第2章

§408。

ii。InsanityInconsequenceoftheimmediacy，whichstillmarkstheself—feeling，i。e。inconsequenceoftheelementofcorporealitywhichisstillundetachedfromthementallife，andasthefeelingtooisitselfparticularandboundupwithaspecialcorporealform，itfollowsthatalthoughthesubjecthasbeenbroughttoacquireintelligentconsciousness，itisstillsusceptibleofdisease，sofarastoremainfastinaspecialphaseofitsself—feeling，unabletorefineitto’ideality’andgetthebetterofit。Thefullyfurnishedselfofintelligentconsciousnessisaconscioussubject，whichisconsistentinitselfaccordingtoanorderandbehaviourwhichfollowsfromitsindividualpositionanditsconnectionwiththeexternalworld，whichisnolessaworldoflaw。Butwhenitisengrossedwithasinglephaseoffeeling，itfailstoassignthatphaseitsproperplaceandduesubordinationintheindividualsystemoftheworldwhichaconscioussubjectis。Inthiswaythesubjectfindsitselfincontradictionbetweenthetotalitysystematizedinitsconsciousness，andthesinglephaseorfixedideawhichisnotreducedtoitsproperplaceandrank。ThisisInsanityormentalDerangement。

Inconsideringinsanitywemust，asinothercases，anticipatethefull—grownandintelligentconscioussubject，whichisatthesametimethenaturalselfofself—feeling。Insuchaphasetheselfcanbeliabletothecontradictionbetweenitsownfreesubjectivityandaparticularitywhich，insteadofbeing’idealized’intheformer，remainsasafixedelementinself—feeling。Mindassuchisfree，andthereforenotsusceptibleofthismalady。Butinoldermetaphysicsmindwastreatedasasoul，asathing;anditisonlyasathing，i。e。assomethingnaturalandexistent，thatitisliabletoinsanity—thesettledfixtureofsomefiniteelementinit。Insanityisthereforeapsychicaldisease，i。e。adiseaseofbodyandmindalike：thecommencementmayappeartostartfromtheonemorethantheother，andsoalsomaythecure。

Theself—possessedandhealthysubjecthasanactiveandpresentconsciousnessoftheorderedwholeofhisindividualworld，intothesystemofwhichhesubsumeseachspecialcontentofsensation，idea，desire，inclination，etc。，asitarises，soastoinsertthemintheirproperplace，Heisthedominantgeniusovertheseparticularities。Betweenthisandinsanitythedifferenceislikethatbetweenwakinganddreaming：onlythatininsanitythedreamfallswithinthewakinglimits，andsomakespartoftheactualself—feeling。Errorandthatsortofthingisapropositionconsistentlyadmittedtoaplaceintheobjectiveinterconnectionofthings。Intheconcrete，however，itisoftendifficulttosaywhereitbeginstobecomederangement。Aviolent，butgroundlessandsenselessoutburstofhatred，etc。，may，incontrasttoapresupposedhigherself—possessionandstabilityofcharacter，makeitsvictimseemtobebesidehimselfwithfrenzy。Butthemainpointinderangementisthecontradictionwhichafeelingwithafixedcorporealembodimentsetsupagainstthewholemassofadjustmentsformingtheconcreteconsciousness。Themindwhichisinaconditionofmerebeing，andwheresuchbeingisnotrenderedfluidinitsconsciousness，isdiseased。Thecontentswhicharesetfreeinthisreversiontomerenaturearetheself—seekingaffectionsoftheheart，suchasvanity，pride，andtherestofthepassions—fanciesandhopes—

merelypersonalloveandhatred。Whentheinfluenceofself—possessionandofgeneralprinciples，moralandtheoretical，isrelaxed，andceasestokeepthenaturaltemperunderlockandkey，the，earthlyelementsaresetfree—thatevilwhichisalwayslatentintheheart，becausetheheartasimmediateisnaturalandselfish。Itistheevilgeniusofmanwhichgainstheupperhandininsanity，butindistinctionfromandcontrasttothebetterandmoreintelligentpart，whichistherealso。

Hencethisstateismentalderangementanddistress。Therightpsychicaltreatmentthereforekeepsinviewthetruththatinsanityisnotanabstractlossofreason（neitherinthepointofintelligencenorofwillanditsresponsibility），butonlyderangement，onlyacontradictioninastillsubsistingreason;—justasphysicaldiseaseisnotanabstract，i。e。mereandtotal，lossofhealth（ifitwerethat，itwouldbedeath），butacontradictioninit。Thishumanetreatment，nolessbenevolentthanreasonable（theservicesofPineltowardswhichdeservethehighestacknowledgement），presupposesthepatient’srationality，andinthatassumptionhasthesoundbasisfordealingwithhimonthisside—justasinthecaseofbodilydiseasethephysicianbaseshistreatmentonthevitalitywhichassuchstillcontainshealth。

（c）Habit§409。

Self—feeling，immersedinthedetailofthefeelings（insimplesensations，andalsodesires，instincts，passions，andtheirgratification），isundistinguishedfromthem。Butintheselfthereislatentasimpleself—relationofideality，anominaluniversality（whichisthetruthofthesedetails）：andassouniversal，theselfistobestampedupon，andmadeappearin，thislifeoffeeling，yetsoastodistinguishitselffromtheparticulardetails，andbearealizeduniversality。Butthisuniversalityisnotthefullandsterlingtruthofthespecificfeelingsanddesires;whattheyspecificallycontainisasyetleftoutofaccount。Andsotootheparticularityis，asnowregarded，equallyformal;itcountsonlyastheparticularbeingorimmediacyofthesoulinoppositiontoitsequallyformalandabstractrealization。Thisparticularbeingofthesoulisthefactorofitscorporeity;herewehaveitbreakingwiththiscorporeity，distinguishingitfromitself—itselfasimplebeing—andbecomingthe’ideal’，subjectivesubstantialityofit—justasinitslatentnotion（§389）itwasthesubstance，andthemeresubstance，ofit。

Butthisabstractrealizationofthesoulinitscorporealvehicleisnotyettheself—nottheexistenceoftheuniversalwhichisfortheuniversal。Itisthecorporeityreducedtoitsmereideality;andsofaronlydoescorporeitybelongtothesoulassuch。Thatistosay，justasspaceandtimeastheabstractone—outside—another，as，therefore，emptyspaceandemptytime，areonlysubjectiveforms，apureactofintuition;soisthatpurebeing（which，throughthesupersessioninitoftheparticularityofthecorporeity，oroftheimmediatecorporeityassuch，hasrealizeditself）mereintuitionandnomore，lackingconsciousness，butthebasisofconsciousness。Andconsciousnessitbecomes，whenthecorporcity，ofwhichitisthesubjectivesubstance，andwhichstillcontinuestoexist，andthatasabarrierforit，hasbeenabsorbedbyit，andithasbeeninvestedwiththecharacterofself—centredsubject。

