第3章

§449。

（3）Whenintelligencereachesaconcreteunityofthetwofactors，thatistosay，whenitisatonceself—collectedinthisexternallyexistingmaterial，andyetinthisself—collectednesssunkintheout—of—selfness，itisIntuitionorMentalVision。

§450。

Atandtowardsthisitsownout—of—selfness，intelligencenolessessentiallydirectsitsattention。Inthisitsimmediacyitisanawakingtoitself，arecollectionofitself。Thusintuitionbecomesaconcretionofthematerialwiththeintelligence，whichmakesititsown，sothatitnolongerneedsthisimmediacy，nolongerneedstofindthecontent。

ii。Representation（orMentalIdea）

§451。

[a]Recollection—[b]Imagination—[c]MemoryRepresentationisthisrecollectedorinwardisedintuition，andassuchisthemiddlebetweenthatstageofintelligencewhereitfindsitselfimmediatelysubjecttomodificationandthatwhereintelligenceisinitsfreedom，or，asthought。Therepresentationisthepropertyofintelligence;withapreponderatingsubjectivity，however，asitsrightofpropertyisstillconditionedbycontrastwiththeimmediacy，andtherepresentationcannotasitstandsbesaidtobe。Thepathofintelligenceinrepresentationsistorendertheimmediacyinward，toinvestitselfwithintuitiveactioninitself，andatthesametimetogetridofthesubjectivityoftheinwardness，andinwardlydivestitselfofit;soastobeinitselfinanexternalityofitsown。Butasrepresentationbeginsfromintuitionandtheready—foundmaterialofintuition，theintuitionalcontraststillcontinuestoaffectitsactivity，andmakesitsconcreteproductsstill’syntheses’，whichdonotgrowtotheconcreteimmanenceofthenotiontilltheyreachthestageofthought。

[a]Recollection§452。

Intelligence，asitatfirstrecollectstheintuition，placesthecontentoffeelinginitsowninwardness—

inaspaceandatimeofitsown。Inthiswaythatcontentis（1）animageorpicture，liberatedfromitsoriginalimmediacyandabstractsinglenessamongstotherthings，andreceivedintotheuniversalityoftheego。Theimagelosesthefullcomplementoffeaturespropertointuition，andisarbitraryorcontingent，isolated，wemaysay，fromtheexternalplace，time，andimmediatecontextinwhichtheintuitionstood。

§453。

（2）Theimageisofitselftransient，andintelligenceitselfisasattentionitstimeandalsoitsplace，itswhenandwhere。Butintelligenceisnotonlyconsciousnessandactualexistence，butquaintelligenceisthesubjectandthepotentialityofitsownspecialisations。Theimagewhenthuskeptinmindisnolongerexistent，butstoredupoutofconsciousness。

Tograspintelligenceasthisnight—likemineorpitinwhichisstoredaworldofinfinitelymanyimagesandrepresentations，yetwithoutbeinginconsciousness，isfromtheonepointofviewtheuniversalpostulatewhichbidsustreatthenotionasconcrete，inthewaywetreat，forexample，thegermasaffirmativelycontaining，invirtualpossibility，allthequalitiesthatcomeintoexistenceinthesubsequentdevelopmentofthetree。Inabilitytograspauniversallikethis，which，thoughintrinsicallyconcrete，stillcontinuessimple，iswhathasledpeopletotalkaboutspecialfibresandareasasreceptaclesofparticularideas。Itwasfeltthatwhatwasdiverseshouldinthenatureofthingshavealocalhabitationpeculiartoitself。Butwhereasthereversionofthegermfromitsexistingspecialisationstoitssimplicityinapurelypotentialexistencetakesplaceonlyinanothergerm—thegermofthefruit;intelligencequaintelligenceshowsthepotentialcomingtofreeexistenceinitsdevelopment，andyetatthesametimecollectingitselfinitsinwardness。Hencefromtheotherpointofviewintelligenceistobeconceivedasthissubconsciousmine，i。e。astheexistentuniversalinwhichthedifferenthasnotyetbeenrealisedinitsseparations。Anditisindeedthispotentialitywhichisthefirstformofuniversalityofferedinmentalrepresentation。

§454。

（3）Animagethusabstractlytreasuredupneeds，ifitistoexist，anactualintuition：andwhatisstrictlycalledRemembranceisthereferenceoftheimagetoanintuition—andthatasasubsumptionoftheimmediatesingleintuition（impression）underwhatisinpointofformuniversal，undertherepresentation（idea）withthesamecontent。Thusintelligencerecognisesthespecificsensationandtheintuitionofitaswhatisalreadyitsown—inthemitisstillwithinitself：atthesametimeitisawarethatwhatisonlyits（primarily）internalimageisalsoanimmediateobjectofintuition，bywhichitisauthenticated。Theimage，whichinthemineofintelligencewasonlyitsproperty，nowthatithasbeenenduedwithexternality，comesactuallyintoitspossession。Andsotheimageisatoncerendereddistinguishablefromtheintuitionandseparablefromtheblanknightinwhichitwasoriginallysubmerged。Intelligenceisthustheforcewhichcangiveforthitsproperty，anddispensewithexternalintuitionforitsexistenceinit。This’synthesis’oftheinternalimagewiththerecollectedexistenceisrepresentationproper：bythissynthesistheinternalnowhasthequalificationofbeingabletobepresentedbeforeintelligenceandtohaveitsexistenceinit。

[b]Imagination§455。

（1）Theintelligencewhichisactiveinthispossessionisthereproductiveimagination，wheretheimagesissuefromtheinwardworldbelongingtotheego，whichisnowthepoweroverthem。Theimagesareinthefirstinstancereferredtothisexternal，immediatetimeandspacewhichistreasuredupalongwiththem。Butitissolelyintheconscioussubject，whereitistreasuredup，thattheimagehastheindividualityinwhichthefeaturescomposingitareconjoined：whereastheiroriginalconcretion，i。e。atfirstonlyinspaceandtime，asaunitofintuition，hasbeenbrokenup。

Thecontentreproduced，belongingasitdoestotheself—identicalunityofintelligence，andanout—putfromitsuniversalmine，hasageneralidea（representation）tosupplythelinkofassociationfortheimageswhichaccordingtocircumstancesaremoreabstractormoreconcreteideas。

Theso—calledlawsoftheassociationofideaswereobjectsofgreatinterest，especiallyduringthatoutburstofempiricalpsychologywhichwascontemporaneouswiththedeclineofphilosophy。

