotheindustryorlabourrequiredfortheacquisitionofthegoodsorwaresormerchandise，asnaturalorartificialproducts，forwhichitisexchanged。Forifitwereeasiertoprocurethematerialwhichiscalledmoneythanthegoodsthatarerequired，therewouldbemoremoneyinthemarketthangoodstobesold;andbecausethesellerwouldthenhavetoexpendmorelabouruponhisgoodsthanthebuyerontheequivalent，themoneycomingintohimmorerapidly，thelabourappliedtothepreparationofgoodsandindustrygenerally，withtheindustrialproductivitywhichisthesourceofthepublicwealth，wouldatthesametimedwindleandbecutdown。Hencebanknotesandassignationsarenottoberegardedasmoney，althoughtheymaytakeitsplacebywayofrepresentingitforatime;becauseitcostsalmostnolabourtopreparethem，andtheirvalueisbasedmerelyupontheopinionprevailingastothefurthercontinuanceofthepreviouspossibilityofchangingthemintoreadymoney。Butonitsbeinginanywayfoundoutthatthereisnotreadymoneyinsufficientquantityforeasyandsafeconversionofsuchnotesorassignations，theopiniongivesway，andafallintheirvaluebecomesinevitable。ThustheindustriallabourofthosewhoworkthegoldandsilverminesinPeruandMexico—
especiallyonaccountofthefrequentfailuresintheapplicationoffruitlesseffortstodiscovernewveinsofthesepreciousmetals—isprobablyevengreaterthanwhatisexpendedinthemanufactureofgoodsinEurope。Hencesuchmininglabour，asunrewardedinthecircumstances，wouldbeabandonedofitself，andthecountriesmentionedwouldinconsequencesoonsinkintopoverty，didnottheindustryofEurope，stimulatedinturnbytheseverymetals，proportionallyexpandatthesametimesoasconstantlytokeepupthezealoftheminersintheirworkbythearticlesofluxurytherebyofferedtothem。Itisthusthattheconcurrenceofindustrywithindustry，andoflabourwithlabour，isalwaysmaintained。
Buthowisitpossiblethatwhatatthebeginningconstitutedonlygoodsorwares，atlengthbecamemoney？Thishashappenedwhereverasovereignasgreatandpowerfulconsumerofaparticularsubstance，whichheatfirstusedmerelyfortheadornmentanddecorationofhisservantsandcourt，hasenforcedthetributeofhissubjectsinthiskindofmaterial。Thusitmayhavebeengold，orsilver，orcopper，oraspeciesofbeautifulshellscalledcowries，orevenasortofmatcalledmakutes，asinCongo;oringotsofiron，asinSenegal;orNegroslaves，asontheGuineaCoast。Whentherulerofthecountrydemandedsuchthingsasimposts，thosewhoselabourhadtobeputinmotiontoprocurethemwerealsopaidbymeansofthem，accordingtocertainregulationsofcommercethenestablished，asinamarketorexchange。Asitappearstome，itisonlythusthataparticularspeciesofgoodscametobemadealegalmeansofcarryingontheindustriallabourofthesubjectsintheircommercewitheachother，andtherebyformingthemediumofthenationalwealth。Andthusitpracticallybecamemoney。
Therationalconceptionofmoney，underwhichtheempiricalconceptionisembraced，isthereforethatofathingwhich，inthecourseofthepublicpermutationorexchangeofpossessions（permutatiopublica），determinesthepriceofalltheotherthingsthatformproductsorgoods—underwhichtermeventhesciencesareincluded，insofarastheyarenottaughtgratistoothers。Thequantityofitamongapeopleconstitutestheirwealth（opulentia）。
Forprice（pretium）isthepublicjudgementaboutthevalueofathing，inrelationtotheproportionateabundanceofwhatformstheuniversalrepresentativemeansincirculationforcarryingonthereciprocalinterchangeoftheproductsofindustryorlabour。*Thepreciousmetals，whentheyarenotmerelyweighedbutalsostampedorprovidedwithasignindicatinghowmuchtheyareworth，formlegalmoney，andarecalledcoin。
*Hencewherecommerceisextensiveneithergoldnorcopperisspeciallyusedasmoney，butonlyasconstitutingwares;becausethereistoolittleofthefirstandtoomuchofthesecondforthemtobeeasilybroughtintocirculation，soasatoncetohavetheformerinsuchsmallpiecesasarenecessaryinpaymentforparticulargoodsandnottohavethelatteringreatquantityincaseofthesmallestacquisitions。Hencesilver—moreorlessalloyedwithcopper—istakenasthepropermaterialofmoneyandthemeasureofthecalculationofallpricesinthegreatcommercialintercommunicationsoftheworld;andtheothermetals—andstillmorenon—metalicsubstances—
canonlytakeitsplaceinthecaseofapeopleoflimitedcommerce。
