第4章

§483。

TheobjectiveMindistheabsoluteIdea，butonlyexistinginposse：andasitisthusontheterritoryoffinitude，itsactualrationalityretainstheaspectofexternalapparency。Thefreewillfindsitselfimmediatelyconfrontedbydifferenceswhicharisefromthecircumstancethatfreedomisitsinwardfunctionandaim，andisinrelationtoanexternalandalreadysubsistingobjectivity，whichsplitsupintodifferentheads：viz。anthropologicaldata（i。e。privateandpersonalneeds），externalthingsofnaturewhichexistforconsciousness，andthetiesofrelationbetweenindividualwillswhichareconsciousoftheirowndiversityandparticularity。Theseaspectsconstitutetheexternalmaterialfortheembodimentofthewill。

§484。

Butthepurposiveactionofthiswillistorealiseitsconcept，Liberty，intheseexternallyobjectiveaspects，makingthelatteraworldmouldedbytheformer，whichinitisthusathomewithitself，lockedtogetherwithit：theconceptaccordinglyperfectedtotheIdea。Liberty，shapedintotheactualityofaworld，receivestheformofNecessity，thedeepersubstantialnexusofwhichisthesystemororganisationoftheprinciplesofliberty，whilstitsphenomenalnexusispowerorauthority，andthesentimentofobedienceawakenedinconsciousness。

§485。

Thisunityoftherationalwillwiththesinglewill（thisbeingthepeculiarandimmediatemediuminwhichtheformerisactualised）constitutesthesimpleactualityofliberty。Asit（anditscontent）belongstothought，andisthevirtualuniversal，thecontenthasitsrightandtruecharacteronlyintheformofuniversality。Wheninvestedwiththischaracterfortheintelligentconsciousness，orinstitutedasanauthoritativepower，itisaLaw。When，ontheotherhand，thecontentisfreedfromthemixednessandfortuitousness，attachingtoitinthepracticalfeelingandinimpulse，andissetandgraftedintheindividualwill，notintheformofimpulse，butinitsuniversality，soastobecomeitshabit，temper，andcharacter，itexistsasmannerandcustom，orUsage。

§486。

This’reality’，ingeneral，wherefreewillhasexistence，istheLaw（Right）—thetermbeingtakeninacomprehensivesensenotmerelyasthelimitedjuristiclaw，butastheactualbodyofalltheconditionsoffreedom。Theseconditions，inrelationtothesubjectivewill，wherethey，beinguniversal，oughttohaveandcanonlyhavetheirexistence，areitsDuties;whereasasitstemperandhabittheyareManners。Whatisarightisalsoaduty，andwhatisaduty，isalsoaright。Foramodeofexistenceisaright，onlyasaconsequenceofthefreesubstantialwill：

andthesamecontentoffact，whenreferredtothewilldistinguishedassubjectiveandindividual，isaduty。Itisthesamecontentwhichthesubjectiveconsciousnessrecognisesasaduty，andbringsintoexistenceintheseseveralwills。Thefinitudeoftheobjectivewillthuscreatesthesemblanceofadistinctionbetweenrightsandduties。

Inthephenomenalrangerightanddutyarecorrelata，atleastinthesensethattoarightonmypartcorrespondsadutyinsomeoneelse。But，inthelightoftheconcept，myrighttoathingisnotmerelypossession，butaspossessionbyapersonitisproperty，orlegalpossession，anditisadutytopossessthingsasproperty，i。e。tobeasaperson。Translatedintothephenomenalrelationship，viz。relationtoanotherperson—thisgrowsintothedutyofsomeoneelsetorespectmyright。Inthemoralityoftheconscience，dutyingeneralisinme—afreesubject—atthesametimearightofmysubjectivewillordisposition。Butinthisindividualistmoralsphere，therearisesthedivisionbetweenwhatisonlyinwardpurpose（dispositionorintention），whichonlyhasitsbeinginmeandismerelysubjectiveduty，andtheactualizationofthatpurpose：andwiththisdivisionacontingencyandimperfectionwhichmakestheinadequacyofmereindividualisticmorality。Insocialethicsthesetwopartshavereachedtheirtruth，theirabsoluteunity;althoughevenrightanddutyreturntooneanotherandcombinebymeansofcertainadjustmentsandundertheguiseofnecessity。Therightsofthefatherofthefamilyoveritsmembersareequallydutiestowardsthem;justasthechildren’sdutyofobedienceistheirrighttobeeducatedtothelibertyofmanhood。Thepenaljudicatureofagovernment，itsrightsofadministration，etc。，arenolessitsdutiestopunish，toadminister，etc。;astheservicesofthemembersoftheStateindues，militaryservice，etc。，aredutiesandyettheirrighttotheprotectionoftheirprivatepropertyandofthegeneralsubstantiallifeinwhichtheyhavetheirroot。AlltheaimsofsocietyandtheStatearetheprivateaimsoftheindividuals。Butthesetofadjustments，bywhichtheirdutiescomebacktothemastheexerciseandenjoymentofright，producesanappearanceofdiversity：andthisdiversityisincreasedbythevarietyofshapeswhichvalueassumesinthecourseofexchange，thoughitremainsintrinsicallythesame。Stillitholdsfundamentallygoodthathewhohasnorightshasnodutiesandviceversa。

§487。

Thefreewillis：

（A）Itselfatfirstimmediate，andhenceasasinglebeing—theperson：theexistencewhichthepersongivestoitslibertyisproperty。TheRightasRight（law）isformal，abstractright。

（B）Whenthewillisreflectedintoself，soastohaveitsexistenceinsideit，andtobethusatthesametimecharacterisedasaparticular，itistherightofthesubjectivewill，moralityoftheindividualconscience。

（C）Whenthefreewillisthesubstantialwill，madeactualinthesubjectandconformabletoitsconceptandrenderedatotalityofnecessity—itistheethicsofactuallifeinfamily，civilsociety，andState。

A。LAW

（a）PROPERTY

§488。

Mind，intheimmediacyofitsself—securedliberty，isanindividual，butonethatknowsitsindividualityasanabsolutelyfreewill：itisaperson，inwhomtheinwardsenseofthisfreedom，asinitselfstillabstractandempty，hasitsparticularityandfulfilmentnotyetonitsownpart，butonanexternalthing。Thisthing，assomethingdevoidofwill，hasnorightsagainstthesubjectivityofintelligenceandvolition，andisbythatsubjectivitymadeadjectivaltoit，theexternalsphereofitsliberty—possession。

§489。

Bythejudgementofpossession，atfirstintheoutwardappropriation，thethingacquiresthepredicateof’mine’。Butthispredicate，onitsownaccountmerely’practical’，hasherethesignificationthatIimportmypersonalwillintothething。

Assocharacterised，possessionisproperty，whichaspossessionisameans，butasexistenceofthepersonalityisanend。

§490。

Inhispropertythepersonisbroughtintounionwithhimself。Butthethingisanabstractlyexternalthing，andtheIinitisabstractlyexternal。TheconcretereturnofmeintomeintheexternalityisthatI，theinfiniteself—relation，amasapersontherepulsionofmefrommyself，andhavetheexistenceofmypersonalityinthebeingofotherpersons，inmyrelationtothemandinmyrecognitionbythem，whichisthusmutual。