§410。

Thesoul’smakingitselfanabstractuniversalbeing，andreducingtheparticularsoffeelings（andofconsciousness）toamerefeatureofitsbeingisHabit。Inthismannerthesoulhasthecontentsinpossession，andcontainstheminsuchmannerthatinthesefeaturesitisnotassentient，nordoesitstandinrelationshipwiththemasdistinguishingitselffromthem，norisabsorbedinthem，buthasthemandmovesinthem，withoutfeelingorconsciousnessofthefact。Thesoulisfreedfromthem，sofarasitisnotinterestedinoroccupiedwiththem：andwhilstexistingintheseformsasitspossession，itisatthesametimeopentobeotherwiseoccupiedandengaged—saywithfeelingandwithmentalconsciousnessingeneral。

Thisprocessofbuildinguptheparticularandcorporealexpressionsoffeelingintothebeingofthesoulappearsasarepetitionofthem，andthegenerationofhabitaspractice。For，thisbeingofthesoul，ifinrespectofthenaturalparticularphaseitbecalledanabstractuniversalitytowhichtheformeristransmuted，isareflexiveuniversality（§175）;i。e。theoneandthesame，thatrecursinaseriesofunitsofsensation，isreducedtounity，andthisabstractunityexpresslystated。

Habitlikememory，isadifficultpointinmentalorganization：habitisthemechanismofself—feeling，asmemoryisthemechanismofintelligence。Thenaturalqualitiesandalterationsofage，sleep，andwakingare’immediately’natural：habit，onthecontrary，isthemodeoffeeling（aswellasintelligence，will，etc。，sofarastheybelongtoself—feeling）madeintoanaturalandmechanicalexistence。Habitisrightlycalledasecondnature;nature，becauseitisanimmediatebeingofthesoul;asecondnature，becauseitisanimmediacycreatedbythesoul，impressingandmouldingthecorporealitywhichentersintothemodesoffeelingassuchandintotherepresentationsandvolitionssofarastheyhavetakencorporealform（§401）。

Inhabitthehumanbeing’smodeofexistenceis’natural’，andforthatreasonnotfree;butstillfree，sofarasthemerelynaturalphaseoffeelingisbyhabitreducedtoamerebeingofhis，andheisnolongerinvoluntarilyattractedorrepelledbyit，andsonolongerinterested，occupied，ordependentinregardtoit。Thewantoffreedominhabitispartlymerelyformal，ashabitmerelyattachestothebeingofthesoul;partlyonlyrelative，sofarasitstrictlyspeakingarisesonlyinthecaseofbadhabits，orsofarasahabitisopposedbyanotherpurpose：whereasthehabitofrightandgoodnessisanembodimentofliberty。ThemainpointaboutHabitisthatbyitsmeansmangetsemancipatedfromthefeelings，eveninbeingaffectedbythem。Thedifferentformsofthismaybedescribedasfollows：

（a）Theimmediatefeelingisnegatedandtreatedasindifferent。Onewhogetsinuredagainstexternalsensations（frost，heat，wearinessofthelimbs，etc。，sweettastes，etc。），andwhohardenstheheartagainstmisfortune，acquiresastrengthwhichconsistsinthis，thatalthoughthefrost，etc。—orthemisfortune—isfelt，theaffectionisdeposedtoamereexternalityandimmediacy;theuniversalpsychicallifekeepsitsownabstractindependenceinit，andtheself—feelingassuch，consciousness，reflection，andanyotherpurposesandactivity，arenolongerbotheredwithit。

（b）Thereisindifferencetowardsthesatisfaction：thedesiresandimpulsesarebythehabitoftheirsatisfactiondeadened。Thisistherationalliberationfromthem;whereasmonasticrenunciationandforcibleinterferencedonotfreefromthem，noraretheyinconceptionrational。Ofcourseinallthisitisassumedthattheimpulsesarekeptasthefinitemodestheynaturallyare，andthatthey，liketheirsatisfaction，aresubordinatedaspartialfactorstothereasonablewill。

（c）Inhabitregardedasaptitude，orskill，notmerelyhastheabstractpsychicallifetobekeptintactperse，butithastobeimposedasasubjectiveaim，tobemadeapowerinthebodilypart，whichisrenderedsubjectandthoroughlypervioustoit。Conceivedashavingtheinwardpurposeofthesubjectivesoulthusimposeduponit，thebodyistreatedasanimmediateexternalityandabarrier。Thuscomesoutthemoredecidedrupturebetweenthesoulassimpleself—concentration，anditsearliernaturalnessandimmediacy;ithaslostitsoriginalandimmediateidentitywiththebodilynature，andasexternalhasfirsttobereducedtothatposition。Specificfeelingscanonlygetbodilyshapeinaperfectlyspecificway（§

410）;andtheimmediateportionofbodyisaparticularpossibilityforaspecificaim（aparticularaspectofitsdifferentiatedstructure，aparticularorganofitsorganicsystem）。Tomouldsuchanaimintheorganicbodyistobringoutandexpressthe’ideality’whichisimplicitinmatteralways，andespeciallysointhespecificbodilypart，andthustoenablethesoul，underitsvolitionalandconceptualcharacters，toexistassubstanceinitscorporeity。Inthiswayanaptitudeshowsthecorporeityrenderedcompletelypervious，madeintoaninstrument，sothatwhentheconception（e。g。aseriesofmusicalnotes）isinme，thenwithoutresistanceandwitheasethebodygivesthemcorrectutterance。

Theformofhabitappliestoallkindsandgradesofmentalaction。Themostexternalofthem，i。e。

thespatialdirectionofanindividual，viz。hisuprightposture，hasbeenbywillmadeahabit—apositiontakenwithoutadjustmentandwithoutconsciousness—whichcontinuestobeanaffairofhispersistentwill;forthemanstandsonlybecauseandinsofarashewillstostand，andonlysolongashewillsitwithoutconsciousness。Similarlyoureyesightistheconcretehabitwhich，withoutanexpressadjustment，combinesinasingleacttheseveralmodificationsofsensation，consciousness，intuition，intelligence，etc。，whichmakeitup。Thinking，too，howeverfreeandactiveinitsownpureelementitbecomes，nolessrequireshabitandfamiliarity（thisimpromptuityorformofimmediacy），bywhichitisthepropertyofmysingleselfwhereIcanfreelyandinalldirectionsrange。ItisthroughthishabitthatIcometorealizemyexistenceasathinkingbeing。

Evenhere，inthisspontaneityofself—centredthought，thereisapartnershipofsoulandbody（hence，wantofhabitandtoo—long—continuedthinkingcauseheadache）;habitdiminishesthisfeeling，bymakingthenaturalfunctionanimmediacyofthesoul。Habitonanamplerscale，andcarriedoutinthestrictlyintellectualrange，isrecollectionandmemory，whereofweshallspeaklater。

Habitisoftenspokenofdisparaginglyandcalledlifeless，casual，andparticular。Anditistruethattheformofhabit，likeanyother，isopentoanythingwechancetoputintoit;anditishabitoflivingwhichbringsondeath，or，ifquiteabstract，isdeathitself：andyethabitisindispensablefortheexistenceofallintellectuallifeintheindividual，enablingthesubjecttobeaconcreteimmediacy，an’ideality’ofsoul—enablingthematterofconsciousness，religious，moral，etc。，tobehisasthisself，thissoul，andnoother，andbeneitheramerelatentpossibility，noratransientemotionoridea，noranabstractinwardness，cutofffromactionandreality，butpartandparcelofhisbeing。