AccordingtoAdamSmith：\"Moneyhasbecome，inallcivilizednations，theuniversalinstrumentofcommerce，bytheinterventionofwhichgoodsofallkindsareboughtandsoldorexchangedforoneanother。\"Thisdefinitionexpandstheempiricalconceptionofmoneytotherationalideaofit，bytakingregardonlytotheimpliedformofthereciprocalperformancesintheonerouscontracts，andthusabstractingfromtheirmatter。Itisthusconformabletotheconceptionofrightinthepermutationandexchangeofthemineandthinegenerally（commutatiolatesicdicta）。Thedefinition，therefore，accordswiththerepresentationintheabovesynopsisofadogmaticdivisionofcontractsapriori，andconsequentlywiththemetaphysicalprincipleofrightingeneral。
II。WhatisaBook？
Abookisawritingwhichcontainsadiscourseaddressedbysomeonetothepublic，throughvisiblesignsofspeech。Itisamatterofindifferencetothepresentconsiderationswhetheritiswrittenbyapenorimprintedbytypes，andonfewormanypages。Hewhospeakstothepublicinhisownnameistheauthor。Hewhoaddressesthewritingtothepublicinthenameoftheauthoristhepublisher。Whenapublisherdoesthiswiththepermissionorauthorityoftheauthor，theactisinaccordancewithright，andheistherightfulpublisher;butifthisisdonewithoutsuchpermissionorauthority，theactiscontrarytoright，andthepublisherisacounterfeiterorunlawfulpublisher。Thewholeofasetofcopiesoftheoriginaldocumentiscalledanedition。
TheUnauthorizedPublishingofBooksisContrarytothePrinciplesofRight，andisRightlyProhibited。
Awritingisnotanimmediatedirectpresentationofaconception，asisthecase，forinstance，withanengravingthatexhibitsaportrait，orabustorcastbyasculptor。Itisadiscourseaddressedinaparticularformtothepublic;andtheauthormaybesaidtospeakpubliclybymeansofhispublisher。Thepublisher，again，speaksbytheaidoftheprinterashisworkman（operarius），yetnotinhisownname，forotherwisehewouldbetheauthor，butinthenameoftheauthor;andheisonlyentitledtodosoinvirtueofamandategivenhimtothateffectbytheauthor。Nowtheunauthorizedprinterandpublisherspeaksbyanassumedauthorityinhispublication;inthenameindeedoftheauthor，butwithoutamandatetothateffect（geritsemandatariumabsquemandato）。Consequentlysuchanunauthorizedpublicationisawrongcommittedupontheauthorizedandonlylawfulpublisher，asitamountstoapilferingoftheprofitswhichthelatterwasentitledandabletodrawfromtheuseofhisproperright（furtumusus）。Unauthorizedprintingandpublicationofbooksis，therefore，forbidden—asanactofcounterfeitandpiracy—
onthegroundofright。
Thereseems，however，tobeanimpressionthatthereisasortofcommonrighttoprintandpublishbooks;buttheslightestreflectionmustconvinceanyonethatthiswouldbeagreatinjustice。
Thereasonofitisfoundsimplyinthefactthatabook，regardedfromonepointofview，isanexternalproductofmechanicalart（opusmechanicum），thatcanbeimitatedbyanyonewhomaybeinrightfulpossessionofacopy;anditisthereforehisbyarealright。
But，fromanotherpointofview，abookisnotmerelyanexternalthing，butisadiscourseofthepublishertothepublic，andheisonlyentitledtodothispubliclyunderthemandateoftheauthor（praestatiooperae）;andthisconstitutesapersonalright。Theerrorunderlyingtheimpressionreferredto，therefore，arisesfromaninterchangeandconfusionofthesetwokindsofrightinrelationtobooks。
ConfusionofPersonalRightandRealRight。
Theconfusionofpersonalrightwithrealrightmaybelikewiseshownbyreferencetoadifferenceofviewinconnectionwithanothercontract，fallingundertheheadofcontractsofhiring（BII。
I），namely，thecontractoflease（jusincolatus）。Thequestionisraisedastowhetheraproprietorwhenhehassoldahouseorapieceofgroundheldonlease，beforetheexpiryoftheperiodoflease，wasboundtoaddtheconditionofthecontinuanceoftheleasetothecontractofpurchase;orwhetheritshouldbeheldthat\"purchasebreakshire，\"ofcourseunderreservationofaperiodofwarningdeterminedbythenatureofthesubjectinuse。Intheformerview，ahouseorfarmwouldberegardedashavingaburdenlyinguponit，constitutingarealrightacquiredinitbythelessee;
andthismightwellenoughbecarriedoutbyaclausemerelyindorsingoringrossingthecontractofleaseinthedeedofsale。Butasitwouldnolongerthenbeasimplelease;anothercontractwouldproperlyberequiredtobeconjoined，amatterwhichfewlessorswouldbedisposedtogrant。Theproposition，then，that\"Purchasebreakshire\"holdsinprinciple;forthefullrightinathingasapropertyoverbearsallpersonalright，whichisinconsistentwithit。Butthereremainsarightofactiontothelessee，onthegroundofapersonalrightforindemnificationonaccountofanylossarisingfrombreakingofthecontract。