Inthefirstplace，itisnotIdeas（properlysocalled）whichareassociated。Secondly，。thesemodesofrelationarenotlaws，justforthereasonthattherearesomanylawsaboutthesamething，astosuggestacapriceandacontingencyopposedtotheverynatureoflaw。Itisamatterofchancewhetherthelinkofassociationissomethingpictorial，oranintellectualcategory，suchaslikenessandcontrast，reasonandconsequence。Thetrainofimagesandrepresentationssuggestedbyassociationisthesportofvacant—mindedideation，where，thoughintelligenceshowsitselfbyacertainformaluniversality，thematterisentirelypictorial。—ImageandIdea，ifweleaveoutofaccountthemoreprecisedefinitionofthoseformsgivenabove，presentalsoadistinctionincontent。Theformeristhemoresensuouslyconcreteidea，whereastheidea（representation），whateverbeitscontent（fromimage，notion，oridea），hasalwaysthepeculiarity，thoughbelongingtointelligence，ofbeinginrespectofitscontentgivenandimmediate。Itisstilltrueofthisideaorrepresentation，asofallintelligence，thatitfindsitsmaterial，asamatteroffact，tobesoandso;

andtheuniversalitywhichtheaforesaidmaterialreceivesbyideationisstillabstract。Mentalrepresentationisthemeaninthesyllogismoftheelevationofintelligence，thelinkbetweenthetwosignificationsofself—relatedness—viz。beinganduniversality，whichinconsciousnessreceivethetitleofobjectandsubject。Intelligencecomplementswhatismerelyfoundbytheattributionofuniversality，andtheinternalanditsownbytheattributionofbeing，butabeingofitsowninstitution。（Onthedistinctionofrepresentationsandthoughts，seeIntroductiontotheLogic，§20

note。）

Abstraction，whichoccursintheideationalactivitybywhichgeneralideasareproduced（andideasquaideasvirtuallyhavetheformofgenerality），isfrequentlyexplainedastheincidenceofmanysimilarimagesoneuponanotherandissupposedtobethusmadeintelligible。Ifthissuperimposingistobenomereaccidentandwithoutprinciple，aforceofattractioninlikeimagesmustbeassumed，orsomethingofthesort，whichatthesametimewouldhavethenegativepowerofrubbingoffthedissimilarelementsagainsteachother。Thisforceisreallyintelligenceitself—theself—identicalegowhichbyitsinternalisingrecollectiongivestheimagesipsofactogenerality，andsubsumesthesingleintuitionunderthealreadyinternalisedimage（§453）。

§456。

Thuseventheassociationofideasistobetreatedasasubsumptionoftheindividualundertheuniversal，whichformstheirconnectinglink。Buthereintelligenceismorethanmerelyageneralform：itsinwardnessisaninternallydefinite，concretesubjectivitywithasubstanceandvalueofitsown，derivedfromsomeinterest，somelatentconceptorIdealprinciple，sofaraswemaybyanticipationspeakofsuch。Intelligenceisthepowerwhichwieldsthestoresofimagesandideasbelongingtoit，andwhichthus（2）freelycombinesandsubsumesthesestoresinobediencetoitspeculiartenor。Suchiscreativeimagination—symbolic，allegoric，orpoeticalimagination—wheretheintelligencegetsadefiniteembodimentinthisstoreofideasandinformsthemwithitsgeneraltone。Thesemoreorlessconcrete，individualisedcreationsarestill’syntheses’：forthematerial，inwhichthesubjectiveprinciplesandideasgetamentallypictorialexistence，isderivedfromthedataofintuition。

§457。

Increativeimaginationintelligencehasbeensofarperfectedastoneednoaidsforintuition。Itsself—sprungideashavepictorialexistence。Thispictorialcreationofitsintuitivespontaneityissubjective—stilllacksthesideofexistence。Butasthecreationunitestheinternalideawiththevehicleofmaterialisation，intelligencehasthereinimplicitlyreturnedbothtoidenticalself—relationandtoimmediacy。Asreason，itsfirststartwastoappropriatetheimmediatedatuminitself（§§

445，435），i。e。touniversaliseit;andnowitsactionasreason（§438）isfromthepresentpointdirectedtowardsgivingthecharacterofanexistenttowhatinithasbeenperfectedtoconcreteauto—intuition。Inotherwords，itaimsatmakingitselfbeandbeafact。Actingonthisview，itisself—uttering，intuition—producing：theimaginationwhichcreatessigns。

Productiveimaginationisthecentreinwhichtheuniversalandbeing，one’sownandwhatispickedup，internalandexternal，arecompletelyweldedintoone。Thepreceding’syntheses’ofintuition，recollection，etc。，areunificationsofthesamefactors，buttheyare’syntheses’;itisnottillcreativeimaginationthatintelligenceceasestobethevaguemineandtheuniversal，andbecomesanindividuality，aconcretesubjectivity，inwhichtheself—referenceisdefinedbothtobeingandtouniversality。Thecreationsofimaginationareonallhandsrecognisedassuchcombinationsofthemind’sownandinwardwiththematterofintuition;whatfurtherandmoredefiniteaspectstheyhaveisamatterforotherdepartments。Forthepresentthisinternalstudioofintelligenceisonlytobelookedatintheseabstractaspects。—Imagination，whenregardedastheagencyofthisunification，isreason，butonlyanominalreason，becausethematterorthemeitembodiesistoimaginationquaimaginationamatterofindifference;whilstreasonquareasonalsoinsistsuponthetruthofitscontent。

Anotherpointcallingforspecialnoticeisthat，whenimaginationelevatestheinternalmeaningtoanimageandintuition，andthisisexpressedbysayingthatitgivestheformerthecharacterofanexistent，thephrasemustnotseemsurprisingthatintelligencemakesitselfbeasathing;foritsidealimportisitself，andsoistheaspectwhichitimposesuponit。Theimageproducedbyimaginationofanobjectisabarementalorsubjectiveintuition：inthesignorsymbolitaddsintuitabilityproper;andinmechanicalmemoryitcompletes，sofarasitisconcerned，thisformofbeing。

§458。

Inthisunity（initiatedbyintelligence）ofanindependentrepresentationwithanintuition，thematterofthelatteris，inthefirstinstance，somethingaccepted，somewhatimmediateorgiven（forexample，thecolourofthecockade，etc。）。Butinthefusionofthetwoelements，theintuitiondoesnotcountpositivelyorasrepresentingitself，butasrepresentativeofsomethingelse。Itisanimage，whichhasreceivedasitssoulandmeaninganindependentmentalrepresentation。ThisintuitionistheSign。

Thesignissomeimmediateintuition，representingatotallydifferentimportfromwhatnaturallybelongstoit;itisthepyramidintowhichaforeignsoulhasbeenconveyed，andwhereitisconserved。Thesignisdifferentfromthesymbol：forinthesymboltheoriginalcharacters（inessenceandconception）ofthevisibleobjectaremoreorlessidenticalwiththeimportwhichitbearsassymbol;whereasinthesign，strictlyso—called，thenaturalattributesoftheintuition，andtheconnotationofwhichitisasign，havenothingtodowitheachother。Intelligencethereforegivesproofofwiderchoiceandamplerauthorityintheuseofintuitionswhenittreatsthemasdesignatory（significative）ratherthanassymbolical。

Inlogicandpsychology，signsandlanguageareusuallyfoistedinsomewhereasanappendix，withoutanytroublebeingtakentodisplaytheirnecessityandsystematicplaceintheeconomyofintelligence。Therightplaceforthesignisthatjustgiven：whereintelligence—whichasintuitinggeneratestheformoftimeandspace，butappearsasrecipientofsensiblematter，outofwhichitformsideas—nowgivesitsownoriginalideasadefiniteexistencefromitself，treatingtheintuition（ortimeandspaceasfilledfull）asitsownproperty，deletingtheconnotationwhichproperlyandnaturallybelongstoit，andconferringonitanotherconnotationasitssoulandimport。Thissign—creatingactivitymaybedistinctivelynamed’productive’Memory（theprimarilyabstract’Mnemosyne’）;sincememory，whichinordinarylifeisoftenusedasinterchangeableandsynonymouswithremembrance（recollection），andevenwithconceptionandimagination，hasalwaystodowithsignsonly。