Inscientificstudiesofthesoulandthemind，habitisusuallypassedover—eitherassomethingcontemptible—orratherforthefurtherreasonthatitisoneofthemostdifficultquestionsofpsychology。

（C）THEACTUALSOUL

§411。

TheSoul，whenitscorporeityhasbeenmouldedandmadethoroughlyitsown，findsitselfthereasinglesubject;andthecorporeityisanexternalitywhichstandsasapredicate，inbeingrelatedtowhich，itisrelatedtoitself。Thisexternality，inotherwords，representsnotitself，butthesoul，ofwhichitisthesign。Inthisidentityofinteriorandexterior，thelattersubjecttotheformer，thesoulisactual：initscorporeityithasitsfreeshape，inwhichitfeelsitselfandmakesitselffelt，andwhichastheSoul’sworkofarthashumanpathognomicandphysiognomicexpression。

Undertheheadofhumanexpressionareincluded，forexample，theuprightfigureingeneral，andtheformationofthelimbs，especiallythehand，astheabsoluteinstrument，ofthemouth—laughter，weeping，etc。，andthenoteofmentalitydiffusedoverthewhole，whichatonceannouncesthebodyastheexternalityofahighernature。Thisnoteissoslight，indefinite，andinexpressibleamodification，becausethefigureinitsexternalityissomethingimmediateandnatural，andcanthereforeonlybeanindefiniteandquiteimperfectsignforthemind，unabletorepresentitinitsactualuniversality。Seenfromtheanimalworld，thehumanfigureisthesupremephaseinwhichmindmakesanappearance。Butfortheminditisonlyitsfirstappearance，whilelanguageisitsperfectexpression。Andthehumanfigure，thoughtheproximatephaseofmind’sexistence，isatthesametimeinitsphysiognomicandpathognomicqualitysomethingcontingenttoit。Totrytoraisephysiognomyandaboveallcranioscopy（phrenology）totherankofsciences，wasthereforeoneofthevainestfancies，stillvainerthanasignaturarerum，whichsupposedtheshapeofaplanttoaffordindicationofitsmedicinalvirtue。

§412。

Implicitlythesoulshowstheuntruthandunrealityofmatter;forthesoul，initsconcentratedself，cutsitselfofffromitsimmediatebeing，placingthelatteroveragainstitasacorporeityincapableofofferingresistancetoitsmouldinginfluence。Thesoul，thussettinginoppositionitsbeingtoits（conscious）self，absorbingit，andmakingititsown，haslostthemeaningofmeresoul，orthe’immediacy’ofmind。Theactualsoulwithitssensationanditsconcreteself—feelingturnedintohabit，hasimplicitlyrealisedthe’ideality’ofitsqualities;inthisexternalityithasrecollectedandinwardizeditself，andisinfiniteself—relation。Thisfreeuniversalitythusmadeexplicitshowsthesoulawakingtothehigherstageoftheego，orabstractuniversality，insofarasitisfortheabstractuniversality。Inthiswayitgainsthepositionofthinkerandsubject—speciallyasubjectofthejudgementinwhichtheegoexcludesfromitselfthesumtotalofitsmerelynaturalfeaturesasanobject，aworldexternaltoit—butwithsuchrespecttothatobjectthatinititisimmediatelyreflectedintoitself。ThussoulrisestobecomeConsciousness。

413。

B。PHENOMENOLOGYOFMIND

CONSCIOUSNESS

（a）ConsciousnessProper—（b）Self—Consciousness—（c）ReasonConsciousnessconstitutesthereflectedorcorrelationalgradeofmind：thegradeofmindasappearance。Egoisinfiniteself—relationofmind，butassubjectiveorasself—certainty。Theimmediateidentityofthenaturalsoulhasbeenraisedtothispure’ideal’self—identity;andwhattheformercontainedisforthisself—subsistentreflectionsetforthasanobject。Thepureabstractfreedomofmindletsgofromititsspecificqualities—thesoul’snaturallife—toanequalfreedomasanindependentobject。Itisofthislatter，asexternaltoit，thattheegoisinthefirstinstanceaware（conscious），andassuchitisConsciousness。Ego，asthisabsolutenegativity，isimplicitlytheidentityintheotherness：theegoisitselfthatotherandstretchesovertheobject（asifthatobjectwereimplicitlycancelled）—itisonesideoftherelationshipandthewholerelationship—thelight，whichmanifestsitselfandsomethingelsetoo。

§414。

Theself—identityofthemind，thusfirstmadeexplicitastheEgo，isonlyitsabstractformalideality。

Assoulitwasunderthephaseofsubstantialuniversality;now，assubjectivereflectioninitself，itisreferredtothissubstantialityastoitsnegative，somethingdarkandbeyondit。Henceconsciousness，likereciprocaldependenceingeneral，isthecontradictionbetweentheindependenceofthetwosidesandtheiridentityinwhichtheyaremergedintoone。Themindasegoisessence;butsincereality，inthesphereofessence，isrepresentedasinimmediatebeingandatthesametimeas’ideal’，itisasconsciousnessonlytheappearance（phenomenon）ofmind。

§415。

Astheegoisbyitselfonlyaformalidentity，thedialecticalmovementofitsintelligibleunity，i。e。thesuccessivestepsinfurtherspecificationofconsciousness，doesnot，toit，seemtobeitsownactivity，butisimplicit，andtotheegoitseemsanalterationoftheobject。Consciousnessconsequentlyappearsdifferentlymodifiedaccordingtothedifferenceofthegivenobject;andthegradualspecificationofconsciousnessappearsasavariationinthecharacteristicsofitsobjects。

Ego，thesubjectofconsciousness，isthinking：thelogicalprocessofmodifyingtheobjectiswhatisidenticalinsubjectandobject，theirabsoluteinterdependence，whatmakestheobjectthesubject’sown。

TheKantianphilosophymaybemostaccuratelydescribedashavingviewedthemindasconsciousness，andascontainingthepropositionsonlyofaphenomenology（notofaphilosophy）

ofmind。TheEgoKantregardsasreferencetosomethingawayandbeyond（whichinitsabstractdescriptionistermedthething—in—itself）;anditisonlyfromthisfinitepointofviewthathetreatsbothintellectandwill。ThoughinthenotionofapowerofreflectivejudgementhetouchesupontheIdeaofmind—asubject—objectivity，anintuitiveintellect，etc。，andeventheIdeaofNature，stillthisIdeaisagaindeposedtoanappearance，i。e。toasubjectivemaxim（§58）。ReinholdmaythereforebesaidtohavecorrectlyappreciatedKantismwhenhetreateditasatheoryofconsciousness（underthenameof’facultyofideation’）。Fichtekepttothesamepointofview：hisnon—egoisonlysomethingsetoveragainsttheego，onlydefinedasinconsciousness：itismadenomorethananinfinite’shock’，i。e。athing—in—itself。Bothsystemsthereforehaveclearlynotreachedtheintelligibleunityorthemindasitactuallyandessentiallyis，butonlyasitisinreferencetosomethingelse。