EPISODICALSECTION。TheIdealAcquisitionofExternalObjectsoftheWill。
32。TheNatureandModesofIdealAcquisition。
Icallthatmodeofacquisitionidealwhichinvolvesnocausalityintime，andwhichisfoundeduponamereideaofpurereason。Itisneverthelessactual，andnotmerelyimaginaryacquisition：anditisnotcalledrealonlybecausetheactofacquisitionisnotempirical。Thischaracteroftheactarisesfromthepeculiaritythatthepersonacquiringacquiresfromanotherwhoeitherisnotyet，andwhocanonlyberegardedasapossiblebeing，orwhoisjustceasingtobe，orwhonolongeris。Hencesuchamodeofattainingtopossessionistoberegardedasamerepracticalideaofreason。
Therearethreemodesofidealacquisition：
I。Acquisitionbyusucapion;
II。Acquisitionbyinheritanceorsuccession;
III。Acquisitionbyundyingmerit（meritumimmortale），ortheclaimbyrighttoagoodnameatdeath。
Thesethreemodesofacquisitioncan，asamatteroffact，onlyhaveeffectinapublicjuridicalstateofexistence，buttheyarenotfoundedmerelyuponthecivilconstitutionoruponarbitrarystatutes;
theyarealreadycontainedaprioriintheconceptionofthestateofnature，andarethusnecessarilyconceivablepriortotheirempiricalmanifestation。Thelawsregardingtheminthecivilconstitutionoughttoberegulatedbythatrationalconception。
33。I。AcquisitionbyUsucapion。
（AcquisitioperUsucapionem）。
Imayacquirethepropertyofanothermerelybylongpossessionanduseofit（usucapio）。Suchpropertyisnotacquired，becauseImaylegitimatelypresumethathisconsentisgiventothiseffect（perconsensumpraesumptum）;norbecauseIcanassumethat，ashedoesnotopposemyacquisitionofit，hehasrelinquishedorabandoneditashis（remderelictam）。ButIacquireitthusbecause，eveniftherewereanyoneactuallyraisingaclaimtothispropertyasitstrueowner，Imayexcludehimonthegroundofmylongpossessionofit，ignorehispreviousexistence，andproceedasifheexistedduringthetimeofmypossessionasamereabstraction，althoughImayhavebeensubsequentlyapprizedofhisrealityaswellasofhisclaim。
Thismodeofacquisitionisnotquitecorrectlydesignatedacquisitionbyprescription（perpraescriptionem）;fortheexclusionofallotherclaimantsistoberegardedasonlytheconsequenceoftheusucapion;andtheprocessofacquisitionmusthavegonebeforetherightofexclusion。Therationalpossibilityofsuchamodeofacquisitionhasnowtobeproved。
Anyonewhodoesnotexerciseacontinuouspossessoryactivity（actuspossessorius）inrelationtoathingashisisregardedwithgoodrightasonewhodoesnotatallexistasitspossessor。Forhecannotcomplainoflesionsolongashedoesnotqualifyhimselfwithatitleasitspossessor。Andevenifheshouldafterwardslayclaimtothethingwhenanotherhasalreadytakenpossessionofit，heonlysayshewasonceonatimeownerofit，butnotthatheissostill，orthathispossessionhascontinuedwithoutinterruptionasajuridicalfact。Itcan，therefore，onlybeajuridicalprocessofpossession，thathasbeenmaintainedwithoutinterruptionandisproveablebydocumentaryfact，thatanyonecansecureforhimselfwhatishisownafterceasingforalongtimetomakeuseofit。
For，supposethattheneglecttoexercisethispossessoryactivityhadnottheeffectofenablinganothertofounduponhishithertolawful，undisputedandbonafidepossession，andirrefragablerighttocontinueinitspossessionsothathemayregardthethingthatisthusinhispossessionasacquiredbyhim。Thennoacquisitionwouldeverbecomeperemptoryandsecured，butallacquisitionwouldonlybeprovisoryandtemporary。Thisisevidentonthegroundthattherearenohistoricalrecordsavailabletocarrytheinvestigationofatitlebacktothefirstpossessorandhisactofacquisition。Thepresumptionuponwhichacquisitionbyusucapionisfoundedis，therefore，notmerelyitsconformitytorightasallowedandjust，butalsothepresumptionofitsbeingright（praesumtiojurisetdejure），anditsbeingassumedtobeinaccordancewithcompulsorylaws（suppositiolegalis）。Anyonewhohasneglectedtoembodyhispossessoryactinadocumentarytitlehaslosthisclaimtotherightofbeingpossessorforthetime;andthelengthoftheperiodofhisneglectingtodoso—whichneednotnecessarilybeparticularlydefined—canbereferredtoonlyasestablishingthecertaintyofthisneglect。Anditwouldcontradictthepostulateofthejuridicallypracticalreasontomaintainthatonehithertounknownasapossessor，andwhosepossessoryactivityhasatleastbeeninterrupted，whetherbyorwithoutfaultofhisown，couldalwaysatanytimere—acquireaproperty;forthiswouldbetomakeallownershipuncertain（dominiarerumincertafacere）。