§459。

Theintuition—initsnaturalphaseasomethinggivenandgiveninspace—acquires，whenemployedasasign，thepeculiarcharacteristicofexistingonlyassupersededandsublimated。Suchisthenegativityofintelligence;andthusthetruerphaseoftheintuitionusedasasignisexistenceintime（butitsexistencevanishesinthemomentofbeing），andifweconsidertherestofitsexternalpsychicalquality，itsinstitutionbyintelligence，butaninstitutiongrowingoutofits（anthropological）ownnaturalness。Thisinstitutionofthenaturalisthevocalnote，wheretheinwardideamanifestsitselfinadequateutterance。Thevocalnotewhichreceivesfurtherarticulationtoexpressspecificideas—speechand，itssystem，language—givestosensations，intuitions，conceptions，asecondandhigherexistencethantheynaturallypossess—investsthemwiththerightofexistenceintheideationalrealm。

Languageherecomesunderdiscussiononlyinthespecialaspectofaproductofintelligenceformanifestingitsideasinanexternalmedium。Iflanguagehadtobetreatedinitsconcretenature，itwouldbenecessaryforitsvocabularyormaterialparttorecalltheanthropologicalorpsychophysiologicalpointofview（§401），andforthegrammarorformalportiontoanticipatethestandpointofanalyticunderstanding。Withregardtotheelementarymaterialoflanguage，whileononehandthetheoryofmereaccidenthasdisappeared，ontheothertheprincipleofimitationhasbeenrestrictedtotheslightrangeitactuallycovers—thatofvocalobjects。YetonemaystillheartheGermanlanguagepraisedforitswealth—thatwealthconsistinginitsspecialexpressionforspecialsounds—Rauschen，Sausen，Knarren，etc。;—therehavebeencollectedmorethanahundredsuchwords，perhaps：thehumourofthemomentcreatesfreshoneswhenitpleases。Suchsuperabundanceintherealmofsenseandoftrivialitycontributesnothingtoformtherealwealthofacultivatedlanguage。Thestrictlyrawmaterialoflanguageitselfdependsmoreuponaninwardsymbolismthanasymbolismreferringtoexternalobjects;itdepends，i。e。onanthropologicalarticulation，asitwerethepostureinthecorporealactoforalutterance。Foreachvowelandconsonantaccordingly，aswellasfortheirmoreabstractelements（thepostureoflips，palate，tongueineach）andfortheircombinations，peoplehavetriedtofindtheappropriatesignification。Butthesedullsubconsciousbeginningsaredeprivedoftheiroriginalimportanceandprominencebynewinfluences，itmaybebyexternalagenciesorbytheneedsofcivilisation。

Havingbeenoriginallysensuousintuitions，theyarereducedtosigns，andthushaveonlytracesleftoftheiroriginalmeaning，ifitbenotaltogetherextinguished。Astotheformalelement，again，itistheworkofanalyticintellectwhichinformslanguagewithitscategories：itisthislogicalinstinctwhichgivesrisetogrammar。Thestudyoflanguagesstillintheiroriginalstate，whichwehavefirstreallybeguntomakeacquaintancewithinmoderntimes，hasshownonthispointthattheycontainaveryelaborategrammarandexpressdistinctionswhicharelostorhavebeenlargelyobliteratedinthelanguagesofmorecivilisednations。Itseemsasifthelanguageofthemostcivilisednationshasthemostimperfectgrammar，andthatthesamelanguagehasamoreperfectgrammarwhenthenationisinamoreuncivilisedstatethanwhenitreachesahighercivilisation。（Cf。W。vonHumboldt’sEssayontheDual。）

Inspeakingofvocal（whichistheoriginal）language，wemaytouch，onlyinpassing，uponwrittenlanguagesfurtherdevelopmentintheparticularsphereoflanguagewhichborrowsthehelpofanexternallypracticalactivity。Itisfromtheprovinceofimmediatespatialintuitiontowhichwrittenlanguageproceedsthatittakesandproducesthesigns（§454）。Inparticular，hieroglyphicsusesspatialfigurestodesignateideas;alphabeticalwriting，ontheotherhand，usesthemtodesignatevocalnoteswhicharealreadysigns。Alphabeticalwritingthusconsistsofsignsofsigns—thewordsorconcretesignsofvocallanguagebeinganalysedintotheirsimpleelements，whichseverallyreceivedesignation。—Leibniz’spracticalmindmisledhimtoexaggeratetheadvantageswhichacompletewrittenlanguage，formedonthehieroglyphicmethod（andhieroglyphicsareusedevenwherethereisalphabeticwriting，asinoursignsforthenumbers，theplanets，thechemicalelements，etc。），wouldhaveasauniversallanguagefortheintercourseofnationsandespeciallyofscholars。Butwemaybesurethatitwasrathertheintercourseofnations（aswasprobablythecaseinPhoenicia，andstilltakesplaceinCanton—seeMacartney’sTravelsbyStaunton）whichoccasionedtheneedofalphabeticalwritingandledtoitsformation。Atanyrateacomprehensivehieroglyphiclanguageforevercompletedisimpracticable。Sensibleobjectsnodoubtadmitofpermanentsigns;but，asregardssignsformentalobjects，theprogressofthoughtandthecontinualdevelopmentoflogicleadtochangesintheviewsoftheirinternalrelationsandthusalsooftheirnature;andthiswouldinvolvetheriseofanewhieroglyphicaldenotation。Eveninthecaseofsense—objectsithappensthattheirnames，i。e。theirsignsinvocallanguage，arefrequentlychanged，as，forexample，inchemistryandmineralogy。Nowthatithasbeenforgottenwhatnamesproperlyare，viz。externalitieswhichofthemselveshavenosense，andonlygetsignificationassigns，andnowthat，insteadofnamesproper，peopleaskfortermsexpressingasortofdefinition，whichisfrequentlychangedcapriciouslyandfortuitously，thedenomination，i。e。thecompositenameformedofsignsoftheirgenericcharactersorothersupposedcharacteristicproperties，isalteredinaccordancewiththedifferencesofviewwithregardtothegenusorothersupposedspecificproperty。Itisonlyastationarycivilisation，liketheChinese，whichadmitsofthehieroglyphiclanguageofthatnation;anditsmethodofwritingmoreovercanonlybethelotofthatsmallpartofanationwhichisinexclusivepossessionofmentalculture。—Theprogressofthevocallanguagedependsmostcloselyonthehabitofalphabeticalwriting;bymeansofwhichonlydoesvocallanguageacquiretheprecisionandpurityofitsarticulation。TheimperfectionoftheChinesevocallanguageisnotorious：numbersofitswordspossessseveralutterlydifferentmeanings，asmanyastenandtwenty，sothat，inspeaking，thedistinctionismadeperceptiblemerelybyaccentandintensity，byspeakinglowandsoftorcryingout。TheEuropean，learningtospeakChinese，fallsintothemostridiculousblundersbeforehehasmasteredtheseabsurdrefinementsofaccentuation。

PerfectionhereconsistsintheoppositeofthatparlersansaccentwhichinEuropeisjustlyrequiredofaneducatedspeaker。ThehieroglyphicmodeofwritingkeepstheChinesevocallanguagefromreachingthatobjectiveprecisionwhichisgainedinarticulationbyalphabeticwriting。