AsagainstSpinozism，again，itistobenotedthatthemindinthejudgementbywhichit’constitutes’itselfanego（afreesubjectcontrastedwithitsqualitativeaffection）hasemergedfromsubstance，andthatthephilosophy，whichgivesthisjudgementastheabsolutecharacteristicofmind，hasemergedfromSpinozism。

§416。

Theaimofconsciousmindistomakeitsappearanceidenticalwithitsessence，toraiseitsself—certaintytotruth。Theexistenceofmindinthestageofconsciousnessisfinite，becauseitismerelyanominalself—relation，ormerecertainty。Theobjectisonlyabstractlycharacterizedasits;

inotherwords，intheobjectitisonlyasanabstractegothatthemindisreflectedintoitself：henceitsexistencetherehasstillacontent，whichisnotasitsown。

§417。

Thegradesofthiselevationofcertaintytotrutharethreeinnumber：first（a）consciousnessingeneral，withanobjectsetagainstit;（b）self—consciousness，forwhichegoistheobject;（c）unityofconsciousnessandself—consciousness，wherethemindseesitselfembodiedintheobjectandseesitselfasimplicitlyandexplicitlydeterminate，asReason，thenotionofmind。

（a）CONSCIOUSNESSPROPER

i。Sensuousconsciousness§418。

Consciousnessis，first，immediateconsciousness，anditsreferencetotheobjectaccordinglythesimple，andunderivedcertaintyofit。Theobjectsimilarly，beingimmediate，anexistent，reflectedinitself，isfurthercharacterizedasimmediatelysingular。Thisissense—consciousness。

Consciousness—asacaseofcorrelation—comprisesonlythecategoriesbelongingtotheabstractegoorformalthinking;andtheseittreatsasfeaturesoftheobject（§415）。Sense—consciousnessthereforeisawareoftheobjectasanexistent，asomething，anexistingthing，asingular，andsoon。

Itappearsaswealthiestinmatter，butaspoorestinthought。Thatwealthofmatterismadeoutofsensations：theyarethematerialofconsciousness（§414），thesubstantialandqualitative，whatthesoulinitsanthropologicalsphereisandfindsinitself。Thismaterialtheego（thereflectionofthesoulinitself）separatesfromitself，andputsitfirstunderthecategoryofbeing。SpatialandtemporalSingularness，hereandnow（thetermsbywhichinthePhenomenologyoftheMind（Werkeii，p。73），Idescribedtheobjectofsense—consciousness）strictlybelongstointuition。Atpresenttheobjectisatfirsttobeviewedonlyinitscorrelationtoconsciousness，i。e。asomethingexternaltoit，andnotyetasexternalonitsownpart，orasbeingbesideandoutofitself。

§419。

Thesensibleassomewhatbecomesanother：thereflectioninitselfofthissomewhat，thething，hasmanyproperties;andasasingle（thing）initsimmediacyhasseveralpredicates。Themuchnessofthesense—singularthusbecomesabreadth—avarietyofrelations，reflectionalattributes，anduniversalities。Thesearelogicaltermsintroducedbythethinkingprinciple，i。e。inthiscasebytheEgo，todescribethesensible。ButtheEgoasitselfapparentseesinallthischaracterizationachangeintheobject;andsensuousconsciousness，soconstruingtheobject，issense—perception。

ii。Sense—perception§420。

Consciousness，havingpassedbeyondthesensible，wantstotaketheobjectinitstruth，notasmerelyimmediate，butasmediated，reflectedinitself，anduniversal。Suchanobjectisacombinationofsensequalitieswithattributesofwiderrangebywhichthoughtdefinesconcreterelationsandconnections。Hencetheidentityofconsciousnesswiththeobjectpassesfromtheabstractidentityof’Iamsure’tothedefiniteidentityof’Iknow，andamaware’。

TheparticulargradeofconsciousnessonwhichKantismconceivesthemindisperception：whichisalsothegeneralpointofviewtakenbyordinaryconsciousness，andmoreorlessbythesciences。Thesensuouscertitudesofsingleapperceptionsorobservationsformthestarting—point：

thesearesupposedtobeelevatedtotruth，bybeingregardedintheirbearings，reflectedupon，andonthelinesofdefinitecategoriesturnedatthesametimeintosomethingnecessaryanduniversal，viz。experiences。

§421。

Thisconjunctionofindividualanduniversalisadmixture—theindividualremainsatthebottomhardandunaffectedbytheuniversal，towhich，however，itisrelated。Itisthereforeatissueofcontradictions—betweenthesinglethingsofsenseapperception，whichformtheallegedgroundofgeneralexperience，andtheuniversalitywhichhasahigherclaimtobetheessenceandground—

betweentheindividualityofathingwhich，takeninitsconcretecontent，constitutesitsindependenceandthevariouspropertieswhich，freefromthisnegativelinkandfromoneanother，areindependentuniversalmatters（§123）。Thiscontradictionofthefinitewhichrunsthroughallformsofthelogicalspheresturnsoutmostconcrete，whenthesomewhatisdefinedasobject（§§

194seqq。）。

iii。TheIntellect§422。

Theproximatetruthofperceptionisthatitistheobjectwhichisanappearance，andthattheobject’sreflectioninselfisonthecontraryaself—subsistentinwardanduniversal。Theconsciousnessofsuchanobjectisintellect。Thisinward，aswecalledit，ofthethingis，ononehand，thesuppressionofthemultiplicityofthesensible，and，inthatmanner，anabstractidentity：ontheotherhand，however，italsoforthatreasoncontainsthemultiplicity，butasaninterior’simple’

difference，whichremainsself—identicalinthevicissitudesofappearance。Thesimpledifferenceistherealmofthelawsofthephenomena—acopyofthephenomenon，butbroughttorestanduniversality。

§423。

Thelaw，atfirststatingthemutualdependenceofuniversal，permanentterms，has，insofarasitsdistinctionistheinwardone，itsnecessityonitsownpart;theoneoftheterms，asnotexternallydifferentfromtheother，liesimmediatelyintheother。Butinthismannertheinteriordistinctionis，whatitisintruth，thedistinctiononitsownpart，orthedistinctionwhichisnone。Withthisnewform—characteristic，onthewhole，consciousnessimplicitlyvanishes：forconsciousnessassuchimpliesthereciprocalindependenceofsubjectandobject。Theegoinitsjudgementhasanobjectwhichisnotdistinctfromit—ithasitself。Consciousnesshaspassedintoself—consciousness。

（b）SELF—CONSCIOUSNESS

§424。

Self—consciousnessisthetruthofconsciousness：thelatterisaconsequenceoftheformer，allconsciousnessofanotherobjectbeingasamatteroffactalsoself—consciousness。Theobjectismyidea：Iamawareoftheobjectasmine;andthusinitIamawareofme。Theformulaofself—consciousnessisI=I：—abstractfreedom，pure’Ideality’;andthusitlacks’reality’：forasitisitsownobject，thereisstrictlyspeakingnoobject，becausethereisnodistinctionbetweenitandtheobject。