Butifheisamemberofthecommonwealthorcivilunion，thestatemaymaintainhispossessionforhimvicariously，althoughitmaybeinterruptedasprivatepossession;andinthatcasetheactualpossessorwillnotbeabletoproveatitleofacquisitionevenfromafirstoccupation，nortofounduponatitleofusucapion。But，inthestateofnature，usucapionisuniversallyarightfulgroundofholding，notproperlyasajuridicalmodeofrequiringathing，butasagroundformaintainingoneselfinpossessionofitwheretherearenojuridicalacts。Areleasefromjuridicalclaimsiscommonlyalsocalledacquisition。Theprescriptivetitleoftheolderpossessor，therefore，belongstothesphereofnaturalright（estjurisnaturae）。
34。II。AcquisitionbyInheritance。
（Acquisitiohaereditatis）。
Inheritanceisconstitutedbythetransfer（translatio）ofthepropertyorgoodsofonewhoisdyingtoasurvivor，throughtheconsentofthewillofboth。Theacquisitionoftheheirwhotakestheestate（haeredisinstituti）andtherelinquishmentofthetestatorwholeavesit，beingtheactsthatconstitutetheexchangeofthemineandthine，takeplaceinthesamemomentoftime—inarticulomortis—
andjustwhenthetestatorceasestobe。Thereisthereforenospecialactoftransfer（translatio）intheempiricalsense;forthatwouldinvolvetwosuccessiveacts，bywhichtheonewouldfirstdivesthimselfofhispossession，andtheotherwouldthereuponenterintoit。Inheritanceasconstitutedbyasimultaneousdoubleactis，therefore，anidealmodeofacquisition。Inheritanceisinconceivableinthestateofnaturewithoutatestamentarydisposition（dispositioultimaevoluntatis）;andthequestionarisesastowhetherthismodeofacquisitionistoberegardedasacontractofsuccession，oraunilateralactinstitutinganheirbyawill（testamentum）。Thedeterminationofthisquestiondependsonthefurtherquestion，whetherandhow，intheverysamemomentinwhichoneindividualceasestobe，therecanbeatransitionofhispropertytoanotherperson。Hencetheproblem，astohowamodeofacquisitionbyinheritanceispossible，mustbeinvestigatedindependentlyofthevariouspossibleformsinwhichitispracticallycarriedout，andwhichcanhaveplaceonlyinacommonwealth。
\"Itispossibletoacquirebybeinginstitutedorappointedheirinatestamentarydisposition。\"ForthetestatorCaiuspromisesanddeclaresinhislastwilltoTitius，whoknowsnothingofthispromise，totransfertohimhisestateincaseofdeath，butthuscontinuingaslongashelivessoleownerofit。Nowbyamereunilateralactofwill，nothingcaninfactbetransmittedtoanotherperson，asinadditiontothepromiseoftheonepartythereisrequiredacceptance（acceptatio）onthepartoftheother，andasimultaneousbilateralactofwill（voluntassimultanea）which，however，ishereawanting。SolongasCaiuslives，Titiuscannotexpresslyacceptinordertoenteronacquisition，becauseCaiushasonlypromisedincaseofdeath;otherwisethepropertywouldbeforamomentatleastincommonpossession，whichisnotthewillofthetestator。However，Titiusacquirestacitlyaspecialrighttotheinheritanceasarealright。Thisisconstitutedbythesoleandexclusiverighttoaccepttheestate（jusinrejacente），whichisthereforecalledatthatpointoftimeahaereditasjacens。Nowaseveryman—becausehemustalwaysgainandneverlosebyit—
necessarily，althoughtacitly，acceptssucharight，andasTitiusafterthedeathofCaiusisinthisposition，hemayacquirethesuccessionasheirbyacceptanceofthepromise。Andtheestateisnotinthemeantimeentirelywithoutanowner（resnullius），butisonlyinabeyanceorvacant（vacua）;becausehehasexclusivelytherightofchoiceastowhetherhewillactuallymaketheestatebequeathedtohimhisownornot。
Hencetestamentsarevalidaccordingtomerenaturalright（suntjurisnaturae）。Thisassertionhowever，istobeunderstoodinthesensethattheyarecapableandworthyofbeingintroducedandsanctionedinthecivilstate，wheneveritisinstituted。Foritisonlythecommonwillinthecivilstatethatmaintainsthepossessionoftheinheritanceorsuccession，whileithangsbetweenacceptanceorrejectionandspeciallybelongstonoparticularindividual。
35。III。TheContinuingRightofaGoodNameafterDeath。（BonafamaDefuncti）。