Alphabeticwritingisonallaccountsthemoreintelligent：inittheword—themode，peculiartotheintellect，ofutteringitsideasmostworthily—isbroughttoconsciousnessandmadeanobjectofreflection。Engagingtheattentionofintelligence，asitdoes，itisanalysed;theworkofsign—makingisreducedtoitsfewsimpleelements（theprimaryposturesofarticulation）inwhichthesense—factorinspeechisbroughttotheformofuniversality，atthesametimethatinthiselementaryphaseitacquirescompleteprecisionandpurity。Thusalphabeticwritingretainsatthesametimetheadvantageofvocallanguage，thattheideashavenamesstrictlysocalled：thenameisthesimplesignfortheexactidea，i。e。thesimpleplainidea，notdecomposedintoitsfeaturesandcompoundedoutofthem。Hieroglyphics，insteadofspringingfromthedirectanalysisofsensiblesigns，likealphabeticwriting，arisefromanantecedentanalysisofideas。Thusatheoryreadilyarisesthatallideasmaybereducedtotheirelements，orsimplelogicalterms，sothatfromtheelementarysignschosentoexpressthese（as，inthecaseoftheChineseKoua，thesimplestraightstroke，andthestrokebrokenintotwoparts）ahieroglyphicsystemwouldbegeneratedbytheircomposition。Thisfeatureofhieroglyphic—theanalyticaldesignationsofideas—whichmisledLeibniztoregarditaspreferabletoalphabeticwritingisratherinantagonismwiththefundamentaldesideratumoflanguage—thename。Towantanamemeansthatfortheimmediateidea（which，howeverampleaconnotationitmayinclude，isstillforthemindsimpleinthename），werequireasimpleimmediatesignwhichforitsownsakedoesnotsuggestanything，andhasforitssolefunctiontosignifyandrepresentsensiblythesimpleideaassuch。Itisnotmerelytheimage—lovingandimage—limitedintelligencethatlingersoverthesimplicityofideasandredintegratesthemfromthemoreabstractfactorsintowhichtheyhavebeenanalysed：thoughttooreducestotheformofasimplethoughttheconcreteconnotationwhichit’resumes’andreunitesfromthemereaggregateofattributestowhichanalysishasreducedit。Bothalikerequiresuchsigns，simpleinrespectoftheirmeaning：signs，whichthoughconsistingofseverallettersorsyllablesandevendecomposedintosuch，yetdonotexhibitacombinationofseveralideas。—Whathasbeenstatedistheprincipleforsettlingthevalueofthesewrittenlanguages。Italsofollowsthatinhieroglyphicstherelationsofconcretementalideastooneanothermustnecessarilybetangledandperplexed，andthattheanalysisofthese（andtheproximateresultsofsuchanalysismustagainbeanalysed）appearstobepossibleinthemostvariousanddivergentways。Everydivergenceinanalysiswouldgiverisetoanotherformationofthewrittenname;justasinmoderntimes（asalreadynoted，evenintheregionofsense）muriaticacidhasundergoneseveralchangesofname。AhieroglyphicwrittenlanguagewouldrequireaphilosophyasstationaryasisthecivilisationoftheChinese。

Whathasbeensaidshowstheinestimableandnotsufficientlyappreciatededucationalvalueoflearningtoreadandwriteanalphabeticcharacter。Itleadsthemindfromthesensiblyconcreteimagetoattendtothemoreformalstructureofthevocalwordanditsabstractelements，andcontributesmuchtogivestabilityandindependencetotheinwardrealmofmentallife。Acquiredhabitsubsequentlyeffacesthepeculiaritybywhichalphabeticwritingappears，intheinterestofvision，asaroundaboutwaytoideasbymeansofaudibility;itmakesthemasortofhieroglyphictous，sothatinusingthemweneednotconsciouslyrealisethembymeansoftones，whereaspeopleunpractisedinreadingutteraloudwhattheyreadinordertocatchitsmeaninginthesound。Thus，while（withthefacultywhichtransformedalphabeticwritingintohieroglyphics）thecapacityofabstractiongainedbythefirstpracticeremains，hieroglyphicreadingisofitselfadeafreadingandadumbwriting。Itistruethattheaudible（whichisintime）andthevisible（whichisinspace），eachhavetheirownbasis，onenolessauthoritativethantheother。Butinthecaseofalphabeticwritingthereisonlyasinglebasis：thetwoaspectsoccupytheirrightfulrelationtoeachother：thevisiblelanguageisrelatedtothevocalonlyasasign，andintelligenceexpressesitselfimmediatelyandunconditionallybyspeaking。—Theinstrumentalfunctionofthecomparativelynon—sensuouselementoftoneforallideationalworkshowsitselffurtheraspeculiarlyimportantinmemorywhichformsthepassagefromrepresentationtothought。

§460。

Thename，combiningtheintuition（anintellectualproduction）withitssignification，isprimarilyasingletransientproduct;andconjunctionoftheidea（whichisinward）withtheintuition（whichisoutward）isitselfoutward。Thereductionofthisoutwardnesstoinwardnessis（verbal）Memory。

[c]Memory§461。

Undertheshapeofmemorythecourseofintelligencepassesthroughthesameinwardising（recollecting）functions，asregardstheintuitionoftheword，asrepresentationingeneraldoesindealingwiththefirstimmediateintuition（§45l）。（1）Makingitsownthesynthesisachievedinthesign，intelligence，bythisinwardising（memorising）elevatesthesinglesynthesistoauniversal，i。e。

permanent，synthesis，inwhichnameandmeaningareforitobjectivelyunited，andrenderstheintuition（whichthenameoriginallyis）arepresentation。Thustheimport（connotation）andsign，beingidentified，formonerepresentation：therepresentationinitsinwardnessisrenderedconcreteandgetsexistenceforitsimport：allthisbeingtheworkofmemorywhichretainsnames（retentiveMemory）。

§462。

Thenameisthusthethingsofarasitexistsandcountsintheideationalrealm。（2）Inthename，Reproductivememoryhasandrecognisesthething，andwiththethingithasthename，apartfromintuitionandimage。Thename，asgivinganexistencetothecontentinintelligence，istheexternalityofintelligencetoitself;andtheinwardisingorrecollectionofthename，i。e。ofanintuitionofintellectualorigin，isatthesametimeaself—externalisationtowhichintelligencereducesitselfonitsownground。Theassociationoftheparticularnamesliesinthemeaningofthefeaturessensitive，representative，orcogitant—seriesofwhichtheintelligencetraversesasitfeels，represents，orthinks。

Giventhenamelion，weneedneithertheactualvisionoftheanimal，noritsimageeven：thenamealone，ifweunderstandit，istheunimagedsimplerepresentation。Wethinkinnames。

Therecentattempts—already，astheydeserved，forgotten—torehabilitatetheMnemonicoftheancients，consistintransformingnamesintoimages，andthusagaindeposingmemorytothelevelofimagination。Theplaceofthepowerofmemoryistakenbyapermanenttableauofaseriesofimages，fixedintheimagination，towhichisthenattachedtheseriesofideasformingthecompositiontobelearnedbyrote。Consideringtheheterogeneitybetweentheimportoftheseideasandthosepermanentimages，andthespeedwithwhichtheattachmenthastobemade，theattachmentcannotbemadeotherwisethanbyshallow，silly，andutterlyaccidentallinks。Notmerelyisthemindputtothetortureofbeingworriedbyidioticstuff，butwhatisthuslearntbyroteisjustasquicklyforgotten，seeingthatthesametableauisusedforgettingbyroteeveryotherseriesofideas，andsothosepreviouslyattachedtoitareeffaced。Whatismnemonicallyimpressedisnotlikewhatisretainedinmemoryreallygotbyheart，i。e。strictlyproducedfromwithinoutwards，fromthedeeppitoftheego，andthusrecited，butis，sotospeak，readoffthetableauoffancy。—Mnemonicisconnectedwiththecommonprepossessionaboutmemory，incomparisonwithfancyandimagination;asifthelatterwereahigherandmoreintellectualactivitythanmemory。Onthecontrary，memoryhasceasedtodealwithanimagederivedfromintuition—

theimmediateandincompletemodeofintelligence;ithasrathertodowithanobjectwhichistheproductofintelligenceitself—suchawithout—bookasremainslockedupinthewithin—bookofintelligence，andis，withinintelligence，onlyitsoutwardandexistingside。