§425。

Abstractself—consciousnessisthefirstnegationofconsciousness，andforthatreasonitisburdenedwithanexternalobject，or，nominally，withthenegationofit。Thusitisatthesametimetheantecedentstage，consciousness：itisthecontradictionofitselfasself—consciousnessandasconsciousness。ButthelatteraspectandthenegationingeneralisinI=Ipotentiallysuppressed;

andhenceasthiscertitudeofselfagainsttheobjectitistheimpulsetorealizeitsimplicitnature，bygivingitsabstractself—awarenesscontentandobjectivity，andintheotherdirectiontofreeitselffromitssensuousness，tosetasidethegivenobjectivityandidentifyitwithitself。Thetwoprocessesareoneandthesame，theidentificationofitsconsciousnessandself—consciousness。

i。AppetiteorInstinctiveDesire§426。

Self—consciousness，initsimmediacy，isasingular，andadesire（appetite）—thecontradictionimpliedinitsabstractionwhichshouldyetbeobjective—orinitsimmediacywhichhastheshapeofanexternalobjectandshouldbesubjective。Thecertitudeofone’sself，whichissuesfromthesuppressionofmereconsciousness，pronouncestheobjectnull：andtheoutlookofself—consciousnesstowardstheobjectequallyqualifiestheabstractidealityofsuchself—consciousnessasnull。

§427。

Self—consciousness，therefore，knowsitselfimplicitintheobject，whichinthisoutlookisconformabletotheappetite。Inthenegationofthetwoone—sidedmomentsbytheego’sownactivity，thisidentitycomestobefortheego。Tothisactivitytheobject，whichimplicitlyandforself—consciousnessisself—less，canmakenoresistance：thedialectic，implicitinit，towardsself—suppressionexistsinthiscaseasthatactivityoftheego。Thuswhilethegivenobjectisrenderedsubjective，thesubjectivitydivestsitselfofitsone—sidednessandbecomesobjectivetoitself。

§428。

Theproductofthisprocessisthefastconjunctionoftheegowithitself，itssatisfactionrealized，anditselfmadeactual。Ontheexternalsideitcontinues，inthisreturnuponitself，primarilydescribableasanindividual，andmaintainsitselfassuch;becauseitsbearingupontheself—lessobjectispurelynegative，thelatter，therefore，beingmerelyconsumed。Thusappetiteinitssatisfactionisalwaysdestructive，andinitscontentselfish：andasthesatisfactionhasonlyhappenedintheindividual（andthatistransient）theappetiteisagaingeneratedintheveryactofsatisfaction。

§429。

Butontheinnerside，orimplicitly，thesenseofselfwhichtheegogetsinthesatisfactiondoesnotremaininabstractself—concentrationorinmereindividuality;onthecontrary—asnegationofimmediacyandindividualitytheresultinvolvesacharacterofuniversalityandoftheidentityofself—consciousnesswithitsobject。Thejudgementordiremptionofthisself—consciousnessistheconsciousnessofa’free’object，inwhichegoisawareofitselfasanego，whichhoweverisalsostilloutsideit。

ii。Self—consciousnessRecognitive§430。

Herethereisaself—consciousnessforaself—consciousness，atfirstimmediately，asoneoftwothingsforanother。InthatotherasegoIbeholdmyself，andyetalsoanimmediatelyexistingobject，anotheregoabsolutelyindependentofmeandopposedtome。（Thesuppressionofthesinglenessofself—consciousnesswasonlyafirststepinthesuppression，anditmerelyledtothecharacterizationofitasparticular。）Thiscontradictiongiveseitherself—consciousnesstheimpulsetoshowitselfasafreeself，andtoexistassuchfortheother：—theprocessofrecognition。

§431。

Theprocessisabattle。Icannotbeawareofmeasmyselfinanotherindividual，solongasIseeinthatotheranotherandanimmediateexistence：andIamconsequentlybentuponthesuppressionofthisimmediacyofhis。ButinlikemeasureIcannotberecognizedasimmediate，exceptsofarasIovercomethemereimmediacyonmyownpart，andthusgiveexistencetomyfreedom。Butthisimmediacyisatthesametimethecorporeityofself—consciousness，inwhichasinitssignandtoolthelatterhasitsownsenseofself，anditsbeingforothers，andthemeansforenteringintorelationwiththem。

§432。

Thefightofrecognitionisalifeanddeathstruggle：eitherself—consciousnessimperilstheother’slife，andincursalikeperilforitsown—butonlyperil，foreitherisnolessbentonmaintaininghislife，astheexistenceofhisfreedom。Thusthedeathofone，thoughbytheabstract，thereforerude，negationofimmediacy，it，fromonepointofview，solvesthecontradiction，isyet，fromtheessentialpointofview（i。e。theoutwardandvisiblerecognition），anewcontradiction（forthatrecognitionisatthesametimeundonebytheother’sdeath）andagreaterthantheother。

§433。

Butbecauselifeisasrequisiteaslibertytothesolution，thefightendsinthefirstinstanceasaone—sidednegationwithinequality。Whiletheonecombatantpreferslife，retainshissingleself—consciousness，butsurrendershisclaimforrecognition，theotherholdsfasttohisself—assertionandisrecognizedbytheformerashissuperior。Thusarisesthestatusofmasterandslave。

Inthebattleforrecognitionandthesubjugationunderamaster，wesee，ontheirphenomenalside，theemergenceofman’ssociallifeandthecommencementofpoliticalunion。Force，whichisthebasisofthisphenomenon，isnotonthataccountabasisofright，butonlythenecessaryandlegitimatefactorinthepassagefromthestateofself—consciousnesssunkinappetiteandselfishisolationintothestateofuniversalself—consciousness。Force，then，istheexternalorphenomenalcommencementofstates，nottheirunderlyingandessentialprinciple。

§434。

Thisstatus，inthefirstplace，impliescommonwantsandcommonconcernfortheirsatisfaction—

forthemeansofmastery，theslave，mustlikewisebekeptinlife。Inplaceoftherudedestructionoftheimmediateobjectthereensuesacquisition，preservation，andformationofit，astheinstrumentalityinwhichthetwoextremesofindependenceandnon—independenceareweldedtogether。Theformofuniversalitythusarisinginsatisfyingthewant，createsapermanentmeansandaprovisionwhichtakescareforandsecuresthefuture。

§435。

Butsecondly，whenwelooktothedistinctionofthetwo，themasterbeholdsintheslaveandhisservitudethesupremacyofhissingleself—hoodresultingfromthesuppressionofimmediateself—hood，asuppression，however，whichfallsonanother。Thisother，theslave，however，intheserviceofthemaster，worksoffhisindividualistself—will，overcomestheinnerimmediacyofappetite，andinthisdivestmentofselfandin’thefearofhislord’makes’thebeginningofwisdom’

—thepassagetouniversalself—consciousness。

iii。UniversalSelf—consciousness§436。

Universalself—consciousnessistheaffirmativeawarenessofselfinanotherself：eachselfasafreeindividualityhashisown’absolute’independence，yetinvirtueofthenegationofitsimmediacyorappetitewithoutdistinguishingitselffromthatother。Eachisthusuniversalself—consciousnessandobjective;eachhas’real’universalityintheshapeofreciprocity，sofaraseachknowsitselfrecognizedintheotherfreeman，andisawareofthisinsofarasitrecognizestheotherandknowshimtobefree。