§491。

Thethingisthemeanbywhichtheextremesmeetinone。Theseextremesarethepersonswho，intheknowledgeoftheiridentityasfree，aresimultaneouslymutuallyindependent。Forthemmywillhasitsdefiniterecognizableexistenceinthethingbytheimmediatebodilyactoftakingpossession，orbytheformationofthethingor，itmaybe，bymeredesignationofit。

§492。

ThecasualaspectofpropertyisthatIplacemywillinthisthing：sofarmywillisarbitrary，Icanjustaswellputitinitasnot—justaswellwithdrawitasnot。

Butsofarasmywillliesinathing，itisonlyIwhocanwithdrawit：itisonlywithmywillthatthethingcanpasstoanother，whosepropertyitsimilarlybecomesonlywithhiswill：—Contract。

（b）CONTRACT

§493。

Thetwowillsandtheiragreementinthecontractareasaninternalstateofminddifferentfromitsrealisationintheperformance。Thecomparatively’ideal’

utterance（ofcontract）inthestipulationcontainstheactualsurrenderofapropertybytheone，itschanginghands，anditsacceptancebytheotherwill。Thecontractisthusthoroughlybinding：itdoesnotneedtheperformanceoftheoneortheothertobecomeso—otherwiseweshouldhaveaninfiniteregressorinfinitedivisionofthing，labour，andtime。Theutteranceinthestipulationiscompleteandexhaustive。Theinwardnessofthewillwhichsurrendersandthewillwhichacceptsthepropertyisintherealmofideation，andinthatrealmthewordisdeedandthing（§462）—thefullandcompletedeed，sinceheretheconscientiousnessofthewilldoesnotcomeunderconsideration（astowhetherthethingismeantinearnestorisadeception），andthewillrefersonlytotheexternalthing。

§494。

Thusinthestipulationwehavethesubstantialbeingofthecontractstandingoutindistinctionfromitsrealutteranceintheperformance，whichisbroughtdowntoameresequel。Inthiswaythereisputintothethingorperformanceadistinctionbetweenitsimmediatespecificqualityanditssubstantialbeingorvalue，meaningbyvaluethequantitativetermsintowhichthatqualitativefeaturehasbeentranslated。Onepieceofpropertyisthusmadecomparablewithanother，andmaybemadeequivalenttoathingwhichis（inquality）whollyheterogeneous。Itisthustreatedingeneralasanabstract，universalthingorcommodity。

§495。

Thecontract，asanagreementwhichhasavoluntaryoriginanddealswithacasualcommodity，involvesatthesametimethegivingtothis’accidental’willapositivefixity。Thiswillmayjustaswellnotbeconformabletolaw（right），and，inthatcase，producesawrong;bywhich，however，theabsolutelaw（right）isnotsuperseded，butonlyarelationshiporiginatedofrighttowrong。

（c）RIGHTversusWRONG

§496。

Law（right）consideredastherealisationoflibertyinexternals，breaksupintoamultiplicityofrelationstothisexternalsphereandtootherpersons（§§491，493

ff。）。Inthiswaythereare（1）severaltitlesorgroundsatlaw，ofwhich（seeingthatpropertybothonthepersonalandtherealsideisexclusivelyindividual）onlyoneistheright，butwhich，becausetheyfaceeachother，eachandallareinvestedwithashowofright，againstwhichtheformerisdefinedastheintrinsicallyright。

§497。

Nowsolongas（comparedagainstthisshow）theoneintrinsicallyright，stillpresumedidenticalwiththeseveraltitles，isaffirmed，willed，andrecognised，theonlydiversityliesinthis，thatthespecialthingissubsumedundertheonelaworrightbytheparticularwilloftheseseveralpersons。Thisisnaive，non—maliciouswrong。Suchwrongintheseveralclaimantsisasimplenegativejudgement，expressingthecivilsuit。Tosettleitthereisrequiredathirdjudgement，which，asthejudgementoftheintrinsicallyright，isdisinterested，andapowerofgivingtheonerightexistenceasagainstthatsemblance。

§498。

But（2）ifthesemblanceofrightassuchiswilledagainsttherightintrinsicallybytheparticularwill，whichthusbecomeswicked，thentheexternalrecognitionofrightisseparatedfromtheright’struevalue;andwhiletheformeronlyisrespected，thelatterisviolated。Thisgivesthewrongoffraud—theinfinitejudgementasidentical（§173）—wherethenominalrelationisretained，butthesterlingvalueisletslip。

§499。

（3）Finally，theparticularwillsetsitselfinoppositiontotheintrinsicrightbynegatingthatrightitselfaswellasitsrecognitionorsemblance。（Herethereisanegativelyinfinitejudgement（§173）inwhichthereisdeniedtheclassasawhole，andnotmerelytheparticularmode—inthiscasetheapparentrecognition。）Thusthewillisviolentlywicked，andcommitsacrime。

§500。

Asanoutrageonright，suchanactionisessentiallyandactuallynull。Inittheagent，asavolitionalandintelligentbeing，setsupalaw—alaw，however，whichisnominalandrecognisedbyhimonly—auniversalwhichholdsgoodforhim，andunderwhichhehasatthesametimesubsumedhimselfbyhisaction。Todisplaythenullityofsuchanact，tocarryoutsimultaneouslythisnominallawandtheintrinsicright，inthefirstinstancebymeansofasubjectiveindividualwill，istheworkofRevenge。Butrevenge，startingfromtheinterestofanimmediateparticularpersonality，isatthesametimeonlyanewoutrage;andsoonwithoutend。Thisprogression，likethelast，abolishesitselfinathirdjudgement，whichisdisinterested—punishment。

§501。

Theinstrumentalitybywhichauthorityisgiventointrinsicrightisthataparticularwill，thatofthejudge，beingconformabletotheright，hasaninteresttoturnagainstthecrime（whichinthefirstinstance，inrevenge，isamatterofchance），andthatanexecutivepower（alsointhefirstinstancecasual）negatesthenegationofrightthatwascreatedbythecriminal。Thisnegationofrighthasitsexistenceinthewillofthecriminal;andconsequentlyrevengeorpunishmentdirectsitselfagainstthepersonorpropertyofthecriminalandexercisescoercionuponhim。Itisinthislegalspherethatcoercioningeneralhaspossiblescope—compulsionagainstthething，inseizingandmaintainingitagainstanother’sseizure：forinthisspherethewillhasitsexistenceimmediatelyinexternalsassuch，orincorporeity，andcanbeseizedonlyinthisquarter。Butmorethanpossiblecompulsionisnot，solongasIcanwithdrawmyselfasfreefromeverymodeofexistence，evenfromtherangeofallexistence，i。e。fromlife。Itislegalonlyasabolishingafirstandoriginalcompulsion。