§463。

（3）Astheinterconnectionofthenamesliesinthemeaning，theconjunctionoftheirmeaningwiththerealityasnamesisstillan（external）synthesis;andintelligenceinthisitsexternalityhasnotmadeacompleteandsimplereturnintoself。Butintelligenceistheuniversal—thesingleplaintruthofitsparticularself—divestments;anditsconsummatedappropriationofthemabolishesthatdistinctionbetweenmeaningandname。Thissupremeinwardisingofrepresentationisthesupremeself—divestmentofintelligence，inwhichitrendersitselfthemerebeing，theuniversalspaceofnamesassuch，i。e。ofmeaninglesswords。Theego，whichisthisabstractbeing，is，becausesubjectivity，atthesametimethepoweroverthedifferentnames—thelinkwhich，havingnothinginitself，fixesinitselfseriesofthemandkeepstheminstableorder。Sofarastheymerelyare，andintelligenceishereitselfthisbeingoftheirs，itspowerisamerelyabstractsubjectivity—memory;

which，onaccountofthecompleteexternalityinwhichthemembersofsuchseriesstandtooneanother，andbecauseitisitselfthisexternality（subjectivethoughthatbe），iscalledmechanical（§

195）。

Acompositionis，asweknow，notthoroughlyconnedbyrote，untiloneattachesnomeaningtothewords。Therecitationofwhathasbeenthusgotbyheartisthereforeofcourseaccentless。Thecorrectaccent，ifitisintroduced，suggeststhemeaning：butthisintroductionofthesignificationofanideadisturbsthemechanicalnexusandthereforeeasilythrowsoutthereciter。Thefacultyofconningbyroteseriesofwords，withnoprinciplegoverningtheirsuccession，orwhichareseparatelymeaningless，forexample，aseriesofpropernames，is。sosupremelymarvellous，becauseitisteveryessenceofmindtohaveitswitsaboutit;whereasinthiscasethemindisestrangedinitself，anditsactionislikemachinery。Butitisonlyasunitingsubjectivitywithobjectivitythatthemindhasitswitsaboutit。Whereasinthecasebeforeus，afterithasinintuitionbeenatfirstsoexternalastopickupitsfactsreadymade，andinrepresentationinwardisesorrecollectsthisdatumandmakesititsown—itproceedsasmemorytomakeitselfexternalinitself，sothatwhatisitsownassumestheguiseofsomethingfound。Thusoneofthetwodynamicfactorsofthought，viz。objectivity，ishereputinintelligenceitselfasaqualityofit。—Itisonlyastepfurthertotreatmemoryasmechanical—theactimplyingnointelligence—inwhichcaseitisonlyjustifiedbyitsuses，itsindispensabilityperhapsforotherpurposesandfunctionsofmind。Butbysodoingweoverlookthepropersignificationithasinthemind。

§464。

Ifitistobethefactandtrueobjectivity，themerenameasanexistentrequiressomethingelse—tobeinterpretedbytherepresentingintellect。Nowintheshapeofmechanicalmemory，intelligenceisatoncethatexternalobjectivityandthemeaning。Inthiswayintelligenceisexplicitlymadeanexistenceofthisidentity，i。e。itisexplicitlyactiveassuchanidentitywhichasreasonitisimplicitly。

Memoryisinthismannerthepassageintothefunctionofthought，whichnolongerhasameaning，i。e。itsobjectivityisnolongerseveredfromthesubjective，anditsinwardnessdoesnotneedtogooutsideforitsexistence。

TheGermanlanguagehasetymologicallyassignedmemory（Ged？chtnis），ofwhichithasbecomeaforegoneconclusiontospeakcontemptuously，thehighpositionofdirectkindredwiththought（Gedanke）。—>Itisnotmatterofchancethattheyounghaveabettermemorythantheold，noristheirmemorysolelyexercisedforthesakeofutility。Theyounghaveagoodmemorybecausetheyhavenotyetreachedthestageofreflection;theirmemoryisexercisedwithorwithoutdesignsoastolevelthegroundoftheirinnerlifetopurebeingortopurespaceinwhichthefact，theimplicitcontent，mayreignandunfolditselfwithnoantithesistoasubjectiveinwardness。Genuineabilityisinyouthgenerallycombinedwithagoodmemory。Butempiricalstatementsofthissorthelplittletowardsaknowledgeofwhatmemoryintrinsicallyis。Tocomprehendthepositionandmeaningofmemoryandtounderstanditsorganicinterconnectionwiththoughtisoneofthehardestpoints，andhithertoonequiteunregardedinthetheoryofmind。Memoryquamemoryisitselfthemerelyexternalmode，ormerelyexistentialaspectofthought，andthusneedsacomplementaryelement。Thepassagefromittothoughtistoourvieworimplicitlytheidentityofreasonwiththisexistentialmode：anidentityfromwhichitfollowsthatreasononlyexistsinasubject，andasthefunctionofthatsubject。ThusactivereasonisThinking。

iii。Thinking§465。

Intelligenceisrecognitive：itcognisesanintuition，butonlybecausethatintuitionisalreadyitsown（§454）;andinthenameitrediscoversthefact（§462）：butnowitfindsitsuniversalinthedoublesignificationoftheuniversalassuch，andoftheuniversalasimmediateorasbeing—findsthatisthegenuineuniversalwhichisitsownunityoverlappingandincludingitsother，viz。being。

Thusintelligenceisexplicitly，andonitsownpartcognitive：virtuallyitistheuniversal—itsproduct（thethought）isthething：itisaplainidentityofsubjectiveandobjective。Itknowsthatwhatisthought，is，andthatwhatis，onlyisinsofarasitisathought（§§5，21）;thethinkingofintelligenceistohavethoughts：theseareasitscontentandobject。

§466。

Butcognitionbythoughtisstillinthefirstinstanceformal：theuniversalityanditsbeingistheplainsubjectivityofintelligence。Thethoughtsthereforearenotyetfullyandfreelydeterminate，andtherepresentationswhichhavebeeninwardisedtothoughtsaresofarstillthegivencontent。

§467。

Asdealingwiththisgivencontent，thoughtis（a）understandingwithitsformalidentity，workinguptherepresentations，thathavebeenmemorised，intospecies，genera，laws，forces，etc。，inshortintocategories—thusindicatingthattherawmaterialdoesnotgetthetruthofitsbeingsaveinthesethought—forms。Asintrinsicallyinfinitenegativity，thoughtis（b）essentiallyanactofpartition—

judgement，which，however，doesnotbreakuptheconceptagainintotheoldantithesisofuniversalityandbeing，butdistinguishesonthelinessuppliedbytheinterconnectionspeculiartotheconcept。Thirdly（c），thoughtsupersedestheformaldistinctionandinstitutesatthesametimeanidentityofthedifferences—thusbeingnominalreasonorinferentialunderstanding。Intelligence，astheactofthought，cognises。And（a）understandingoutofitsgeneralities（thecategories）explainstheindividual，andisthensaidtocomprehendorunderstanditself：（b）inthejudgementitexplainstheindividualtobeauniversal（species，genus）。Intheseformsthecontentappearsasgiven：（c）

butininference（syllogism）itcharacterisesacontentfromitself，bysupersedingthatform—difference。Withtheperceptionofthenecessity，thelastimmediacystillattachingtoformalthoughthasvanished。