Itwouldbeabsurdtothinkthatadeadpersoncouldpossessanythingafterhisdeath，whenhenolongerexistsintheeyeofthelaw，ifthematterinquestionwereamerething。Butagoodnameisacongenitalandexternal，althoughmerelyideal，possession，whichattachesinseparablytotheindividualasaperson。Nowwecanandmustabstractherefromallconsiderationastowhetherthepersonsceasetobeafterdeathorstillcontinueassuchtoexist;because，inconsideringtheirjuridicalrelationtoothers，weregardpersonsmerelyaccordingtotheirhumanityandasrationalbeings（homonoumenon）。Henceanyattempttobringthereputationorgoodnameofapersonintoevilandfalsereputeafterdeath，isalwaysquestionable，evenalthoughawell—foundedchargemaybeallowed—fortothatextentthebrocard\"Demortuisnilnisibene\"*iswrong。Yettospreadchargesagainstonewhoisabsentandcannotdefendhimself，showsatleastawantofmagnanimity。
*[Letnothingbesaidofthedeadbutwhatisfavourable。]
Byablamelesslifeandadeaththatworthilyendsit，nothingendsit，itisadmittedthatamanmayacquirea（negatively）goodreputationconstitutingsomethingthatishisown，evenwhenhenolongerexistsintheworldofsenseasavisibleperson（homophaenomenon）。Itisfurtherheldthathissurvivorsandsuccessors—
whetherrelativesorstrangers—areentitledtodefendhisgoodnameasamatterofright，onthegroundthatunprovedaccusationssubjectthemalltothedangerofsimilartreatmentafterdeath。Nowthatamanwhendeadcanyetacquiresucharightisapeculiarand，nevertheless，anundeniablemanifestationinfact，oftheapriorilaw—givingreasonthusextendingitslawofcommandorprohibitionbeyondthelimitsofthepresentlife。Ifsomeonethenspreadsachargeregardingadeadpersonthatwouldhavedishonouredhimwhenliving，orevenmadehimdespicable，anyonewhocanadduceaproofthatthisaccusationisintentionallyfalseanduntruemaypubliclydeclarehimwhothusbringsthedeadpersonintoillreputetobeacalumniator，andaffixdishonourtohiminturn。Thiswouldnotbeallowableunlessitwerelegitimatetoassumethatthedeadpersonwasinjuredbytheaccusation，althoughheisdead，andthatacertainjustsatisfactionwasdonetohimbyanapology，althoughhenolongersensiblyexists。Atitletoactthepartthevindicatorofthedeadpersondoesnotrequiretobeestablished;foreveryonenecessarilyclaimsthisofhimself，notmerelyasadutyofvirtueregardedethically，butasarightbelongingtohiminvirtueofhishumanity。Nordoesthevindicatorrequiretoshowanyspecialpersonaldamage，accruingtohimasafriendorrelative，fromastainonthecharacterofthedeceased，tojustifyhiminproceedingtocensureit。
Thatsuchaformofidealacquisition，andevenarightinanindividualafterdeathagainstsurvivors，isthusactuallyfounded，cannot，therefore，bedisputed，althoughthepossibilityofsucharightisnotcapableoflogicaldeduction。
Thereisnogroundfordrawingvisionaryinferencesfromwhathasjustbeenstated，tothepresentimentofafuturelifeandinvisiblerelationstodepartedsouls。Fortheconsiderationsconnectedwiththisrightturnonnothingmorethanthepurelymoralandjuridicalrelationwhichsubsistsamongmen，eveninthepresentlife，asrationalbeings。Abstractionis，however，madefromallthatbelongsphysicallytotheirexistenceinspaceandtime;thatis，menareconsideredlogicallyapartfromthesephysicalconcomitantsoftheirnature，notastotheirstatewhenactuallydeprivedofthem，butonlyinsofarasbeingspiritstheyareinaconditionthatmightrealizetheinjurydonethembycalumniators。Anyonewhomayfalselysaysomethingagainstmeahundredyearshenceinjuresmeevennow。Forinthepurejuridicalrelation，whichisentirelyrationalandsurprasensible，abstractionismadefromthephysicalconditionsoftime，andthecalumniatorisasculpableasifhehadcommittedtheoffenceinmylifetime;onlythiswillnotbetriedbyacriminalprocess，buthewillonlybepunishedwiththatlossofhonourhewouldhavecausedtoanother，andthisisinflicteduponhimbypublicopinionaccordingtothelextalionis。Evenaplagiarismfromadeadauthor，althoughitdoesnottarnishthehonourofthedeceased，butonlydepriveshimofapartofhisproperty，isyetproperlyregardedasalesionofhishumanright。
CH3
FIRSTPART。PRIVATERIGHT。
TheSystemofthoseLawsWhichRequireNoExternalPromulgation。
CHAPTERIII。AcquisitionConditionedbytheSentenceofaPublicJudicatory。
36。HowandWhatAcquisitionisSubjectivelyConditionedbythePrincipleofaPublicCourt。
Naturalright，understoodsimplyasthatrightwhichisnotstatutory，andwhichisknowablepurelyapriori，byeveryman’sreason，willincludedistributivejusticeaswellascommutativejustice。Itismanifestthatthelatter，asconstitutingthejusticethatisvalidbetweenpersonsintheirreciprocalrelationsofintercoursewithoneanother，mustbelongtonaturalright。Butthisholdsalsoofdistributivejustice，insofarasitcanbeknownapriori;anddecisionsorsentencesregardingitmustberegulatedbythelawofnaturalright。