§502。

Adistinctionhasthusemergedbetweenthelaw（right）andthesubjectivewill。

The’reality’ofright，whichthepersonalwillinthefirstinstancegivesitselfinimmediatewise，isseentobeduetotheinstrumentalityofthesubjectivewill—

whoseinfluenceasononehanditgivesexistencetotheessentialright，somayontheothercutitselfofffromandopposeitselftoit。Conversely，theclaimofthesubjectivewilltobeinthisabstractionapoweroverthelawofrightisnullandemptyofitself：itgetstruthandrealityessentiallyonlysofarasthatwillinitselfrealisesthereasonablewill。Assuchitismoralityproper。

Thephrase’LawofNature’，orNaturalRight，inuseforthephilosophyoflawinvolvestheambiguitythatitmaymeaneitherrightassomethingexistingready—formedinnature，orrightasgovernedbythenatureofthings，i。e。bythenotion。Theformerusedtobethecommonmeaning，accompaniedwiththefictionofastateofnature，inwhichthelawofnatureshouldholdsway;

whereasthesocialandpoliticalstateratherrequiredandimpliedarestrictionoflibertyandasacrificeofnaturalrights。Therealfactisthatthewholelawanditseveryarticlearebasedonfreepersonalityalone—onself—determinationorautonomy，whichistheverycontraryofdeterminationbynature。Thelawofnature—strictlysocalled—isforthatreasonthepredominanceofthestrongandthereignofforce，andastateofnatureastateofviolenceandwrong，ofwhichnothingtruercanbesaidthanthatoneoughttodepartfromit。Thesocialstate，ontheotherhand，istheconditioninwhichalonerighthasitsactuality：whatistoberestrictedandsacrificedisjustthewilfulnessandviolenceofthestateofnature。

B。MORALITY

§503。

Thefreeindividual，who，inmerelaw，countsonlyasaperson，isnowcharacterisedasasubject—awillreflectedintoitselfsothat，beitsaffectionwhatitmay，itisdistinguished（asexistinginit）asitsownfromtheexistenceoffreedominanexternalthing。Becausetheaffectionofthewillisthusinwardised，thewillisatthesametimemadeaparticular，andtherearisefurtherparticularisationsofitandrelationsofthesetooneanother。Thisaffectionispartlytheessentialandimplicitwill，thereasonofthewill，theessentialbasisoflawandmorallife：partlyitistheexistentvolition，whichisbeforeusandthrowsitselfintoactualdeeds，andthuscomesintorelationshipwiththeformer。Thesubjectivewillismorallyfree，sofarasthesefeaturesareitsinwardinstitution，itsown，andwilledbyit。Itsutteranceindeedwiththisfreedomisanaction，intheexternalityofwhichitonlyadmitsasitsown，andallowstobeimputedtoit，somuchasithasconsciouslywilled。

Thissubjectiveor’moral’freedomiswhataEuropeanespeciallycallsfreedom。

Invirtueoftherighttheretoamanmustpossessapersonalknowledgeofthedistinctionbetweengoodandevilingeneral：ethicalandreligiousprinciplesshallnotmerelylaytheirclaimonhimasexternallawsandpreceptsofauthoritytobeobeyed，buthavetheirassent，recognition，orevenjustificationinhisheart，sentiment，conscience，intelligence，etc。Thesubjectivityofthewillinitselfisitssupremeaimandabsolutelyessentialtoit。

The’moral’mustbetakeninthewidersenseinwhichitdoesnotsignifythemorallygoodmerely。InFrenchlemoralisopposedtolephysique，andmeansthementalorintellectualingeneral。Butherethemoralsignifiesvolitionalmode，sofarasitisintheinteriorofthewillingeneral;itthusincludespurposeandintention—andalsomoralwickedness。

（a）PURPOSE

§504。

Sofarastheactioncomesintoimmediatetouchwithexistence，mypartinitistothisextentformal，thatexternalexistenceisalsoindependentoftheagent。Thisexternallycanperverthisactionandbringtolightsomethingelsethanlayinit。

Now，thoughanyalterationassuch，whichissetonfootbythesubjects’action，isitsdeed，stillthesubjectdoesnotforthatreasonrecogniseitasitsaction，butonlyadmitsasitsownthatexistenceinthedeedwhichlayinitsknowledgeandwill，whichwasitspurpose。Onlyforthatdoesitholditselfresponsible。

（b）INTENTION&WELFARE

§505。

Asregardsitsempiricallyconcretecontent（1）theactionhasavarietyofparticularaspectsandconnections。Inpointofform，theagentmusthaveknownandwilledtheactioninitsessentialfeature，embracingtheseindividualpoints。

Thisistherightofintention。Whilepurposeaffectsonlytheimmediatefactofexistence，intentionregardstheunderlyingessenceandaimthereof。（2）Theagenthasnolesstherighttoseethattheparticularityofcontentintheaction，inpointofitsmatter，isnotsomethingexternaltohim，butisaparticularityofhisown—

thatitcontainshisneeds，interests，andaims。Theseaims，whensimilarlycomprehendedinasingleaim，asinhappiness（§479），constitutehiswell—being。

Thisistherighttowell—being。Happiness（goodfortune）isdistinguishedfromwell—beingonlyinthis，thathappinessimpliesnomorethansomesortofimmediateexistence，whereaswell—beingisregardedashavingamoraljustification。

§506。

Buttheessentialityoftheintentionisinthefirstinstancetheabstractformofgenerality。Reflectioncanputinthisformthisandthatparticularaspectintheempiricallyconcreteaction，thusmakingitessentialtotheintentionorrestrictingtheintentiontoit。Inthiswaythesupposedessentialityoftheintentionandtherealessentialityoftheactionmaybebroughtintothegreatestcontradiction—e。g。

agoodintentionincaseofacrime。Similarlywell—beingisabstractandmaybeplacedinthisorthat：asappertainingtothissingleagent，itisalwayssomethingparticular。

（c）GOODNESS&WICKEDNESS

§507。

Thetruthoftheseparticularitiesandtheconcreteunityoftheirformalismisthecontentoftheuniversal，essentialandactual，will—thelawandunderlyingessenceofeveryphaseofvolition，theessentialandactualgood。Itisthustheabsolutefinalaimoftheworld，anddutyfortheagentwhooughttohaveinsightintothegood，makeithisintentionandbringitaboutbyhisactivity。

§508。

Butthoughthegoodistheuniversalofwill—auniversaldeterminedinitself—

andthusincludinginitparticularity—stillsofarasthisparticularityisinthefirstinstancestillabstract，thereisnoprincipleathandtodetermineit。Suchdeterminationthereforestartsupalsooutsidethatuniversal;andasheteronomyordeterminanceofawillwhichisfreeandhasrightsofitsown，thereawakesherethedeepestcontradiction。（a）Inconsequenceoftheindeterminatedeterminismofthegood，therearealwaysseveralsortsofgoodandmanykindsofduties，thevarietyofwhichisadialecticofoneagainstanotherandbringsthemintocollision。Atthesametimebecausegoodisone，theyoughttostandinharmony;andyeteachofthem，thoughitisaparticularduty，isasgoodandasdutyabsolute。Itfallsupontheagenttobethedialecticwhich，supersedingthisabsoluteclaimofeach，concludessuchacombinationofthemasexcludestherest。