InLogictherewasthought，butinitsimplicitness，andasreasondevelopsitselfinthisdistinction—lackingmedium。Soinconsciousnessthoughtoccursasastage（§437note）。Herereasonisasthetruthoftheantitheticaldistinction，asithadtakenshapewithinthemind’sownlimits。Thoughtthusrecursagainandagaininthesedifferentpartsofphilosophy，becausethesepartsaredifferentonlythroughthemediumtheyareinandtheantithesestheyimply;whilethoughtisthisoneandthesamecentre，towhichastotheirtruththeantithesesreturn。

§468。

Intelligencewhichastheoreticalappropriatesanimmediatemodeofbeing，is，nowthatithascompletedtakingpossession，initsownproperty：thelastnegationofimmediacyhasimplicitlyrequiredthattheintelligenceshallitselfdetermineitscontent。Thusthought，asfreenotion，isnowalsofreeinpointofcontent。Butwhenintelligenceisawarethatitisdeterminativeofthecontent，whichisitsmodenolessthanitisamodeofbeing，itisWill。

（b）MINDPRACTICAL

§469。

iFeeling—iiImpulses—iiiHappinessAswill，themindisawarethatitistheauthorofitsownconclusions，theoriginofitsself—fulfilment。

Thusfulfilled，thisindependencyorindividualityformsthesideofexistenceorofrealityfortheIdeaofmind。Aswill，themindstepsintoactuality;whereasascognitionitisonthesoilofnotionalgenerality。Supplyingitsowncontent，thewillisself—possessed，andinthewidestsensefree：thisisitscharacteristictrait。Itsfinitudeliesintheformalismthatthespontaneityofitsself—fulfilmentmeansnomorethanageneralandabstractownness，notyetidentifiedwithmaturedreason。Itisthefunctionoftheessentialwilltobringlibertytoexistintheformalwill，anditisthereforetheaimofthatformalwilltofillitselfwithitsessentialnature，i。e。tomakelibertyitspervadingcharacter，content，andaim，aswellasitssphereofexistence。Theessentialfreedomofwillis，andmustalwaysbe，athought：hencethewaybywhichwillcanmakeitselfobjectivemindistorisetobeathinkingwill—togiveitselfthecontentwhichitcanonlyhaveasitthinksitself。

Trueliberty，intheshapeofmorallife，consistsinthewillfindingitspurposeinauniversalcontent，notinsubjectiveorselfishinterests。Butsuchacontentisonlypossibleinthoughtandthroughthought：itisnothingshortofabsurdtoseektobanishthoughtfromthemoral，religious，andlaw—abidinglife。

§470。

Practicalmind，consideredatfirstasformalorimmediatewill，containsadoubleought—（1）inthecontrastwhichthenewmodeofbeingprojectedoutwardbythewillofferstotheimmediatepositivityofitsoldexistenceandcondition—anantagonismwhichinconsciousnessgrowstocorrelationwithexternalobjects。（2）Thatfirstself—determination，beingitselfimmediate，isnotatonceelevatedintoathinkinguniversality：thelatter，therefore，virtuallyconstitutesanobligationontheformerinpointofform，asitmayalsoconstituteitinpointofmatter;—adistinctionwhichonlyexistsfortheobserver。

i。PracticalSenseorFeeling§471。

Theautonomyofthepracticalmindatfirstisimmediateandthereforeformal，i。e。itfindsitselfasanindividualitydeterminedinitsinwardnature。Itisthus’practicalfeeling’，orinstinctofaction。

Inthisphase，asitisatbottomasubjectivitysimplyidenticalwithreason，ithasnodoubtarationalcontent，butacontentwhichasitstandsisindividual，andforthatreasonalsonatural，contingentandsubjective—acontentwhichmaybedeterminedquiteasmuchbymerepersonalitiesofwantandopinion，etc。，andbythesubjectivitywhichselfishlysetsitselfagainsttheuniversal，asitmaybevirtuallyinconformitywithreason。

Anappealissometimesmadetothesense（feeling）ofrightandmorality，aswellasofreligion，whichmanisallegedtopossess—tohisbenevolentdispositions—andeventohisheartgenerally—

i。e。tothesubjectsofarasthevariouspracticalfeelingsareinitallcombined。Sofarasthisappealimplies（1）thattheseideasareimmanentinhisownself，and（2）thatwhenfeelingisopposedtothelogicalunderstanding，it，andnotthepartialabstractionsofthelatter，maybethetotality—theappealhasalegitimatemeaning。Butontheotherhand，feelingtoomaybeone—sided，unessential，andbad。Therational，whichexistsintheshapeofrationalitywhenitisapprehendedbythought，isthesamecontentasthegoodpracticalfeelinghas，butpresentedinitsuniversalityandnecessity，initsobjectivityandtruth。

Thusitis，ontheonehand，sillytosupposethatinthepassagefromfeelingtolawanddutythereisanylossofimportandexcellence;itisthispassagewhichletsfeelingfirstreachitstruth。Itisequallysillytoconsiderintellectassuperfluousorevenharmfultofeeling，heart，andwill;thetruthand，whatisthesamething，theactualrationalityoftheheartandwillcanonlybeathomeintheuniversalityofintellect，andnotinthesinglenessoffeelingasfeeling。Iffeelingsareoftherightsort，itisbecauseoftheirqualityorcontent—whichisrightonlysofarasitisintrinsicallyuniversalorhasitssourceinthethinkingmind。Thedifficultyforthelogicalintellectconsistsinthrowingofftheseparationithasarbitrarilyimposedbetweentheseveralfacultiesoffeelingandthinkingmind，andcomingtoseethatinthehumanbeingthereisonlyonereason，infeeling，volition，andthought。

AnotherdifficultyconnectedwiththisisfoundinthefactthattheIdeaswhicharethespecialpropertyofthethinkingmind，namelyGod，lawandmorality，canalsobefelt。Butfeelingisonlytheformoftheimmediateandpeculiarindividualityofthesubject，inwhichthesefacts，likeanyotherobjectivefacts（whichconsciousnessalsosetsoveragainstitself），maybeplaced。

Ontheotherhand，itissuspiciousorevenworsetoclingtofeelingandheartinplaceoftheintelligentrationalityoflaw，right，andduty;becauseallthattheformerholdsmorethanthelatterisonlytheparticularsubjectivitywithitsvanityandcaprice。Forthesamereasonitisoutofplaceinascientifictreatmentofthefeelingstodealwithanythingbeyondtheirform，andtodiscusstheircontent;forthelatter，whenthought，ispreciselywhatconstitutes，intheiruniversalityandnecessity，therightsanddutieswhicharethetrueworksofmentalautonomy。Solongaswestudypracticalfeelingsanddispositionsspecially，wehaveonlytodealwiththeselfish，bad，andevil;itisthesealonewhichbelongtotheindividualitywhichretainsitsoppositiontotheuniversal：theircontentisthereverseofrightsandduties，andpreciselyinthatwaydothey—butonlyinantithesistothelatter—retainaspecialityoftheirown。