ThemoralpersonwhopresidesinthesphereofjusticeandadministersitiscalledtheCourtofjustice，and，asengagedintheprocessofofficialduty，thejudicatory;thesentencedeliveredinacase，isthejudgement（judicium）。Allthisistobehereviewedapriori，accordingtotherationalconditionsofright，withouttakingintoconsiderationhowsuchaconstitutionistobeactuallyestablishedororganized，forwhichparticularstatutes，andconsequentlyempiricalprinciples，arerequisite。
Thequestion，then，inthisconnection，isnotmerely\"Whatisrightinitself？\"inthesenseinwhicheverymanmustdetermineitbythejudgementofreason;but\"Whatisrightasappliedtothiscase？\"thatis，\"Whatisrightandjustasviewedbyacourt？\"Therationalandthejudicialpointsofviewarethereforetobedistinguished;andtherearefourcasesinwhichthetwoformsofjudgementhaveadifferentandoppositeissue。Andyettheymayco—existwitheachother，becausetheyaredeliveredfromtwodifferent，yetrespectivelytrue，pointsofview：theonefromregardtoprivateright，theotherfromtheideaofpublicright。Theyare：I。Thecontractofdonation（pactumdonationis）;II。Thecontractofloan（commodatum）;
III。Theactionofrealrevindication（vindicatio）;andIV。
Guaranteebyoath（juramentum）。
Itisacommonerroronthepartofthejuristtofallhereintothefallacyofbeggingthequestionbyatacitassumption（vitiumsubreptionis）。Thisisdonebyassumingasobjectiveandabsolutethejuridicalprinciplewhichapubliccourtofjusticeisentitledandevenboundtoadoptinitsownbehoof，andonlyfromthesubjectivepurposeofqualifyingitselftodecideandjudgeuponalltherightspertainingtoindividuals。Itisthereforeofnosmallimportancetomakethisspecificdifferenceintelligible，andtodrawattentiontoit。
37。I。TheContractofDonation。
（PactumDonationis）。
Thecontractofdonationsignifiesthegratuitousalienation（gratis）ofathingorrightthatismine。Itinvolvesarelationbetweenmeasthedonor（donans），andanotherpersonasthedonatory（donatarius），inaccordancewiththeprincipleofprivateright，bywhichwhatismineistransferredtothelatter，onhisacceptanceofit，asagift（donum）。However，itisnottobepresumedthatI
havevoluntarilyboundmyselftherebysoastobecompelledtokeepmypromise，andthatIhavethusgivenawaymyfreedomgratuitously，and，asitwere，tothatextentthrownmyselfaway。Nemosuumjactarepraesumitur。Butthisiswhatwouldhappen，undersuchcircumstances，accordingtotheprincipleofrightinthecivilstate;
forinthisspherethedonatorycancompelme，undercertainconditions，toperformmypromise。If，then，thecasecomesbeforeacourt，accordingtotheconditionsofpublicright，itmusteitherbepresumedthatthedonorhasconsentedtosuchcompulsion，orthecourtwouldgivenoregard，inthesentence，totheconsiderationastowhetherheintendedtoreservetherighttoresilefromhispromiseornot;butwouldonlyrefertowhatiscertain，namely，theconditionofthepromiseandtheacceptanceofthedonatory。Althoughthepromiser，therefore，thought—asmayeasilybesupposed—thathecouldnotbeboundbyhispromiseinanycase，ifhe\"rued\"itbeforeitwasactuallycarriedout，yetthecourtassumesthatheoughtexpresslytohavereservedthisconditionifsuchwashismind;andifhedidnotmakesuchanexpressreservation，itwillbeheldthathecanbecompelledtoimplementhispromise。Andthisprincipleisassumedbythecourt，becausetheadministrationofjusticewouldotherwisebeendlesslyimpeded，orevenmadeentirelyimpossible。
38。II。TheContractofLoan。（Commodatum）。
Inthecontractofcommodate—loan（commodatum）Igivesomeonethegratuitoususeofsomethingthatismine。Ifitisathingthatisgivenonloan，thecontractingpartiesagreethattheborrowerwillrestoretheverysamethingtothepowerofthelender，Butthereceiveroftheloan（commodatarius）cannot，atthesametime，assumethattheownerofthethinglent（commodans）willtakeuponhimselfallrisk（casus）ofanypossiblelossofit，orofitsusefulquality，thatmayarisefromhavinggivenitintothepossessionofthereceiver。Foritisnottobeunderstoodofitselfthattheowner，besidestheuseofthething，whichhehasgrantedtothereceiver，andthedetrimentthatisinseparablefromsuchuse，alsogivesaguaranteeorwarrandiceagainstalldamagethatmayarisefromsuchuse。Onthecontrary，aspecialaccessorycontractwouldhavetobeenteredintoforthispurpose。Theonlyquestion，then，thatcanberaisedisthis：\"Isitincumbentonthelenderortheborrowertoaddexpresslytheconditionofundertakingtheriskthatmayaccruetothethinglent;or，ifthisisnotdone，whichofthepartiesistobepresumedtohaveconsentedandagreedtoguaranteethepropertyofthelender，uptorestorationoftheverysamethingoritsequivalent？\"Certainlynotthelender;becauseitcannotbepresumedthathehasgratuitouslyagreedtogivemorethanthemereuseofthething，sothathecannotbesupposedtohavealsoundertakentheriskoflossofhisproperty。Butthismaybeassumedonthesideoftheborrower;becausehetherebyundertakesandperformsnothingmorethanwhatisimpliedinthecontract。