§509。

（b）Totheagent，whoinhisexistentsphereoflibertyisessentiallyasaparticular，hisinterestandwelfaremust，onaccountofthatexistentsphereofliberty，beessentiallyanaimandthereforeaduty。Butatthesametimeinaimingatthegood，whichisthenot—particularbutonlyuniversalofthewill，theparticularinterestoughtnottobeaconstituentmotive。Onaccountofthisindependencyofthetwoprinciplesofaction，itislikewiseanaccidentwhethertheyharmonise。Andyettheyoughttoharmonise，becausetheagent，asindividualanduniversal，isalwaysfundamentallyoneidentity。

（c）Buttheagentisnotonlyamereparticularinhisexistence;itisalsoaformofhisexistencetobeanabstractself—certainty，anabstractreflectionoffreedomintohimself。Heisthusdistinctfromthereasoninthewill，andcapableofmakingtheuniversalitselfaparticularandinthatwayasemblance。Thegoodisthusreducedtothelevelofamere’mayhappen’fortheagent，whocanthereforedecideonsomethingoppositetothegood，canbewicked。

§510。

（d）Theexternalobjectivity，followingthedistinctionwhichhasariseninthesubjectivewill（§503），constitutesapeculiarworldofitsown—anotherextremewhichstandsinnorapportwiththeinternalwill—determination。Itisthusamatterofchancewhetheritharmoniseswiththesubjectiveaims，whetherthegoodisrealised，andthewicked，anaimessentiallyandactuallynull，nullifiedinit：itisnolessmatterofchancewhethertheagentfindsinithiswell—being，andmorepreciselywhetherintheworldthegoodagentishappyandthewickedunhappy。

Butatthesametimetheworldoughttoallowthegoodaction，theessentialthing，tobecarriedoutinit;itoughttograntthegoodagentthesatisfactionofhisparticularinterest，andrefuseittothewicked;justasitoughtalsotomakethewickeditselfnullandvoid。

§511。

Theall—roundcontradiction，expressedbythisrepeatedought，withitsabsolutenesswhichyetatthesametimeisnot—containsthemostabstract’analysis’ofthemindinitself，itsdeepestdescentintoitself。Theonlyrelationtheself—contradictoryprincipleshavetooneanotherisintheabstractcertaintyofself;andforthisinfinitudeofsubjectivitytheuniversalwill，good，right，andduty，nomoreexistthannot。Thesubjectivityaloneisawareofitselfaschoosinganddeciding。Thispureself—certitude，risingtoitspitch，appearsinthetwodirectlyinter—changingforms—ofConscienceandWickedness。Theformeristhewillofgoodness;butagoodnesswhichtothispuresubjectivityisthenon—objective，non—universal，theunutterable;andoverwhichtheagentisconsciousthatheinhisindividualityhasthedecision。Wickednessisthesameawarenessthatthesingleselfpossessesthedecision，sofarasthesingleselfdoesnotmerelyremaininthisabstraction，buttakesupthecontentofasubjectiveinterestcontrarytothegood。

§512。

Thissupremepitchofthe’phenomenon’ofwill—sublimatingitselftothisabsolutevanity—toagoodness，whichhasnoobjectivity，butisonlysureofitself，andaself—assurancewhichinvolvesthenullificationoftheuniversal—collapsesbyitsownforce。Wickedness，asthemostintimatereflectionofsubjectivityitself，inoppositiontotheobjectiveanduniversal（whichittreatsasmeresham）isthesameasthegoodsentimentofabstractgoodness，whichreservestothesubjectivitythedeterminationthereof：—theutterlyabstractsemblance，thebareperversionandannihilationofitself。Theresult，thetruthofthissemblance，is，onitsnegativeside，theabsolutenullityofthisvolitionwhichwouldfainholditsownagainstthegood，andofthegood，whichwouldonlybeabstract。

Ontheaffirmativeside，inthenotion，thissemblancethuscollapsingisthesamesimpleuniversalityofthewill，whichisthegood。Thesubjectivity，inthisitsidentitywiththegood，isonlytheinfiniteform，whichactualisesanddevelopsit。Inthiswaythestandpointofbarereciprocitybetweentwoindependentsides—thestandpointoftheought，isabandoned，andwehavepassedintothefieldofethicallife。

C。ETHICS

§513。

Themorallifeistheperfectionofspiritobjective—thetruthofthesubjectiveandobjectivespirititself。Thefailureofthelatterconsists—partlyinhavingitsfreedomimmediatelyinreality，insomethingexternaltherefore，inathing—

partlyintheabstractuniversalityofitsgoodness。Thefailureofspiritsubjectivesimilarlyconsistsinthis，thatitis，asagainsttheuniversal，abstractlyself—determinantinitsinwardindividuality。Whenthesetwoimperfectionsaresuppressed，subjectivefreedomexistsasthecovertlyandovertlyuniversalrationalwill，whichissensibleofitselfandactivelydisposedintheconsciousnessoftheindividualsubject，whilstitspracticaloperationandimmediateuniversalactualityatthesametimeexistasmoralusage，mannerandcustom—whereself—consciouslibertyhasbecomenature。

§514。

Theconsciouslyfreesubstance，inwhichtheabsolute’ought’isnolessan’is’，hasactualityasthespiritofanation。Theabstractdisruptionofthisspiritsinglesitoutintopersons，whoseindependenceit，however，controlsandentirelydominatesfromwithin。Buttheperson，asanintelligentbeing，feelsthatunderlyingessencetobehisownverybeing—ceaseswhensomindedtobeamereaccidentofit—

looksuponitashisabsolutefinalaim。Initsactualityheseesnotlessanachievedpresent，thansomewhathebringsaboutbyhisaction—yetsomewhatwhichwithoutallquestionis。Thus，withoutanyselectivereflection，thepersonperformshisdutyashisownandassomethingwhichis;andinthisnecessityhehashimselfandhisactualfreedom。

§515。

Becausethesubstanceistheabsoluteunityofindividualityanduniversalityoffreedom，itfollowsthattheactualityandactionofeachindividualtokeepandtotakecareofhisownbeing，whileitisononehandconditionedbythepre—supposedtotalinwhosecomplexaloneheexists，isontheotheratransitionintoauniversalproduct。—Thesocialdispositionoftheindividualsistheirsenseofthesubstance，andoftheidentityofalltheirinterestswiththetotal;andthattheotherindividualsmutuallyknoweachotherandareactualonlyinthisidentity，isconfidence（trust）—thegenuineethicaltemper。

§516。

Therelationsbetweenindividualsintheseveralsituationstowhichthesubstanceisparticularisedformtheirethicalduties。Theethicalpersonality，i。e。thesubjectivitywhichispermeatedbythesubstantiallife，isvirtue。Inrelationtothebarefactsofexternalbeing，todestiny，virtuedoesnottreatthemasamerenegation，andisthusaquietreposeinitself：inrelationtosubstantialobjectivity，tothetotalofethicalactuality，itexistsasconfidence，asdeliberateworkforthecommunity，andthecapacityofsacrificingselfthereto;whilstinrelationtotheincidentalrelationsofsocialcircumstance，itisinthefirstinstancejusticeandthenbenevolence。Inthelattersphere，andinitsattitudetoitsownvisiblebeingandcorporeity，theindividualityexpressesitsspecialcharacter，temperament，etc。

aspersonalvirtues。

§517。

Theethicalsubstanceis：

（a）as’immediate’ornaturalmind—theFamily。

（b）The’relative’totalityofthe’relative’relationsoftheindividualsasindependentpersonstooneanotherinaformaluniversality—CivilSociety。