§472。

The’Ought’ofpracticalfeelingistheclaimofitsessentialautonomytocontrolsomeexistingmodeoffact—whichisassumedtobeworthnothingsaveasadaptedtothatclaim。Butasboth，intheirimmediacy，lackobjectivedetermination，thisrelationoftherequirementtoexistentfactistheutterlysubjectiveandsuperficialfeelingofpleasantorunpleasant。

Delight，joy，grief，etc。，shame，repentance，contentment，etc。，arepartlyonlymodificationsoftheformal’practicalfeeling’ingeneral，butarepartlydifferentinthefeaturesthatgivethespecialtoneandcharactermodetotheir’Ought’。

Thecelebratedquestionastotheoriginofevilintheworld，sofaratleastasevilisunderstoodtomeanwhatisdisagreeableandpainfulmerely，arisesonthisstageoftheformalpracticalfeeling。

Evilisnothingbuttheincompatibilitybetweenwhatisandwhatoughttobe。’Ought’isanambiguousterm—indeedinfinitelyso，consideringthatcasualaimsmayalsocomeundertheformofOught。Butwheretheobjectssoughtarethuscasual，evilonlyexecuteswhatisrightfullyduetothevanityandnullityoftheirplanning：fortheythemselveswereradicallyevil。Thefinitudeoflifeandmindisseenintheirjudgement：thecontrarywhichisseparatedfromthemtheyalsohaveasanegativeinthem，andthustheyarethecontradictioncalledevil。Inthelifelessthereisneitherevilnorpain：forininorganicnaturetheintelligibleunity（concept）doesnotconfrontitsexistenceanddoesnotinthedifferenceatthesametimeremainitspermanentsubject。Whereasinlife，andstillmoreinmind，wehavethisimmanentdistinctionpresent：hencearisestheOught：andthisnegativity，subjectivity，ego，freedomaretheprinciplesofevilandpain。JacobB？hmeviewedegoity（selfhood）aspainandtorment，andasthefountainofnatureandofspirit。

ii。TheImpulsesandChoice§473。

Thepracticaloughtisa’real’judgement。Will，whichisessentiallyself—determination，findsintheconformity—asimmediateandmerelyfoundtohand—oftheexistingmodetoitsrequirementanegation，andsomethinginappropriatetoit。Ifthewillistosatisfyitself，iftheimplicitunityoftheuniversalityandthespecialmodeistoberealised，theconformityofitsinnerrequirementandoftheexistentthingoughttobeitsactandinstitution。Thewill，asregardstheformofitscontent，isatfirststillanaturalwill，directlyidenticalwithitsspecificmode：—naturalimpulseandinclination。

Should，however，thetotalityofthepracticalspiritthrowitselfintoasingleoneofthemanyrestrictedformsofimpulse，eachbeingalwaysinconflicttoanother，itispassion。

§474。

Inclinationsandpassionsembodythesameconstituentfeaturesasthepracticalfeeling。Thus，while，ononehand，theyarebasedontherationalnatureofthemind;they，ontheother，aspartandparcelofthestillsubjectiveandsinglewill，areinfectedwithcontingency，andappearasparticulartostandtotheindividualandtoeachotherinanexternalrelationandwithanecessitywhichcreatesbondage。

Thespecialnoteinpassionisitsrestrictiontoonespecialmodeofvolition，inwhichthewholesubjectivityoftheindividualismerged，bethevalueofthatmodewhatitmay。Inconsequenceofthisformalism，passionisneithergoodnorbad;thetitleonlystatesthatasubjecthasthrownhiswholesoul—hisinterestsofintellect，talent，character，enjoyment—ononeaimandobject。Nothinggreathasbeenandnothinggreatcanbeaccomplishedwithoutpassion。Itisonlyadead，toooften，indeed，ahypocriticalmoralisingwhichinveighsagainsttheformofpassionassuch。

Butwithregardtotheinclinations，thequestionisdirectlyraised，Whicharegoodandbad？—Uptowhatdegreethegoodcontinuegood;—and（astherearemany，eachwithitsprivaterange）。Inwhatwayhavethey，beingallinonesubjectandhardlyall，asexperienceshows，admittingofgratification，tosufferatleastreciprocalrestriction？And，firstofall，asregardsthenumbersoftheseimpulsesandpropensities，thecaseismuchthesameaswiththepsychicalpowers，whoseaggregateistoformthemindtheoretical—anaggregatewhichisnowincreasedbythehostofimpulses。Thenominalrationalityofimpulseandpropensityliesmerelyintheirgeneralimpulsenottobesubjectivemerely，buttogetrealised，overcomingthesubjectivitybythesubject’sownagency。Theirgenuinerationalitycannotrevealitssecrettoamethodofouterreflectionwhichpre—supposesanumberofindependentinnatetendenciesandimmediateinstincts，andthereforeiswantinginasingleprincipleandfinalpurposeforthem。Buttheimmanent’reflection’ofminditselfcarriesitbeyondtheirparticularityandtheirnaturalimmediacy，andgivestheircontentsarationalityandobjectivity，inwhichtheyexistasnecessarytiesofsocialrelation，asrightsandduties。Itisthisobjectificationwhichevincestheirrealvalue，theirmutualconnections，andtheirtruth。AndthusitwasatrueperceptionwhenPlato（especiallyincludingashedidthemind’swholenatureunderitsright）showedthatthefullrealityofjusticecouldbeexhibitedonlyintheobjectivephaseofjustice，namelyintheconstructionoftheStateastheethicallife。

Theanswertothequestion，therefore，Whatarethegoodandrationalpropensities，andhowtheyaretobecoordinatedwitheachother？resolvesitselfintoanexpositionofthelawsandformsofcommonlifeproducedbythemindwhendevelopingitselfasobjectivemind—adevelopmentinwhichthecontentofautonomousactionlosesitscontingencyandoptionality。Thediscussionofthetrueintrinsicworthoftheimpulses，inclinations，andpassionsisthusessentiallythetheoryoflegal，moral，andsocialduties。

§475。

Thesubjectistheactofsatisfyingimpulses，anactof（atleast）formalrationality，asittranslatesthemfromthesubjectivityofcontent（whichsofarispurpose）intoobjectivity，wherethesubjectismadetoclosewithitself。Ifthecontentoftheimpulseisdistinguishedasthethingorbusinessfromthisactofcarryingitout，andweregardthethingwhichhasbeenbroughttopassascontainingtheelementofsubjectiveindividualityanditsaction，thisiswhatiscalledtheinterest。

Nothingthereforeisbroughtaboutwithoutinterest。

Anactionisanaimofthesubject，anditishisagencytoowhichexecutesthisaim：unlessthesubjectwereinthiswayeveninthemostdisinterestedaction，i。e。unlesshehadaninterestinit，therewouldbenoactionatall。—Theimpulsesandinclinationsaresometimesdepreciatedbybeingcontrastedwiththebaselesschimeraofahappiness，thefreegiftofnature，wherewantsaresupposedtofindtheirsatisfactionwithouttheagentdoinganythingtoproduceaconformitybetweenimmediateexistenceandhisowninnerrequirements。Theyaresometimescontrasted，onthewholetotheirdisadvantage，withthemoralityofdutyforduty’ssake。Butimpulseandpassionaretheverylife—bloodofallaction：theyareneedediftheagentisreallytobeinhisaimandtheexecutionthereof。Themoralityconcernsthecontentoftheaim，whichassuchistheuniversal，aninactivething，thatfindsitsactualisingintheagent;andfindsitonlywhentheaimisimmanentintheagent，ishisinterestand—shoulditclaimtoengrosshiswholeefficientsubjectivity—hispassion。