Forexample，Ienterahouse，whenovertakenbyashowerofrain，andasktheloanofacloak。Butthroughaccidentalcontactwithcolouringmatter，itbecomesentirelyspoiledwhileinmypossession;oronenteringanotherhouse，Ilayitasideanditisstolen。Undersuchcircumstances，everybodywouldthinkitabsurdformetoassertthatIhadnofurtherconcernwiththecloakbuttoreturnitasitwas，or，inthelattercase，onlytomentionthefactofthetheft;andthat，inanycase，anythingmorerequiredwouldbebutanactofcourtesyinexpressingsympathywiththeowneronaccountofhisloss，seeinghecanclaimnothingonthegroundofright。Itwouldbeotherwise，however，if，onaskingtheuseofanarticle，Idischargedmyselfbeforehandfromallresponsibility，incaseofitscomingtogriefwhileinmyhands，onthegroundofmybeingpoorandunabletocompensateanyincidentalloss。Noonecouldfindsuchaconditionsuperfluousorludicrous，unlesstheborrowerwere，infact，knowntobeawell—to—doandwell—disposedman;becauseinsuchacaseitwouldalmostbeaninsultnottoactonthepresumptionofgenerouscompensationforanylosssustained。
Nowbytheverynatureofthiscontract，thepossibledamage（casus）
whichthethinglentmayundergocannotbeexactlydeterminedinanyagreement。Commodateisthereforeanuncertaincontract（pactumincertum），becausetheconsentcanonlybesofarpresumed。Thejudgement，inanycase，decidinguponwhomtheincidenceofanylossmustfall，cannotthereforebedeterminedfromtheconditionsofthecontractinitself，butonlybytheprincipleofthecourtbeforewhichitcomes，andwhichcanonlyconsiderwhatiscertaininthecontract;andtheonlythingcertainisalwaysthefactastothepossessionofthethingasproperty。Hencethejudgementpassedinthestateofnaturewillbedifferentfromthatgivenbyacourtofjusticeinthecivilstate。Thejudgementfromthestandpointofnaturalrightwillbedeterminedbyregardtotheinnerrationalqualityofthething，andwillrunthus：\"Lossarisingfromdamageaccruingtoathinglentfallsupontheborrower\"（casumsentitcommodatarius）;whereasthesentenceofacourtofjusticeinthecivilstatewillrunthus：\"Thelossfallsuponthelender\"（casumsentitdominus）。Thelatterjudgementturnsoutdifferentlyfromtheformerasthesentenceofthemeresoundreason，becauseapublicjudgecannotfounduponpresumptionsastowhateitherpartymayhavethought;andthustheonewhohasnotobtainedreleasefromalllossinthething，byaspecialaccessorycontract，mustbeartheloss。Hencethedifferencebetweenthejudgementasthecourtmustdeliveritandtheforminwhicheachindividualisentitledtoholditforhimself，byhisprivatereason，isamatterofimportance，andisnottobeoverlookedintheconsiderationofjuridicaljudgements。
39。III。TheRevindicationofwhathasbeenLost。
（Vindicatio）。
Itisclearfromwhathasbeenalreadysaidthatathingofminewhichcontinuestoexistremainsmine，althoughImaynotbeincontinuousoccupationofit;andthatitdoesnotceasetobeminewithoutajuridicalactofderelictionoralienation。Further，itisevidentthatarightinthisthing（jusreale）belongsinconsequencetome（juspersonale），againsteveryholderofit，andnotmerelyagainstsomeparticularperson。Butthequestionnowarisesastowhetherthisrightmustberegardedbyeveryotherpersonasacontinuousrightofpropertyperse，ifIhavenotinanywayrenouncedit，althoughthethingisinthepossessionofanother。
Athingmaybelost（resamissa）andthuscomeintootherhandsinanhonourablebonafidewayasasupposed\"find\";oritmaycometomebyformaltransferonthepartofonewhoisinpossessionofit，andwhoprofessestobeitsowner，althoughheisnotso。Takingthelattercase，thequestionariseswhether，sinceIcannotacquireathingfromonewhoisnotitsowner（anondomino），Iamexcludedbythefactfromallrightinthethingitself，andhavemerelyapersonalrightagainstawrongfulpossessor？Thisismanifestlyso，iftheacquisitionisjudgedpurelyaccordingtoitsinnerjustifyinggroundsandviewedaccordingtothestateofnature，andnotaccordingtotheconvenienceofacourtofjustice。