（c）Theself—conscioussubstance，astheminddevelopedtoanorganicactuality—thePoliticalConstitution。

（a）THEFAMILY

§518。

Theethicalspirit，initsimmediacy，containsthenaturalfactorthattheindividualhasitssubstantialexistenceinitsnaturaluniversal，i。e。initskind。Thisisthesexualtie，elevated，however，toaspiritualsignificance，—theunanimityofloveandthetemperoftrust。Intheshapeofthefamily，mindappearsasfeeling。

§519。

（1）Thephysicaldifferenceofsexthusappearsatthesametimeasadifferenceofintellectualandmoraltype。Withtheirexclusiveindividualitiesthesepersonalitiescombinetoformasingleperson：thesubjectiveunionofhearts，becominga’substantial’unity，makesthisunionanethicaltie—Marriage。The’substantial’unionofheartsmakesmarriageanindivisiblepersonalbond—

monogamicmarriage：thebodilyconjunctionisasequeltothemoralattachment。

Afurthersequeliscommunityofpersonalandprivateinterests。

§520。

（2）Bythecommunityinwhichthevariousmembersconstitutingthefamilystandinreferencetoproperty，thatpropertyoftheoneperson（representingthefamily）

acquiresanethicalinterest，asdoalsoitsindustry，labour，andcareforthefuture。

§521。

Theethicalprinciplewhichisconjoinedwiththenaturalgenerationofthechildren，andwhichwasassumedtohaveprimaryimportanceinfirstformingthemarriageunion，isactuallyrealisedinthesecondorspiritualbirthofthechildren—ineducatingthemtoindependentpersonality。

§522。

（3）Thechildren，thusinvestedwithindependence，leavetheconcretelifeandactionofthefamilytowhichtheyprimarilybelong，acquireanexistenceoftheirown，destined，however，tofoundanewsuchanactualfamily。Marriageisofcoursebrokenupbythenaturalelementcontainedinit，thedeathofhusbandandwife：buteventheirunionofhearts，asitisamere’substantiality’offeeling，containsthegermofliabilitytochanceanddecay。Invirtueofsuchfortuitousness，themembersofthefamilytakeuptoeachotherthestatusofpersons;anditisthusthatthefamilyfindsintroducedintoitforthefirsttimetheelement，originallyforeigntoit，oflegalregulation。

（b）CIVILSOCIETY

§523。

Asthesubstance，beinganintelligentsubstance，particularisesitselfabstractlyintomanypersons（thefamilyisonlyasingleperson），intofamiliesorindividuals，whoexistindependentandfree，asprivatepersons，itlosesitsethicalcharacter：

forthesepersonsassuchhaveintheirconsciousnessandastheiraimnottheabsoluteunity，buttheirownpettyselvesandparticularinterests。Thusarisesthesystemofatomismbywhichthesubstanceisreducedtoageneralsystemofadjustmentstoconnectself—subsistingextremesandtheirparticularinterests。Thedevelopedtotalityofthisconnectivesystemisthestateascivilsociety，orstateexternal。

（a）TheSystemofWants§524。

（a）Theparticularityofthepersonsincludesinthefirstinstancetheirwants。Thepossibilityofsatisfyingthesewantsisherelaidonthesocialfabric，thegeneralstockfromwhichallderivetheirsatisfaction。Intheconditionofthingsinwhichthismethodofsatisfactionbyindirectadjustmentisrealised，immediateseizure（§

488）ofexternalobjectsasmeanstheretoexistsbarelyornotatall：theobjectsarealreadyproperty。Toacquirethemisonlypossiblebytheintervention，ononehand，ofthepossessor’swill，whichasparticularhasinviewthesatisfactionoftheirvariouslydefinedinterests;while，ontheotherhand，itisconditionedbytheever—continuedproductionoffreshmeansofexchangebytheexchangers’ownlabour。Thisinstrument，bywhichthelabourofallfacilitatessatisfactionofwants，constitutesthegeneralstock。

§525。

（b）Theglimmerofuniversalprincipleinthisparticularityofwantsisfoundinthewayintellectcreatesdifferencesinthem，andthuscausesanindefinitemultiplicationbothofwantsandofmeansfortheirdifferentphases。Botharethusrenderedmoreandmoreabstract。This’morcellement’oftheircontentbyabstractiongivesrisetothedivisionoflabour。Thehabitofthisabstractioninenjoyment，information，learning，anddemeanourconstitutestraininginthissphere，ornominalcultureingeneral。

§526。

Thelabourwhichthusbecomesmoreabstracttendsononehandbyitsuniformitytomakelaboureasierandtoincreaseproduction—onanothertolimiteachpersontoasinglekindoftechnicalskill，andthusproducemoreunconditionaldependenceonthesocialsystem……Theskillitselfbecomesinthiswaymechanical，andgetsthecapabilityoflettingthemachinetaketheplaceofhumanlabour。

§527。

（c）Buttheconcretedivisionofthegeneralstock—whichisalsoageneralbusiness（ofthewholesociety）—intoparticularmassesdeterminedbythefactorsofthenotion—masseseachofwhichpossessesitsownbasisofsubsistence，andacorrespondingmodeoflabour，ofneeds，andofmeansforsatisfyingthem，alsoofaimsandinterests，aswellasofmentalcultureandhabit—constitutesthedifferenceofEstates（ordersorranks）。Individualsapportionthemselvestotheseaccordingtonaturaltalent，skill，option，andaccident。Asbelongingtosuchadefiniteandstablesphere，theyhavetheiractualexistence，whichasexistenceisessentiallyaparticular;andinittheyhavetheirsocialmorality，whichishonesty，theirrecognitionandtheirhonour。

Wherecivilsociety，andwithittheState，exists，therearisetheseveralestatesintheirdifference：

fortheuniversalsubstance，asvital，existsonlysofarasitorganicallyparticularisesitself。Thehistoryofconstitutionsisthehistoryofthegrowthoftheseestates，ofthelegalrelationshipsofindividualstothem，andoftheseestatestooneanotherandtotheircentre。

§528。

Tothe’substantial’，naturalestatethefruitfulsoilandgroundsupplyanaturalandstablecapital;itsactiongetsdirectionandcontentthroughnaturalfeatures，anditsmorallifeisfoundedonfaithandtrust。Thesecond，the’reflected’estatehasasitsallotmentthesocialcapital，themediumcreatedbytheactionofmiddlemen，ofmereagents，andanensembleofcontingencies，wheretheindividualhastodependonhissubjectiveskill，talent，intelligence，andindustry。Thethird，’thinking’estatehasforitsbusinessthegeneralinterests;likethesecondithasasubsistenceprocuredbymeansofitsownskill，andlikethefirstacertainsubsistence，certain，however，becauseguaranteedthroughthewholesociety。