Thisuniversalreappearanceofself—consciousness—thenotionwhichisawareofitselfinitsobjectivityasasubjectivityidenticalwithitselfandforthatreasonuniversal—istheformofconsciousnesswhichliesattherootofalltruementalorspirituallife—infamily，fatherland，state，andofallvirtues，love，friendship，valour，honour，fame。Butthisappearanceoftheunderlyingessencemayalsobeseveredfromthatessence，andbemaintainedapartinworthlesshonour，idlefame，etc。

§437。

Thisunityofconsciousnessandself—consciousnessimpliesinthefirstinstancetheindividualsmutuallythrowinglightuponeachother。Butthedifferencebetweenthosewhoarethusidentifiedismerevaguediversity—orratheritisadifferencewhichisnone。Henceitstruthisthefullyandreallyexistentuniversalityandobjectivityofself—consciousness—whichisReason。

Reason，astheIdea（§213）asithereappears，istobetakenasmeaningthatthedistinctionbetweennotionandrealitywhichitunifieshasthespecialaspectofadistinctionbetweentheself—concentratednotionorconsciousness，andtheobjectsubsistingexternalandopposedtoit。

（c）REASON

§438。

Theessentialandactualtruthwhichreasonis，liesinthesimpleidentityofthesubjectivityofthenotionwithitsobjectivityanduniversality。Theuniversalityofreason，therefore，whilstitsignifiesthattheobject，whichwasonlygiveninconsciousnessquaconsciousness，isnowitselfuniversal，permeatingandencompassingtheego，alsosignifiesthatthepureegoisthepureformwhichoverlapstheobjectandencompassesit。

§439。

Self—consciousness，thuscertifiedthatitsdeterminationsarenolessobjective，ordeterminationsoftheverybeingofthings，thantheyareitsownthoughts，isReason，whichassuchanidentityisnotonlytheabsolutesubstance，butthetruththatknowsit。Fortruthherehas，asitspeculiarmodeandimmanentform，theself—centredpurenotion，ego，thecertitudeofselfasinfiniteuniversality。

Truth，awareofwhatitis，ismind（spirit）。

440。

C。PSYCHOLOGY

MIND

（a）TheoreticalMind—（b）PracticalMind—（c）FreeMindMindhasdefineditselfasthetruthofsoulandconsciousness—theformerasimpleimmediatetotality，thelatternowaninfiniteformwhichisnot，likeconsciousness，restrictedbythatcontent，anddoesnotstandinmerecorrelationtoitastoitsobject，butisanawarenessofthissubstantialtotality，neithersubjectivenorobjective。Mind，therefore，startsonlyfromitsownbeingandisincorrelationonlywithitsownfeatures。

Psychologyaccordinglystudiesthefacultiesorgeneralmodesofmentalactivityquamental—

mentalvision，ideation，remembering，etc。，desires，etc。—apartbothfromthecontent，whichonthephenomenalsideisfoundinempiricalideation，inthinkingalsoandindesireandwill，andfromthetwoformsinwhichthesemodesexist，viz。inthesoulasaphysicalmode，andinconsciousnessitselfasaseparatelyexistentobjectofthatconsciousness。This，however，isnotanarbitraryabstractionbythepsychologist。Mindisjustthiselevationabovenatureandphysicalmodes，andabovethecomplicationwithanexternalobject—inoneword，abovethematerial，asitsconcepthasjustshown。Allithasnowtodoistorealisethisnotionofitsfreedom，andgetridoftheformofimmediacywithwhichitoncemorebegins。Thecontentwhichiselevatedtointuitionsisitssensations：itisitsintuitionsalsowhicharetransmutedintorepresentations，anditsrepresentationswhicharetransmutedagainintothoughts，etc。

§441。

Thesoulisfinite，sofarasitsfeaturesareimmediateorconnatural。Consciousnessisfinite，insofarasithasanobject。Mindisfinite，insofaras，thoughitnolongerhasanobject，ithasamodeinitsknowledge;i。e。itisfinitebymeansofitsimmediacy，or，whatisthesamething，bybeingsubjectiveoronlyanotion。Anditisamatterofnoconsequence，whichisdefinedasitsnotion，andwhichastherealityofthatnotion。Saythatitsnotionistheutterlyinfiniteobjectivereason，thenitsrealityisknowledgeorintelligence：saythatknowledgeisitsnotion，thenitsrealityisthatreason，andtherealisationofknowledgeconsistsinappropriatingreason。Hencethefinitudeofmindistobeplacedinthe（temporary）failureofknowledgetogetholdofthefullrealityofitsreason，or，equally，inthe（temporary）failureofreasontoattainfullmanifestationinknowledge。

Reasonatthesametimeisonlyinfinitesofarasitis’absolute’freedom;sofar，thatis，aspresupposingitselfforitsknowledgetoworkupon，ittherebyreducesitselftofinitude，andappearsaseverlastingmovementofsupersedingthisimmediacy，ofcomprehendingitself，andbeingarationalknowledge。

§442。

Theprogressofmindisdevelopment，insofarasitsexistentphase，viz。knowledge，involvesasitsintrinsicpurposeandburdenthatutterandcompleteautonomywhichisrationality;inwhichcasetheactionoftranslatingthispurposeintorealityisstrictlyonlyanominalpassageoverintomanifestation，andiseventhereareturnintoitself。Sofarasknowledgewhichhasnotshakenoffitsoriginalqualityofmereknowledgeisonlyabstractorformal，thegoalofmindistogiveitobjectivefulfilment，andthusatthesametimeproduceitsfreedom。

Thedevelopmentheremeantisnotthatoftheindividual（whichhasacertainanthropologicalcharacter），wherefacultiesandforcesareregardedassuccessivelyemergingandpresentingthemselvesinexternalexistencesseriesofsteps，ontheascertainmentofwhichtherewasforalongtimegreatstresslaid（bythesystemofCondillac），asifaconjecturalnaturalemergencecouldexhibittheoriginofthesefacultiesandexplainthem。InCondillac’smethodthereisanunmistakableintentiontoshowhowtheseveralmodesofmentalactivitycouldbemadeintelligiblewithoutlosingsightofmentalunity，andtoexhibittheirnecessaryinterconnection。Butthecategoriesemployedindoingsoareofawretchedsort。Theirrulingprincipleisthatthesensibleistaken（andwithjustice）asthepriusortheinitialbasis，butthatthelatterphasesthatfollowthisstarting—pointpresentthemselvesasemerginginasolelyaffirmativemanner，andthenegativeaspectofmentalactivity，bywhichthismaterialistransmutedintomindanddestroyedasasensible，ismisconceivedandoverlooked。AsthetheoryofCondillacstatesit，thesensibleisnotmerelytheempiricalfirst，butisleftasifitwerethetrueandessentialfoundation。