§476。

Thewill，asthinkingandimplicitlyfree，distinguishesitselffromtheparticularityoftheimpulses，andplacesitselfassimplesubjectivityofthoughtabovetheirdiversifiedcontent。Itisthus’reflecting’will。

§477。

Suchaparticularityofimpulsehasthusceasedtobeameredatum：thereflectivewillnowseesitasitsown，becauseitcloseswithitandthusgivesitselfspecificindividualityandactuality。Itisnowonthestandpointofchoosingbetweeninclinations，andisoptionorchoice。

§478。

Willaschoiceclaimstobefree，reflectedintoitselfasthenegativityofitsmerelyimmediateautonomy。However，asthecontent，inwhichitsformeruniversalityconcludesitselftoactuality，isnothingbutthecontentoftheimpulsesandappetites，itisactualonlyasasubjectiveandcontingentwill。Itrealisesitselfinaparticularity，whichitregardsatthesametimeasanullity，andfindsasatisfactioninwhatithasatthesametimeemergedfrom。Asthuscontradictory，itistheprocessofdistractionandofsuspendingonedesireorenjoymentbyanother—andonesatisfaction，whichisjustasmuchnosatisfaction，byanother，withoutend。Butthetruthoftheparticularsatisfactionsistheuniversal，whichunderthenameofhappinessthethinkingwillmakesitsaim。

iii。Happiness§479。

Inthisidea，whichreflectionandcomparisonhaveeduced，ofauniversalsatisfaction，theimpulses，sofarastheirparticularitygoes，arereducedtoamerenegative;anditisheldthatpartlytheyaretobesacrificedtoeachotherforthebehoofofthataim，partlysacrificedtothataimdirectly，eitheraltogetherorinpart。Theirmutuallimitation，ononehand，proceedsfromamixtureofqualitativeandquantitativeconsiderations：ontheotherhand，ashappinesshasitssoleaffirmativecontentsinthespringsofaction，itisonthemthatthedecisionturns，anditisthesubjectivefeelingandgoodpleasurewhichmusthavethecastingvoteastowherehappinessistobeplaced。

§480。

Happinessisthemereabstractandmerelyimagineduniversalityofthingsdesired—auniversalitywhichonlyoughttobe。Buttheparticularityofthesatisfactionwhichjustasmuchisasitisabolished，andtheabstractsingleness，theoptionwhichgivesordoesnotgiveitself（asitpleases）

anaiminhappiness，findtheirtruthintheintrinsicuniversalityofthewill，i。e。itsveryautonomyorfreedom。Inthiswaychoiceiswillonlyaspuresubjectivity，whichispureandconcreteatonce，byhavingforitscontentsandaimonlythatinfinitemodeofbeing—freedomitself。Inthistruthofitsautonomywhereconceptandobjectareone，thewillisanactuallyfreewill。

（c）FREEMIND

§481。

Actualfreewillistheunityoftheoreticalandpracticalmind：afreewill，whichrealisesitsownfreedomofwill，nowthattheformalism，fortuitousness，andcontractednessofthepracticalcontentuptothispointhavebeensuperseded。Bysupersedingtheadjustmentsofmeansthereincontained，thewillistheimmediateindividualityself—instituted—anindividuality，however，alsopurifiedofallthatinterfereswithitsuniversalism，i。e。withfreedomitself。Thisuniversalismthewillhasasitsobjectandaim，onlysofarasitthinksitself，knowsthisitsconcept，andiswillasfreeintelligence。

§482。

Themindwhichknowsitselfasfreeandwillsitselfasthisitsobject，i。e。whichhasitstruebeingforcharacteristicandaim，isinthefirstinstancetherationalwillingeneral，orimplicitIdea，andbecauseimplicitonlythenotionofabsolutemind。AsabstractIdeaagain，itisexistentonlyintheimmediatewill—itistheexistentialsideofreason—thesinglewillasawareofthisitsuniversalityconstitutingitscontentsandaim，andofwhichitisonlytheformalactivity。Ifthewill，therefore，inwhichtheIdeathusappearsisonlyfinite，thatwillisalsotheactofdevelopingtheIdea，andofinvestingitsself—unfoldingcontentwithanexistencewhich，asrealisingtheidea，isactuality。Itisthus’Objective’Mind。

NoIdeaissogenerallyrecognisedasindefinite，ambiguous，andopentothegreatestmisconceptions（towhichthereforeitactuallyfallsavictim）astheideaofLiberty：noneincommoncurrencywithsolittleappreciationofitsmeaning。Rememberingthatfreemindisactualmind，wecanseehowmisconceptionsaboutitareoftremendousconsequenceinpractice。Whenindividualsandnationshaveoncegotintheirheadstheabstractconceptoffull—blownliberty，thereisnothinglikeitinitsuncontrollablestrength，justbecauseitistheveryessenceofmind，andthatasitsveryactuality。Wholecontinents，AfricaandtheEast，haveneverhadthisIdea，andarewithoutitstill。TheGreeksandRomans，PlatoandAristotle，eventheStoics，didnothaveit。Onthecontrary，theysawthatitisonlybybirth（as，forexample，anAthenianorSpartancitizen），orbystrengthofcharacter，education，orphilosophy（—thesageisfreeevenasaslaveandinchains）

thatthehumanbeingisactuallyfree。ItwasthroughChristianitythatthisIdeacameintotheworld。

AccordingtoChristianity，theindividualassuchhasaninfinitevalueastheobjectandaimofdivinelove，destinedasmindtoliveinabsoluterelationshipwithGodhimself，andhaveGod’sminddwellinginhim：i。e。manisimplicitlydestinedtosupremefreedom。If，inreligionassuch，manisawareofthisrelationshiptotheabsolutemindashistruebeing，hehasalso，evenwhenhestepsintothesphereofsecularexistence，thedivinemindpresentwithhim，asthesubstanceofthestate，ofthefamily，etc。Theseinstitutionsareduetotheguidanceofthatspirit，andareconstitutedafteritsmeasure;whilstbytheirexistencethemoraltempercomestobeindwellingintheindividual，sothatinthissphereofparticularexistence，ofpresentsensationandvolition，heisactuallyfree。

IftobeawareoftheIdea—tobeaware，thatis，thatmenareawareoffreedomastheiressence，aim，andobject—ismatterofspeculation，stillthisveryIdeaitselfistheactualityofmen—notsomethingwhichtheyhave，asmen，butwhichtheyare。Christianityinitsadherentshasrealisedanever—presentsensethattheyarenotandcannotbeslaves;iftheyaremadeslaves，ifthedecisionasregardstheirpropertyrestswithanarbitrarywill，notwithlawsorcourtsofjustice，theywouldfindtheverysubstanceoftheirlifeoutraged。Thiswilltolibertyisnolongeranimpulsewhichdemandsitssatisfaction，butthepermanentcharacter—thespiritualconsciousnessgrownintoanon—impulsivenature。Butthisfreedom，whichthecontentandaimoffreedomhas，isitselfonlyanotion—aprincipleofthemindandheart，intendedtodevelopintoanobjectivephase，intolegal，moral，religious，andnotlessintoscientificactuality。

SECTIONTWO：OBJECTIVESPIRIT

Introduction