（b）AdministrationofJustice§529。

Whenmaturedthroughtheoperationofnaturalneedandfreeoptionintoasystemofuniversalrelationshipsandaregularcourseofexternalnecessity，theprincipleofcasualparticularitygetsthatstablearticulationwhichlibertyrequiresintheshapeofformalright。

（1）Theactualizationwhichrightgetsinthissphereofmerepracticalintelligenceisthatitbebroughttoconsciousnessasthestableuniversal，thatitbeknownandstatedinitsspecificalitywiththevoiceofauthority—theLaw。

Thepositiveelementinlawsconcernsonlytheirformofpublicityandauthority—whichmakesitpossibleforthemtobeknownbyallinacustomaryandexternalway。Theircontentpersemaybereasonable—oritmaybeunreasonableandsowrong。Butwhenright，inthecourseofdefinitemanifestation，isdevelopedindetail，anditscontentanalysesitselftogaindefiniteness，thisanalysis，becauseofthefinitudeofitsmaterials，fallsintothefalselyinfiniteprogress：thefinaldefiniteness，whichisabsolutelyessentialandcausesabreakinthisprogressofunreality，caninthissphereoffinitudebeattainedonlyinawaythatsavoursofcontingencyandarbitrariness。Thuswhetherthreeyears，tenthalers，oronly21/2，23/4，24/5years，andsoonadinfinitum，betherightandjustthing，canbynomeansbedecidedonintelligibleprinciples—andyetitshouldbedecided。Hence，thoughofcourseonlyatthefinalpointsofdeciding，onthesideofexternalexistence，the’positive’principlenaturallyenterslawascontingencyandarbitrariness。Thishappensandhasfromofoldhappenedinalllegislations：theonlythingwantedisclearlytobeawareofit，andnotbemisledbythetalkandthepretenceasiftheidealoflawwere，orcouldbe，tobe，ateverypoint，determinedthroughreasonorlegalintelligence，onpurelyreasonableandintelligentgrounds。Itisafutileperfectionismtohavesuchexpectationsandtomakesuchrequirementsinthesphereofthefinite。

Therearesomewholookuponlawsasanevilandaprofanity，andwhoregardgoverningandbeinggovernedfromnaturallove，hereditarydivinityornobility，byfaithandtrust，asthegenuineorderoflife，whilethereignoflawisheldanorderofcorruptionandinjustice。Thesepeopleforgetthatthestars—andthecattletoo—aregovernedandwellgovernedtoobylaws;—laws，however，whichareonlyinternallyintheseobjects，notforthem，notaslawssettothem：—

whereasitisman’sprivilegetoknowhislaw。Theyforgetthereforethathecantrulyobeyonlysuchknownlaw—evenashislawcanonlybeajustlaw，asitisaknownlaw;—thoughinotherrespectsitmustbeinitsessentialcontentcontingencyandcaprice，oratleastbemixedandpollutedwithsuchelements。

Thesameemptyrequirementofperfectionisemployedforanoppositethesis—viz。tosupporttheopinionthatacodeisimpossibleorimpracticable。Inthiscasetherecomesintheadditionalabsurdityofputtingessentialanduniversalprovisioninoneclasswiththeparticulardetail。Thefinitematerialisdefinableonandontothefalseinfinite：butthisadvanceisnot，asinthementalimagesofspace，agenerationofnewspatialcharacteristicsofthesamequalityasthoseprecedingthem，butanadvanceintogreaterandevergreaterspecialitybytheacumenoftheanalyticintellect，whichdiscoversnewdistinctions，whichagainmakenewdecisionsnecessary。Toprovisionsofthissortonemaygivethenameofnewdecisionsornewlaws;butinproportiontothegradualadvanceinspecializationtheinterestandvalueoftheseprovisionsdeclines。Theyfallwithinthealreadysubsisting’substantial’，generallaws，likeimprovementsonafloororadoor，withinthehouse—whichthoughsomethingnew，arenotanewhouse。Butthereisacontrarycase。Ifthelegislationofarudeagebeganwithsingleprovisos，whichgoonbytheirverynaturealwaysincreasingtheirnumber，therearises，withtheadvanceinmultitude，theneedofasimplercode—theneed，i。e。ofembracingthatlotofsingularsintheirgeneralfeatures。Tofindandbeabletoexpresstheseprincipleswellbeseemsanintelligentandcivilisednation。Suchagatheringupofsinglerulesintogeneralforms，firstreallydeservingthenameoflaws，haslatelybeenbeguninsomedirectionsbytheEnglishMinisterPeel，whohasbysodoinggainedthegratitude，eventheadmiration，ofhiscountrymen。

§530。

（2）ThepositiveformofLaws—tobepromulgatedandmadeknownaslaws—isaconditionoftheexternalobligationtoobeythem;inasmuchas，beinglawsofstrictright，theytouchonlytheabstractwill—itselfatbottomexternal—

notthemoralorethicalwill。Thesubjectivitytowhichthewillhasinthisdirectionarightishereonlythatthelawsbeknown。Thissubjectiveexistence，isasexistenceoftheabsolutetruthinthissphereofRight，atthesametimeanexternallyobjectiveexistence，asuniversalauthorityandnecessity。

Thelegalityofpropertyandofprivatetransactionsconcernedtherewith—inconsiderationoftheprinciplethatalllawmustbepromulgated，recognized，andthusbecomeauthoritative—getsitsuniversalguaranteethroughformalities。

§531。

（3）Legalformsgetthenecessity，towhichobjectiveexistencedeterminesitself，inthejudicialsystem。Abstractrighthastoexhibititselftothecourt—totheindividualisedright—asproven：—aprocessinwhichtheremaybeadifferencebetweenwhatisabstractlyrightandwhatisprovablyright。Thecourttakescognisanceandactionintheinterestofrightassuch，deprivestheexistenceofrightofitscontingency，andinparticulartransformsthisexistence—asthisexistsasrevenge—intopunishment（§500）。

Thecomparisonofthetwospecies，orrathertwoelementsinthejudicialconviction，bearingontheactualstateofthecaseinrelationtotheaccused—（1）accordingasthatconvictionisbasedonmerecircumstancesandotherpeople’switnessalone—or（2）inadditionrequirestheconfessionoftheaccused，constitutesthemainpointinthequestionoftheso—calledjury—courts。Itisanessentialpointthatthetwoingredientsofajudicialcognisance，thejudgementastothestateofthefact，andthejudgementasapplicationofthelawtoit，should，asatbottomdifferentsides，beexercisedasdifferentfunctions。Bythesaidinstitutiontheyareallottedeventobodiesdifferentlyqualifiedfromtheoneofwhichindividualsbelongingtotheofficialjudiciaryareexpresslyexcluded。Tocarrythisseparationoffunctionsuptothisseparationinthecourtsrestsratheronextra—essentialconsiderations：themainpointremainsonlytheseparateperformanceoftheseessentiallydifferentfunctions。—Itisamoreimportantpointwhethertheconfessionoftheaccusedisorisnottobemadeaconditionofpenaljudgement。Theinstitutionofthejury—courtlosessightofthiscondition。Thepointisthatonthisgroundcertaintyiscompletelyinseparablefromtruth：buttheconfessionistoberegardedastheveryacmeofcertainty—givingwhichinitsnatureissubjective。Thefinaldecisionthereforelieswiththeconfession。Tothisthereforetheaccusedhasanabsoluteright，iftheproofistobemadefinalandthejudgestobeconvinced。Nodoubtthisfactorisincomplete，becauseitisonlyonefactor;butstillmoreincompleteistheotherwhennolessabstractlytaken—viz。merecircumstantialevidence。Thejurorsareessentiallyjudgesandpronounceajudgement。Insofar，then，asalltheyhavetogoonaresuchobjectiveproofs，whilstatthesametimetheirdefectofcertainty（incompleteinsofarasitisonlyinthem）