Similarly，iftheactivitiesofmindaretreatedasmeremanifestations，forces，perhapsintermsstatingtheirutilityorsuitabilityforsomeotherinterestofheadorheart，thereisnoindicationofthetruefinalaimofthewholebusiness。Thatcanonlybetheintelligibleunityofmind，anditsactivitycanonlyhaveitselfasaim;i。e。itsaimcanonlybetogetridoftheformofimmediacyorsubjectivity，toreachandgetholdofitself，andtoliberateitselftoitself。Inthiswaytheso—calledfacultiesofmindasthusdistinguishedareonlytobetreatedasstepsofthisliberation。Andthisistheonlyrationalmodeofstudyingthemindanditsvariousactivities。

§443。

Asconsciousnesshasforitsobjectthestagewhichprecededit，viz。thenaturalsoul（§413），somindhasorrathermakesconsciousnessitsobject：i。e。whereasconsciousnessisonlythevirtualidentityoftheegowithitsother（§415），themindrealisesthatidentityastheconcreteunitywhichitanditonlyknows。Itsproductionsaregovernedbytheprincipleofallreasonthatthecontentsareatoncepotentiallyexistent，andarethemind’sown，infreedom。Thus，ifweconsidertheinitialaspectofmind，thataspectistwofold—asbeingandasitsown：bytheone，themindfindsinitselfsomethingwhichis，bytheotheritaffirmsittobeonlyitsown。Thewayofmindistherefore（a）tobetheoretical：ithastodowiththerationalasitsimmediateaffectionwhichitmustrenderitsown：orithastofreeknowledgefromitspresupposednessandthereforefromitsabstractness，andmaketheaffectionsubjective。Whentheaffectionhasbeenrendereditsown，andtheknowledgeconsequentlycharacterisedasfreeintelligence，i。e。ashavingitsfullandfreecharacterisationinitself，itis（b）Will：practicalmind，whichinthefirstplaceislikewiseformal—i。e。itscontentisatfirstonlyitsown，andisimmediatelywilled;anditproceedsnexttoliberateitsvolitionfromitssubjectivity，whichistheone—sidedformofitscontents，sothatit（c）confrontsitselfasfreemindandthusgetsridofbothitsdefectsofone—sidedness。

§444。

ThetheoreticalaswellasthepracticalmindstillfallunderthegeneralrangeofMindSubjective。

Theyarenottobedistinguishedasactiveandpassive。Subjectivemindisproductive：butitisamerelynominalproductivity。Inwards，thetheoreticalmindproducesonlyits’ideal’world，andgainsabstractautonomywithin;whilethepractical，whileithastodowithautonomousproducts，withamaterialwhichisitsown，hasamaterialwhichisonlynominallysuch，andthereforearestrictedcontent，forwhichitgainstheformofuniversality。Outwards，thesubjectivemind（whichasaunityofsoulandconsciousness，isthusalsoareality—arealityatonceanthropologicalandconformabletoconsciousness）hasforitsproducts，inthetheoreticalrange，theword，andinthepractical（notyetdeedandaction，but）enjoyment。

Psychology，likelogic，isoneofthosescienceswhichinmoderntimeshaveyetderivedleastprofitfromthemoregeneralmentalcultureandthedeeperconceptionofreason。Itisstillextremelyilloff。TheturnwhichtheKantianphilosophyhastakenhasgivenitgreaterimportance：ithas，andthatinitsempiricalcondition，beenclaimedasthebasisofmetaphysics，whichistoconsistofnothingbuttheempiricalapprehensionandtheanalysisofthefactsofhumanconsciousness，merelyasfacts，justastheyaregiven。Thispositionofpsychology，mixingitupwithformsbelongingtotherangeofconsciousnessandwithanthropology，hasledtonoimprovementinitsowncondition：butithashadthefurthereffectthat，bothforthemindassuch，andformetaphysicsandphilosophygenerally，allattemptshavebeenabandonedtoascertainthenecessityofessentialandactualreality，togetatthenotionandthetruth。

（a）THEORETICALMIND

§445。

iIntuition—iiRepresentation—iiiThinkingIntelligencefindsitselfdetermined：thisisitsapparentaspectfromwhichinitsimmediacyitstarts。

Butasknowledge，intelligenceconsistsintreatingwhatisfoundasitsown。Itsactivityhastodowiththeemptyform—thepretenseoffindingreason：anditsaimistorealiseitsconceptortobereasonactual，alongwithwhichthecontentisrealisedasrational。Thisactivityiscognition。Thenominalknowledge，whichisonlycertitude，elevatesitself，asreasonisconcrete，todefiniteandconceptualknowledge。Thecourseofthiselevationisitselfrational，andconsistsinanecessarypassage（governedbytheconcept）ofonegradeortermofintelligentactivity（aso—calledfacultyofmind）intoanother。Therefutationwhichsuchcognitiongivesofthesemblancethattherationalisfound，startsfromthecertitudeorthefaithofintelligenceinitscapabilityofrationalknowledge，andinthepossibilityofbeingabletoappropriatethereason，whichitandthecontentvirtuallyis。

ThedistinctionofIntelligencefromWillisoftenincorrectlytakentomeanthateachhasafixedandseparateexistenceofitsown，asifvolitioncouldbewithoutintelligence，ortheactivityofintelligencecouldbewithoutwill。Thepossibilityofacultureoftheintellectwhichleavestheheartuntouched，asitissaid，andoftheheartwithouttheintellect—ofheartswhichinone—sidedwaywantintellect，andheartlessintellects—onlyprovesatmostthatbadandradicallyuntrueexistencesoccur。Butitisnotphilosophywhichshouldtakesuchuntruthsofexistenceandofmereimaginingfortruth—taketheworthlessfortheessentialnature。Ahostofotherphrasesusedofintelligence，e。g。thatitreceivesandacceptsimpressionsfromoutside，thatideasarisethroughthecausaloperationsofexternalthingsuponit，etc。，belongtoapointofviewutterlyalientothementallevelortothepositionofphilosophicstudy。

Afavoritereflectionalformisthatofpowersandfacultiesofsoul，intelligence，ormind。Faculty，likepowerorforce，isthefixedqualityofanyobjectofthought，conceivedasreflectedintoself。

Force（§136）isnodoubttheinfinityofform—oftheinwardandtheoutward：butitsessentialfinitudeinvolvestheindifferenceofcontenttoform（ib。note）。Inthisliesthewantoforganicunitywhichbythisreflectionalform，treatingmindasa’lot’offorces，isbroughtintomind，asitisbythesamemethodbroughtintonature。Anyaspectwhichcanbedistinguishedinmentalactionisstereotypedasanindependententity，andthemindthusmadeaskeleton—likemechanicalcollection。Itmakesabsolutelynodifferenceifwesubstitutetheexpression’activities’forpowersandfaculties。Isolatetheactivitiesandyousimilarlymakethemindamereaggregate，andtreattheiressentialcorrelationasanexternalincident。