Foreverythingalienablemustbecapableofbeingacquiredbyanyone。Therightfulnessofacquisition，however，restsentirelyupontheforminaccordancewithwhichwhatisinpossessionofanother，istransferredtomeandacceptedbyme。Inotherwords，rightfulacquisitiondependsupontheformalityofthejuridicalactofcommutationorinterchangebetweenthepossessorofthethingandtheacquirerofit，withoutitsbeingrequiredtoaskhowtheformercamebyit;becausethiswoulditselfbeaninjury，onthegroundthat：Quilibetpraesumiturbonus。Nowsupposeitturnedoutthatthesaidpossessorwasnottherealowner，Icannotadmitthattherealownerisentitledtoholdmedirectlyresponsible，orsoentitledwithregardtoanyonewhomightbeholdingthething。ForIhavemyselftakennothingawayfromhim，when，forexample，Iboughthishorseaccordingtothelaw（tituloemptivenditi）whenitwasofferedforsaleinthepublicmarket。Thetitleofacquisitionisthereforeunimpeachableonmyside;andasbuyerIamnotbound，norevenhaveI
theright，toinvestigatethetitleoftheseller;forthisprocessofinvestigationwouldhavetogooninanascendingseriesadinfinitum。
HenceonsuchgroundsIoughttoberegarded，invirtueofaregularandformalpurchase，asnotmerelytheputative，buttherealownerofthehorse。
Butagainstthisposition，thereimmediatelystartupthefollowingjuridicalprinciples。Anyacquisitionderivedfromonewhoisnottheownerofthethinginquestionisnullandvoid。Icannotderivefromanotheranythingmorethanwhathehimselfrightfullyhas;
andalthoughasregardstheformoftheacquisitionthemodusacquirendi—ImayproceedinaccordancewithalltheconditionsofrightwhenIdealinastolenhorseexposedforsaleinthemarket，yetarealtitlewarrantingtheacquisitionwasawanting;forthehorsewasnotreallythepropertyofthesellerinquestion。HoweverI
maybeabonafidepossessorofathingundersuchconditions，Iamstillonlyaputativeowner，andtherealownerhastherightofvindicationagainstme（remsuamvindicandi）。
Now，itmaybeagainasked，whatisrightandjustinitselfregardingtheacquisitionofexternalthingsamongmenintheirintercoursewithoneanother—viewedinthestateofnatureaccordingtotheprinciplesofcommutativejustice？Anditmustbeadmittedinthisconnectionthatwhoeverhasapurposeofacquiringanythingmustregarditasabsolutelynecessarytoinvestigatewhetherthethingwhichhewishestoacquiredoesnotalreadybelongtoanotherperson。Foralthoughhemaycarefullyobservetheformalconditionsrequiredforappropriatingwhatmaybelongtothepropertyofanother，asinbuyingahorseaccordingtotheusualtermsinamarket，yethecan，atthemost，acquireonlyapersonalrightinrelationtoathing（jusadrem）solongasitisstillunknowntohimwhetheranotherthanthesellermaynotbetherealowner。Hence，ifsomeotherpersonweretocomeforwardandprovebydocumentaryevidenceapriorrightofpropertyinthething，nothingwouldremainfortheputativenewownerbuttheadvantagewhichhehasdrawnasabonafidepossessorofituptothatmoment。Nowitisfrequentlyimpossibletodiscovertheabsolutelyfirstoriginalownerofathingintheseriesofputativeowners，whoderivetheirrightfromoneanother。Hencenomereexchangeofexternalthings，howeverwellitmayagreewiththeformalconditionsofcommutativejustice，caneverguaranteeanabsolutelycertainacquisition。
Here，however，thejuridicallylaw—givingreasoncomesinagainwiththeprincipleofdistributivejustice;anditadoptsasacriterionoftherightfulnessofpossession，notwhatisinitselfinreferencetotheprivatewillofeachindividualinthestateofnature，butonlytheconsiderationofhowitwouldbeadjudgedbyacourtofjusticeinacivilstate，constitutedbytheunitedwillofall。Inthisconnection，fulfillmentoftheformalconditionsofacquisition，thatinthemselvesonlyestablishapersonalright，ispostulatedassufficient;andtheystandasanequivalentforthematerialconditionswhichproperlyestablishthederivationofpropertyfromapriorputativeowner，totheextentofmakingwhatisinitselfonlyapersonalright，validbeforeacourt，asarealright。ThusthehorsewhichIboughtwhenexposedforsaleinthepublicmarket，underconditionsregulatedbythemunicipallaw，becomesmypropertyifalltheconditionsofpurchaseandsalehavebeenexactlyobservedinthetransaction;butalwaysunderthereservationthattherealownercontinuestohavetherightofaclaimagainsttheseller，onthegroundofhispriorunalienatedpossession。