isadmitted，thejury—courtshowstracesofitsbarbaricorigininaconfusionandadmixturebetweenobjectiveproofsandsubjectiveorso—called’moral’conviction。—Itiseasytocallextraordinarypunishmentsanabsurdity;butthefaultliesratherwiththeshallownesswhichtakesoffenceatamerename。Materiallytheprincipleinvolvesthedifferenceofobjectiveprobationaccordingasitgoeswithorwithoutthefactorofabsolutecertificationwhichliesinconfession。

§532。

Thefunctionofjudicialadministrationisonlytoactualisetonecessitytheabstractsideofpersonallibertyincivilsociety。Butthisactualizationrestsatfirstontheparticularsubjectivityofthejudge，sincehereasyetthereisnotfoundthenecessaryunityofitwithrightintheabstract。Conversely，theblindnecessityofthesystemofwantsisnotliftedupintotheconsciousnessoftheuniversal，andworkedfromthatpointofview。

（c）PoliceandCorporation§533。

Judicialadministrationnaturallyhasnoconcernwithsuchpartofactionsandinterestsasbelongsonlytoparticularity，andleavestochancenotonlytheoccurrenceofcrimesbutalsothecareforpublicweal。Incivilsocietythesoleendistosatisfywant—andthat，becauseitisman’swant，inauniformgeneralway，soastosecurethissatisfaction。Butthemachineryofsocialnecessityleavesinmanywaysacasualnessaboutthissatisfaction。Thisisduetothevariabilityofthewantsthemselves，inwhichopinionandsubjectivegood—pleasureplayagreatpart。Itresultsalsofromcircumstancesoflocality，fromtheconnectionsbetweennationandnation，fromerrorsanddeceptionswhichcanbefoisteduponsinglemembersofthesocialcirculationandarecapableofcreatingdisorderinit—asalsoandespeciallyfromtheunequalcapacityofindividualstotakeadvantageofthatgeneralstock。Theonwardmarchofthisnecessityalsosacrificestheveryparticularitiesbywhichitisbroughtabout，anddoesnotitselfcontaintheaffirmativeaimofsecuringthesatisfactionofindividuals。Sofarasconcernsthem，itmaybefarfrombeneficial：yetheretheindividualsarethemorallyjustifiableend。

§534。

Tokeepinviewthisgeneralend，toascertainthewayinwhichthepowerscomposingthatsocialnecessityact，andtheirvariableingredients，andtomaintainthatendinthemandagainstthem，istheworkofaninstitutionwhichassumesononehand，totheconcreteofcivilsociety，thepositionofanexternaluniversality。

Suchanorderactswiththepowerofanexternalstate，which，insofarasitisrootedinthehigherorsubstantialstate，appearsasstate—’police’。Ontheotherhand，inthissphereofparticularitytheonlyrecognitionoftheaimofsubstantialuniversalityandtheonlycarryingofitoutisrestrictedtothebusinessofparticularbranchesandinterests。Thuswehavethecorporation，inwhichtheparticularcitizeninhisprivatecapacityfindsthesecuringofhisstock，whilstatthesametimeheinitemergesfromhissingleprivateinterest，andhasaconsciousactivityforacomparativelyuniversalend，justasinhislegalandprofessionaldutieshehashissocialmorality。

（c）THESTATE

§535。

TheStateistheself—consciousethicalsubstance，theunificationofthefamilyprinciplewiththatofcivilsociety。Thesameunity，whichisinthefamilyasafeelingoflove，isitsessence，receiving，however，atthesametimethroughthesecondprincipleofconsciousandspontaneouslyactivevolitiontheformofconsciousuniversality。Thisuniversalprinciple，withallitsevolutionindetail，istheabsoluteaimandcontentoftheknowingsubject，whichthusidentifiesitselfinitsvolitionwiththesystemofreasonableness。

§536。

Thestateis（a）itsinwardstructureasaself—relatingdevelopment—constitutional（inner—state）law：（b）aparticularindividual，andthereforeinconnectionwithotherparticularindividuals—international（outer—state）law;（c）buttheseparticularmindsareonlystagesinthegeneraldevelopmentofmindinitsactuality：universalhistory。

（a）ConstitutionalLaw§537。

Theessenceofthestateistheuniversal，self—originated，andself—developed—thereasonablespiritofwill;but，asself—knowingandself—actualizing，sheersubjectivity，and—asanactuality—oneindividual。Itsworkgenerally—inrelationtotheextremeofindividualityasthemultitudeofindividuals—consistsinadoublefunction。Firstitmaintainsthemaspersons，thusmakingrightanecessaryactuality，thenitpromotestheirwelfare，whicheachoriginallytakescareofforhimself，butwhichhasathoroughlygeneralside;itprotectsthefamilyandguidescivilsociety。Secondly，itcarriesbackboth，andthewholedispositionandactionoftheindividual—whosetendencyistobecomeacentreofhisown—

intothelifeoftheuniversalsubstance;and，inthisdirection，asafreepoweritinterfereswiththosesubordinatespheresandmaintainstheminsubstantialimmanence。

§538。

Thelawsexpressthespecialprovisionsforobjectivefreedom。First，totheimmediateagent，hisindependentself—willandparticularinterest，theyarerestrictions。But，secondly，theyareanabsolutefinalendandtheuniversalwork：

hencetheyareaproductofthe’functions’ofthevariousorderswhichparcelthemselvesmoreandmoreoutofthegeneralparticularizing，andareafruitofalltheactsandprivateconcernsofindividuals。Thirdly，theyarethesubstanceofthevolitionofindividuals—whichvolitionistherebyfree—andoftheirdisposition：

beingassuchexhibitedascurrentusage。

§539。

Asalivingmind，thestateonlyisasanorganisedwhole，differentiatedintoparticularagencies，which，proceedingfromtheonenotion（thoughnotknownasnotion）ofthereasonablewill，continuallyproduceitastheirresult。Theconstitutionisthisarticulationororganisationofstate—power。Itprovidesforthereasonablewill—insofarasitisintheindividualsonlyimplicitlytheuniversalwill—comingtoaconsciousnessandanunderstandingofitselfandbeingfound;

alsoforthatwillbeingputinactuality，throughtheactionofthegovernmentanditsseveralbranches，andnotlefttoperish，butprotectedbothagainsttheircasualsubjectivityandagainstthatoftheindividuals。Theconstitutionisexistentjustice—theactualityoflibertyinthedevelopmentofallitsreasonableprovisions。