Theactionofintelligenceastheoreticalmindhasbeencalledcognition（knowledge）。Yetthisdoesnotmeanintelligenceinteraliaknows—besideswhichitalsointuits，conceives，remembers，imagines，etc。Totakeupsuchapositionisinthefirstinstance，partandparcelofthatisolatingofmentalactivityjustcensured;butitisalsoinadditionconnectedwiththegreatquestionofmoderntimes，astowhethertrueknowledgeortheknowledgeoftruthispossible—which，ifansweredinthenegative，mustleadtoabandoningtheeffort。Thenumerousaspectsandreasonsandmodesofphrasewithwhichexternalreflectionswellsthebulkofthisquestionareclearedupintheirplace：

themoreexternaltheattitudeofunderstandinginthequestion，themorediffuseitmakesitssimpleobject。Atthepresentplacethesimpleconceptofcognitioniswhatconfrontsthequitegeneralassumptiontakenupbythequestion，viz。theassumptionthatthepossibilityoftrueknowledgeingeneralisindispute，andtheassumptionthatitispossibleforusatourwilleithertoprosecuteortoabandoncognition。Theconceptorpossibilityofcognitionhascomeoutasintelligenceitself，asthecertitudeofreason：theactofcognitionitselfisthereforetheactualityofintelligence。Itfollowsfromthisthatitisabsurdtospeakofintelligenceandyetatthesametimeofthepossibilityorchoiceofknowingornot。Butcognitionisgenuine，justsofarasitrealisesitself，ormakestheconceptitsown。Thisnominaldescriptionhasitsconcretemeaningexactlywherecognitionhasit。

Thestagesofitsrealisingactivityareintuition，conception，memory，etc。：theseactivitieshavenootherimmanentmeaning：theiraimissolelytheconceptofcognition（§445note）。Iftheyareisolated，however，thenanimpressionisimpliedthattheyareusefulforsomethingelsethancognition，orthattheyseverallyprocureacognitivesatisfactionoftheirown;andthatleadstoaglorificationofthedelightsofintuition，remembrance，imagination。Itistruethatevenasisolated（i。e。asnon—intelligent），intuition，imagination，etc。canaffordacertainsatisfaction：whatphysicalnaturesucceedsindoingbyitsfundamentalquality—itsout—of—selfness—exhibitingtheelementsorfactorsofimmanentreasonexternaltoeachother—thattheintelligencecandobyvoluntaryact，butthesameresultmayhappenwheretheintelligenceisitselfonlynaturalanduntrained。Butthetruesatisfaction，itisadmitted，isonlyaffordedbyanintuitionpermeatedbyintellectandmind，byrationalconception，byproductsofimaginationwhicharepermeatedbyreasonandexhibitideas—inaword，bycognitiveintuition，cognitiveconception，etc。Thetruthascribedtosuchsatisfactionliesinthis，thatintuition，conception，etc。arenotisolated，andexistonlyas’moments’

inthetotalityofcognitionitself。

i。Intuition（IntelligentPerception）

§446。

Themindwhichassoulisphysicallyconditioned—whichasconsciousnessstandstothisconditiononthesametermsastoanoutwardobject—butwhichasintelligencefindsitselfsocharacterised—is（1）aninarticulateembryoniclife，inwhichitistoitselfasitwerepalpableandhasthewholematerialofitsknowledge。Inconsequenceoftheimmediacyinwhichitisthusoriginally，itisinthisstageonlyasanindividualandpossessesavulgarsubjectivity。Itthusappearsasmindintheguiseoffeeling。

Iffeelingformerlyturnedup（§399）asamodeofthesoul’sexistence，thefindingofitoritsimmediacywasinthatcaseessentiallytobeconceivedasacongenitalorcorporealcondition;

whereasatpresentitisonlytobetakenabstractlyinthegeneralsenseofimmediacy。

§447。

Thecharacteristicformoffeelingisthatthoughitisamodeofsome’affection’，thismodeissimple。

Hencefeeling，evenshoulditsimportbemoststerlingandtrue，hastheformofcasualparticularity—nottomentionthatitsimportmayalsobethemostscantyandmostuntrue。

Itiscommonlyenoughassumedthatmindhasinitsfeelingthematerialofitsideas，butthestatementismoreusuallyunderstoodinasensetheoppositeofthatwhichithashere。Incontrastwiththesimplicityoffeelingitisusualrathertoassumethattheprimarymentalphaseisjudgementgenerally，orthedistinctionofconsciousnessintosubjectandobject;andthespecialqualityofsensationisderivedfromanindependentobject，externalorinternal。Withus，inthetruthofmind，themereconsciousnesspointofview，asopposedtotruemental’idealism’，isswallowedup，andthematteroffeelinghasratherbeensupposedalreadyasimmanentinthemind。—Itiscommonlytakenforgrantedthatasregardscontentthereismoreinfeelingthaninthought：thisbeingspeciallyaffirmedofmoralandreligiousfeelings。Nowthematerial，whichthemindasitfeelsistoitself，isheretheresultandthematureresultofafullyorganisedreason。henceundertheheadoffeelingiscomprisedallrationalandindeedallspiritualcontentwhatever。Buttheformofselfishsinglenesstowhichfeelingreducesthemindisthelowestandworstvehicleitcanhave—oneinwhichitisnotfoundasafreeandinfinitelyuniversalprinciple，butratherassubjectiveandprivate，incontentandvalueentirelycontingent。Trainedandsterlingfeelingisthefeelingofaneducatedmindwhichhasacquiredtheconsciousnessofthetruedifferencesofthings，oftheiressentialrelationshipsandrealcharacters;anditiswithsuchamindthatthisrectifiedmaterialentersintoitsfeelingandreceivesthisform。Feelingistheimmediate，asitweretheclosest，contactinwhichthethinkingsubjectcanstandtoagivencontent。Againstthatcontentthesubjectreactsfirstofallwithitsparticularself—feeling，whichthoughitmaybeofmoresterlingvalueandofwiderrangethanaone—sidedintellectualstandpoint，mayjustaslikelybenarrowandpoor;andinanycaseistheformoftheparticularandsubjective。Ifamanonanytopicappealsnottothenatureandnotionofthething，oratleasttoreasons—tothegeneralitiesofcommonsense—buttohisfeeling，theonlythingtodoistolethimalone，becausebyhisbehaviourherefusestohaveanylotorpartincommonrationality，andshutshimselfupinhisownisolatedsubjectivity—hisprivateandparticularself。

§448。

（2）Asthisimmediatefindingisbrokenupintoelements，wehavetheonefactorinAttention—theabstractidenticaldirectionofmind（infeeling，asalsoinallothermoreadvanceddevelopmentsofit）—anactiveself—collection—thefactoroffixingitasourown，butwithanasyetonlynominalautonomyofintelligence。Apartfromsuchattentionthereisnothingforthemind。Theotherfactoristoinvestthespecialqualityoffeeling，ascontrastedwiththisinwardnessofmind，withthecharacterofsomethingexistent，butasanegativeorastheabstractothernessofitself。Intelligencethusdefinesthecontentofsensationassomethingthatisoutofitself，projectsitintotimeandspace，whicharetheformsinwhichitisintuitive。Totheviewofconsciousnessthematerialisonlyanobjectofconsciousness，arelativeother：fromminditreceivestherationalcharacteristicofbeingitsveryother（§§247，254）。