LibertyandEqualityarethesimplerubricsintowhichisfrequentlyconcentratedwhatshouldformthefundamentalprinciple，thefinalaimandresultoftheconstitution。Howevertruethisis，thedefectofthesetermsistheirutterabstractness：ifstucktointhisabstractform，theyareprincipleswhicheitherpreventtheriseoftheconcretenessofthestate，i。e。itsarticulationintoaconstitutionandagovernmentingeneral，ordestroythem。Withthestatetherearisesinequality，thedifferenceofgoverningpowersandofgoverned，magistracies，authorities，directories，etc。Theprincipleofequality，logicallycarriedout，rejectsalldifferences，andthusallowsnosortofpoliticalconditiontoexist。Libertyandequalityareindeedthefoundationofthestate，butasthemostabstractalsothemostsuperficial，andforthatveryreasonnaturallythemostfamiliar。Itisimportantthereforetostudythemcloser。

Asregards，first，Equality，thefamiliarproposition，Allmenarebynatureequal，blundersbyconfusingthe’natural’withthe’notion’。Itoughtrathertoread：Bynaturemenareonlyunequal。

Butthenotionofliberty，asitexistsassuch，withoutfurtherspecificationanddevelopment，isabstractsubjectivity，asapersoncapableofproperty（§488）。Thissingleabstractfeatureofpersonalityconstitutestheactualequalityofhumanbeings。Butthatthisfreedomshouldexist，thatitshouldbeman（andnotasinGreece，Rome，etc。somemen）thatisrecognizedandlegallyregardedasaperson，issolittlebynature，thatitisratheronlyaresultandproductoftheconsciousnessofthedeepestprincipleofmind，andoftheuniversalityandexpansionofthisconsciousness。Thatthecitizensareequalbeforethelawcontainsagreattruth，butwhichsoexpressedisatautology：itonlystatesthatthelegalstatusingeneralexists，thatthelawsrule。But，asregardstheconcrete，thecitizens—besidestheirpersonality—areequalbeforethelawonlyinthesepointswhentheyareotherwiseequaloutsidethelaw。Onlythatequalitywhich（inwhateverwayitbe）they，asithappens，otherwisehaveinproperty，age，physicalstrength，talent，skill，etc。

—orevenincrime，canandoughttomakethemdeserveequaltreatmentbeforethelaw：—onlyitcanmakethem—asregardstaxation，militaryservice，eligibilitytooffice，etc。—punishment，etc。—

equalintheconcrete。Thelawsthemselves，exceptinsofarastheyconcernthatnarrowcircleofpersonality，presupposeunequalconditions，andprovidefortheunequallegaldutiesandappurtenancesresultingtherefrom。

AsregardsLiberty，itisoriginallytakenpartlyinanegativesenseagainstarbitraryintoleranceandlawlesstreatment，partlyintheaffirmativesenseofsubjectivefreedom;butthisfreedomisallowedgreatlatitudebothasregardstheagent’sself—willandactionforhisparticularends，andasregardshisclaimtohaveapersonalintelligenceandapersonalshareingeneralaffairs。Formerlythelegallydefinedrights，privateaswellaspublicrightsofanation，town，etc。werecalledits’liberties’。

Really，everygenuinelawisaliberty：itcontainsareasonableprincipleofobjectivemind;inotherwords，itembodiesaliberty。Nothinghasbecome，onthecontrary，morefamiliarthantheideathateachmustrestricthislibertyinrelationtothelibertyofothers：thatthestateisaconditionofsuchreciprocalrestriction，andthatthelawsarerestrictions。Tosuchhabitsofmindlibertyisviewedasonlycasualgood—pleasureandself—will。Henceithasalsobeensaidthat’modern’nationsareonlysusceptibleofequality，orofequalitymorethanliberty：andthatfornootherreasonthanthat，withanassumeddefinitionofliberty（chieflytheparticipationofallinpoliticalaffairsandactions），itwasimpossibletomakeendsmeetinactuality—whichisatoncemorereasonableandmorepowerfulthanabstractpresuppositions。Onthecontrary，itshouldbesaidthatitisjustthegreatdevelopmentandmaturityofforminmodernstateswhichproducesthesupremeconcreteinequalityofindividualsinactuality：while，throughthedeeperreasonablenessoflawsandthegreaterstabilityofthelegalstate，itgivesrisetogreaterandmorestableliberty，whichitcanwithoutincompatibilityallow。Eventhesuperficialdistinctionofthewordslibertyandequalitypointstothefactthattheformertendstoinequality：whereas，onthecontrary，thecurrentnotionsoflibertyonlycarryusbacktoequality。Butthemorewefortifyliberty，—assecurityofproperty，aspossibilityforeachtodevelopandmakethebestofhistalentsandgoodqualities，themoreitgetstakenforgranted：andthenthesenseandappreciationoflibertyespeciallyturnsinasubjectivedirection。Bythisismeantthelibertytoattemptactiononeveryside，andtothrowoneselfatpleasureinactionforparticularandforgeneralintellectualinterests，theremovalofallchecksontheindividualparticularity，aswellastheinwardlibertyinwhichthesubjecthasprinciples，hasaninsightandconvictionofhisown，andthusgainsmoralindependence。Butthislibertyitselfononehandimpliesthatsupremedifferentiationinwhichmenareunequalandmakethemselvesmoreunequalbyeducation;andonanotheritonlygrowsupunderconditionsofthatobjectiveliberty，andisandcouldgrowtosuchheightonlyinmodernstates。If，withthisdevelopmentofparticularity，therebesimultaneousandendlessincreaseofthenumberofwants，andofthedifficultyofsatisfyingthem，ofthelustofargumentandthefancyofdetectingfaults，withitsinsatiatevanity，itisallbutpartofthatindiscriminatingrelaxationofindividualityinthisspherewhichgeneratesallpossiblecomplications，andmustdealwiththemasitcan。Suchasphereisofcoursealsothefieldofrestrictions，becauselibertyisthereunderthetaintofnaturalself—willandself—pleasing，andhasthereforetorestrictitself：andthat，notmerelywithregardtothenaturalness，self—willandself—conceit，ofothers，butespeciallyandessentiallywithregardtoreasonableliberty。

Thetermpoliticalliberty，however，isoftenusedtomeanformalparticipationinthepublicaffairsofstatebythewillandactionevenofthoseindividualswhootherwisefindtheirchieffunctionintheparticularaimsandbusinessofcivilsociety。Andithasinpartbecomeusualtogivethetitleconstitutiononlytothesideofthestatewhichconcernssuchparticipationoftheseindividualsingeneralaffairs，andtoregardastate，inwhichthisisnotformallydone，asastatewithoutaconstitution。Onthisuseofthetermtheonlythingtoremarkisthatbyconstitutionmustbeunderstoodthedeterminationofrights，i。e。oflibertiesingeneral，andtheorganisationoftheactualizationofthem;andthatpoliticalfreedomintheabovesensecaninanycaseonlyconstituteapartofit。Ofitthefollowingparagraphswillspeak。